Somalia: The S.F.G.’s Strategy of Political Conflict

[xiinfaniin]

By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

 

A confrontation over the form of federalism that a future Somali state would adopt is looming, as confidential sources report that the provisional Somali Federal Government (S.F.G.) is in the process of making a concerted push to control the formation of local, regional, and presumptive regional-state administrations in south-central Somalia.

 

The S.F.G., say the sources, is attempting to resist the early formation of a Jubbaland state in the south that would base itself on a decentralized-federal model, as Puntland has done; head off a similar process to the one in the south in the southwestern Bay and Bakool regions by placing an administration allied to it in charge there; counter the Galmudug authority in the east-central area by backing ex-warlord Abdi Qeybdid against the sitting government; and influence the leadership that will succeed the recently-deceased chair of the Ahlu Sunna wal-Jamaa (A.S.W.J.) movement, Sh. Mohamed Yusuf Hefow, that controls most of the central and east-central regions of Galgadud and Hiiraan. On each of those political fronts, the S.F.G. faces opposition, both locally and nationally by the autonomous state of Puntland, which resists the S.F.G.’s bids for control.

 

The S.F.G.’s Strategy of Political Conflict

 

By adopting a strategy of political conflict in south-central Somalia’s regions, the S.F.G.’s president, Hassan Sh. Mohamud, is attempting to solve his most pressing political problem, which is to establish the S.F.G.’s authority – dominance and control – over those regions. In the process of trying to do so, Mohamud is forcing the issue of what the state-form of Somalia will be. The options have narrowed down to two, a centralized federalism favored by the S.F.G. and its allies, and a decentralized federalism advocated by Puntland and its allies. The core political conflict in Somalia is between the S.F.G. and Puntland over state-form; the south-central regions are the arenas in which that conflict is being played out. Both the S.F.G. and Puntland are aware of the high stakes involved in their confrontation; if the S.F.G. prevails in the south-central regions, Puntland will be politically isolated and subject to pressure to abandon its autonomy, which gives it generous control over its natural resources and security policy; if Puntland is able to block the S.F.G., the latter will have had to cede significant authority over nascent regional states. The S.F.G.’s pursuit of a strategy of political conflict has turned a constitutional issue into a political power struggle.

 

Whether or not the S.F.G.’s strategy succeeds – and its success is highly problematic – that strategy is intelligible and follows from the power position of the S.F.G. The new federal government was to all intents and purposes imposed by the Western “donor”-powers/U.N. under veiled and explicit threats to withdraw financial support. The “donor”-powers wanted a “permanent” government established in Somalia so that they could decrease their commitment to the country and at the same time make agreements favorable to them with it. In pursuing those aims, they ended up settling for a provisional/interim entity operating under an incomplete constitution that left the fundamental question of state-form open; absent from the constitution was a determination of centralized or decentralized federalism, and there were not yet regional states set up in south-central Somalia.

 

As a result of the “donor”-powers’ actions, the S.F.G. was left with the challenge of establishing its authority in the south-central regions without a constitutional basis, scant resources to buy allies in the regions, and military forces that did not extend beyond the capital Mogadishu. Under those constraints, the S.F.G. had few options; it could renounce the attempt to control the south-central regions and allow those regions substantial autonomy, which would weaken whatever (potential) power it might have; or it could do what it has chosen to do, which is to contest the forces for decentralized federalism region by region by allying with factions in each region that felt marginalized by nascent autonomous administrations with power bases independent of the S.F.G. The new federal government opted for the latter, which set up the conditions for political conflict. A source reports that the strategy of political conflict was urged upon Hassan by his inner circle of advisers from his Damul Jadid movement.

 

 

Read on:

http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_The_S_F_G_s_Strategy_of_Political_Conflict.shtml

[xiinfaniin]

The Status of the Conflict

 

It is too early in the conflict over the state-form that Somalia will/might take to make a grounded prediction about its outcomes. The S.F.G. has only attempted to implement its strategy of political conflict in earnest since the return of Hassan to Mogadishu in mid-February from his round of visits to the external actors with interests in Somalia. Having touched base and gotten promises of support, Hassan had to try to “deliver” on his end of the bargain, showing that he led a (potentially) effective government.

