oba hiloowlow Posted March 2, 2013 The GOK hoped that the "strong Jubaland," which would result from a successful, Kenyan-backed effort to defeat al-Shabaab in southern Somalia, would "cage in the H-block." http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10ADDISABABA166&q=haji%20jubaland © Summary A TFG-backed Juba offensive, aimed at pushing al-Shabaab out of Kismayo, appears to be moving forward, but competing Ethiopian and/or ******* clan interests could complicate matters. TFG Minister of Defense "Gandi" reports that the TFG is in contact with local players in Juba, including Ras Kamboni leaders Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim Shukri, in an effort to reconcile differences and obtain their cooperation. "Gandi" said President Sharif fully supports the plan, which remains closely held within the TFG. The force in Lower Juba will consist of D-block/Kabalah clan militia but will not include D-block/******* militia from the Gedo region. Madobe appears willing to cooperate with the TFG if Lower Juba's autonomy would be assured. "Gandi" told us that the TFG is in negotiations with the Government of Kenya over support for the plan. Several of our Lower Juba contacts tell us they think some ******* leaders are attempting to confuse the Kenyans by telling them that the ******* have agreed to cooperate with those in Lower Juba in order to take Kismayo. End summary. "Gandi's" Plan -------------- 2. © During an August 15 conversation with the Somalia Unit, TFG Minister of Defense "Gandi" confirmed TFG involvement in an evolving *****/Kabalah/Obsame plan to take Kismayo and consolidate control of Lower Juba (refs a,b). "Gandi" said the TFG in March began to talk to local players in Juba, to include Ras Kamboni leaders Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim Shukri, in an effort to reconcile differences and obtain their cooperation. "Gandi" said that President Sharif fully supports the plan, and that it remains closely held within the TFG. "Gandi" said the offensive must take place before mid-October in order to take advantage of current weather conditions that complicate al-Shabaab's efforts to re-supply through the port of Kismayo. The force in Lower Juba will consist of *****/Kabalah clan militia but will not include *****/******* militia from the Gedo region. Gandi said ******* involvement in the effort to take Kismayo would be "horrible" and stated firmly "the ******* can not go to Kismayo." ****** militia, in cooperation with ******* militia leaders, might go to Gedo to assist ******* militia against al-Shabaab in that region, but "Gandi" said this would be a last resort because of the long-standing tensions between the two ***** subclans. "Gandi" said Ethiopian-backed ******* proxy Barre Hirale and *****/Kabalah/*****/Mojerteen warlord General Morgan are not involved in the TFG's plan in Gedo or Lower Juba. "Gandi" said he had full confidence in Shukri's commitment to the TFG but described Madobe as a "complex" but militarily necessary participant. "Gandi" said that the TFG is in negotiations with the Kenyans regarding support for the plan. He declared that "the Kenyans are ready to help us," but said the plan would move forward with or without Kenyan support (ref c). "Gandi" hoped that AMISOM might be able to provide artillery or aerial support to the offensive. Madobe's Version of Events Reveals ******-Centric Agenda ---------------------------------- 3. © On August 12 Somalia Unit PolOff met Abdi Ali Raghe, a close contact and kinsman of Ahmed Madobe, who had just returned from spending several days with Madobe in the Lower Juba town of Dhobley. Raghe relayed to Poloff Madobe's version of recent events. Approximately six months before Madobe's late-March return to Lower Juba, Ras Kamboni leader Hassan al-Turki orchestrated a power-sharing arrangement for the Kismayo port between al-Shabaab and Ras Kamboni/Hisbul Islam. (Note: Madobe was Governor of Kismayo under the Council of Islamic Courts CIC) and was captured and imprisoned by Ethiopian forces when the CIC fled Kismayo in 2006. He was released from jail after President Sharif interceded on his behalf during his maiden visit to Addis Ababa. Madobe was appointed an MP in Somalia's expanded Parliament in January 2009. He resigned as MP in April 2009 and remained in Lower Juba. End note.) Turki had placed non-****** al-Shabaab in primary leadership positions in Kismayo, forcing ******-clan Ras Kamboni leaders into deputy positions. This suggested to Madobe that Turki's primary NAIROBI 00001732 002 OF 003 allegiance was to al-Shabaab. The Kismayo port agreement called for revenues to be divided, with 30% going to al-Shabaab, 30% to a joint Ras Kamboni/al-Shabaab administration, 30% to Ras Kamboni, and 10% to the Anole group. (Note: The Anole group is a faction of Hisbul Islam comprised of *****/Kabalah/***** militia. End Note.) Ras Kamboni in the end, however, received only about 2% of the revenues over the following months and, as a result, ****** clansmen defected to al-Shabaab. 