The Somaliland (SNM) Predicament

[Knight of Wisdom]

STATEHOOD FOR SOMALILAND AND THE GLARING HYPOCRISY

 

 

 

“Wixii hore u soo daashaday Dugashanaysaaye” “In Pursuit of the futile” (clans) Cabdillahi Suldan Timacadde

 

 

On October 18, 2011, the President of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland (Northern Somalia) distributed a two page overview of the Horn of Africa region on the world-wide web. The English version, “The other Horn of Africa” by Ahmed Mohamoud Siilanyo was published by the Somaliland Press. The Somali version of the same article appeared in Jamhuuriya Newspaper on line with the long title, “Madaxweyne Siilanyo oo soo Bandhigay Sababta Beesha Caalamku Indhaha uga Qabsatay Qadiyadda Somaliland,” in which President Siilanyo presents the reasons why the international community shuns the issue of Somaliland statehood. Though the headline does not accurately reflect the contents of the article, President Siilanyo uses the article to point out both grievances and accomplishments of his state.

 

His first grievance is addressed to the international community, and poses the question as to why that community is putting so much effort and money into Southern Somalia rather than into the much more stable Somaliland. He intimated that Somaliland should have a share of that money due to the stabilizing role it could have in the surrounding areas as a partner in the exchange of benefits.

 

The second grievance was directed to the African Union, specifically those elements of its charter that prevent African states from redrawing colonial boundaries. He contends those same components of the charter have already been breached by recent developments in Eritrea, and even more recently in South Sudan (July of 2011).

 

President Siilanyo also addresses the accomplishments of his state, and believes they are just cause to qualify Somaliland for the status of statehood. He points out that there have been three elections conducted by his state since its inception in 1991. He notes that there are three active political parties in Somaliland. He then draws attention to the referendum of 2001 that led to the separation of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia. In the president’s own words, “independence should be recognized only if a clear majority (well over 50% of the voters) have freely chosen it, ideally in an unbiased referendum.” It is obvious than an unbiased referendum must include a guaranty of fair and equal treatment of minorities.

 

Upon further examination, it is clear that the 2001 referendum to which President Siilanyo referred in his article was rigged in many areas; and there was no referendum at all in the regions of Sool and Sanaag. It is also clear from the president’s article that he has strong reservations about the referendum of 2001. He arbitrarily determined the figure of 50% to allow for complete secession. Clans in Somaliland include Isak, **********, ***********, Warsengli Iisa, Figi Shini, Gabooye and Madibaan. These groups, which the president identifies as minorities, actually comprise approximately 60% of the total Somaliland population. None of these groups wholeheartedly supports Somaliland.

 

Over the last twenty years the argument used for the recognition of Somaliland is its similarity to the events in Eritrea. That is not a fair comparison for several good reasons. For one thing Eritreans are a mixed population of Christians and Muslims. Historically, the mostly Tigrayan Christian population supported the unification of Ethiopia, while the Muslim population favored independence. A compromise among the two populations was reached through the United Nations. The compromise resulted in a federation with Ethiopia allowing all the main organs of the state to be run by Ethiopia’s central government, while local government was run by Eritreans. By 1958 Eritrea was completed incorporated into Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie.

Thirty-five years of guerrilla warfare culminated in the collapse of the Mengistu regime 1991. The president’s biological—and Tigrayan cousins–determined the fate of the two countries. Ethiopian leaders agreed in a national conference to hold a referendum under the supervision of the United Nations to decide the future of Eritrea. It was through the referendum that Eritrea acquired its independence in 1993.

 

It is important to examine the differences between the situation in Somaliland and the political process that led to Eritrea’s independence. Notably, no Eritrean leader ever came to the central government requesting to be part of Ethiopia. Instead, Haile Selassie and subsequent leaders ruled Eritrea through the Tigrayan Christians. Conversely, Somaliland was the pioneer in seeking independence from the British-the region championed the cause of, and led in efforts to bring about the unification of greater Somalia. In fact all former Somali civil servants under the British colonial rule refused to take their pensions from the British, preferring to be a part of a united Somalia. There was no coercion from any source that compelled Somaliland to seek independence and join Southern Somalia.

