Ethiopia’s Analysis of Somalia’s Political Situation: “A Web of Obstruction”

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

Ethiopia’s Analysis of Somalia’s Political Situation: “A Web of Obstruction”

1 Jun 1, 2012 - 9:19:04 PM

 

By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

 

On May 11, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a position paper, “Ethiopia’s policy towards Somalia,” which defines where Addis Ababa stands in the current conflicts in the territories of post-independence Somalia. The tightly structured document provides an account of what the Ethiopian government judges to be a change in Somalia’s threats to Ethiopia (from a Greater Somalia agenda to Islamic terrorism); a vision of a best-case scenario for Ethiopia’s relation to Somalia (focused on access to Somali ports and cooperation on water sharing); a reading of the present political situation in Somalia; and guidelines for Ethiopia’s response to that situation.

 

For the purposes of the present analysis, the important part of the document is its reading of the present political situation in Somalia; that reading is straightforward and realistic. It should serve as a touchstone for any discussion of the political dynamics of Somalia today.

 

Ethiopia’s Reading of Somalia’s Political Dynamics

 

The most telling feature of the Ethiopian document is its failure to mention anything about the roadmap process, which has been orchestrated by the Western “donor”-powers through the United Nations, and which is supposed to eventuate in a new constitutional government for Somalia by August 20, 2012. That process appears to be at the forefront of every other actor’s mind; Ethiopia is alone in passing it by. Addis Ababa seems to have judged that the entire “transition” of Somalia to an altered political arrangement will have no significant effect on its policy towards Somalia.

 

Addis Ababa has made the judgment “that the condition of instability in Somalia is likely to persist for some time.”

 

Metaphors can be revealing. The ones used by the “donor”-powers/U.N. have become so familiar to followers of the Somali scene that they have become nearly literal to the observing mind: roadmap, dual-track, and transition – all of them transportation metaphors that connote movement and destination. Ethiopia offers a counter-metaphor: Somalia is trapped in a “web of obstruction.” A web has been cast over the road and there will be no movement until is it is removed.

 

As Addis Ababa sees it, the web has been cast by actors “who reap benefits from the absence of authority,” among with it includes “a number of Somali groups [which ones?], some traders, religious extremists, and their foreign friends.” Meanwhile, the “international community” is “evidently not ready to exert all its efforts to realize” the aim of a condition of peace in Somalia. Evidently, Addis Ababa does not believe that the “transition” is going anywhere. The web of obstruction has blocked the road.

 

Ethiopia’s analysis is accurate as far as it goes. Indeed, all that is needed in order to make it accurate is to broaden the list of obstructionist web casters to include all the actors involved in post-independence Somalia, including, of course, Addis Ababa. All of them have cast the web and all of them are enveloped and embedded in the web: all the Somali factions, the regional actors, and the international actors. None of them is leading the others; there is no protagonist – there are only antagonists, each one with its own interests, not one willing to give an inch. They come from all directions, some intent on picking

Somalia apart, others trying to hold on to what they have, each one taking its own position in the web. “Although the Somali people long for peace [do they? all of them? on compatible terms?], they have not been able to break out of the web of obstruction,” so says Addis Ababa’s document. Who has the will and the means to break out of the web? It is a strange web – hundreds of spiders spinning a web in which they entrap themselves, not one outside the web.

 

Only a literary approach will do for an analysis of this situation. One needs a picture in order to orient oneself – a fanciful, surreal picture if need be. A roadmap with two tracks that the actors straddle (how can they move?). A web without a spider that makes it and stays outside it, but one made by many spiders which catch themselves inside it as they push and pull against its threads, unable to break out of it.

 

How did this happen? A simple principle of political process explains it all: it is impossible to achieve a stable political organization without having first prepared the way through social reconciliation. Yet social reconciliation would involve a protracted process of give and take in order to succeed. If anyone is most responsible for the web of obstruction, it is the international actors who are not ready to exert themselves yet insist on (mis)managing the process. Under those conditions the regional actors and the Somali actors scramble to get whatever they can at the expense of the international actors and each other. That is how the “web of obstruction” is made as the efforts of the actors end up being at cross-purposes.

 

Ethiopia’s Policy Towards Somalia

 

Lacking any expectation of stability in the territories of post-independence Somalia, Addis Ababa announces that it will pursue a “damage-limitation” policy, which amounts to attempting “to weaken and neutralize those forces coming from any part of Somalia to perpetrate attacks against our country.”

 

It is not only Ethiopia that is pursuing a damage-limitation policy. All of the actors are in a defensive mode (although ready to seize opportunities for aggressive action), except perhaps for newcomer Turkey, which is in the process of getting caught in the web.

[Mario B]

Somaliland, Puntland, ASWJ, some members of TFG, some members of TFP are all puppets of Addis Ababa!

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

Except Alshabaab but we call them terrorists.

