Somalia: The Structural Weakness of the Provisional Government

[Che -Guevara]

29 Dec 29, 2012 - 11:42:33 AM

 

By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

 

Closed-source intelligence provides the basis for explaining the lack of progress that “Somalia’s” new provisional federal government (p.f.g.) has thusfar made in establishing effective governance.

 

A source from Mogadishu reports on the relations between the Western “donor”-powers/United Nations/AMISOM and the p.f.g.; and a source from the West reports on the relations within the p.f.g. and between the p.f.g. and other Somali political factions. Taken together, the sources describe the weakness of the p.f.g. that is responsible for the government’s ineffectiveness. The analysis that can be derived from the intelligence centers on a fundamental problem of power distribution faced by the p.f.g. that renders it incapable of effective action; that is, lack of progress by the p.f.g. is not due to defects in leadership, but to its position in a configuration of power that defines the conjuncture of actors with interests in Somalia.

 

The following discussion will begin with the analysis and then employ the intelligence to illustrate it.

 

The p.f.g. Pulled Apart

 

The great mistake of many Somali intellectuals and activists, when they criticize the p.f.g., and argue that its president, Hassan sh. Mohamoud, is incompetent, non-inclusive, or power-hungry, is to isolate the p.f.g., taking it out of its context in a power configuration. Any or all of the accusations against Hassan might or might not be true, but they might not have a decisive impact on the p.f.g.’s (in)effectiveness, if the p.f.g. has already been rendered ineffective by other more important factors.

 

The p.f.g. is a weak actor in a power configuration in which it is pulled by the proxy-chain presided over by the “donor”-powers, which hold the purse strings and bankroll AMISOM, and pulled into the fragmented clan, local, and regional conflicts of Somali politics. A government that cannot support itself and cannot exert control over the territory that it is supposed to govern can be called a “permanent” government for the purposes of international convenience, but it is sovereign only in a restricted legal sense and not I actuality.

 

How can a government provide security and deliver services if it depends on external actors to finance it and those actors are not giving it the resources to perform its basic functions? How can a government govern if its authority is actively disputed within its supposed territory and the very form of its political system has not been determined? The p.f.g. is financially starved from without and contested from within. What can it be expected to do? Political outcomes in “Somalia” are not under the p.f.g.’s control, but are resultants of the play between external actors, the p.f.g., and domestic factions. Critics of Hassan and the p.f.g. should ask themselves if any leader could be effective in such a power distribution. It is the easiest thing to blame leadership as a deflection from the unwillingness or inability to address more serious and less tractable structural conditions, which is not, of course, to say that Hassan is a strong leader.

 

The p.f.g. is like Gulliver in Jonathon Swift’s novel, confronting both Brobdingnagian giants and Lilliputian dwarfs – and both are equally destructive.

 

The Pull from Without

 

The intelligence from Mogadishu provides an inside look at the tensions and struggles between the “donor”-powers/UN and the p.f.g.

 

The source reports on a meeting in Mogadishu between the “donor”-powers/UN and the p.f.g. over control of the funds that the “donor”-powers are preparing to give to the p.f.g. The meeting ended without resolution because the p.f.g. demanded that it control the aid, and the “donor”-powers said that the aid would not be forthcoming unless the p.f.g. availed itself of “donor”-power “expertise.” The U.N.’s deputy special representative, Peter de Clercq, is reported to have said that the p.f.g. could not work “side by side” with the “donor”-powers and would need outside “expertise” for the next twenty years.

 

According to the source, the “donor”-powers’ position has led to outside N.G.O.s flooding into and setting up shop in Mogadishu with the aim of getting contracts for projects covering the normal functioning of government. Meanwhile, the p.f.g. has been financially starved, a condition that will persist at least until the tug of war between the “donor”-powers and p.f.g. ends; and probably beyond then.

 

The source reports that parliamentary speaker, Mohamed sh. Osman Jawari, has complained that money has not been provided to pay the salaries of members of parliament. The speaker has stated the problem succinctly: “We can’t do anything without money.” Expressing his frustration, Jawari wonders how it will be possible for the p.f.g. to “compromise” with the “donor”-powers.

 

The source adds that Somalia’s central bank is unable to function effectively because it does not have the $110,000.00 to pay for essential software and does not even have machines for identifying counterfeit money or even for counting bills.