 

Even more striking, Somaliland does not have a mixed population whose heritage and cultural values are different. All citizens of both greater Somalia and Somaliland adhere to the Islamic scripture included on the Somaliland flag, “There is no God but God and His messenger is Mohamed.” Somaliland’s judicial system is rooted Sharia law. Some of the greatest leaders who fought for Somalia against the United Kingdom were northerners, including Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan and the great poet Abdillahi Suldan Timacadde. Abdillahi described the day of independence from colonial rule with the patriotic words, “This morning is the first day to see a Somali hoisting a flag” (“Soomaaloo callan taagta saakaa inoogu horaysa”). When Somaliland celebrates June 26, 1960 in commemoration of its long struggle culminating in its self-declared independence, are the contributions of these great champions of a united Somalia included in the celebration? The history of modern Somalia is shared by all the component parts into which it has now become divided.

 

The second comparison with Eritrea cited by President Siilanyo is that of South Sudan, which acquired its independence in July. 2011. The Somaliland president and his leadership went to South Sudan to celebrate its independence in an effort to gain recognition by the rest of the world. The same colonial power that ruled Somalia over a hundred years also ruled over both North and South Sudan. The north is comprised of primarily Arab speaking Muslims. The South has indigenous African tribes with two different cultures and multitudes of languages. I see no comparison here.

The United Nations Charter has established some basic criteria for statehood.

 

These include a clearly defined territory, a permanent population, and an effective government. In regard to the first criterion, “a clearly defined territory,” Somaliland’s territory is based on a colonial boundary that was ill-defined by Great Britain during the colonial era in Africa. When Somalia joined the United Nations, it simply inherited boundaries that were not justly defined. Under the United Nations charter, all borders defining all parts of Somalia are the same administrative lines to this day. That means the borders of Somaliland were based purely on lines drawn through a territory occupied and established by a colonial power.

 

Those colonial boundaries were purposely delineated in a manner that hopefully would provide a buffer zone between existing Ethiopian, British and French power structures. That is why to this day skirmishes among the Habar Yoonis and Ciida Gale and Tol Jecle clans are settled in Hargeisa rather than by the Ethiopians—in spite of existing boundaries in which members of those clans live. For the ********** in Harawa valley, disputes are brought to Borama for settlement, while disputes among the Isa clan residing in Shiinle are brought to Djibouti. There are no definitive borders aside from those established by the

 

British in their efforts to control nomadic families across the territory.

The second problem with a defined territory is that each clan has its own recognized territory in which it runs its own affairs. *********** residing in the Sool and Sanaag regions continue to have their respective aspirations for self-determination. This clan is unique in that it is the only known Somali clan never to have relinquished its land on paper to the British. President Siilanyo has tried to subsume these groups into Somaliland several times without success. His government therefore has no legitimacy in those two regions. A governing power’s unilateral decision to take control against the peoples’ will violates the charter of the United Nations regardless of the number of presidential and parliamentary elections held.

[Knight of Wisdom]

It is probably impossible to quantify a permanent population as it pertains to Somaliland. Somaliland does not have a permanent population confined solely to its borders. The colonial legacy left members of the five clans residing in Somalia scattered among Ethiopia, Djibouti and Southern Somalia. A majority of the population continues to straddle these areas, resulting in ever-changing and fluid populations not clearly confined to any particular border or borders. The British colonial authorities in preparing to leave Somalia attempted to save face by carving out an area west of Somaliland known as the “Reserve Area.” The area was established so that the local nomads could have a place for their livestock to graze. When the Reserve Area was given to the Ethiopians by the British in 1954, massive demonstrations took place in Hargeisa. Demonstrators carried signs reading, “If our land is taken our lives are taken.”

