''Somalia's Compromised National Reconciliation Conference

[Xudeedi]

July 19, 2007

 

On July 15, the long awaited, thrice delayed and seriously compromised National Reconciliation Conference (N.R.C.) -- aimed at beginning to resolve Somalia's multiple conflicts -- was kicked off, only to be abruptly adjourned, as eight mortar rounds were fired at the meeting's venue, a refurbished former police garage in the country's official capital Mogadishu. The chair of the commission that organized the conference, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, said the adjournment was due to the fact that only half of the 1,325 anticipated delegates had arrived; local and international media, however, traced it to the mortar attacks. The conference is scheduled to reopen on July 19.

 

The N.R.C. is the brainchild of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the president of Somalia's weak Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), which was pressured by international donor powers -- the United States, Western European states, the European Union and the United Nations -- to initiate an inclusive reconciliation process in the wake of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in December 2006 that ousted the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.) from its control over most of the country south of the semi-autonomous sub-state of Puntland. Addis Ababa had acted in the belief that its intervention would establish the T.F.G. as a pliant authority and eliminate a perceived Islamist threat, but its result was the emergence of a multi-faceted political and armed resistance against the Ethiopian occupiers and the T.F.G.

 

Although the donor powers, particularly Washington, were pleased to see the Courts movement, which sought to create an Islamic state in Somalia based on Shari'a law, defeated, they were appalled by the resulting instability, which threatened to drive Somalia back into the chaotic statelessness that had prevailed there before the rise of the Courts movement. Their preferred solution was an inclusive reconciliation process, held under their supervision, that would bring together the T.F.G. and its non-violent political oppositions in a dialogue that would isolate the Islamist insurgency and pave the way for a national accord.

 

The T.F.G. executive saw the donors' plan, which would eventuate in its sharing power with the oppositions, as a threat to its interests in preserving its control of formal institutions and the perquisites that went along with it. Yusuf responded to international pressure by devising an alternative plan: a conference that would be organized by a T.F.G.-appointed committee and would be based on clan membership and representation rather than on political divisions, would not be mediated by external actors, and would exclude bargaining over the structure of the T.F.G. or its personnel.

 

The donor powers reacted coolly to Yusuf's version of reconciliation, but they were unwilling to impose their plan on him and confined themselves to repeated appeals for "inclusiveness," which were not heeded. Trapped by their decision to support the T.F.G. as Somalia's legitimate authority despite its weakness, unpopularity and dependence for its existence on the Ethiopian occupation, the donor powers acquiesced in the N.R.C. Yusuf had scored a decisive tactical victory, having finessed the external actors.

 

During the month since PINR released its last report on Somalia, the country's politics has been dominated by the run-up to the N.R.C. On the ground, violent attacks on Ethiopian forces and T.F.G. militias, including mortar fire, targeted assassinations of officials, roadside bombings, shoot-outs and grenade assaults, have been a daily occurrence. In response, the Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces have engaged in indiscriminate return fire, imposition of a curfew, intensive weapons searches, arrests of suspected insurgents and their supporters, and raids on media houses, civil society organizations, mosques, businesses and schools -- all in an attempt to secure Mogadishu ahead of the N.R.C. On the political front, the T.F.G.'s opponents have continued their process of coalescing into a bloc and have refused to participate in the N.R.C. through their clans.

 

The run-up to the N.R.C. and its truncated opening confirm PINR's consistent assessment since the Ethiopian intervention that Somalia has entered a devolutionary cycle marked by regional, local and clan fragmentation, with the addition of political and ideological divisions, and a revolutionary Islamist insurgency. The T.F.G., which admits that it needs external financial, military and diplomatic support to survive, might have scored a tactical success in evading serious negotiations on power-sharing, but in the long run it has only bought some time in a deteriorating situation.

 

The Basic Situation

 

Even if the N.R.C. restarts and runs through its projected 45-day course, it will be compromised from the outset by Somalia's devolutionary cycle. The most incisive analysis of the country's political situation during the past month appeared in an interview published by the International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) with the head of its delegation for Somalia, Pascal Hundt, who reported that the country is so insecure that "no really effective [humanitarian] action is possible, whether with regard to protection or detention."

