Now what ?

[Blessed]

Moses lol

 

What is with the fake accent? don't make me expose you.

 

 

Ameenah.....anyone who worked for the notorious NSS is guilty. If i had my way , no one who worked for Barre's regime shouldn't hold any office......and lets be honest , everyone in somali politics faithfully served my aabi siyaad one or another!

Guevara

 

They are all guilty by association, I guess! But you know what some 1 told me that you'd have to have 20 years political experience to serve office in Somalia... this only leaves as with Siyads men. They werent all bad though!

 

In 1991, for the sake of peace, the elders in NW Somalia declared amnesty for all collaborators/members of the previous regime. And Egal made Kaahin V.P. for tribal balance in their 'government' and to get the Western tribes on side of secession.

Does that make him guilty? The allegations made about him weren't really concerete they were based on the assumption that because he worked for the NSS then he was directly responsible for the killings. I don't think that is enough to put him trial.

 

I'm also dismissing it as propaganda because the author herself stated that a man with such history should not be running for election.. so the article was written to stop him from becoming president.

 

He might well be guilty but you can't mess arround with justice like that ignoring criminals and pointing them out when it suites ya. People knew Riyaal Kaahin before they appointed him as V.P, he actually was President when the articel was published. Office is Office end of the day. It just doesn't add up. I am not convinced.

 

 

O you who believe! Stand out firmly for Allâh and be just witnesses and let not the enmity and hatred of others make you avoid justice. Be just: that is nearer to piety, and fear Allâh. Verily, Allâh is Well­ Acquainted with what you do. Maida 8.

[Gabbal]

Qaryaqaan your posts remind me of the first debate I had in this forum with Samy_Gyrl and you are restressing exactly the points I had stressed in those previous posts.

[LANDER]

First of all, Gargyaqaan you claim I am one who argues for the sake of argument, and yet you’re the one I see constantly commenting on the secession of Somaliland in the hopes of attracting argument. Secondly you asked yourself if I read your postings, which I did and understood clearly, but unfortunately I cannot say the same for your understanding of mine. The problem is you come with weak arguments, and you state and re-state the obvious. I will try once again to be clear, although I don’t enjoy repeating myself I will break it down for you as needed. Obviously there is a Somali nation (nation=a people that share a common culture, heritage and language). My point was that before independence in 1960, there was no political entity known as a Somali Nation-State (Political unit of a Nation) and hence those who argue that Somaliland is breaking the “Somali Unity” have no basis for their argument. Historically the Somali nation and its 5 regions was never united so how can you accuse a people of breaking a unity that was never there to begin with? Therefore you can say we were a bunch of wandering nomads with no sense of statehood. As for the short life of the nation-state of Somalia, it was a failure and any reasonable person would admit it. You can use all the lamus terms such as “it was hijacked by a dictator” to justify the failure of the state, but the fact remains it was no less a failure. By the way, I never said that Somalia didn’t exist, I don’t know where your getting that from and you can go back and quote me if you like. If all I have said above doesn’t prove this point to you then your really not comprehending what I’m talking about.

 

The fact that Somaliland is a former british protectorate is hardly the reason for the nation’s legitimacy. That is only you narrow outlook on things.

 

As for your suggestion that Somaliland could be plagued by the same problems that occurred with the old nation(i.e.tribalisme), you are definitely right about that. But the very existence of this state is a testimony to the willingness of all of its diverse clans to co-exist in peace. These matters are far from being solved and there is still much work to be done as our democracy is still in its infant stages. Yet I can proudly say our parliamentary representation could even put the US government to shame.

 

 

You say “Differentiate between Bare and the Somali people” and I will tell you that obviously my quarrel is not with the Somali people as I am one of them, but those who oppose the right to self-determination of my Nation-State. I think this problem is at the heart of the issue.

 

What the rest of Somalis have to understand is that Somalilanders will never listen or even consider arguments of unity so long as their right to self-determination is not recognized and respected by the rest. I believe the real reasons people oppose Somaliland are not as noble as the classic somali Unity argument. I will leave it up to the pro-unity supporters to give other reasons as I really have come to be cynical of this ladder argument.

 

Garyaqaan you say we are nothing without you, and that is not true. Somaliland can succeed without the rest, has succeeded without the rest and will continue to do so. Truth of the matter is we don’t need you and you don’t need us. From my point of view this has nothing to do with tribalism has I am not tribalist, however I am extremely nationalist. I’ll leave it to you to understand the difference between the two.