 

Hassan’s most important political front, which demands his immediate attention, is the south, where a convention is slated to be held on February 23 to form a Jubbaland state comprising the Lower and Middle Jubba regions and the Gedo region. Approximately 500 delegates, including elders from the three regions are expected to attend, with the S.F.G. and regional states (Ethiopia and Kenya) as observers. Up until the present, it has appeared that the Jubbaland process would issue in a regional state modeled on Puntland. The S.F.G. will try to reverse that outcome.

 

According to one source, Hassan’s strategy has found willing supporters among sub-clans in the south that feel disadvantaged by the dominance of Ahmed Madobe, the interim governor in Kismayo, and his Ras Kamboni militia, which is allied with Kenyan forces in the south and is mainly composed of members of the Mohamed Suber sub-clan of the ******-*****. That leaves other ****** sub-clans, the *********-***** (with ties to Puntland), and the *******-***** more or less disposed to thwart any attempt by Madobe to dominate the Jubbaland state.

 

Another source confirms open-source reports that ex-warlord and ******* leader, Barre Hirale, has met with Hassan and is “on good terms with the S.F.G.” The source says that the ******* will “listen to Hirale if he is empowered.” Meanwhile, on February 13, Garoweonline reported that a delegation whose members are involved in forming a Jubbaland state met with Puntland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, to discuss how “Puntland’s efforts to establish [the] Jubbalnad state could be improved.” On February 15, Garoweonline reported that Hassan and the S.F.G.’s prime minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, who is *******, had split on the Jubbaland issue, with Shirdon supporting the ongoing process and Hassan attempting to undermine it.

[xiinfaniin]

Assessment

One of the sources contributing to this analysis has put the S.F.G.’s/Hassan’s strategy of political conflict succinctly and precisely: Hassan is attempting to isolate some leaders and factions in each region and to empower others favorable to him. In doing so, Hassan is splitting each region politically, intervening in local conflicts and exacerbating them, and working with whoever will ally with him for whatever reason, whether it be ex-warlords, dissident clans, or factions within a movement. That is the familiar strategy of divide-and-rule, which is used by actors who cannot (Hassan) or do not want to expend the military and/or financial resources required to control the outcome of a conflict.

Hassan is playing the divide-and-rule game to extend the authority of the S.F.G. into the south-central regions, but in doing so he is carrying with him the program of centralized federalism. Puntland has yet to play its hand overtly, but it can be expected to do so if it appears that the centralized-federalist project is gaining traction and momentum. Since Hassan’s strategy necessitates opposition to its implementation by the forces that he is attempting to isolate, as it has done in each case, the path is open not only to confrontation at the local level and the re-activation of H.S.M., but to counter-moves by Puntland.

 

It is too early to predict whether or not Hassan will be successful, but it can be said that a political battle is looming that will overshadow all other political issues in the territories of post-independence Somalia.

 

Hassan’s strategy is obviously high risk and high stakes. In his best-case scenario, Hassan prevails in each south-central region and Puntland is faced with the option of compromising its autonomy or separating from south-central Somalia. Short of the best case for Hassan, “Somalia” becomes irretrievably fragmented and balkanized, or its territories become a mixture of uncoordinated regional and local forms of administration.

 

It is unclear whether or not the “donor”-powers understand what is happening in Somali domestic politics and, if they do, whether they are prepared to intervene and in what way. That the “donor”-powers will act decisively to try to prevent political breakdown is unlikely. The United States, for example, was prepared to support the S.F.G.’s request to have the United Nations arms embargo on it lifted, but then backtracked after European opposition and stated that it would wait for the completion of a U.N. “review” of the desirability of taking such action. The U.S. backtrack was a blow to the S.F.G., which had expected more robust support when the U.S. recognized it.