 

Hundt observed that the "new phenomenon of insurrection" had rendered a military solution to Somalia's conflicts impossible, leaving only the possibility of a political accord, and concluded that "the solution has to come from the Somalis themselves with massive and unified support from the international community." He was unwilling to predict any outcomes.

 

In his most telling comment, Hundt said that he had trouble "understanding the complex, varied and ever-changing chains of command" among the contending groups in Somalia -- a precise characterization of the volatility that characterizes devolution and fragmentation.

 

The I.C.R.C.'s judgments are in line with those of PINR. When there is a power vacuum, as there would be in Somalia were Ethiopian forces not filling it temporarily, uneasily and imperfectly, there is a retreat to more primary solidarities. The absence of regularized relations among the sub-groups leads to incipient conflicts that break out sporadically or chronically. In the general condition of instability, the balance of power continually shifts, prompting leaders of sub-groups to switch allegiances in response to short-term calculations of advantage. Even when the conflicts become aggregated and polarized, the contending sides are divided internally, rendering long-term stability problematic and compromises tenuous.

 

As the devolutionary cycle in Somalia deepens, the conditions for successful reconciliation become far more difficult to meet. In the absence of "massive and unified support" from external actors, which has not been forthcoming and is unlikely to be provided, fragmentation proliferates and polarized opponents become more unwilling to compromise.

 

As a tactic contrived in response to the pressure of donor powers that is aimed at avoiding a political solution, the N.R.C. does as much or more to exacerbate devolution as it might conceivably do to arrest and reverse it.

 

The Players Take Their Positions

 

Put in the bluntest terms -- and they are justified -- the N.R.C. is a nuanced yet simple power play by the T.F.G. executive to maintain its position by keeping international financial, military and diplomatic support; keeping the Ethiopian occupation in place barring the deployment of an adequate African Union (A.U.) or preferably U.N. peacekeeping force; and controlling the electoral process that is supposed to result in a permanent government and is mandated to take place in 2009. It is in the T.F.G.'s interest to ride out the remainder of the transition period and to prolong itself into any permanent arrangement. Part of staying in the saddle is to frame the reconciliation process to accord with its interests, which it has done for the time being, and to drag it out, attempting to use clan negotiations to build support and, if necessary, to divide and rule.

 

Given the T.F.G.'s weakness and dependence on an unpopular occupation, and the cool reaction of donors to its reconciliation plan, it was an achievement simply to mount the N.R.C. In its last report on Somalia, PINR was doubtful that the conference would be held. The insurgency had become chronic and rooted in Mogadishu, there was no indication that delegates were being selected and the conference had no agenda. The ****** clan family, which is dominant in Mogadishu, had rejected participation in the N.R.C. unless a long list of demands was addressed, and the political oppositions were flatly rejectionist.

 

What changed the picture was the judgment of the donor powers that a severely flawed reconciliation process was better than none at all, given the severe strains placed on Addis Ababa by the occupation, the failure of force to crush the insurgency, the reluctance of African states to contribute troops to a peacekeeping mission without a peace to keep, the growing danger that Islamist terrorist cells would form in Somalia, a mounting humanitarian crisis and a slide into the instability that accompanies devolution.

 

Increasingly desperate to halt the devolutionary cycle, the donor powers, which control the purse strings of the impoverished T.F.G., were divided on how to approach the transitional executive, with Washington adopting a qualified favorable line toward the N.R.C. and Brussels deepening its skepticism about it.

 

On June 15, Washington released US$1.5 million to fund the conference -- well short of the $32 million requested by the T.F.G. and the $8 million that it had been reported that donors had decided to provide. On the same day, the U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement carrying no binding authority that expressed "grave concern" over attacks by "extremists" and "all attempts to undermine" the N.R.C., and called on all U.N. member states to cease support of "extremists and spoilers." The statement went on to emphasize the "urgent need" for the United Nations to plan for a possible peacekeeping mission and urged African states to contribute to the A.U. peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), which has only 1,600 Ugandan troops on the ground out of a projected 8,000 multi-nation force.

