Kenya's Military Engagement Against Al Shabaab

[Mintid Farayar]

From Stratfor, the U.S. based private intelligence firm:

 

 

 

Africa Analyst Mark Schroeder discusses the strategy behind Kenya’s incursion into Somalia to combat Islamist militia al Shaabab.

 

Kenyan military forces are continuing their press into southern Somalia, and an estimated 4,000 Kenyan forces are converging from three vectors, from Kenya, into southern Somalia and it would appear that their intended target is the southern Somali port-town of Kismayo. Now, Kismayo is extremely notable as it is the stronghold of the transnationalist faction of the Somali jihadist group al Shabaab.

 

The Kenyan intervention is not an original concept, even though it’s going on two weeks old. This operation harkens back a couple of years and is part of an overall regional strategy to combat and isolate the Somali jihadists. Until now, this fight has largely been led by African Union peacekeeping forces, or AMISOM, who are found predominantly in Mogadishu. But Ethiopian military forces and Ethiopian-backed militias have also had a considerable part of this counterinsurgency campaign.

 

Now these 4,000 Kenyan military forces are not likely to be able to to defeat al Shabaab. What will likely end up being the reaction from al Shabaab is a withdrawal into a triangle of southern Somalia that al Shabaab can basically call home. This triangle is bounded by Kismayo, the city on the southern coastal region of Somalia, Baidoa in south-central and in Mogadishu, along the coast as well. Within this triangle, al Shabaab can maneuver, but with the Kenyan encroachment of the South, continued Ethiopian militia support from central Somalia and AMISOM within Mogadishu itself, territory that al Shabaab has to maneuver is becoming increasingly limited. There are likely overflight operations by U.S. and other Western forces in the region, who will be constantly engaged in trying to identify, pinpoint, isolate and remove high-value targets within the al Shabaab leadership. Particularly, those individuals such as Godane and al-Afghani.

 

But al Shabaab is known for declining combat when it comes to a pitched battle. So, should the Kenyans approach Kismayo and fight their way through towns such as Afmadow, the al Shabaab fighters found there will likely decline combat. Al Shabaab’s strength is clearly in waging guerrilla-style warfare. The Kenyan military forces engaged in Somalia are not likely to stay there as an occupation force for the long-term, instead, to establish a robust buffer zone to then withdraw in favor of a renewed and robust Somali militia, but leaving increasingly narrow territory for al Shabaab to maneuver.

[xiinfaniin]

That Kenya is not going to defeat Alshabaab is a reasonable prediction. But what is omitted is another more likely outcome which is Alshabaab will be given another life line on the expense of TFG, whose financial resource and political legitimacy will diminish as a result of the converging foreign military interventions.

[Mintid Farayar]

xiinfaniin;755270 wrote:

That Kenya is not going to defeat Alshabaab is a reasonable prediction. But what is omitted is another more likely outcome which is Alshabaab will be given another life line on the expense of TFG, whose financial resource and political legitimacy will diminish as a result of the converging foreign military interventions.

 

I see your point regarding loss of financial resources and political legitimacy for the TFG. But the question that begs to be asked: What has the TFG accomplished thus far with the financial resources and exclusive political legitimacy it's enjoyed in the past? What signs were there that it would improve its governing position with the recent AMISOM gains? All actors who deal with the TFG point out its failure and inability to govern. Even the governments that fathered it, militarily protected it, politically instructed it have abandoned it one by one in utter frustration with its dysfunctionality and kleptocracy.

 

Why are you so wedded to it?

[xiinfaniin]

^^I am not 'so wedded to it', rather I think TFG is the only entity that provides a national framework. From that angle, its purpose is tooffer starting point from which to go forward. With AMISOM securing key installations, and effectively defending it, TFG could be used a launchpad for reconciliation. Somalis need this legal fiction to go forward. The only alternative is a radical one, and I don't think it is suitable to the current political setting on the ground.

[Mintid Farayar]

xiinfaniin;755282 wrote:

^^I am not 'so wedded to it', rather I think TFG is the only entity that provides a national framework. From that angle, its purpose is tooffer starting point from which to go forward. With AMISOM securing key installations, and effectively defending it, TFG could be used a launchpad for reconciliation. Somalis need this legal fiction to go forward. The only alternative is a radical one, and I don't think it is suitable to the current political setting on the ground.

It seems this "legal fiction' only works for you, using SOL as a non-scientific sample. Markaa, 'ma adaa waalan mise dadkaa waalan??'

 

P.S. Attempt to refrain from the ego gymnastics and do try to spare us the use of the royal 'we'......

[xiinfaniin]

^^The 'legal fiction' called TFG is the closest we have to a national framework I said.

 

 

PS. We is a pronoun signifying plural. In this case it denotes Somalis. That you have an issue with anything that has something to do with unity is an old news awoowe.

[Mintid Farayar]

How's this legal fiction different from Ali Mahdi's attempt at a cross-section of carpetbaggers to form a government, or Aideed's, or Abdulqasim's, or Abdullahi Yusuf's?

At least they controlled regions on their own with the exception of A. Yusuf. Do you notice the rapid footsteps of each region as they abandon any attempt of coming under the TFG umbrella and attempt to create little 'Somalilands' all over the place? To repeat, this 'legal fiction' only works for you and a fast-dwindling list of supporters.

 

You keep repeating slogans yet present no realistic solutions to a dream you're so wedded to. You accuse others of the traitorous use of foreign troops to achieve their goals yet you cheerlead for the very entity that rides on the backs of 9,000 to 10,000 Ugandans/Burundese. As recent posts have made clear to you, I'm not alone in seeing the glaring contradictions in your logic. However, regardless of all your warts, you have a role to fulfill in the Somali exchange of ideas....

[xiinfaniin]

^^Apparently you are bringing your running battles with xiin to this post as well

 

But if you think TFG is akin to old Mogadishu warlords, you are entitled to your opinion however weak. Again TFG is the only national framework that allows politicians/leaders with varying background clannish and ideology wise to operate in the same national entity and in the same city. I must believe there is a process to improve it. To improve and build on it will be the interest of all Somalis, you included. Destroying it with no alternative to replace it will be a major setback.

[Mintid Farayar]

Ok, Xiin. On one point, I have sympathy for your position - 'Destroying without an alternative being a setback'. And I wouldn't wish Al Shabaab on anyone. However, where's the forward movement? Let's forget about the moribund TFG military forces and take the AMISOM gains as widening the space for the TFG governance. But you have to govern, correct? Time and time again, the TFG has proven itself as either woefully inadequate to govern or maybe, not even interested in governing. This is the insanity of this whole TFG enterprise. You have to govern! Sometime, somewhere...

 

The TFG carpetbaggers don't seem interested. It's not Mintid who's saying this, it's AMISOM, AU, UN, and every other partner that's had the misfortune to work with the TFG.