 

As it stands, no actor, external or domestic, is working to avoid the impending confrontation. There is no formal process of reconciliation underway. The discourse of Somali political actors and intellectuals is not addressing the issue directly or, in some cases, at all. The external actors are silent about it. At the point at which the conflict intensifies to the degree that it is impossible for actors to ignore it, it is likely that it will be too late to resolve; this analysis is simply an early warning.

[nuune]

From the beginning, when everyone was cheering for this guy, I wasn't, and I was never a supportive of this man and his policies be it Somaliland, Jubbaland, Puntland and the world, one interview I listened to about him way before he was elected was enough for me not to even mention him, I have observed that he is short-sighted and needs a little bit of that jug(Af Soomaali jug like baabuurka jugda ku kaco), but there is still hope, and I hope that his advisors if he got series advisors to give him a lesson concerning all dimensions of Somali politics.

 

 

President Hassan needs to save his image, and build a national image that sees him as the man for the job, this is what everyone sees in him from the beginning, but he needs to improve a lot in how he handles and does his job.

[xiinfaniin]

^nuune,

 

My candidate was defeated in that election after almost everyone decided to oppose him. Sharif had many weak points but he was not a USC or clannish. He was a man with religuos background and had a very diverse team whom he respected their advise and input. Because of him Somalia was able to complete the roadmap.

 

What we now got is clearly a regressive leader with revisionist political agenda that will take Somalia back to its reer hebel vs reer hebel days. But he has no clothes and his policies are backfiring precisely because he lacked the patience to bare his teeth at the right time.

[xiinfaniin]

Hassan is attempting to isolate some leaders and factions in each region and to empower others favorable to him. In doing so, Hassan is splitting each region politically, intervening in local conflicts and exacerbating them, and working with whoever will ally with him for whatever reason, whether it be ex-warlords, dissident clans, or factions within a movement. That is the familiar strategy of divide-and-rule, which is used by actors who cannot (Hassan) or do not want to expend the military and/or financial resources required to control the outcome of a conflict.

 

This explains why he sent a ministerial delegates after a minor security incident while failing to respond an official invitation to come to Kismayo and witness the commencement of Jubbaland conference.

[xiinfaniin]

^^It looks that way.

 

But I really think we shall overcome this little roadblock this persident seems to be planning to abort what has been agreed in Mogadishu as the result of the road map. I just cannot see him succeed in doing what he is transparently doing. I was in the school of 'give-the-president-a -chance' to share his strategies in moving the country forward.

 

But obviously I have been had. But it is not too late to oppose this shortsighted man

 

PS. this makes our Mooge of SOL a man who knows what he is talking about, most of the time that is

[Mintid Farayar]

Oodweyne;922020 wrote:

Very interesting analysis particularly the endless divide and rule strategy. It seems somalis are cursed never to learn from their miserable and multi generational failed politics. It is pity really.

Oodka, there's a lot of sense to what the Professor writes. But this too must be taken with a grain of salt as well. The good Professor seems to only get 'Garowe Online' translations on Somali happenings (if you read between the lines). This is the Puntland-centric world he lives in

 

i.e. he writes:

"On each of those political fronts, the S.F.G. faces opposition, both locally and nationally by the autonomous state of Puntland, which resists the S.F.G.’s bids for control.

 

"The core political conflict in Somalia is between the S.F.G. and Puntland over state-form; the south-central regions are the arenas in which that conflict is being played out."

 

"It is too early to predict whether or not Hassan will be successful, but it can be said that a political battle is looming that will overshadow all other political issues in the territories of post-independence Somalia."

 

All his quoted sources are 'Garowe Online', surprise, surprise...

 

Now I'm torn in deciding which is which:

 

A) The Professor has been hoodwinked by the self-absorption of the Faroole brothers into thinking a far bigger conflict with many various players is simply a 'titanic battle between Puntland and Hassan's gov't'...

 

or

 

B) The Professor is correct in his assessment: Madoobe & Abtigiis' troops are simple cannon fodder to be used for the larger political ambitions of the Puntland crowd in their quest to get a more preferable share of the Mogadishu pie...

 

Which is it, Oodweyne? I'm just so conflicted

[Mintid Farayar]

Way nakaa!