 

The presidential statement accorded with Washington's position that armed resistance to the T.F.G. is the work of "extremist" jihadists supported by Eritrea, which has a simmering border dispute with Ethiopia and has provided safe haven and a base for the political oppositions to the transitional authority, and by Arab states, which have interests in limiting Addis Ababa's influence in the Horn of Africa.

 

Although Washington got the presidential statement that it wanted, other external actors expressed reservations. The U.N.'s undersecretary-general for political affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, said that he would be "concerned" if the N.R.C. were delayed yet again. The E.U.'s commissioner for development and humanitarian aid, Louis Michel, was more emphatic, stating that the N.R.C. was "not working satisfactorily" and that there was no excuse for postponing the conference.

 

On June 16, U.S. Senator Russ Feingold criticized the failure of the Bush administration and the international community to pressure the N.R.C. to undertake genuine reconciliation, saying that the concerned external powers should stop sending mixed messages to the T.F.G. and should specify "clear expectations" for the N.R.C., including the requirement that the conference produce "an outcome document laying out a roadmap for a sustained and pervasive [reconciliation] process" that would include "all stakeholders" and incorporate international organizations as observers. On June 18, the European Union enhanced its diplomatic presence by appointing Georges-Marc Andre as its special envoy to Somalia.

 

In the last week of June, the U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that violence in Mogadishu had spiked since the June 15 opening of the N.R.C. was delayed, hindering delivery of aid. Washington shifted its position to bring it more into line with the E.U.'s, with the U.S. State Department issuing a statement warning the T.F.G.'s prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, that efforts to undermine dialogue were "unacceptable" and that arrests and detentions of "prominent citizens" and harassment of "respected NGOs" undermine efforts "for a national dialogue and political reconciliation." Washington's growing skepticism peaked in a BBC interview with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, who said that it was "difficult to frankly say" that Somalia was currently better off than it had been before the Ethiopian intervention.

 

The picture changed abruptly on July 3, when Andre praised the T.F.G. for "reaching out" to the oppositions by including "political issues" on the N.R.C.'s unspecified agenda. On July 11, Andre led a delegation of the Contact Group (C.G.), which brings together Somalia's Western donor powers, to Mogadishu to meet with T.F.G. officials and leaders of the ****** clan. He commented after the discussions that "we received good news and are going back happy."

 

Taking the lead on the diplomatic front, the E.U. held a joint meeting with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.) -- the regional cooperation organization of Horn of Africa states, in which Eritrea has suspended participation -- on July 13, firming up the consensus of external actors that there is only a "political solution" to Somalia's conflicts and that an "inclusive" N.R.C. that only leaves out those who do not renounce violence is the means to achieve it.

 

Although the intensive behind-the-scenes diplomacy that led to the consensus of donor powers to support the N.R.C. has not been reported, it is clear that Washington had joined Brussels in demanding concessions from the T.F.G. and that Brussels was satisfied with what the T.F.G. offered. On July 16, the N.R.C.'s organizing commission reported that it had received $4.5 million for the conference and pledges of $8.2 million that would be given in staggered allotments dependent on the conference's "progress" in achieving reconciliation. Still, on July 18, a day before the conference was to reopen, Gedi criticized the donor powers for failing to provide adequate funds even to transport delegates to the venue, warning that unless more aid was made available, the N.R.C. "might fail."

 

In PINR's judgment, the concessions made by the T.F.G., which will be discussed below, do not ensure that the N.R.C. will result in political reconciliation and inclusive dialogue. The T.F.G. can be expected to fight to keep control of the conference, and the political opposition has thus far refused to participate in it.

 

Determined to remain in the saddle during the remainder of the transition period and under pressure to include all "stakeholders" in a political discussion, the T.F.G. responded to the donor powers by making mainly symbolic moves to placate them.

 

On June 17, the transitional parliament, based in the town of Baidoa, discussed a proposal to pardon members of Islamist militias and to release former fighters and opposition politicians from jail. On June 19, Yusuf signed an amnesty decree, making clear that it did not apply to "those with direct links with the internationally wanted terrorists and those who continue to pursue violence." Since then, the U.N. has reported that the amnesty has had no effect on the level of the insurgency, and the I.C.C.'s political wing, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, has rejected it, with Ahmed claiming that it is the T.F.G. that needs to beg for pardon due to its "grave crimes against Somalia's people, God and the country."