[Che -Guevara]

lol war XX, did you just call Somaliland Ethio puppet?

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

No i didn't say that Mario said that but they have influence over Somaliland which is not what i wanted for Somaliland but because it doesn't have state recognition things will remain as they are.

[ugaas Ali]

Xaaji Xunjuf;837580 wrote:

No i didn't say that Mario said that but they have influence over Somaliland which is not what i wanted for Somaliland but because it doesn't have state recognition things will remain as they are.

so true.

[Mario B]

Xaaji Xunjuf;837575 wrote:

Except Alshabaab but we call them terrorists.

Yeah, its like me supporting the pirates just because they are not Ethiopians puppets or because they bring us a few dough with their illegal activities...it just defeats the purpose, which is, us living in peace within our borders and in peace with our neighbours.

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

The World Chronicler’s (in Somali, Waayo Sheegaha Aduunka), Roving Editor, Mr. Truce Digger (In Somali, Md. Mashqac Ku-Baadhe) and Investigative Reporter, Mr. Blunt Bothersome (in Somali, Md. Meel Xun Abaare) recently caught up with a senior official of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry in Addis Ababa. TWC agreed to the official’s condition of remaining anonymous in granting this interview—The Managing Editor

 

Somalis are Somalis. Never mind whether they are Somalians or Somalilanders or those residing in my country or in fraternal Kenya or in that hellish place called Djibouti—it is the name of their capital city too—or in wherever. As such, Somalis are our eternal enemies.

 

Listen guys, this ‘eternal enemies’ thing is strictly confidential; like what you journalists call it in your particular lingo—yes, that is right, you call it “off the record”, don’t you? I know we agreed that I’ll stay anonymous in this interview and presumably that would be enough to protect me, but still this bit about eternal enemies is off the record. You see, I’m a diplomat and diplomats don’t talk about eternal enemies. They, by the nature of their profession, talk about eternal friendships and friends, even as they’re designing your demise. This eternal enemies bit is off the record; it that clear, guys?

 

I see you’re silent about my little request regarding this little eternal-enemies thing. But wasn’t silence said to denote consent? Thus, I take your silence means your consent to my little request.

 

I was saying as our eternal enemies, a safe Somali is a …… I wouldn’t go as far as to say a dead one—no, no, that wouldn’t be a decent and humane thing to say; though, come to think of it, if a Somali died, I wouldn’t be the first or even the second person to shed tears on account of his misfortune. If I did, Somalis would characterize my tears as crocodile tears anyway! See, neither Somalis nor we don’t appreciate shedding tears on account of each other’s demises or other misfortunes.

 

No, no, I wouldn’t go as far as to say that, but I’d say that a safe Somali is a weak one. One who is eternally under our mercy; a Somali who is always under our peck and call; one into whose land and home we can always have an easy excess, nay, we can always invade whether or not he likes that.

 

How any Somali would possibly like us to invade his country, you asking me? You say that my last statement alluded to as much. Well, well, looks like you guys don’t know a great deal about Somalis! I can’t blame you, since you haven’t been living as their neighbor as we Ethiopians, by no choice of ours—if it were our choice, we’d have said “Thanks, but no thanks”—well by no choice of ours have been destined to live as their neighbors.

 

So I wouldn’t blame you for your ignorance of the Somali ways, but to answer your question, yes, definitely yes, some Somalis really like us invading their country. As a matter of fact their governments officially beseech us to invade their country now and then. Remember their first real ‘president’, that old sage, Abdillahi Yusuf, now deceased, I believe—well, remember that good ‘president’ of theirs, no less, literally begged us to invade his country back in late 2006! And we obliged him (what else could we have done; we’d literally feared for the old sage’s sanity if we didn’t oblige him?). From then on, the beseeching from their governments to invade their country never stopped.

 

To be honest with you, it sometimes gets rather tedious, the beseeching from the Somali leaders’ to invade their country, that is. But we do what we can to oblige them in consideration of the leaders’ sanity and even, at times, their very survival. As a matter of fact, as I speak now, our army is heavily involved in several different operations deep inside their country and only praise is what we’re getting from their leaders as well as others.

 

You saying that we routinely have a heavy hand in molding their leaderships and governments and therefore they could do no less than beseeching us to invade their country now and then and praise us when we oblige them? Listen guys! That is a preposterous thing to say to me! “A heavy hand”?! “A heavy hand”, you say?! That is entirely not true. We categorically deny it. I’m telling you that, guys.

 

You see, guys, as the Somalis’ best neighbors and African brethren; and as the Somalis amongst themselves couldn’t agree on constituting their own effective governments and good leaders for decades; and as an effective government with good leaders is to the best interests of all concerned i.e. to them as no country cannot be without an effective government for so long; to us as their best neighbors and African brethren; to you as your country is so concerned of terrorism and piracy and what not; to Dick, to Harry, to all and sundry for whatever reason—well, in light of all the foregoing, we have an obligation to do what we can to help them in establishing an effective government with good leaders in their country, haven’t we?