4. © When Madobe returned to Lower Juba in late-March he was welcomed by ****** clan leaders. At that time, al-Shabaab began a campaign to persuade Turki that Madobe could not be trusted. Al-Shabaab urged Turki not to let Madobe join the Ras Kamboni leadership for three months, arguing that he may have been influenced by Ethiopia while in captivity. For their part, ****** clan elders told Madobe he must put clan interests before relations with al-Shabaab. Madobe subsequently traveled to Kismayo to begin to mobilize support among the subclans. In order to counter al-Shabaab's accusations against him as he worked to mobilize ****** support, Madobe resigned from the TFG. When al-Shabaab in Kismayo began to take the "converted" Ras Kamboni militia to Mogadishu to participate in the May offensive, Madobe's ****** clan complained that al-Shabaab was using ****** militia to ensure safe passage to Mogadishu, then was abandoning them once there. Madobe believed their grievances presented a good opportunity to convince his former militia in Mogadishu to return to Lower Juba for an attack on Kismayo. Madobe claimed that as many as 80% of his supporters have returned to Lower Juba from Mogadishu. After a one month meeting in Afmadow, Ras Kamboni restructured and appointed Madobe its head and Shukri as head of internal affairs. Madobe, Shukri and their allied militias claim to control Afmadow (including Dhobley), Badadee, and west Jilib, and are now in a position to defeat al-Shabaab in Kismayo, Jimaame, and east Jilib. 5. © Madobe reportedly wants to push al-Shabaab out and win leadership of an autonomous Lower Juba linked to the TFG. According to Raghe, Madobe said he does not think the TFG understands Madobe's decision to go to Mogadishu, even though Madobe assured "Gandi" he did not go to Mogadishu to fight the TFG. Raghe told us Madobe would accept a minister position within the TFG, but would demand control of a semi-autonomous Jubaland administration if he stayed in the region after delivering Kismayo. Madobe said he does not want to publicly announce his intention to join or support the government too soon because it would give al-Shabaab propaganda material, but told Raghe that *****/Kabalah clan militia will support his plan to do so once the port is taken and the clan imperative met. Evolving Jubaland Administration Retains Cautious View Of Madobe ----------------------------------- 6. © On August 12 *****/Kabalah clan leaders who had been working toward a would-be Jubaland administration met with PolOff and added nuance to earlier statements about their relationship with Madobe (refs a,b). They said their goal is a regional administration, linked to the TFG. They were willing to have Madobe at its head if he was successful in taking Kismayo. (Note: In earlier comments the same contacts indicated to us that Madobe had already been appointed leader of the evolving Jubaland Administration. End note.) The *****/Kabalah leaders said the day Madobe captures Kismayo he will have to announce that he is part of and/or supports the TFG or he will loose clan support. ****** leaders reportedly believe that ******-led control of Kismayo will translate into greater ****** representation in the TFG at the ministerial level and that political negotiations regarding a greater Jubaland to include Gedo should for now remain unaddressed. Growing Concern Over Ethiopian-Backed ******* Involvement -------------------------------------- 7. © "Gandi" told us he is worried that Ethiopia is giving ammunition and support to Barre Hirale's troops. He said he views recent meetings in Nairobi between General Morgan, Barre Hirale, Ali Gedi and others as dangerous. "Gandi" urged us to explain to Ethiopia that the TFG, like Ethiopia, wishes to counter and defeat al-Shabaab. "Gandi" worried that Ethiopian meddling could undercut the Kismayo offensive. NAIROBI 00001732 003 OF 003 https://dazzlepod.com/cable/09NAIROBI1732/ Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
