Mogadishu based think-tank HIPS [Heritage Institute for Policy Studies] first policy breifing...

[Daqane]

The U.S. Recognition of Somalia:

Implications and the Way Forward

 

The U.S. recognition of the Somali government on 17 January 2013 is a great

and timely opportunity that could contribute to Somalia’s effort to retake its

rightful place among community of nations. In the two decades Somalia took

hiatus from the international scene, many opportunities that could have helped

Somalia shed the ‘failed state’ designation appeared and vanished with the same

speed. Thus, it’s up to the Somali government (and citizens) to ensure the U.S.

recognition does not turn out, yet again, another squandered opportunity. More

importantly, the government must compliment the international diplomatic

successes with tangible domestic achievements anchored in the president’s sixpillar

policy.

More broadly, Somalis need to properly understand what, exactly, the U.S.

recognition entails, what opportunities it avails as well as what challenges are

embedded with it. In doing so, they must be guided by the cardinal truth of

international relations; that foreign policy decisions are always made to advance

national interests. From the outset, therefore, the U.S. recognition should be

seen as an outcome of strategic calculations, which reflect that it’s in the best

interest of the United States to recognize Somalia at this particular time. It

should not be, under any circumstance, viewed as a favor to the war weary

Somalis.

What Somali politicians and citizens should have been euphoric about is NOT

the recognition itself - as the case has been - but the fact that that in the eyes of

United States, Somalia’s fortunes have improved so well that the U.S.

government wants to recognize it. Somalis should also be very conscious that

interactions between states are entirely a give and take process. It is the

responsibility of national leaders to defend nation’s interests against those of

partners, who at times have more leverages and negotiation powers, as clearly

the case currently is between Somalia and the U.S. Moreover, one missing

question that should have piqued the public’s curiosity and at the same time

generated serious media interest is what has the Somali government give in or

give up in exchange for the official U.S. diplomatic recognition. The fact that

the recognition coincided with the resignation of Somalia’s Special Envoy to the

U.S., Abukar Arman, raises more questions about the internal deliberations of

the new government. The departure of the key Somali interlocutor amid the

most important recognition in what he described as “misunderstanding” over

policy issues is interesting.

 

That said, the price paid by the Somali government for the recognition was not

too steep. However, the absence of any serious discussions about the reality of

give-and-take based foreign policy was noticeable. Understandably, the Somali

government was too jubilant about the recognition, but it seemed to have

placed high premiums on the symbolisms of president Hassan Sheikh’s brief

encounter with President Barack Obama. A key challenge now is how to

capitalize on the U.S. recognition. This requires putting the issue in context,

outlining possible opportunities and drawing attention to potential blind spots.

The Context

Contrary to the assertions of Somali government officials, the recognition was

neither triggered by policies (such as the formation of small cabinet) nor

personalities (the ascendance of three civil society leaders). Instead, it was a

logical conclusion and culmination of a decade-long international and U.S.

efforts to bring stability and give legitimacy to Somalia’s nascent national

institutions. In strict legal terms, the United States has always recognized the

Somali state as a contiguous nation in the Horn of Africa. It’s only now

recognizing the legitimacy of the new government of that state. Having played a

prominent role in the process that ended the dysfunctional transitional

governance that ushered in fragile yet semi-permanent national institutions, the

U.S. government would have recognized any post transition entity. For over a

decade, the U.S. was looking into Somalia through the prisms of counterterrorism

and the need to contain and combat al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab

fighters. Similarly, the problems of piracy off the Somalia coast as well as the

need for a constant international intervention on Somalia’s recurring

humanitarian crises made Somalia a constant fixture on U.S. foreign policy.

 

Opportunities

By appearance and practice, United States’ attitude and interactions with

Somalia was antithesis to the accepted norms of state-to-state relations. The U.S.

practiced what it termed as the “Dual Track Policy” which essentially meant

dealing with sub-national entities notwithstanding the central government.