 

In this regard, we might have had a lithe finger or, at a maximum, an easy touch or a slow hand in their governmental and leadership selection efforts, but never, ever a heavy hand as you have so impertinently and disrespectfully accused us. And one more thing: It is not only Ethiopia that lends the Somalis a lithe finger or an easy touch or a slow hand in such matters. Other caring countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti … do it. I suspect even you guys’, own country, the US, and do it in a kind of roundabout way. Even some Arab countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and suchlike do it, though the Arabs, true to their inherent awkwardness and incompetence, aren’t as good at it as others are. Organizations like the UN, the AU, the IGAD and others do it.

 

So what is the problem if we, Ethiopians, likewise do it? I can even say, without naming names, that some of the others use poking fingers or rough touches or clumsy hands, which we never do and I never heard anybody blaming them. So I’m puzzled why Ethiopia is blamed when we so discreetly use only the lithest of fingers or the easiest of touches or the slowest of hands of them all!

 

But, speaking of blame apportioning and name calling, where you journalists are concerned, it is always ‘damn if you do and damn if you don’t! I’m certain that you’d have still blamed us if we—as their best neighbors and African brethren—didn’t do the right thing by the Somalis and failed to employ occasionally as well as discreetly a lithe finger or an easy touch or a slow hand on their good behalf.

 

Anyway, before you popped your annoying question, I was in the midst of an important thing. Jesus! Where was I? I thought that in this interview I’d just read from my well prepared and well thought over notes and that’d be that. But you somehow derail me and I blab-blab about things I didn’t prepare well or thought over properly prior to the blab-blabbing.

 

Anyway, where was I? Yes, yes, now I remember, Thank Heavens! I was talking about who a good Somali should be, wasn’t I? I was saying that a good Somali is a weak Somali, one whose assets are ours; one who would never collude with a fellow Somali to ever put up any meaningful resistance to whatever we’d like to do to him or with him. Is that clear, guys?

 

You’re saying ‘Yes’? Thank you, guys. Good that for once you’d understand rather than derail me from my course. You should be smart enough to know how to treat a Somali. Of course we expect no less from you, Americans, who are our eternal friends and who always see things our way as far as matters pertaining to Somalis are concerned.

 

So I was saying this Somali should be kept in perpetual turmoil and, when we are extraordinarily nice to him, in timeless limbo. I’ll explain what I mean by ‘timeless limbo’ later; but let me first elaborate a bit on the ‘perpetual turmoil’ part.

 

For this ‘perpetual turmoil’ purpose, it’s fine with us that the Somalians (meaning those from Somalia) continue to slaughter each other. If an effective government, in the conventional sense of government as understood by everybody else save a Somalian, has eluded them for so long, well, that too is, eerie … fine with us as long as it is fine with them. And twenty years on, who doubts that this situation is perfectly fine with them? Some say that we are behind this “no-effective-government” business, but then, isn’t everybody entitled to his opinion?! Suffices to say that any “president” in Villa Somalia is a brother and should behave like a brother. If he isn’t a brother and doesn’t behave like one, then all we can say is to wish good luck. But whatever happens to him after that is none of our business.

 

We’ve been exceptionally nice to them. Remember, our army has been to their very capital and beyond—all the way to Kismayo and the Kenyan border. And didn’t we withdraw our troops after we helped them liberate themselves of that ignoble Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) terrorist gang and in its place installed their astute “president” Abdillahi Yusuf in Villa Somalia? Others might’ve colonized Somalia and kept their occupation forces in their country for centuries, but we’re not others; we’re their best neighbors and African brethren.

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

Of course, we’d not expect Somalians, being Somalis after all, to be grateful to us for all that trouble we’d gone through on their behalf. Can you imagine that they turned against that old sage Abdillahi Yusuf? We knew they’d never get a better “president” but when they rejected him, and since we still wanted to be nice to them, we helped rehabilitate and install Sheikh Sharif as their new “president”. That Sheikh Sharif was the very “president” of the UIC terrorist gang whom we’d chased out of the town (Mogadishu, that is) earlier at the behest of their astute late ‘president’ Abdillahi Yusuf, but whom (witness their contradictions!) most ordinary Somalians and other Somalis and even many non-Somalis had chastised us for doing so. That Sheikh Sharif was the one who’d (can there be a worse crime?) made Asmara his base for anti-Ethiopian activities after we’d chased him out of town, Mogadishu, that is. That he’d been all such things and worse and still we helped in installing him as their new ‘president’, is an amble testament of our being their best neighbors and African brethren; of us being exceptionally nice to them as no one else possibly could. I can bet on that!