 

The tensions between the “donor”-powers and the p.f.g. came out in the open on December 23 when p.f.g. minister for social affairs, Maryan Qasim Aweys, held a press conference, reported by Garoweonline, at which she said: “The Somali Federal Government wants to see new changes and expects all international agencies to present their plans and consult with the Somali Federal Government prior to aid operations in the country.” Henceforth, said the minister, aid agencies would operate under the oversight of the p.f.g. and would be required to “match the expectations designed by the Somali Federal Government.”

 

Given the source’s assessment, it is not likely that the p.f.g.’s demands will be met by the “donor”-powers/UN. Minister Qasim’s statement is part of the tug of war and shows that the struggle is getting out of hand. The p.f.g. is attempting to resist the pull from the “donor”-powers to make it a trusteeship entity. Aside from any other interests that the “donor”-powers have, they do not trust the p.f.g. with their money because they do not consider it to be competent and resistant to corruption. Similar tensions hobbled preceding Somali transitional administrations; nothing has changed for the new “permanent”/provisional government.

[Che -Guevara]

The Pull From Within

 

As the p.f.g. attempts to secure funds and some control over their use, the Western source reports that “local issues are keeping the president busy.” In particular, according to the source, the administration of the south (Gedo and the Jubba regions) is viewed as a “life and death” issue by Hassan.

 

The p.f.g. has taken the position that any administration for the southern regions should be approved by the p.f.g., whereas the factions in the south that are participating in the process of forming a “Jubbaland” state, under the aegis of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.), insist on setting up the administration themselves.

 

In the conflict over the south, Kenya, which occupies the southern regions, backs the I.G.A.D. process and the Somali factions involved in it, setting up a confrontation between the p.f.g. and Kenya.

 

When, after delays due to the disagreement over the southern regions, Hassan met with Kenya’s president, Mwai Kibaki, in Nairobi in December, 2012, the communiqe that resulted from the talks did not make any mention of the Jubbaland issue, which means that the political outcome in the south has not yet been determined, and that it will continue to absorb Hassan’s efforts and attention.

 

It makes sense for Hassan to consider “Jubbaland” a “life and death” issue. What happens politically in the south is likely to set the pattern for relations between a future Somali national government and the regional states with which it shares power. In the present case, it is a question of the role of the national government in the selection of officials in the regional-state governments. Beyond that is control over security forces and disposition of natural resources, and foreign agreements that the regional-states make. Whatever his motives might be in countering the Jubbaland initiative, the objective effect of Hassan’s resistance is to bring to the fore the essential question of state-structure: What kind of federalism will Somalia have (if it ever does have an actual permanent government)?

 

That said, concentration of effort on working out basic political organization takes away attention from normal governing, and exerts an internal pull on the p.f.g. That pull has become even stronger by opposition to Hassan and the p.f.g. by factions-interests that feel they have been excluded from the government, particularly sub-clans of major clan families that say that they have not received a fair share of power and positions. The opposition to Hassan has been publicly reported and is confirmed by the Western source, who reports that sub-clan resentments have bred an atmosphere of “unspoken suspicion” in government, parliament, and other political actors. Here, as in the case of “Jubbaland,” the problem is basic: Who is represented and with what relative power? Normally functioning governments do not have to address that question.

 

It is quite possible that conflicts will break out in parliament, and between parliament and government, as they did in previous transitional administrations, that are actuated by the representation question. The same conditions are present as held in the past. Indeed, Shabelle Media reported on December 24 that physical fighting occurred in parliament during debates on the budget and the number of foreign embassies Somalia should have, and that the meeting was adjourned due to disorder. Garoweonline reported that on December 26 parliament reconvened and rejected the 2013 budget proposed by the p.f.g. by a vote of 70-54-39. At issue was the demand by some parliamentarians that the pay for security forces be increased.

 

The “Jubbaland” affair and the representation dispute illustrate the weakness of the p.f.g. from within, a deficit of domestic support in a fragmented political situation.

 

Conclusion

 

The p.f.g. is being pulled apart by the “donor”-power proxy-chain that deprives it of adequate resources in an attempt to exert control; and domestic factions outside it that contest its authority and divert it from performing the normal functions of government. In the power configuration that characterizes the present situation, the p.f.g. loses legitimacy and is incapable of mobilizing support. That has been the case for previous transitional governments in Somalia and it remains so.

 

Whatever flaws the p.f.g. might have and whatever defects in leadership the p.f.g. might show pale in significance next to the constraints on it imposed by the “donor”-powers and the factionalized domestic opposition. It is likely that the structural problem in power distribution will not be overcome.

 

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University in Chicago weinstem@purdue.edu

 

©2012 All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this article for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Rebublication or redistribution of this report, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Garowe Online.

