Alastair Campbell reveals all

[N.O.R.F]

A book i look forward to reading

 

Iraq: the debate, the rebellion and the march to war

 

 

In this extract from his diaries Alastair Campbell reveals the intense discussions taking place around the cabinet table on the eve of the invasion

 

Monday July 9, 2007

The Guardian

 

 

The day before the defining Commons vote on Iraq Robin Cook resigned, adding to a sense of crisis and a prime minister's future on the line as he sought to persuade parliament to support military action.

 

Monday March 17 2003

 

TB started Cabinet, introduced Goldsmith, then Clare came in and asked Sally where Robin was. "He's gone," said Sal. "Oh my God." TB's only reference to Robin was to say that he had resigned. Peter Goldsmith went through the answer on legal authority to use force. One by one, a succession of colleagues expressed support for TB, then Clare said she owed them "a short statement", that she intended to reflect overnight.

 

She said publication of the roadmap was significant but we shouldn't kid ourselves that it means it is going to happen. She said she admired the effort and energy that had gone into getting a second resolution but there had been errors of presentation. "I'm going to have my little agonising overnight. I owe it to you." JP, John Reid and one or two others looked physically sick. JR spoke next, said never underestimate the instincts for unity and understand that we will be judged by the Iraq that replaces Saddam's Iraq, and by the Middle East. Derry said he felt we would have got a second resolution if the French hadn't been determined to scupper it, and said we had made so much effort to get a second resolution that it had led to people thinking we actually needed one. Paul Murphy was just back from America and said what an amazing feeling there was towards us there. "It's not quite the same here," said TB.

Tuesday March 18 2003

 

Debate day dominant. GWB's statement overnight had come out fine. They had taken in all our changes, the ultimatum was calm and strong, the tone towards Iraqi people compassionate, the commitment to the Middle East peace process was in there strong, and all the bellicose stuff either taken out or conditional. So to be fair, they had delivered big-time for us.

 

The Robin resignation speech, and the standing ovation in parts of the House, was still getting a lot of play but I sensed that was the high point of the rebellion.

 

TB was on the phone to Blunkett who was warning him that John Denham would resign. Also Philip Hunt [lords minister] went on the radio to resign. That seemed to be about it at the moment. TB was in a pretty calm mood. He felt we were winning some people over on the arguments, but we had a problem in that there were a lot of our MPs who had promised their local parties that they wouldn't support without a second resolution. This was the unintended effect of the point Derry made yesterday, that we fought so hard to get one that people assumed we needed one before action. Clare was making a complete fool of herself.

 

Hague was on to it, had an absolutely brilliant line in the debate, how TB had "taken his revenge and kept her". TB's speech in the house was one of...his best. Very serious, full of real argument, confronting the points of difficulty and we felt it moving our way. He did a brilliant put-down to the Lib Dems, which helped the mood behind him. I did another secure call with Dan [bartlett]. It looked like Wednesday late, special forces. It was one of those days when people out in the country were actually following what was going on.

 

IDS and Charles Kennedy had both been poor. There had been some excellent backbench speeches but though the interventions didn't really zing, TB had definitely come out on top. There were a lot of protesters outside, so I faced a bit of abuse going in, then up to JP's office to agree the line that we push from the moment the vote was over, that we won the vote, because we won the argument, and now the country should unite.

 

We ended up having a very friendly chat, then going down to wait for the vote, which for the government motion was 412 for and 149 against, and for the rebel motion 396 voting against and 217 for. 139 Labour MPs rebelled.

 

I called Dan with the result as it came through. I was in the front office of TB's Commons office, MPs coming and going, the staff all pretty relieved. TB came back and called everyone in to say thanks. He said we had pulled out the stops and we had to. His own performance today had been superb. All of us, I think, had had pretty severe moments of doubt but he hadn't really...now there was no going back at all. He had to give authority for our forces to go in...everyone was assuming the Americans would start a massive bombing whereas in fact the first action would be some of our forces acting to prevent an ecological disaster.

 

· The Blair Years: Extracts from The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Published today by Hutchinson

 

[N.O.R.F]

A classic moment in Downing Street

 

 

In this extract from Alastair Campbell's diaries, he talks about the Northern Ireland peace process

 

Monday July 9, 2007

The Guardian

 

Thursday, December 11, 1997

Gerry Adams and his team arrived 15 minutes early, and he did a little number in the street, where the media numbers were huge. This was a big moment, potentially historic in the progress it could lead to. They came inside and we kept them waiting while we went over what TB was due to say. Mo Mowlam and Paul Murphy were both there and Mo was pretty fed up, feeling she was getting shit from all sides.

 

They were...summoned down to the Cabinet room. We had agreed TB should be positive but firm. He actually came over as friendly, welcoming them individually as they came in. I shook McGuinness by the hand, who as he sat down said, fairly loudly: "So this is the room where all the damage was done."