 

Nonetheless, you can never expect the Somalians to be appreciative however exceptionally nice you’re to them! Can you imagine that, guys?

 

We hear that the Somalians, being … well, Somalis, have turned against the Sharif himself as well, can you believe it? What, in Heaven’s Name, do they really want? They ask for one particular “president” and as soon as they get him, they say “No, no, we don’t want him!” without even the merest of thanks for the efforts of getting him when they asked for him.

 

They not only say “We don’t want him”, they also propose doggedly and in a manner of unbecoming physical composition (usually in small pieces rather than in one piece as, at the very least, in decency is proper) sending him (their ‘president’, that is) to his grave somewhat earlier than God disposes. Of course, we and other good Samaritans view such a proposition as uncalled for or as inhumane even if it were. Therefore we helped the AU in deploying 10,000 “peacekeepers” (AMISOM we call them) solely to protect the Somalian “presidents” in the Villa Somalia.

 

Appropriately, the “peacekeepers” take their job rather seriously. Count on woe to befall to anyone who as much as contemplates harming the “presidents”. Whenever Villa Somalia is shot at with even as small a weapon as a handgun, AMISOM naturally responds with a barrage of artillery shells in the direction from which the offending fire has come. What else could they do, we want to know? Is there any other way to deal with people who are bent on sending their “presidents” to their early graves—and not even in one piece—without first consulting God Almighty, Who Alone manages such things?

 

If in the all-important task of protecting the Somalian ‘presidents’, innocent civilians are killed, maimed, wounded or displaced by the AMISOM barrages—well, that’s an unfortunate and unintentional consequence of the game. In Americanize, it’s called “Collateral Damage”, remember?

 

Anyway, in the spirit of best neighborliness and African brotherhood, we’ll continue to be nice to Somalians in spite of their characteristic ingratitude. We can do no less, can we? Others and even some Ethiopians say why don’t we just say good riddance of a bad apple and simply wash our hands of Somalia’s intractable problems? Good question. But nobody answers the other equally good question: If we, Ethiopians, who’re supernaturally (and through no choice of ours) fated to be their best neighbors and African brethren don’t lend them a helping hand in their hours of need, who else, pray tell me, would do it?

 

So, we’ll continue to be nice to them, the great expense to us notwithstanding. We’ll continue to send our troops across the border into their territory whenever we feel their effective and legitimate “governments” are under threat from one or other of their myriad and unfathomable armed groups. In fact, we’ll continue to activate our lithe fingers or easy touches or slow hands in helping them set up their effective “governments” and “presidents” whenever the need for them arises. We’ll continue to help protecting their legitimate “governments” and “presidents”. We know that–given the Somalians’ knack for disliking their effective and legitimate “governments” and “presidents” as soon as they’re installed for them–well, we know that all that is a tall order, but one’s got to do what one’s got to do, hasn’t one?

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

As for the Somalilanders, and here the ‘timeless limbo’ part comes into play—well, as for the Somalilanders, they’re Somalis likewise, aren’t they? As such they too are our internal enemies, aren’t they? So, let them stay in their timeless non-recognition limbo to infinity. That is what I meant by the ‘timeless limbo’ thing.

 

“Why?!” “Why?!” “Why?!” We, all three of us, asking the same question in unison! So amazing, isn’t it, guys? Believe me, guys, my asking “Why?!” was, I admit, a bit rhetorical but, certainly, not entirely outside the course of clarifying my narration while I suspect your exclaiming “Whys?!” were more due to your tendencies of derailing me from my normal lines of thought. One way or another and since I unintentionally shared in the asking of the question, let me give the answer right away.

 

See, Somalilanders are a naïve people. They think it was a change of heart on our part when we saved them from extermination at the hands of their fellow Somalis some two decades ago by allowing them into our country in droves. No, that was not our real intention, ******! Our real intention was to topple the fascist Siad Barre regime that had the temerity of attacking Ethiopia and nearly succeeded in dismantling our state. Only dismantling his own state, no less, could have done as punishment for Siad Barre’s cardinal crime–talk about giving one a dose of his own medicine. See what I mean?

 

We’d to sleep with quite a lot of devils to achieve this all-important objective, and Somalilanders happened to be some of those devils. That this devilish bed fellowship made incumbent on us saving the Somalilanders from genocide at the hands of their Fascist tyrant Siad Barre was just one of those inexplicable ironies of this topsy-turvy world. But believe you me, we were just after toppling Siad Barre’s regime and not after saving the Somalilanders from genocide. That just happened to be an unintentional consequence in the perusal of our core objective. But, like I said it was and still is a topsy-turvy world, don’t you agree, guys?

 

Now, Somalilanders may be naïve, but strangely for being ethnically Somalis, they seem to have still some sense left in their heads. Unexpectedly, they pacified and restored the rule of law in their country. They established effective and legitimate governments (no need to put inverted commas on the word governments in their case). Amazingly they did all this all by themselves and well before they grabbed our—or anybody else’s—attention.