 

On June 24, the transitional parliament's speaker, Sheikh Adan Madobe, said that the N.R.C. organizers were "reaching out" to the Islamists and dissident members of parliament based in Eritrea, who could attend the conference if they were chosen by their clan elders, and reaffirmed the clan-representational formula of the N.R.C., which he claimed was "inclusive."

 

On June 27, the commission chair Mahdi announced that he had invited "some members" of the I.C.C., mentioning its former foreign affairs chief, Ibrahim Hassan Adow, specifically, to attend the N.R.C. On June 28, Adow said that Mahdi had contacted him and other I.C.C. leaders in Sudan, Eritrea and Qatar, and insisted that it was "impossible for even one Courts official" to participate in the N.R.C. as long as it was held under the Ethiopian occupation.

 

On July 5, in an interview with Ghana's Accra Daily Mail, Gedi clarified the nature and purpose of the N.R.C., saying that the conference "will start with the wider social reconciliation," taking the "first step" of "sorting out the internal differences of the clans and sub-clans of the Somali people." He insisted that the T.F.G. was not ignoring the political dimension of reconciliation, which would be dealt with at the end of the transitional period when political parties would be formed. On July 9, Mahdi echoed Gedi, saying that the purpose of the N.R.C. would be to "settle all grievances and grudges that each and every Somali tribe harbors against one another."

 

At the truncated opening of the N.R.C. on July 15, Yusuf announced his intention to remain in his post until the end of the transition period. Press reports claimed that the conference agenda would include disarmament, a T.F.G. priority; clan reconciliation; compensation for past abuses stemming from inter-clan conflicts; and resource sharing, none of which address political issues directly.

 

On July 17, Awad Ashara, chairman of the transitional parliament's Committee for Information, Guidance and Culture, said that the N.R.C. would produce a "binding document" based on a "declaration of commitment to a future of peace and tranquility" embodying justice, democracy, fairness and equality -- the T.F.G.'s conception of a roadmap.

 

It appears that the T.F.G. has come out with the edge in its sparring match with the donor powers. Its refusal to make the conference "political" rendered the T.F.G.'s amnesty and its overtures to the I.C.C. and parliamentary dissidents symbolic. The one success of the T.F.G. in reaching out to the oppositions was to engineer a split between the *** and Abgal sub-clans of the ******, persuading the Abgal to send representatives to the N.R.C., which left the ***, from which the I.C.C. gained its strongest support, in a more deeply rejectionist position.

 

The oppositions to the T.F.G. represent a diverse array of groups and positions that are incipiently strained and have coalesced around resistance to the Ethiopian occupation and the transitional institutions, which they consider to be Addis Ababa's illegitimate pawns.

 

The military opposition to the T.F.G. is centered in the militant wing of the Courts movement -- primarily the al-Shabaab militia, which now calls itself the Youth Mujahideen Movement (Y.M.M.) -- that is committed to the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia through armed revolution. The Y.M.M. has claimed responsibility for many attacks in Mogadishu, most recently the shelling of the N.R.C.'s venue during the conference's opening day, and has vowed to continue to disrupt the proceedings. The Y.M.M. rejects not only the N.R.C., but the political process itself, and is the most important trigger for international pressures to hold the N.R.C. and get a political process underway that might isolate the militant jihadists.

 

The Y.M.M.'s most prominent supporter is Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the leader of the militant wing of the Courts movement who is in hiding from the T.F.G. and Ethiopians. In an interview with al-Jazeera on June 23, Aweys vowed that the resistance would overthrow the T.F.G. and set up an Islamic state. On June 26, Aweys presented his analysis of the situation in Somalia to al-Jazeera, stating that the U.S. and European states are propping up the T.F.G. through their Ethiopian proxy because they fear "the destruction of their system." According to Aweys, Muslims face "a world war against the possible establishment of an Islamic government in the world."