[N.O.R.F]

Dee naga daaya

[xiinfaniin]

^^I guess it is that time of the year when our Northern brothers see Puntland everywhere

 

Mintid as always is trying to muddle the narrative. Puntland being the only effective political entity outside of Mogadishu is indeed a decisive factor in this fight. That it supports the Jubbaland initiative does only mean Puntland is an ally with it and welcomes the fact that if Jubbaland takes off, the federal vision of Somalia becomes irreversible political reality.

 

As far as Gedo folks go, they are indeed supportive of this initiative. The Egad created Jubbaland committee is five members , two of the five are from Gedo (General Looyan and Aw Libax). Hassan is dreaming if he is counting on Gedo folks doing his bid to abort federalism.

[Baashi]

Kismayo is ground zero of Somalia's ever-shifting political chess game. Puntland is not in the driver seat here (mighty OG is) and anyone who tells you otherwise is a novice and uninformed lay person (in the clannish realpolitik sense). The most astute players in this chess game are Killinka 5aad's Iley and Kenya's OG top echelon Somali elites.

 

Thanks to Professor Gandi ground game, Jigjiga, Garrisa, Garbahareey and Garowe are on the same page on creating a new federal member state in most resourceful region of the Somali peninsula. As Oodweyne correctly guessed Caabudwaaq has to make its mind and very soon at that or else they will be forever be locked in the Wallaalaha Galgaduud alliance.

[xiinfaniin]

^^OG baa libinta siyaasadeed loo diidanyahay.

 

Kan Mintid ayaan dhaweyd oo Ina Illey fajaasay oo gaashaamo ugu tegay buu weli ka caraysanyahay oo goconayaa

[Baashi]

Nimanaan dhulka Ganaane iyo sida loo kala dego aqoon baa hadaaqa ceynkaas oo kale ah ka soo yeeri kadhaa. Awoowe hadii Suldaan inala joogi lahaa Dharbaaxa jinni gabaygiis buu noo tirin lahaa:

 

Dayfkii reerka martiyey ee daacadu soortay,

Ee goortii u dibaray, maalka reerka kula dooday,

Kamay duwana tay wadaan nimanka D**ood e,

 

Dooda abwaanku waaba ka shisheeysay nimanka tay wadaan oo issagu waxa uu lahaa dooxada Ganaane ha joogtee, Gedo baysan ba degin

[Mintid Farayar]

xiinfaniin;922036 wrote:

^^I guess it is that time of the year when our Northern brothers see Puntland everywhere

 

Mintid as always is trying to muddle the narrative. Puntland being the only effective political entity outside of Mogadishu is indeed a decisive factor in this fight.

That it supports the Jubbaland initiative does only mean Puntland is an ally with it and welcomes the fact that if Jubbaland takes off, the federal vision of Somalia becomes irreversible political reality.

 

As far as Gedo folks go, they are indeed supportive of this initiative. The Egad created Jubbaland committee is five members , two of the five are from Gedo (General Looyan and Aw Libax). Hassan is dreaming if he is counting on Gedo folks doing his bid to abort federalism.

yet in Nov.2011, you were singing from a different tune (appreciation to Ngonge for his elephant-like memory in reposting):

 

xiinfaniin;754737 wrote:

^^

The 'disgruntled groups' you are speaking of are tools of Kenyan scheme. They are taken by Kenya's promise of political dominance in the region.

So for Sharif to put efforts in wining them back to his column would be a futile thing to do.

 

Somalis of all walks of life have deep roots in Kenya. It is even astonishing that Sharif got the courage to oppose Kenyan invasion given Kenya's overreaching influence on the lives of millions of Somalis, Sharif included.

 

According to Daily Nation, Kenya is attempting to reach some sort of compromise with TFG (Sharif) and calm things down a bit.

But even if Sharif is bought back by Kenya, the damage is already done and one of the casualty of this invasion will be the TFG itself. And that throws Somalia's political road map into real disarray.

 

I'm just so conflicted.... Which viewpoint is true??