 

 

To the Somalilanders,

 

As May 18 approaches, I sincerely feel that we should remember all the lives lost during the Somali civil war. We as landers should also remember those who sacrified their lives for us to enjoy the peace and freedom we have today.

 

On a lighter note:

 

What are you plans for may 18? What’s happening in Canada for it?

I’d appreciate if y’all could share that with me.

 

Salaam

[Che -Guevara]

Ameenah.....Siyyad's boys did nothing when their boss were creating this havoc , we are in right now. Those who turned against him did so coz they felt threatened by him, not coz they want to free all somalis from the tranny of the barre regime.Most of them still have core beliefs of their late master!....These men can't be trusted with anything. Their experience won't be of any use to the somali ppl.

[Gabbal]

1.1 How the Somalis Lived Before Separation

 

From around the 9'th century to the 14'th century AD, for several hundred years before the colonialists arrived in Eastern Africa, there was a loose collection of city states with the collective name of "Shungwaya" -- that is unfortunately not well documented in written history. "Shungwaya" is a Bantu word, that had several different meanings simultaneously: a cultural belief system and set of legends, a form of government, and actual city-state governments.

 

According to the Shungwaya legends, there was a unified city state along the coast covering the territory from approximately Berbera in the North to Northern Tanzania in the South, called "Greater Shungwaya". However, it broke up into different smaller city states that were culturally related but politically relatively independent. Around 1071, Shungwaya sent an ambassador to China. Examples of some such cities include locations: near Berbera, at Kelafo inside of Ethiopia today on the Shebelle River, at Hobbio, near Mogadishu, and along the Coast between Mogadishu and Malindi. The Ajuran Imamate from about 1500 to 1650 AD and centered around Kelafo on the Shebelle River played a central role in Somali history.1

 

This was a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual political system. To the Southwest, Bantu ethnic groups and languages predominated and to the Northeast Cushitic ethnic groups and languages predominated. The political structure of city states reflects the primarily nomadic occupation of the people, with traders centralized in cities on good trading routes, and without clear "national borders" as are common today for "nation states" of farmers, as in Europe.

 

The Somali ethnic group came into existence around 1200 AD, when a small number of Arab settlers along the coast between Zeila and Bosaso married local Cushitic indigenous women, combining the Arab clan-structure system with the Cushitic/Shungwaya political/cultural system and a Cushitic language.2 This young ethnic group flourished, possibly due to innovative nomadic techniques brought from Arabia, spreading deeply into present Ethiopia and Kenya, displacing other Cushitic groups, such as the Oramo ethnic group, and Bantu people who lived here earlier.

 

In parallel with this ethnic displacement of Somalis expanding and displacing other ethnic groups within this larger system, Christianity and Islam were already displacing earlier animist religions throughout the whole system, but in forms modified by the earlier animist religions and the regional cultural belief system.

 

1.2 How the Somalis Became Separated

 

The colonialists came to East Africa and started to draw lines on maps to delineate colonial borders like the national borders of the nation states in Europe. These colonial borders introduced artificial rigidity along lines in the sand replacing the flexibility normally associated with nomadic groups of people around the World.

 

In 1884 to 1885, Great Britain signed nearly identical separate treaties with the

 

Isa group of clans (whose territory is in Djibouti, the Republic of Somaliland, and Ethiopia today),

 

Gadabuursi group of clans (whose territory is in the RSL and Ethiopia today),

 

Habr Garhagis group of **** clans (the Habr Yunis and Eidegalla clans, whose territory is in the RSL and Ethiopia today),

 

Habr Awal clan of the **** group of clans (whose territory is in the RSL and Ethiopia today), and

 

Habr Tojaala clan of the **** group of clans (whose territory is in the RSL and Ethiopia today).

 

 

In 1896, Britain signed an additional treaty with Ahmed Murgan, "Chief of the Ogaden Somalis", mainly applying to the Mohamed Zubier subclan of the Ogadeni clan (who live in the territory known as Region 5 of Ethiopia today).

 

France signed similar treaties with the Isa group of clans and Afar ethnic group living in Djibouti. Italy signed similar treaties with the major clans living in Southern Somalia (the former Italian Somalia) and across the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya today.

 

A general map of "Greater Somalia" is shown below in Figure 1.1.