It was a classic moment where the different histories played out. Everyone on our side thought he was referring to the mortar attack on Major, and we were shocked. Yet it became obvious from their surprise at our shock that he was referring to policymaking down the years, and Britain's involvement in Ireland. "No, no, I meant 1921," he said. I found McGuinness more impressive than Adams, who did the big statesman bit, and talked in grand historical sweeps, but McGuinness just made a point and battered it, and forced you to take it on board.

 

Of the women, I could not work out whether they really mattered, or whether they just took them round to look a bit less hard. They were tough as boots all three of them. TB was good in the use of language and captured the sense of occasion. He said we faced a choice of history - violence and despair, or peace and progress. We were all taking risks, but they are risks worth taking. He said to Adams he wanted to be able to look him in the eye, hear him say he was committed to peaceful means, and he wanted to believe him.

 

I was eyeing their reaction to TB the whole time, and both Adams and McG regularly let a little smile cross their lips. Mo got pissed off, volubly, when they said she wasn't doing enough. TB was maybe not as firm as we had planned, but he did ask - which I decided not to brief, and knew they wouldn't - whether they would be able to sign up to a settlement that did not explicitly commit to a united Ireland. Adams was OK, McGuinness was not. Adams said the prize of a lasting peace justifies the risks. Lloyd George, Balfour, Gladstone, Cromwell, they all thought they had answers of sorts. We want our answers to be the endgame. A cobbled-together agreement will not stand the test of time.

 

He pushed hard on prisoners being released, and the aim of total demilitarisation, and TB just listened. TB said he would not be a persuader for a united Ireland. The principle of consent was central to the process.

 

The Blair Years: Extracts from The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Published today by Hutchinson

[N.O.R.F]

'What gives me real edge is that I'm not as Labour as you lot'

 

 

In this extract from Alastair Campbell's diaries, he talks about the Lib Dems, Diana and 9/11

 

Monday July 9, 2007

The Guardian

 

On courting the Lib Dems

Saturday April 26 1997

 

We were holding up really well in the polls. Richard Branson [head of Virgin] was going to be the big thing today. Again, it would help in terms of mood, the sense of things going in our direction. My favourite story was "Major takes charge of campaign". Where the hell had he been up to now? Meanwhile, TB was getting stronger all the time.

 

I got there just before 7 and he stunned me straight out with the boldest plan yet. "How would people feel if I gave Paddy a place in the Cabinet and started merger talks?" **** me. I loved the boldness of it, but doubted he could get it through the key players. He had the Clause 4 glint in his eye. He'd hinted at it...in the past, but this sounded like a plan. He was making a cup of tea, and chuckling. "We could put the Tories out of business for a generation."

On the death of Diana

 

Saturday August 30 1997

 

I got to bed, and at around two I was paged by media monitoring: "Car crash in Paris. Dodi killed. Di hurt. This is not a joke." Then TB came on. He was really shocked. He said she was in a coma and the chances are she'd die. I don't think I'd ever heard him like this. He was full of pauses, then gabbling a little. We started to prepare a statement.

 

By now the phones were starting from the press, and I didn't sleep. Then about an hour later Nick, the duty clerk, called and said simply: "She's dead. The prime minister is being told now." I went through on the call. Angus Lapsley was duty private secretary and was taking him through what we knew. "I can't believe this. I just can't believe it," said TB. "You just can't take it in, can you?"

 

On Labour values Wednesday August 30 2000

 

TB said it was important I understood why parts of Thatcherism were right. Later in the day he came up with another belter when Peter Hyman [strategist and speechwriter] asked what gave him real edge as a politician and TB said: "What gives me real edge is that I'm not as Labour as you lot." I pointed out that was a rather discomfiting observation. He said it was true. He felt he was in the same position he had always been and we were the people who had changed.

 

On 9/11

 

Tuesday September 11 2001

 

TB was straight onto the diplomatic side...he said that we had to help the US, that they could not go it all on their own, that they felt beleaguered and that this would be tantamount to a military attack in their minds. We had to decide whether we should cancel the speech [to TUC conference]. There was always a moment in these terrorist outrages where governments said we must not let the terrorists change what we do, but it was meaningless. Of course they changed what we did. .

 

On Blair's departure plans

 

Thursday July 11 2002

 

TB called me through and we went out for a chat on the terrace. Philip [Gould] had briefed him on how his trust ratings had really dipped. He said: "In truth I've never really wanted to do more than two full terms." It was pretty clear to me that he had just about settled his view. The big question was the same as before - does it give him an authority of sorts, or does it erode that authority, and do people just move automatically towards GB?

 

[Sophist]

He has left out alot of material Re GB!

 

I wont buy it but will def read at Borders Insha Allah with Coffe!!