Somaliland's Recognition - Myths, Truths Law

[Jacaylbaro]

Several major, recent developments have brought the issue of Somaliland's recognition as an independent nation to the top of the agenda in the politics of the Horn of Africa region (HOA). The first is the successful referendum in southern Sudan the result of which is widely expected to show a massive majority in favour of independence. This referendum marks a watershed moment in modern African history, since it will be only the second time that the people of a territory in an African country achieved independent statehood through their freely expressed wishes evidenced by voting - the first time was the referendum that presaged Eritrea's emergence as an independent country in 1993. The second development is the increasing acceptance by the principal international sponsors/donors (both African and Western) that the TFG of Sheikh Sharif is incapable of bringing peace, governance and stability to Somalia, even as the expiry of its mandate in August 2011 approaches.

 

These facts have forced a new, more mature perspective upon the major, foreign stakeholders as well as Somaliland and Somalia's neighbours regarding Somaliland's claim to formal, de jure recognition of its independence. This is evidenced by several important, new factors in Somaliland's relations with its neighbours, as well as foreign powers, which are outlined below:

 

The willingness of Ethiopia to actively support Somaliland's campaign for recognition, as confirmed publicly to the new government in Hargeisa. Previously, Ethiopia, while supporting Somaliland and opening a Consulate in Hargeisa, had shied away from open, vocal support of Somaliland's campaign for international recognition to avoid being accused of seeking to break-up its historic enemy.

 

The willingness of IGAD, grouping Somaliland's neighbours in the HOA, to work with Somaliland's Government officially, thereby accepting Somaliland as a de facto state. This was evidenced during a visit by senior IGAD officials (including the Secretary-General) to Hargeisa in December last year, as well as the SG's recent statement, in the wake of the southern Sudan referendum, that IGAD was willing to play a major role in holding a similar referendum in Somaliland at the appropriate time.

 

The improvement in relations between Somaliland and Djibouti heralded by the visit of Somaliland's new President, Ahmed Mahmoud Silanyo, in November last year. Previously the Guelleh regime in Djibouti had pursued a dual track policy regarding Somaliland of maintaining ‘good neighbour' relations, while focusing its efforts upon nurturing and promoting the TFG. The advent of a new government in Hargeisa provided Djibouti with the opportunity to publicly acknowledge what it had been forced to accept in private - namely that the TFG was an abject failure and that the political tide regionally and internationally had shifted decisively in favour of engagement with Somaliland. Ever the canny politician, Ismail Omar Guelleh, jumped aboard the bandwagon and embraced President Silanyo with a state visit with all the trimmings.

 

The new willingness of major Western powers to engage more closely with Somaliland as evidenced by Washington's announcement of its new ‘dual track' policy for Somalia whereby it will continue to support the TFG (albeit grudgingly), while also dealing directly with Somaliland, Puntland and other self-governing areas opposed to Al-Shabaab. This closer engagement with Somaliland was also evidenced in the UK's invitation to the Silanyo administration which resulted in an official visit (minus the trimmings) during which the Cameron government promised increased aid in various areas. Finally, the new approach of these governments is evidenced in the closer intelligence and security cooperation between them and the Somaliland authorities.

 

The interest of China in securing access to the potential hydrocarbon deposits in Somaliland (which are reported to be significant and potentially large) by establishing relations with the Somaliland government, as evidenced by the invitation extended to President Silanyo to visit China with a high powered delegation including the Somaliland business community.

 

Finally, in the Arab World, particularly the Gulf countries, there is also evidence of a new, more accommodative attitude towards Somaliland and its claim to recognition. In Saudi Arabia in November 2009 the government lifted the ban on livestock imports from Somaliland, despite intense lobbying from the TFG and its supporters among the Saudi business community. This has dramatically improved Somaliland's economy since the Kingdom is the destination for some 90% of Somaliland's livestock exports, which account for around 90% of the country's export revenues. In addition, the government of Kuwait has significantly increased its aid to Somaliland and members of the ruling family are building vacation residences in the country which points towards improving contacts and relations for the future.

[Jacaylbaro]

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[nuune]

The willingness of Ethiopia to actively support Somaliland's campaign for recognition

,

as confirmed publicly to the new government in Hargeisa.

Previously, Ethiopia, while supporting Somaliland and opening a Consulate in Hargeisa,

had shied away from open, vocal support of Somaliland's campaign for international recognition

to avoid being accused of seeking to break-up its

historic enemy

.

For the record yaa arkey Che hanoo sheego the contradictions