 

 

Figure 1-1: Location of "Greater Somalia" and its Surroundings

 

The main motivations of Great Britain in establishing the British Somaliland Protectorate were

 

to create a secure source of food, mainly meat, for its military bases in Aden, and

 

to prevent other European colonial powers from claiming all of the East-African coast and thereby hampering British naval and trading operations in this region.

 

 

The main motivation of the Somali clans in signing these treaties with Great Britain, as well as with France and Italy, was to obtain European protection for their territorial integrity, particularly from encroachments by neighboring Ethiopia.

 

Great Britain signed a treaty with the Ogadeni clan in the Ogaden in 1896, promising to protect the sovereignty of the Ogaden, particularly from Ethiopia. Only one year later, Great Britain ceded the Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1897 -- in a secret treaty, whereby the Ogadenis did not discover this treachery until several decades later.

 

In 1948, Great Britain gave the Ogaden to Ethiopia a second time, claiming that their treaty with Ethiopia in 1897 was a valid treaty with a recognized country according to international law, which had a higher precedence over their earlier treaties with the Somali clans in 1894 and 1896 promising to protect their sovereignty. In 1954, Great Britain also ceded the Haud, an additional 24-mile wide strip of land along the border with British Somaliland, to Ethiopia. These actions created great protests and resentment among the Somalis, since this created artificial borders in the middle of the traditional nomadic grazing territory for many individual Somali clans. It also violated the solemn promises of Great Britain to protect the sovereignty of this Somali territory on behalf of the Somalis.

 

1.3 How the Borders Were Defined

 

The delineation between British Somaliland and French Somaliland may correspond roughly to an internal boundary among Isa clans, with the territory of the Mamasan clan in the Isa group of clans being in British Somaliland and other Isa clans being in French Somaliland. At the end of the last century, the dominant port of the Isas was the old port city of Zeila and a large fraction of all Isas were engaged in trade and transport between Zeila, across barren and dry lowlands, to Harar on the fertile Harar plateau, which was the economic, cultural, and political capital of this region.

 

From 1897 to 1903, France built the railroad between Djibouti and Dire Dawa, which lies lower and is more accessible for rail transport than Harar. This replaced the traditional trade route with camel caravans between Zeila and Harar with a new railroad route between Djibouti and Dire Dawa. One result was a displacement of Isa traders and transporters from Zeila to Djibouti. For this reason, 60% of the population of Djibouti today are Somalis, mainly Isas, but also including substantial numbers of Gadabuursi and ****s. As a result, the border between the RSL and Djibouti today has little connection to the ethnic and economic relationships that existed when it was drawn at the end of the last century, in terms of Somali clans living on one or the other side of it.

 

By contrast, the border from the coast inwards between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia reflects the clear clan boundaries that existed then and have been preserved until today. This border represents the general nomadic grazing border between the Warsangeli and *********** clans on the side of British Somaliland and the ********* clan on the side of Italian Somalia. Colonial rule until 1960 also served to cement this division into two separate economic zones under different colonial cultural influence, with

 

the port of Bosaso serving the *********s in Italian Somalia and

 

the smaller nearby ports of Las Koreh and Mait as well as the larger more-distant port of Berbera serving the Warsangelis and ***********s in British Somaliland.

 

 

During the first half of this century, a significant number of Warsangelis, ***********s, and *********s (all of whom belong to the same Harti subgroup within the ***** group of clans) moved South to areas near Kismayo along the border with Kenya and Mogadishu, i.e. in lower Juba with more fertile land than their original dry nomadic grazing areas in the North. Demands by these Hartis living in the distant South for reunification between the Republic of Somaliland and Southern Somalia, in order be legally reunited with their brothers in the North, are not based upon economic need for these two separate economic regions and should receive a corresponding lower priority and attention.

 

We do not yet have clear background information on how the border between Southern Somalia and Kenya was defined.

 

Particularly from the British perspective, the borders between French Somaliland, British Somaliland, and Italian Somalia were clearly defined going from the coast inwards. However, from the British perspective, the depths of these territories inland, bordering with Ethiopia, were less clear and relevant. Yet, there was considerable rivalry between the British and the French over the fertile and productive region around Harar, with their respective attempts to define their own hegemony deeper into this region, at the expense of the other. When it was convenient for their own interests, they interpreted the inner borders to be as deep as possible up to the border with non-Somali Ethiopia at that time.