Given the limited territorial control of the Mogadishu-based Federal

Government, that policy will likely continue in one form or another. Still the

official recognition has the appearance of a paradigm shift and the emergence

of a partnership, however titled. On the other hand, the U.S. recognition boosts

the prospect of national unity and deals a big blow to the biggest national

security threat Somalia faced in the past twenty years – the breakup of the

country. The significance of the U.S. recognition was not lost to the advocates

of Somaliland separation as both the government and opposition groups noted it

as a major setback to their aspirations.

 

The U.S. recognition enables the Somali government to reopen its diplomatic

mission in Washington. This will facilitate the government’s bid to make its case

to array of power centers within the U.S. government, media and other opinion

makers. Recognition also opens up direct U.S. government assistance and at the

same time bestows further credibility in the eyes of other international donors.

With U.S. recognition, prospects to tap into international financial institutions,

such as the World Bank and the IMF, improve markedly.

 

Crucially, President Hassan Sheikh’s government can use the U.S. recognition

as a leverage against the adventurist and scheming strategies of the neighboring

countries who often misled the American policy towards Somalia. Many other

states will no longer see Somalia as a source of terror, pirates and refugees but

an untapped economic frontier and a country requiring major reconstruction.

The more other countries establish relations, the more the manipulations of the

regional actors decrease, giving Somalia leverages and tools to negotiate

effectively and advance its strategic national interests.

 

There’s no doubt that the Turkish model—where Ankara sees Somalia not as an

irredeemable and failed state but as a friend in need with full potential—greatly

affected many countries’ calculations, including the timing of the U.S.

recognition. Although it’s the newest country to intervene in Somalia, Turkey is

one of Somalia’s most influential partners and perhaps best strategically

positioned to benefit any reconstruction boom as well as exploitation of the

country’s untapped natural resources. With a modest financial aid and an

unprecedented diplomatic engagement, Turkey won the hearts and minds of the

Somali people in an extraordinary and unrivalled manner. The U.S., which

invested millions of dollars in the African Union’s peacekeeping mission that

essentially defeated al-Shabaab, had hoped to get even a fraction of the

immense goodwill that Turkey has. Most probably, the U.S. government

concluded that Turkey set the trend and the only way it could catch up or get

parity is to follow suit the Turkish model and establish visible, bilateral and

direct relations

 

Given the aggressive Chinese and European oil interests in the region, the

activities by upstart oil firms in certain Somali regions such as Puntland and

Turkey’s strategic and strong presence on the ground, it’s not surprising that the

U.S. sought be in the right place at the right time.

 

Finally the U.S. recognition reinforces the already prevailing optimism among

the Somali people and international partners. It was with the U.S. departure

after the Black Hawk Down incident in October 1993 that made “stay away

from Somalia” the standard international norm. Now, with the United States

forging a new partnership, others have already begun rolling the red carpet for

the Somali president. Many educated Somalis who hitherto were avoiding

returning home are coming back in droves to be part of the recovery phase.

There has also been an exodus of Somali refugees and businesspeople selfrepatriating

from Kenya. With a robust international diplomatic presence, what

is happening inside Somalia becomes more transparent, forcing the government

to be more accountable, more democratic and eventually more responsive to

the needs of its citizens.

[Daqane]

Possible Complications

 

Whether the U.S. recognition yields any of the aforementioned benefits depends

largely on

on how the Somali government and its people capitalize on this

opportunity and how they manage (or mismanage) their internal affairs. In the

past, Somali politicians never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

While more credible politicians lead this government, the possibility of

squandering this opportunity is still there. Frivolous intra Somali disputes could

render the jubilation surrounding the U.S. diplomatic recognition as

unremarkable event with insignificant strategic value. The list of issues and

actors that could act as a source of conflict are too long to list, but include:

conflict within the institutions and leaders of the current fragile Federal

Government, flare-up between the center and the regions such Puntland or

Jubbaland, conflict between the Somali government and the neighboring

countries.

More importantly, if the U.S. recognition leads to Somali institutional arrogance

and intransigence that upsets the tribal, traditional and regional equilibrium, it

could erode the diplomatic gains made. Disgruntled stakeholders could easily

up the ante and force change of policy, perception or both. Similarly, if the

Somali government misreads its substantive power vis-à-vis the regional

countries, it could lead to deterioration of security and revival of al-Shabaab. It’s

the military muscle of the neighbors that is largely responsible for the impressive

and ongoing security gains as well as the government’s capacity to provide

services and build institutions.