[Che -Guevara]

One of his better articles,

 

Something to think about specially for those who are ranting about Jubbaland, do you want a Somalia with vilable strong central government that that could offer services to its people and is not at the mercy of foreign countries and entities or Somalia with a weak which is subject to foreign whips and has tribal states that are proxy states of the neighboring countries.

[Haatu]

This news is a sad reality which we all already know. The internal issues seem to be sorting themselves out now but the donor issue is a sticking point. I guess this explains why the government is keen on expanding the tax collection.

[Che -Guevara]

No government could exist without guaranteed stream revenue or if it's being undermined by the very people it should be ruling.

[walaalkis]

These so called tribal states are mini friends for enemies of somalia, they can always be friends with one another. Easier to kill one by one rather than collectively

[Che -Guevara]

lool I don't think killing anyone will solve anything.

[Haatu]

Che, tax collections should be able to save the government from collapse for the short-term if it's collected from every major town in the south. As for the local issues, Al Hamdulilah that is being solved now.

[Che -Guevara]

Haatu, there's a lesson to be learned from the all entities that tried to rule Xamar since the start of the civil war and that's their failure to establish a proper working government for Benadir before embarking on securing the rest of the country. I think this government must prove itself by establishing viable government for Benadir that's managed and paid for by Somalis. This means setting up proper security solely dedicated to Xamar and paid for by Somalis, building the district institutions including police forces, investing infrastructures by inviting the diaspora and friendly countries, and creating a mechanism to collect taxes but also offer basic services. The Government can slowly expand into neighboring villages and towns.

 

All this doesn't mean, the Government should disengage from the provinces. They need to work with them and come to political solution.

[Haatu]

All that you have said we have seen and are continuing to seen. Sure, Xamar isn't perfect but it's a hell of a lot better than 2 years ago. Nation-wide tax collection is the next step. Baby steps.

[United Somalia]

Good article.

 

Its not fair for professor Michael A. Weinstein, who is a highly respected scholar in Somali affairs to say that not much has changed. Considering the lightning progress that Somalia has made in these couple of years with the support of Uganda and Burundi.

 

The government of Somalia is no longer transitional but permanent, that alone has changed the whole game

 

Its very important to point out that international NGO's who are almost all based in Nairobi are deeply unpopular in the eyes of the Somali people. To have these deeply unpopular organisations attempt to push aside the role of Somalia's government and have their staff (mostly Kenyans) make critical decisions for Somalia will NEVER be accepted by the people of Somalia nor the government

 

The UN can do what it please with the money that it has pocketed in the name of Somalia but it cannot expect the government of Somalia to allow foreign NGO's to run the affairs of the Somali people, that is simply unacceptable and rings bells of colonialism

 

Donor nations should bear in mind that the UN and all of these international NGO's are based in Nairobi, which are mainly staffed by Kenyan nationals, many who were ex-kenyan government officials.

Donor countries should also take note that Narobi has been behaving very hostile to the stability and progress of Somalia, where Nairobi has even went as far as to claim vast areas of Somali territorial water.

 

It certainly is true that the government is strapped of cash but it is a wonderful challenge for the government of Somalia and her people to resolve this issue by collecting taxes and building partnerships with other nations who are interested in assisting the people of Somalia

 

Again, i must thank professor Michael A. Weinstein for this well written article that gives the Somali people a birds eye's view that our government and nation faces

[Daqane]

These are the real issues in somalia

 

- Active IGAD and Western disruption of somali peace and local governance evolution

- Cheap and petty whoring by somali sub-clans against the central goverment.

 

This would have been the case who ever had won the election.

 

The main problem is simple The proposed J.M.F.B [JOINT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT BOARD] will oversee government expenditure, the government has agreed but made it clear that that the U.N and NGO's will have to go through the same auditing procedure on the money they get for Somalia projects and how much they spend, this is what they do not want to happen.

 

As someone who has worked with these organizations I pray that they do not succeed what ever they touch becomes diseased trust me Somalis wil be despondent with in the next 4 years if the bulk of monies gets into the hands of the swindling AID agencies.

[United Somalia]

Its very interesting, in the sense of professor Michael A. Weinstein stating that there are tensions between the government and these international NGO's about who will run the affairs of the country. Aren't these international NGO's overreaching themselves?

 

(a) Somalia belongs to the Somali people

(b) these foreign NGO's are overreaching themselves if they believe they can impose colonialism over the Somali people

© Much of the funds that these international NGO's obtain in the name of Somalia goes mainly to Nairobi, including almost all of the job created, meaning Somali's gain NOTHING from these people in anyway whatsoever.