 

A long-term problem has been that:

 

the British, French, and Italians seemed to think of their protectorates as territories defined by lines drawn on maps, whereby the lines defining the depth were unclear and changeable, to meet their desires, whereas

 

the Somalis who granted them rights in exchange for territorial protection thought that they were getting protection for the sovereignty of the land that they occupied and lived on.

 

 

When Britain gave independence to Kenya in 1962, it did conduct a referendum in October 1962 of the people living in the Northern Frontier District, mainly 250,000 Somalis with a smaller Oramo minority. The vast majority voted in favor of reunification with the Republic of Somalia. However, Great Britain acted against the expressed self-determination of the inhabitants of the Northern Frontier District, by ceding it to Kenya instead of Somalia. The result has been continued political unrest and "shifta" warfare in the Northern Frontier District, so that Kenya inherited only problems with this "gift" and no benefits. It also resulted in political antagonism between Somalia and Kenya as neighbors.

 

When France granted independence to French Somaliland, their government decided to retain their independence and not to join the Republic of Somalia. One factor was the fact that 60% of the population were Somalis and 40% were Afars, who occupy 2/3 of Djibouti as well as the Danakil Desert in what is now Northeastern Ethiopia and Southern Eritrea.

 

In this way, Great Britain played the key role in dividing the loosely-organized Somali territory, in the tradition of Shungwaya, into the 5 Somali territories today:

 

Djibouti (60% Somali and 40% Afar),

 

Republic of Somaliland (100% Somali)

 

Region 5 of Eastern Ethiopia (nearly 100% Somali),

 

Italian Somalia (nearly 100% Somali), and

 

Northern Frontier District of Kenya (nearly 100% Somali and Oramo).

 

 

Although this partitioning of the Somalis, against their will and, in the case of the Ogaden, secretly for several decades, may have served short-term British political interests, it has laid the basis for much of the tension and conflict on the Horn-of-Africa during the post-colonial period.

 

The Charter of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) and their Resolution 16(1) of July 1964 made the colonial borders sacrosanct, demanding that new state borders should coincide with the colonial boundaries.3 Most international lawyers agree that this policy by the OAU guarantees the colonial border between the former British Somaliland and Southern Somalia. This policy has been interpreted as blocking any changes in the locations of such borders, but not to block the elimination of such borders upon a unification between neighboring states, such as between Libya and Egypt, and not to block the re-instatement of such borders when such a unification fails, as was the case between Libya and Egypt. However, this official policy of the OAU, also supported by the International Community, probably has less weight at a lower level than international law.4

 

1.4 Partial Reunification in 1960

 

On 4 June 1946, the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Bevin, proposed to the House of Commons that: "British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance and there might be a real chance of a decent economic life, as understood in that territory".5 This policy proposal mobilized public opinion of the Somalis for reunification into a "Greater Somalia".

 

When Great Britain actually ceded the Ogaden to Ethiopia a second time in 1948 and ceded the Haud and Trust Territories to Ethiopia for the first time in the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1954, this mobilized public opinion among the Somalis on both sides of this changing new border to strongly oppose separation and to favor reunification.

 

When Great Britain granted independence to British Somaliland on 26 June 1960, the two main political parties in Somaliland at that time had been formed earlier as parties of protest against the actions of Great Britain in ceding their territory to Ethiopia. They were the SNL (Somali National League) of the ****s and the USP (United Somali Party) of the ***********s. Therefore, reunification was the key local political issue at that time, whereby reunification with the just-lost Ogaden and Haud were highest in priority.

 

When Italy also granted independence to Italian Somalia five days later on 1 July 1960, this opened the technical opportunity for at least reunification between Somaliland and Somalia, even though this reunification had their lowest priority. Still, this bilateral reunification between Somaliland and Somalia appeared to be a positive step forwards towards the more-important components of reunification. In addition to reunification with the Ogaden and the Haud, the Somalilanders were hopeful that Britain would then allow at least the Northern Frontier District to join their union with Somalia and that French Somaliland would also join them later, when France granted independence. (Both of these hopes and anticipations remained unfulfilled!)

 

The Prime Minister in the last years of British Somaliland, as well as the President of the independent and internationally-recognized Somaliland for 5 days after it received independence until it joined Southern Somalia, was Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (who is also the current President of the Republic of Somaliland). He and other political leaders in Somaliland were cautious and generally opposed to any quick bilateral reunification with Southern Somalia without detailed negotiations. However, they already had a democracy and the majority of the citizens demanded immediate reunification with Southern Somalia as soon as Italy granted independence.