 

See, the little scamps stealthily held all their peacemaking and state-building conferences squatting in dusty squares in their little dusty towns and sustaining themselves with unpalatable camel’s meat and other unsavory nutrients. This is so unlike their Southern brethren who demand five star accommodation and the lifestyles of the rich and famous in foreign capitals (at enormous cost to the IC) before they agree even to hold a conference. So don’t blame us or the world at large if the Somaliland peace and reconciliation gatherings eluded our attention and consequently lacked any input from foreigners including from us, their dear best neighbors and African brethren.

 

The damn rascals—Alas! They duped us all, didn’t they?!!!

 

Worse still, this colossal deception didn’t end there. The Somalilanders went on to meet all the prerequisite parameters of a sovereign nation–borders, currency, constitution …, you name it–in reclaiming the sovereignty they had enjoyed for just five days way back in 1960 before they merged with Somalia. Thus, they presented us and the world at large, still unawares, with a treacherous fait accompli: They said to all and sundry, “We’re called Somaliland. We’re independent. We meet all the conditions of statehood, including the moral ones. So recognize us!” That was the worst part of this colossal deception.

 

This is because, between you and me, if they were not Somalis and therefore not our eternal enemies, we’d have said that they’ve had a valid point. If they were not Somalis, believe me, we’d have extended them our political recognition right away. In point of fact, if objectivity were heeded, they merit recognition, all sorts of assistance, admiration and what not, if simply they were not Somalis and therefore not our eternal enemies!

 

But since it was too late to avert this paradox–damn it, the Somalilanders duped us as well as everybody else–we and the world at large were left to being reactive instead of being proactive when dealing with Somaliland. Of course, we’d have preferred to have been proactive, but our being reactive, though not as effective, isn’t without its consequences, thank Heavens!

 

Why I say thank Heavens, you asking? You see, you young man, you’re the junior of the two of you. Isn’t this your senior Editor as you’ve introduced yourselves to me at the beginning of this conversation? You saying ‘Yes’? Then how come you’re always asking me very bothersome questions? How come you’re asking me any questions at all when somebody senior to you is present and he’s so mute, though he’s furiously scribing on his notepad? Don’t you have respect for seniority and rank? For the life of me, I can’t understand the Western Mentality and Attitudes—even after I’ve been to their places so many times in line of my work! It must be due to deficiencies of my mental faculties or something else—whatever it is!

 

See, guys, in my Ethiopia and Ethiopian culture, such behavior is unacceptable, thank Heavens. We’ve respect for seniority and rank, so we don’t talk or ask questions if we’re junior in both.

 

But, Oh! I understand your behavior now—stupid of me to have missed it at the onset of this conversation. Your very name, Blunt Bothersome, explains it, doesn’t it? Certainly, you’re blunt and no doubt you’re bothersome. Aha! And him, so-called Senior Editor’s name, Mr. Truce Digger! That’s why he’s been furiously scribing on his notepad all the time, like he was not wanting to miss nothing I say and how I say it! His name, Truce Digger, is very much telling on his behavior and demeanor too, though he slightly played with its spelling. He’s seriously into finding the truth as if I myself ain’t into keeping the truth out in the open anyway!

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

So, guys, your names are telling on you. I used to hear the refrain, “What is a name?”And people used to say in return, “Nothing!” Obviously, these people never met you, guys. I think for their own good, they shouldn’t either.

 

Shall we go back to the subject, you say OK? We agree? Thanks, guys. In answer to last question, forget why I said ‘Thank Heavens’ because that’s neither here nor there. Rather, hear this information which carries more substance.

 

See, our nation, Ethiopia, is the Grand Old Man of Black Africa. Other African countries look up to us for guidance on what they should do and how should they do it. We’re an old civilization that was never colonized. The seat of the African Union (AU), the Pan-African organization with a capital name and as likewise capital ideals, but in point of fact just a talking shop nonetheless; this ‘talking shop’ bit, like the ‘eternal enemies’ bit earlier, is likewise off the record, understand, guys? Silence again? Thanks anyway, guys. I was saying the AU Head Quarters is in Addis Ababa, our own Capital city here. We’re America’s and Europe’s major ally in Black Africa. What we say or do carries as much weight as what we don’t say or don’t do. If we recognized Somaliland today, we’re sure a dozen other African countries and the US and Europe would fellow suit within hours. The Somalians and Arabs would cry and hue and proclaim that the world has presently come to an end as the result of our recognition of Somaliland. But, then, when was the last time anybody paid much attention to Arab or Somalian sentiments, sensitivities and opinions? They’re of no consequences. Their barks are loader than their bites; wasn’t that always the case? No, a guy, that isn’t definitely the reason why we don’t want to recognize Somaliland.