A telling example of how the U.S. recognition could produce unexpected

complications could be seen in the relations between Somalia and Somaliland.

Before the recognition, a promising rapprochement was in the making between

the two sides. That’s now hanging in the balance. Bargaining powers and

perceptions changed dramatically and positivism and preference for

compromise give way to blame game and pessimistic outlook. A situation as

delicate as mending a fractural republic, a simple miscalculation,

miscommunication or misreading of implications of the U.S. recognition or the

intentions of counterpart may easily ruin the prospect for negotiated settlement.

Conclusion

The U.S. recognition of the Somali government is a significant diplomatic

success that gives the new administration much-needed leverage to engage

other external actors. It could also open the door for major international

investment in the reconstruction of Somalia. But the new government must

capitalize on this opportunity by complimenting it with achievements at the

domestic front. The new government should address legitimate grievances of

regional administrations, local actors, and must move forward with institutional

building, anchored in president Hassan Sheikh’s six-pillar policy. For its part,

 

the United States must translate its recognition into tangible bilateral support for

Somali institutions and for the private sector.

Recommendations

 

To the Somali government:

 Compliment the international recognitions with domestic legitimacy by

engaging local actors, accommodating all stakeholders, resolving

outstanding grievances, working toward compromises and building state

institutions that can dismantle corruption syndicates, terrorist groups and

piracy outfits.

 Assemble and assign the international relations portfolio with a

competent, credible and inclusive team that can sort out the competing

interests of other countries and articulate the strategic Somali national

interests.

 Share the benefits of the diplomatic achievements with domestic

stakeholders, including regional administrations, and extend the domain

of the government beyond Mogadishu.

 Encourage pluralism by engaging all sectors of the Somali elite by

drawing on their experiences and tapping into their knowledge to chart a

national vision forward.

To citizens and regional authorities:

 Support the Federal Government’s diplomatic success by paying taxes

(particularly the business community) and cooperating with national

institutions

 Hold the Federal Government accountable to the letter of the

Constitution and ensure that national resources are shared equally.

 Align your regional priorities with the vital national interests, and ensure

that the Federal Government is informed of your external activities.

To the U.S. and international partners:

 Compliment your recognition with tangible bilateral support for the Somali

national institutions as well as the private sector by easing your restrictive

regulatory regime on the business community, particularly the remittance

companies.

Reopen your embassy in Mogadishu as soon as feasible, and ensure that you

engage the Somali government as an equal partner that has its own vital

interests and strategic allies.

 Lobby for a gradual end to the arms embargo on Somalia, as suggested

by the UN chief Ban Ki-Moon, so that the Federal Government can take

a qualitative monopoly on the instruments of legitimate violence

 Pressure your allies in the Horn of Africa region to support the Somali

government

[Somalia]

HAG has rebranded its name, good to know.

[Haatu]

For heavens sake! Horta, what was that app that genius kid made that shortened down long articles into a paragraph?

[Mintid Farayar]

A very interesting piece...

 

I don't see the need to shorten the policy paper. It's actually well laid out and presents an interesting take on the complete situation as well as broad strategies to move forward for the Mogadishu gov't.

 

The question is where did this 'Think-Tank' come from? Who's behind it/membership? Who is it funded by???

 

The answers to these questions might shed some light on some significant shifts occurring in the Somali power sphere...

[xiinfaniin]

Where did they publish the policy paper? Daqane's email?

 

Source please.

[Mintid Farayar]

xiinfaniin;915678 wrote:

Where did they publish the policy paper? Daqane's email?

 

Source please.

http://www.heritageinstitute.org/index.php/sample-sites/policy-briefing

 

It's well funded by Somali standards but I'm not ready to spill the beans as to who's behind it

[xiinfaniin]

^^Thanks for the link , Mintid.

 

I read it and I agree this is a measured piece.

[Mooge]

recommendations: Lobby for a gradual end to the arms embargo on Somalia, as suggested

by the UN chief Ban Ki-Moon, so that the Federal Government can take

a qualitative monopoly on the instruments of legitimate violence

lool. spectacular failure of thought there.