 

The Somalis in Southern Somalia were less interested in whether the Somalilanders joined them or not. Therefore, the reunification of Somaliland and Southern Somalia, on the day when Italy granted independence to the latter, was a result of the enthusiasm of the Somalilanders, tempered by the caution of their leaders. The International Community showed no interest in whether they joined or not at that time.

 

Somaliland drafted an "Act of Union" to be approved by the legislatures of Somaliland and Southern Somalia and then to be signed by representatives from both independent nation states. On 27 June, Somaliland's Legislative Assembly passed the "Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law", which incorporated their proposed Act of Union. This law was to come into force in the South as well, upon the signature by authorized representatives from the South -- but it was never signed by any representatives from the South. On 30 June 1960, the Legislative Assembly of the South approved a new "Act of Union", but only "in principle", and with its text differing substantially from the text of the Act of Union proposed by Somaliland. At midnight on 30 June 1960, the President of the Legislative Assembly of the South proclaimed the independence of a reunified State of Somalia.6

 

The draft Constitution had already been prepared in the South, together with Italian officials, before Great Britain granted independence to British Somaliland. Politicians from the North were not given an opportunity to make more than marginal changes in this draft Constitution. This added to the resentment by the Somalilanders to the way they were being treated by the South.

 

An important component of the unsigned Act of Union for reunification between Somaliland and Southern Somalia, was that a referendum must be held to confirm this reunification, before it became final. Because of the haste of the Somalilanders, they started the reunification before conducting this referendum. It quickly became apparent that the Somalilanders had granted too many compromises in their haste, such as accepting the capital in Mogadishu and a majority of the high-level positions going to Southerners.

 

When this referendum was finally taken, combined with a referendum on the proposed Constitution for the reunified state in June 1961, only 100,000 of the estimated 650,000 citizens of Somaliland voted, with approximately 70% opposing reunification with Southern Somalia and the proposed Constitution. But it was too late and Southern Somalia did not let the Somalilanders go.

 

This led to mutiny by senior Somalilander military officers, trying to restore independence in accordance with the incomplete treaty, but they were defeated and Somaliland was forcibly kept reunified with Southern Somalia. At the trial of these military officials, "the judge acquitted them on the basis that, in the absence of an Act of Union, the court had no jurisdiction over Somaliland.7

 

Lawyers have pointed out that this bilateral precipitous reunification between Somaliland and Southern Somalia was never legally completed. It is therefore legally improper to speak of "secession" today, since reunification was never legally completed. This is like a marriage being "annulled" because it was never consummated, rather than a "divorce" to dissolve a legal marriage.

 

The main pre-occupation of the Somalis concerning reunification remained the important issue of reunification with the Ogaden, now Region 5 of Ethiopia.

 

Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre comes from the Marehan clan of the ***** group of clans. Only about one half of the Marehans live in Southern Somalia, with most living in the Ogaden and some in the Northern Frontier District. Within the clan-based political system in Somalia, the number of Marehans living in Somalia was too small to support a Marehan as President and Dictator. Therefore, Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre was only able to stay in power by a cunning political game of playing the larger clans off against each other, in shifting alliances with his own small and relatively insignificant Marehan clan. The Somalis spoke of Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre ruling generally with an MOD Alliance (Marehan, Ogadeni, and *********** ).

 

When Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre came to power with his coup in October 1969, "there were only four officers from his clan in the armed forces; it is now estimated [in 1982] that more than 60 percent of the officers are [Marehan] clan members".8

 

Since most of the Marehan and Ogadeni clansmen and a significant number of the *********** clansmen in this alliance live across the border in the Ogaden, this gave Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre a particular focus and priority for reunification of these three clans, who formed the cornerstone of his ruling alliance. This factor accentuated the local political pressures for reunification and caused constant political conflict with two wars between Somalia and Ethiopia.

 

This clan aspect had other important consequences. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre was present at a traditional inter-clan battle as a child, where his father was killed by an **** . This led to personal hatred by Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre against the **** group of clans, who make up 66% of the population in Somaliland, and led him to conduct a systematic program of genocide against them, starting in 1980.9 At most, Somaliland was only a subjugated colony for Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre to exploit and oppress, while he aspired to genuine reunification with his clansmen in the Ogaden.