 

The answer to the question of why we shouldn’t recognize Somaliland is the question itself: Why should we? What’s the benefit to us in doing so? Get it straight from me, guys, we won’t do it. First, they’re ethnic Somalis and therefore our eternal enemies. Never forget the big picture, mind you! Second, it’s easier to manage and manipulate them in their non-recognition status than in otherwise. If they were recognized, they’d be able to interact with the world directly instead of through us as they presently do, wouldn’t they? Their Presidents and government officials would be able travel to foreign capitals without transiting through Addis Ababa as they presently do, wouldn’t they?

 

We know some trouble- and rumor-mongers allege that this transiting through Addis Ababa involves a little more than the transiting per se. Maliciously, they say the transiting involves a certain briefing sessions for the Somaliland leaders on their way out to foreign capitals and another some debriefing sessions of the Somaliland leaders on their way back from foreign capitals.

 

If you asked me point blankly if we, in point of fact, do such briefings and debriefings with the Somalilander leaders, I’d say “No comment”. Only that the trouble-mongers don’t appreciate our role as Somaliland’s best neighbors and African brethren by mentioning even the briefings and debriefings per se. I’m afraid they’re fond of defamations directed towards good countries like Ethiopia and good people such as the Somaliland leaders who transit through here on their worthless sojourns to other world capitals.

 

But come to think of it, unlike these trouble-mongers, and between you and me-like, I don’t see what wrong there’s with a little briefing to and a little debriefing of foreign leaders if one can do it without too much cost or effort. Tell me, guys, of any country in the world that wouldn’t have seized the same opportunity if it presented itself. In fact, most countries spend fortunes to avail themselves of the same advantages. It’s called espionage, if my recollection isn’t failing me as it sometimes does; but I don’t think my recollection would be so uncharitable right now, Thank Heavens! I think you realize by now that my lips love saying ‘Thank Heavens’ but don’t worry; it’s neither here nor there.

 

Lest we be diverted by the grumblings of the trouble-mongers, let us continue with the subject, shall we? Where were we? Anyway, we’re afraid that if Somaliland got political recognition, Somalilanders would put on airs. These people who, in contravention to conventional wisdom, were able to accomplish so much and all that much without rattling any feathers, could theoretically act and behave like a real sovereign nation, couldn’t they? Example: They could stand up for their national rights. They might resist some of our requests, mostly of the security kind, that they presently submit to without too much persuasion. Specifically, we’re afraid that they might forget or, worse still, ignore that we’re their best neighbors and African brethren.

If such a scenario materializes, we might reluctantly be compelled to take some remedial actions. Such actions might look like entirely neither neighborly nor brotherly. These (i.e. such actions) might not be entirely compatible with international laws. Therefore, there’d be hues and cries and condemnations and such-like from many quarters on account of such remedial actions that we’d have been reluctantly compelled to take on account of Somalilanders forgetting or, worse still, ignoring that we’re their best neighbors and African brethren.

 

You see what we mean now? I see you’re nodding your heads and I think that means that you see what we mean. Thank you for seeing what we mean, guys. If Somaliland is recognized, international laws and regulations would apply with regards to our relationships with Somaliland. Our hands would be tied and we’d find it difficult to exercise as much influence on them as we do now or as we would like to or as we deem it as necessary for the sake of our national interests or for the sake of continuing to be their best neighbors and African brethren.

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

So we’ll see to it that Somaliland rots in its unrecognized never-never land.

 

Don’t lose sight of the big picture. Somalis are Somalis. Never mind whether they are Somalilanders or Somalians or Djiboutian or Somali-Kenyans or Somali-Ethio…………. Somalis are our eternal erne…….Sorry, we said this bit at the beginning of this conversation and this bit is highly confidential and therefore off the record.

 

Thank you, you guys with amazing, though not amusing names. Thank you.

 

Note: TWC believes that the anonymity of the Ethiopian Senior Foreign Ministry Official is enough to protect him and therefore we opted to carry the interview in its entirety in spite of his request to keep certain parts of it off the record—The Managing Editor

 

There is another school of opinion as to what Ethiopia’s real intention on the question of Somaliland’s political recognition is about. It is more down to earth, if for Somaliland it is no less ominous. Its essence is that Ethiopia prefers, for good or bad, to deal with just one central and all powerful entity or authority in erstwhile Somali Republic. To this purpose, Ethiopia, like most other countries and political organizations (the UN, AU, AL etc), is just bidding its time until such central and all powerful entity or authority is firmly and irrevocably established in Mogadishu.

 

When that objective is achieved, Somaliland will be railroaded to rejoin Somalia. Period!

 

It is quite obvious that all above rationales are detrimental to Somaliland.