[Daqane]

Hey minitid is there another conspiracy theory behind HIPS that I do not know about:D since we are Somalis probably there is, I think all the info is in the public domain walaal http://www.heritageinstitute.org/.

 

I am just glad that there finally is an indigenous think tank with the intellectual firepower to present the somali case, I am sure am not the only one who was exasperated by the like of pham and weinstein being the only source of pontification on Somali affairs.

[Haatu]

What I don't understand is what purpose think tanks serve. What is the benefit in them? A bunch of men/women commentating on things - how does that solve anything?

[Daqane]

loool Haatu your not yet sixth form education is beginning to show

[Mintid Farayar]

^^^ Daqane, Just remember you heard right here on SOL first&who you first heard it from

 

If you've read my previous statements on Somali-related events(as opposed to theories - I usually differentiate between the two), you would realize 'conspiracy' is a hasty accusation. Unfortunately, I'm not at liberty to currently spill the beans but it will become clear in due time. There are enough enterprising opponents to happenings in Mogadishu performing due diligence on current events - they will unearth the financial lifeline and puppetmaster of this new entity soon enough. I don't belong to that group so I choose not to divulge the information for the time being.

 

I'm currently ambivalent on this 'think tank' - don't oppose it, don't support it - it's far too early to make a decision on that score. But let me flesh somethings out for you....

 

Let's assume the professional Somalis associated with this project are doing it out of 'love of country and people' with no expectation of wages. But you also have (extracted directly from the Somali Heritage website):

 

Mary Harper is a public policy fellow with the Heritage Institute and the Africa Editor of the BBC World Service. She has reported on Africa for the past twenty years, and has a special interest in Somalia. She has reported frequently from the country, covering conflict, piracy, Islamism and other subjects. Mary is the author of “Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State.” She has reported from many other African conflict zones, including Sudan, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Algeria. She has written for several publications including The Economist, Granta, The Guardian, The Times and The Washington Post.

 

 

Dr. Laura Hammond is a development policy fellow with Heritage Institute and a senior lecturer at the University of London at SOAS. Her research interests include food security, conflict, forced migration and diasporas. She has worked in the Horn of Africa for the past fifteen years, and has done consultancy for a wide range of development and humanitarian organizations, including UNDP, USAID, Oxfam, Medécins Sans Frontières, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the World Food Programme. She is the author of “This Place Will Become Home: Refugee Repatriation to Ethiopia”

 

 

Jason Mosley is a public policy fellow at Heritage Institute and an Associate Fellow of the Africa Programme at Chatham House, and a Research Associate at the African Studies Centre of Oxford University. He is also the Managing Editor of the Journal of Eastern African Studies. Jason’s main geographical interests are in the greater Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region and Nigeria. He is interested in the politics of ethnicity, and of religion -- particularly of Islam -- in these and other areas. Jason regularly analyses the expanding economic horizons of Africa broadly speaking, and particularly in terms of the growing consumer base, and the investment opportunities outside traditional sectors of resource extraction and primary commodity production

 

 

Now currently in Mogadishu, the Federal Gov't(with all the port and airport proceeds under its control) doesn't have the capacity to fund each ministry with at least 5 competent staff members with world-class credentials yet a mysterious 'policy group' has the ability to draw in Western professionals with advanced careers. Come on, let's get serious here!

 

Must I spell everything out for you....

 

BTW, the initial funding is currently below the $5 Million mark, but will be increased by the outside source(s) if the project shows signs of success within the first 12 months.

[Daqane]

Mayaa brother minitid when I said conspiracy I did not mean it in a bad way just how Somalis have parallel universe explanations for every thing.

 

Please continue with your explanation, I know how fellowships work and I know something of the legwork Abdi Aynte put into setting this project up, lakiin I want you to finish your thoughts because am eager to hear...as you I am neutral, I am just happy that there is a different well organized voice in the discourse walaal.

[AYOUB]

Mintid Farayar;915685 wrote:

http://www.heritageinstitute.org/index.php/sample-sites/policy-briefing

 

It's well funded by Somali standards but I'm not ready to spill the beans as to who's behind it

Must be funded by that girl that sings "hips don't lie".