A critique Western Diplomacy and the rise of terrorism

[baalcade]

Mohamed Egal’s well written article posted in WardheerNews certainly makes good reading but otherwise his recycling of hackneyed secessionist mantra, albeit cleverly repackaged, adds little or nothing to unravelling the vexed political problems of Somalia let alone resolving it. Looking at Somalia as he does through his tainted secessionist lenses, Mr Egal sees as doomed all international efforts to “reconstruct” what he maliciously refers to as the “ex-ante” Somali State. From his perspective and those of his fellow secessionists, such “futile and counterproductive” initiatives as have been pursued by the international community, and that also include the denial of recognition to his one-clan based secessionist enclave in the north of Somalia, are at the heart of the country’s problems and the cause for the rise of Al Shabab and all associated terrorism in the country.

 

Pontificating from his secessionist high horse, Mr Egal’s simple but disingenuous proposal to the international community is that the road to Somalia’s elusive salvation passes through his beloved kingdom and that all will be alright again if only Somaliland was to be recognised and the rest of Somalia put under five years of quasi UN “colonial” administration which could rely on his clan’s SNM militia to maintain law and order. The irony of inviting the outlaws as a Sheriff, or the unmistakable insult it entails for the Somali people, do not seem to have dawned on Mr. Egal. Even Somalia’s worst enemies could not have come up with such mischievous prescription but then the secessionists are clearly foremost amongst them.

 

If there is much ground to rubbish Mr. Egal’s preposterous proposed solutions for Somalia, no less palatable are his partisan and at times shameless distortions of the real factors leading to the fall of Siyad Barre’s government and the subsequent collapse of the Somali State, with all the dire consequences these have unleashed to the present day. The following extract at the beginning of his article serves as a good foretaste to his pervasive falsification of the facts:

 

“…the Somali National Movement (SNM) defeated the Somali army and expelled Siyad Barre regime from Somaliland in 1991, this decisive fact not only sounded the death knell for that dictatorship, but resulted directly in the disintegration of the erstwhile Republic of Somalia”.

 

Without sounding pedantic, it is appropriate to set the record straight. The fact of the matter is that it was the southern United Somali Congress (USC) militia under General Mohamed Farah Aideed who overrun Mogadishu and forced President Mohamed Siyad Barre to flee his capital – an event that led to the fall of the government and the disintegration of the Somali national army throughout the country- north and south. It was this auspicious vacuum from the SNM’s perspective which enabled them initially to take over the principal Isaak-inhabited towns. Otherwise, this clan-based militia had never defeated the Somali army in any battle nor has it occupied any territory in the North except when it briefly occupied parts of Burco and Hargeisa, in a surprise offensive in the early 1980s. It was driven out soon afterwards by the national army admittedly at a high cost to the civilian population. So much as to who ousted Siyad Barre from power, brought down his government, or defeated his army.

 

The fall of a government, as did that of Siyad Barre in January 1991, would not have been necessarily equivalent to the collapse of the State provided State institutions were still functioning at least in the capital, Mogadishu. Examples abound of other countries where governments have fallen and not replaced for long periods and yet the state continued to function thanks to its performing institutions. Unfortunately, that was not what happened in Somalia.

 

The mainly ****** uprising against Siyad Barre in Mogadishu did not only bring down his government but also destroyed at the same time all government and state institutions thereby rendering the State defunct. What is worse, incessant intra ****** clan wars for power in Mogadishu, or the struggle for resources among the capital’s warlords, have thwarted to the present day all national and international attempts aimed at establishing a functioning national government or reviving the Somali State. This has left the rest of the people in Somalia helpless and hostage all these years to this state of affairs in Mogadishu over which they have little control or say.

 

Thus, the epitaphs for the fall of the last functioning national government, the disintegration of the Somali national army and the collapse of the Somali State are all to be found in the ruins of Mogadishu and not Hargeisa. The rest of the people in Somalia have been buffeted by the actions of two clans whose intentions are different but whose consequences amount to the same, namely the continued existence of the moribund Somali State. One clan in the north is sworn to secession which they reckon can best be achieved by actively aiding and abetting the continued collapse of the State. And then there is another clan in the South which has no such intentions but all the same its actions since 1991 lead to the same thing. What is strange is that whereas the ****** would understandably shy away from admitting their role in the continued collapse of the Somali State, Mr. Egal seems to take profound pride in laying claim to this treacherous feat. Gloating over the fall of the Somali State and the misfortunes it engendered is a common pastime among the secessionists