 

In general, other Ethiopian policies and actions, especially those pertaining to Somalia, cause Somalilanders’ honest disagreement or discomfort. It is no secret to Somalilanders that any government in Mogadishu which lacked Ethiopian express approval and/or sponsorship could not expect but bite the dust. The Transitional National Government (TNG), constituted in Djibouti in 2001, could not take a step forward or even a step or two sideways in large part because Ethiopia it did not enjoy Ethiopian good graces. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG)), formed in Nairobi in 2004, was much luckier since, as the ‘Ethiopian official’ have been reminded by ‘Messrs Digger and Bothersome’ in the above ‘Interview’, Ethiopia have had a “heavy hand” in its creation. Yet, Ethiopia has been in the thick of the tragicomic tribulations that have been the only characteristic of the TFG since its inception. The crux of the matter is that the opinions, wishes and consent of the Somalians are not factors which Ethiopia grants any respect or considerations in as far as Somalian governments are concerned.

 

It was lost to Somalilanders that many of the warlords that had been bedeviling Somalia, before their utter defeat in battle with the United Islamic Courts (UIC) in early 2006, had been under the sponsorship of Ethiopia. Ethiopian patronage of Somali armed groups sometimes defies conventional wisdom. While it is understandably diehard anti-Al Shabab, it is strangely highly supportive of Ahli Sunna Wa Jama’ah (ASWJ). Though the former are admittedly dangerous Al Qaeda affliated Islamists, the latter’s use of the Islamic Religion as a means towards their political objectives makes even many Somalis rather uncomfortable. Ethiopia must be privy to something that Somalis are unaware of in accepting the ASWJ as bedfellows. At any rate, the analogy of the Western support for Al Qaeda during the Anti-Soviet war in Afganistan in the Seventies and Eighties simply because the enemy of your enemy is your friend seems to have escaped Ethiopian logic.

 

Most Somalilanders did not approve of—and were immensely dismayed by—Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006/2007. If Ethiopia were ever honest with its proclamations of noninterference in the affairs of Somalia, there could have been no convincing justification for that invasion.

 

In early 2006, the UIC had taken over power in Mogadishu and most regions of Southern Somalia after years of warlord mayhem. Not only had the long suffering denizens of Mogadishu and Southern Somalia for the first time in a decade and a half, become blessed with a semblance of peace, tranquility, and rule of law (any law), but the UIC was the closest thing to a Somali-owned governance that emerged in Somalia and which could claim somewhat the consent of its subjects.

 

Ethiopia, the United States and other major western countries were stricken by what seemed to be nothing less than fright and panic at this development. The trigger of their instantaneous and almost kneejerk anxiety was one adjective and one acronym: Islamic and TFG.

 

Though the adjective was part of their name and notwithstanding that caution and a monitoring regime on them were on order (for any use of religion for political purpose is an abuse of religion), there was no indisputable proof that the UIC was fundamentalist Islamists. In spite of the amateurishness of some of its members in their rhetoric and pronouncements, especially as directed at Ethiopia, there was very little likelihood that the UIC had any other agenda save pacifying and returning the rule of law to Somalia. The UIC neither possessed the wherewithal nor displayed manifest intentions that could have posed a credible threat to any foreign country, Ethiopia included.

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

As for the acronym, the TFG, let us first decode it. It stood and still does for the Transitional Federal Government. At the time headed by ‘president’ Abdillahi Yusuf, it was holed up in Baidoa under the protection of thousands of thousands of Ethiopian troops. This presence of the Ethiopian army units must have been the direct cause of the UIC’s previously mentioned careless and pompous rhetoric and statements against Ethiopia; but even in this case, who was the real provocateur—the government which informally, though quite openly, deployed its forces in another country or one of that country’s major political contenders which decried such illegal deployment?

 

However, there was one supremely fundamental factor in the TFG/UIC/Ethiopian saga. It was a factor that was being (and still is being) ignored; a factor which if or when necessary was forcefully being (and still is forcefully) negated; a factor that was never (and continues not to be) given its rightful consideration.

That factor is this: Since its inception, if the Somalians’ popular opinion, preferences, wishes and/or consent counted in a reasonable measure to the foreigners with fingers in Somalia’s political pie, the TFG would never have seen the light of the day in the first place. If it did, it would have perished long before the advent of the UIC. Provided it, as unlikely as it would have been, survived to the UIC era, it would have taken the UIC mere hours to sweep the TFG aside.

 

The Basic reason the TFG would not have come into being, or would not have endured for days if it did, had nothing to with UIC or any other Somalian armed group. The real reason was and still is that, in the eyes of Somalians, it never remotely enjoyed or earned the prerequisite attributes of a viable government: Indigenousness, Principles, Legitimacy, Competence—Nothing that would qualify it as a government in the real sense of the word.