 

In regard to the criterion for effective government, Somaliland’s government as currently constituted has been neither effective nor inclusive. All the most important portfolio and decision-making powers are within the hands President Siilanyo’s clan. These include the office of president, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense and several other important posts. All three existing political parties are from Mr. Siilanyo’s extended clan, effectively guaranteeing that all power remains within the frame work of that clan. Government revenue has been used for bribes and questionable deals. Multitudes of clan headmen run traditional parallel states within Somaliland, and are more effective in settling disputes than any government body. The most dangerous and divisive trend has been replacing greater Somali’s history with the civil war history featuring the Somali National Movement (SNM) within Somaliland’s educational system. The treatment of SNM heroes as martyrs has been included in the regular school curriculum.

 

It is not acceptable to focus so much attention on recognition for statehood while failing to address and solve the myriad internal problems plaguing Somaliland identified in this paper. There is serious clan domination, and exclusive rather than inclusive representation at all levels of Somaliland’s current government framework. The best possible course of action is to reconstruct the Somali state from a center in Hargeisa. This central authority must be inclusive and representative of all citizens of greater Somalia. It should be the authority that settles disputes in accordance with effective, traditional means of problem-solving and conflict resolution. Such an authority could be much more effective and culturally sensitive than UN courts or the African Union. There is no good reason to return to the colonial boundaries that have been so divisive, such a barrier to meaningful development of greater Somalia, and so universally unpopular and ignored by those they were originally intended to benefit.

 

There are effective, longstanding, and widely accepted economic and social systems already in place among the residents of greater Somalia. Rekindling the administration of the much broader and more inclusive Somali ethnic kinship is a just and worthy cause.

References:

 

 

1. Sanford J. Ungar, Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent. Simon & Schuster. New York1989.

 

2. Michela Wrong, “I didn’t Do It for You” How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation. Harper Collin Publishers. New York. 2005.

 

3. James P. Hubbard, The United States And The End OF British Colonial Rule In Africa, 1941-1968. Mcfarland & Company, Inc., Publishers. North Carolina. 2011.

 

By Jaafar M. Sh. Jama

 

Email: jaafarjama@hotmail.co

[Carafaat]

So your preiction is the reconstruction of the Somali state from a centeral authority in Hargeisa.

[Knight of Wisdom]

Carafaat;753986 wrote:

So your preiction is the reconstruction of the Somali state from a centeral authority in Hargeisa.

Whether it be Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Hergeisa or even Laascaanood, I could careless where the Somali people of Somalia choose their Capital to be.

[Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar]

Farta baluugan ayaaba wax laga aqrin karin. Darn.

[A_Khadar]

^lol.. blue is patriotic....

 

This is a great analysis though not sure about the statistics is used.

[Knight of Wisdom]

A_Khadar;754036 wrote:

^lol.. blue is patriotic....

 

This is a great analysis though not sure about the statistics is used.

I know, blue is patriotic. lol

 

What statistics are you talking about? If it's the 60% part, then it's correct. If you add up Reer Awdal, SSC, Maakhir they'll be over 60% of the population of Northern Somalia, maybe more.

[burahadeer]

What a nonsense 60 percent.this is the truth, 90 percent majority, 10 percent minority.keep rewriting history and everything else,it only shows that you r not people to be trusted or to have anything to do with.what destroyed Somalia is few people who lived like in this illusion only to be bestowed in total destruction by the majority they thought they could put beneath the carpet.

[Mayaani]

60 percent I don't that but their choice of state those regions is blue one(Somalia) no question about that.

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

Majority or Minority who cares Somaliland belongs to Somalilanders one flag one nation one people

 

 

 

God bless

[PasserBy]

Knight of Wisdom

The best possible course of action is to reconstruct the Somali state from a center in Hargeisa.

Hargeisa is too small and too far north to be Somalia's capital. Mogadishu is geographically suitable and so should remain its capital. It just needs to be pacified and the clan cleansing that took place in the early 90s needs to be reversed. Somalia and Somaliland have to come to an agreement on a referendum for Somalilanders to decide their future.