 

In his analysis of the collapse of the Somali State, Mr Egal asserts that “the glue holding the Somali state together was the nationalist, irredentist dream of uniting all the five geographic territories in to which the Somali people were divided during the colonial carve-up of Africa ….” That glue has been destroyed, according to Mr. Egal, by Siyad Barre’s dictatorial rule to the extent that “no community in Somalia or Somaliland has any loyalty or fealty to the Somalia that was”.-Mr Egal of course is free to speak for himself and his community (clan) but it is presumptuous of him to present himself as speaking for the rest of us in Somalia. Notwithstanding his wishful thinking, the glue holding Somalis together, apart from his minority clan-based secessionists in the north, is as strong and binding today as it has ever been.

 

In pronouncing the death of Somali irredentism or “fealty to the Somalia that was”, Mr Egal has only one goal in mind: justify the break-up of Somalia and then make a case for Somaliland’s right to separation and recognition. The “Somaliland” he has in mind comprises his clan, the main backer for the secession, and the other majority clans in Awdal, Sanaag, Sool and Cayn. These non-secessionist regions/clans, the last three of which belong to the autonomous Puntland regional administration, consider themselves as part of Somalia and are recognised as such by the international community. All the same, they have been high jacked or occupied at gun point by the secessionists in the belief that recognition will be forthcoming once they are seen to be in control of the whole or most parts of former British Somaliland.

 

If the irredentist, nationalist glue is something of the past and non-existent, as Mr. Egal would have us believe, this would mean that, in the absence of adherence to national identity, Somalis everywhere, including the north, will simply withdraw to their clan origin. .This is only true of the Isaak clan to the extent they want to de-link from the rest of Somalis and retreat to their former shell- the defunct former British Somaliland. One might therefore ask what other kind of glue is then holding together the disparate clans in the north (Somaliland) that is exclusive to them? None –to put it simply. Clearly, the glue holding together the dominant clan in the secessionist heartland is their clan identity, their common xenophobia towards other Somalis in the south and their aversion to the union. This is the rationale for the secession.

 

The other card Mr. Egal has used as a possible back-up for Somaliland’s recognition is his scaremongering about the threat Jihadists like Al Shabaab pose for the current government of Somalia or to others in the region. Al Shabaab and other kindred groups are not a by-product of Western efforts to help Somalia as Mr. Egal claims, but foreign interventions in Somalia, notably Ethiopia’s creeping hegemony over Somalia, its transformation of the country into Bantustans, like Somaliland and Puntland, and the subsequent USA collusion with the warlords and with Ethiopia’s brutal invasion. The last Djibouti conference leading to the “election” of Sheikh Sheriff as president, only added fuel to the fire in its attempt to sideline the resistance movement who claim to have liberated the country from Ethiopia and who feel denied their due reward.

 

Mr. Egal wrongly portrays Al Shabab as a southern phenomenon. On the contrary, they have widespread support in both Puntland and Somaliland. Many of the Jihadists fighting in the South are from Somaliland and Puntland. Mr. Egal has failed to mention for obvious reasons that the perpetrators of the suicide bombings in Hargeisa a year ago hailed from that area..

 

The solution for countering extremis and “terrorism” is the establishment of a broadly based government which includes moderate elements from Al Shabaab and other related groups like Hisbul Islaam. Certainly, no solution should ever include the recognition of Somaliland. To do so would only be another boon to the Jihadists who are bound to take its fighting to the North. Apart from Al Shabaab’s intervention, any conflagration in the North will also pit the non-secessionist clans against the pro-secession clan, a situation which will draw in Puntland and eventually Somalia –at a time when it is able to take its national duty and defend the unity and territorial integrity of the country.

 

Recognising Somaliland’s secession is bound to serve as a precedent within Somalia and beyond. Inside Somalia, other regions could follow Somaliland’s example. Puntland seems well on that road. Outside Somalia, the recognition of Somaliland will most certainly affect adversely Somalia’s neighbours and far beyond. For all there reasons, there is nothing to be gained and everything to lose from recognising Somaliland. The stakes are too high and the international community should no longer sit on the fence and remain passive observers. It should everything possible to end the secession. The best way to do that is for sympathetic governments like Great Britain and all international aid organisations to cease pampering or hobnobbing with an illegal entity.

 

Reviving a united and democratic Somalia, as it used to be in the past, is what its suffering people need most and what is in the interest of the international community in terms of countering terrorism.

 

Source