 

But, as things were at the time of UIC’s emergence, the TFG could count on the crucial and decisive advantage of its original sponsors’ protection and sustenance. Ethiopia, Kenya, the UN, the AU, and the IGAD directly and the US and its Western allies indirectly were exclusively the backers of the TFG. Now they realized that their baby faced the most credible and imminent danger of the long suppressed Somalian wishes getting their way in the embodiment of the UIC. Having taken over all over South/Central Somalia including the all important Mogadishu (which they couldn’t have without Somalian popular support and consent), Baidoa remained the major urban center for the UIC to overrun and the TFG to be assigned to history.

 

As it turned out, the TFG backers, spearheaded by Ethiopia, could stomach to see all their hard won achievements and creations going down the drain. Since when was any consideration given to Somalians’ wishes or aspirations? Nor was it now (then) the time to loosen the reins on the Somalian aspirations and certainly not under the leadership of an organization whose name carried a frightening adjective. Thus the invasion!

 

Regardless of whether or not the Ethiopian invasion—with at best the US and other Western countries’ acquiescence—was uncalled for, its consequences was incalculable. It was extremely disastrous for the already blighted Somalians in life, limb and livelihoods. The greatest displacement of the Somalians since the fall of Siad Barre’ dictatorial regime in 1991 and the ensuing civil wars was another lingering outcome of that invasion.

 

Worst of all, the occupation and the understandable resistance that it inevitably stirred in countering it also motivated the birth of the phenomenon of Al-Shababism. Today, not only is Al-Shababism the biggest menace that all Somalis and all their entities face, but also it poses a credible threat to the security of many other nations; not least of which is Ethiopia and other countries that either overtly or covertly colluded with the invader in its ignoble enterprise on Somalia.

 

The cost to Ethiopia, though lesser in extent, was very high nonetheless. In the end, Ethiopia could not long sustain its occupation. It dawned on that country, fairly soon enough, that it had bitten more than it could chew. Moreover, it is much too uncertain that Ethiopia achieved any of the objectives, whatever they were, for which it had sustained—and to Somalians had inflicted—immense sacrifices.

 

Quite on the contrary, Ethiopia might have lost more than it gained from its Somalia misadventure. Certainly it weakened whatever mutually beneficial rapport and goodwill that had been in the making between the Somalis and the Ethiopians after ages of senseless enmity and mistrust between the two peoples. Besides, the emergence of inherently violent groups, such as the Al-Shabab, in particular and the continuation of the turmoil in Somalia in general, proved that the ultimate outcome of the Ethiopian fiasco turned out to be decidedly counterproductive for all concerned

 

On another front, furthermore, the serious allegations of human rights abuses that were repeatedly reported by international humanitarian organizations and media to have been perpetuated by Ethiopian security forces against civilian ethnic Somali-Ethiopians in retaliation of rebel insurgency have invoked the revulsion of many in Somaliland who remember only too well the horrors and ultimately the fallacies of such collective punishments or atrocities.

 

Nor are Somalilanders amused by Ethiopian security agents’ not so infrequent and not entirely concealed incursions to Somaliland’s urban centers to carry out illegal missions. Kidnappings and/or assassinations of alleged anti-Ethiopian suspects (mostly Ethiopian ethnic Somalis or Oromo) within Somaliland’s territory have not been unheard off. It is also known that the Ethiopian government sometimes presents Somaliland authority with names and simply demand their handover. At other times, entire units of Ethiopian forces have crossed into Somaliland ostensibly to conduct operations against, what the Ethiopians claim to be, anti-Ethiopian rebels.

 

Somalilanders usually learn about such occurrences after they took place. It is clear that Ethiopia’s respect for international law and conventions or their applicability where Somaliland is concerned do not register with Ethiopia. It is equally obvious Ethiopia expects no reproach from any quarter as a consequence of this disrespect.

 

In conclusion, there is no doubt that Somalilanders feel many vexing disappointments at what they see as Ethiopia’s less than forthcoming attitude, coyness and ambiguities on their independence and recognition issues. Specifically, they are frankly incensed that Ethiopia ties its current and potential recognition issue positions to the goodwill and consent of entities and people who, for various though unjustifiable reasons are unlikely to endow neither.

 

To them, this condition is tantamount to require a hare to acquire a fox’s consent to graze in the same enclosed field in which the fox hunts.

 

It is but one of the legacies of its non-recognition status that has condemned Somaliland with so little room for maneuver, if any at all, or without any meaningful leverage which could enable her to impress on Ethiopia to adapt more equitable policies and relationships with Somaliland in particular with Somalis at large in general.

The hope here is that the causes of these vexing misgivings will not continue to the limit—or cross the line—where they could seriously diminish the overpowering gratitude that Ethiopians had previously earned from Somalilanders in so good measure and on so undeniably commendable grounds.

[GaraadMon]

My analysis on Ethiopia's analysis: A Wall of Deflection. This is how professionals control a sovereign state, chastise your puppets in public to remove all suspicion.