[Duufaan]

Why not offer referendum for Oromo people who make majority of Ethiopia who dislike the Ethiopian system? In Somalia it is not practical to offer one clan or several a referendums and specially a colonial support referedum

[PasserBy]

Read the Ethiopian constitution. There is no monolithic Oromo view, but the vast majority have no desire to be independent. Even OLF has retracted its hollow ambition. Somalilanders on the other hand have been ruling themselves for over 20 years. In addition they claim to be a product of British colony. If that can be ascertained, give them the referendum they so desire.

 

BTW, this thread is not about Ethiopia. It is about Somalilanders. It is mind boggling why nomads insert xabashis in every argument. It is a cheap distraction

[Wiil Cusub]

These groups, which the president identifies as minorities, actually comprise approximately 60% of the total Somaliland population. None of these groups wholeheartedly supports Somaliland.

Everybody who mention percentage without proper statically studies or reference shows ignorance

[Carafaat]

Knight of Wisdom;753895 wrote:

It is probably impossible to quantify a permanent population as it pertains to Somaliland. Somaliland does not have a permanent population confined solely to its borders. The colonial legacy left members of the five clans residing in Somalia scattered among Ethiopia, Djibouti and Southern Somalia. A majority of the population continues to straddle these areas, resulting in ever-changing and fluid populations not clearly confined to any particular border or borders. The British colonial authorities in preparing to leave Somalia attempted to save face by carving out an area west of Somaliland known as the “Reserve Area.” The area was established so that the local nomads could have a place for their livestock to graze. When the Reserve Area was given to the Ethiopians by the British in 1954, massive demonstrations took place in Hargeisa. Demonstrators carried signs reading, “If our land is taken our lives are taken.”

 

In regard to the criterion for effective government, Somaliland’s government as currently constituted has been neither effective nor inclusive. All the most important portfolio and decision-making powers are within the hands President Siilanyo’s clan. These include the office of president, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense and several other important posts. All three existing political parties are from Mr. Siilanyo’s extended clan, effectively guaranteeing that all power remains within the frame work of that clan. Government revenue has been used for bribes and questionable deals. Multitudes of clan headmen run traditional parallel states within Somaliland, and are more effective in settling disputes than any government body. The most dangerous and divisive trend has been replacing greater Somali’s history with the civil war history featuring the Somali National Movement (SNM) within Somaliland’s educational system. The treatment of SNM heroes as martyrs has been included in the regular school curriculum.

It is not acceptable to focus so much attention on recognition for statehood while failing to address and solve the myriad internal problems plaguing Somaliland identified in this paper. There is serious clan domination, and exclusive rather than inclusive representation at all levels of Somaliland’s current government framework. The best possible course of action is to reconstruct the Somali state from a center in Hargeisa. This central authority must be inclusive and representative of all citizens of greater Somalia. It should be the authority that settles disputes in accordance with effective, traditional means of problem-solving and conflict resolution. Such an authority could be much more effective and culturally sensitive than UN courts or the African Union. There is no good reason to return to the colonial boundaries that have been so divisive, such a barrier to meaningful development of greater Somalia, and so universally unpopular and ignored by those they were originally intended to benefit.

 

There are effective, longstanding, and widely accepted economic and social systems already in place among the residents of greater Somalia. Rekindling the administration of the much broader and more inclusive Somali ethnic kinship is a just and worthy cause.

References:

 

 

1. Sanford J. Ungar, Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent. Simon & Schuster. New York1989.

 

2. Michela Wrong, “I didn’t Do It for You” How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation. Harper Collin Publishers. New York. 2005.

 

3. James P. Hubbard, The United States And The End OF British Colonial Rule In Africa, 1941-1968. Mcfarland & Company, Inc., Publishers. North Carolina. 2011.

 

By Jaafar M. Sh. Jama

 

Email:

jaafarjama@hotmail.co

The author comes up with the strangest conclusion after stating that a 'minority' clan forms the Somaliland Goverment. A goverment which the author finds neither effective nor inclusive.

 

Why does he expect from a minority clan that they would/could reconstruct an inclusive and representative central state for all citizens of greater Somalia in Hargeisa?