 

The political oppositions to the T.F.G. include the political wing of the I.C.C., dissident members of the transitional parliament led by former speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, nationalists opposed to a clan-based formula for Somalia, sectors of the Somali diaspora concentrated in the Somali Diaspora Network (S.D.N.) and the *** sub-clan of the ****** family, which has not joined the coalescing political bloc that includes the other opposition groups.

 

All of the opposition groups fault the N.R.C. for its clan formula, its nontransparent selection process and its siting in Mogadishu, which is occupied by Ethiopian troops. They argue that the clan formula allows the T.F.G. to evade serious power-sharing negotiations, that the selection process has been controlled by the T.F.G. to its advantage, and that the presence of the Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu would subject opposition figures who might attend to arrest and intimidation, and renders free expression and discussion impossible. Some of the opposition groups also argue that the insecurity in Mogadishu will not allow the N.R.C. to function effectively. They say that if a reconciliation conference is held, it must be sited at a neutral venue and be based on political rather than clan divisions.

 

Beyond their points of agreement, the political oppositions diverge on their aims and strategies, with the I.C.C. remaining committed to an Islamist formula, the nationalists to an ethnic-Somali state and the S.D.N. to a reconciliation process in which the T.F.G. has no control over the selection process and does not host the conference, and which would lead to a "legitimate unity government that would prepare the way for democratic elections in 2009."

 

Although the nationalists would prefer a unified opposition movement, the I.C.C. is insistent on maintaining its organizational independence, rendering the oppositions a coalition rather than an incipient party. Nevertheless, on July 12, the oppositions made their decisive break with the N.R.C. by announcing that they would hold their own "constituent congress" on September 1 with the aim of "liberating Somalia from the yoke of the Ethiopian occupation." On the same day, the spokesman for the *** sub-clan, Ahmed Diriye, announced that the *** would not attend the N.R.C., summarizing the general opposition objections to it: "The conference would make sense if it was bringing rival politicians and armed groups to the same table. But if the idea is to talk about non-existent tribal conflict, it's a waste of money and energy."

 

The announcement of the oppositions' constituent congress marks the failure of the T.F.G. to mount an inclusive reconciliation process aimed at a "political solution." Like the T.F.G. executive, the oppositions are likely to attempt to ride out the transition period, attempting to marshal resources, build support and "undermine" the T.F.G. If that scenario plays out, the devolutionary cycle in Somalia will deepen. The only thing that would change the picture would be the highly unlikely success of the N.R.C. in drawing broad public support based on "progress" in reconciliation; were that to happen, some of the opposition factions might join the process.

 

The prospects for reconciliation through the N.R.C. became even more dim on July 18, when Somalia's civil society organizations, whose participation in the conference is essential according to the donor powers, announced that they would not attend. The coordinator of the civil-society groups' council, Abdikafi Hilowle Usman, stressed that Somalia's conflicts are political disputes, not clan rivalries, concluding that "there will be no outcome" from the N.R.C. and that "it is important to postpone it."

 

Conclusion

 

On July 14, McClatchy Newspapers published parts of a recent U.S. intelligence briefing on Somalia, to which it had gained access. The report stated that the T.F.G. is perceived by Somalis as "little more than a pawn of Ethiopia, yet its continued survival, certainly in Mogadishu, remains dependent on the support of the Ethiopian military." Under those conditions, the report goes on, extremists are able to "regain their footing and heighten inter-state tensions."

 

On July 13, in an interview with Agence France-Presse, Roland Marchal of the Center for International Studies and Research in Paris, commented that Somalia's conflicts are not rooted in clans, but in political and military divisions. For Marchal, the N.R.C. is a product of international pressure on the T.F.G., yet "the international community has been deficient on the political issue." He continued that there would be no cease-fire in the absence of "politically inclusive talks," offering that "alternatively you can pretend to have won, like it was done in Iraq and Afghanistan."

 

PINR has reached the same conclusions as Marchal and the U.S. intelligence report, based on data from its own monitoring project. The N.R.C. is a tactical victory for the T.F.G. executive, yet it represents not a "first step" up in the reconciliation process, but another step down in Somalia's devolutionary cycle.

 

Report Drafted By:

Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

 

 

Source: Pinr