A Way Forward for Somalia

[miles-militis]

A rather lengthy I understand but informative report providing some background information as to the nature and process of the present Somali R&P Process.

 

Read along it might assist the formation of an opinion in one way or another.

 

././

An Undiscovered Option: A Way Forward for Somalia?

 

Executive Summary

 

For over a decade, the Somali crisis has represented the most complete and intractable case of state collapse to confront the international community. Despite the declaration of a Transitional National Government (TNG) for Somalia at Arta, Djibouti, in August 2000, sub-national polities such as Somaliland, Puntland and (to a lesser extent) the administration of the Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA), continue to describe the political topography with greater meaning and authenticity than the concept of a transitional national government. Somali territory continues to serve as a transit zone for arms, drugs other contraband, and provides a potential platform for cross-border rebel groups and militant Islamist organizations. In sum, the Arta process has transformed Somalia from a “failed state” into a “quasi-state”: a state that possesses international juridical status, but empirically exists only in name.

 

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, intensified reflections on Somalia’s enduring statelessness and its implications for regional instability have awakened renewed international interest in the search for a solution. The IGAD summit in Khartoum in early January concluded with an offer to bring Somali representatives together for a meeting soon, to be hosted in Nairobi and prepared by an IGAD Ministerial delegation.

 

This new situation presents both risks and opportunities. On the one hand, there exists the potential for concerted international action in support of an enduring, broad-based political solution for Somalia; on the other hand, the international community’s heightened sense of urgency is likely to make quick fixes appear attractive, occluding less obvious, more durable solutions.

 

A deliberate approach, based on detailed, comprehensive and objective assessment of the situation, is required if this opportunity for constructive engagement in Somalia is not to be missed. This paper outlines some of the:

 

• challenges to be addressed in restoring peace and functional government to Somalia;

• fundamental principles on which a peace process might be built;

• institutional options for a future Somali state; and

• considerations for a successful transition to democracy.

 

It concludes by suggesting a possible design for such a peace process.

 

Such a process would require sustained international commitment, disinterested and impartial leadership, realistic objectives, a flexible time frame, and broad participation from across Somali society. Even under the best of circumstances, however, realizing a comprehensive agreement at the conclusion of the process is highly unlikely (and possibly even undesirable). Instead, an iterative (and possibly conditional) implementation of the accords may be necessary.

 

No single option can hope to satisfy everybody. But if a new initiative persuades a critical mass of the Somali people that a new agreement serves the interests of all, not of some, and that the way forward holds promise, not menace, then it will have broken new ground in the search for peace in Somalia.

 

State collapse and political reconstruction in Somalia

 

Somalia’s brief history as a corrupt and predatory state has left its mark on political dynamics in the country since the collapse of Mohamed Siyad Barre’s dictatorship in 1991. The abusive practices of the military regime – state-sponsored violence, institutionalized repression, authoritarian and corrupt leadership – comprehensively and enduringly damaged Somali confidence in the institutions of the state. Over the past decade, Somalis have resisted national solutions, instead establishing smaller, more accountable political arrangements in what some have termed ‘uncentralized’ political reconstruction. Through this diffuse process, nearly two-thirds of Somali territory achieved relative security, stability, and functional (or at least incipient) administration between 1996 and 2000:

 

o In February 1997, after nearly two years of civil strife, peace was restored to Somaliland and the administration subsequently broadened and deepened its ambit.

 

o In July 1998, the Puntland administration was established in northeast Somalia, and the region embarked on an unprecedented period of economic and political development.

 

o In June 1999, the Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) expelled occupying Habar Gidir militia from Bay and Bakool regions and took tentative steps to establish a regional administration.

 

o In Mogadishu, following unsuccessful efforts to install a “Banadir” administration in late 1998, a loose coalition of business leaders and Islamic courts came together to provide the city with a degree of security and stability unprecedented since the government’s collapse.

 

o In the Juba Valley and parts of central Somalia, community and political leaders took stock of developments elsewhere and began to explore the prospects for local administrations in their own areas.

 

The international community acknowledged and endorsed these positive developments. The UN system began, in 1998, to describe Somalia in terms of recovery, transition, and crisis zones. In 1999, the members of the IGAD Partners Forum meeting in Rome endorsed a ‘peace-dividend, bottom-up’ approach to reconstruction intended to consolidate gains in stable regions and encourage less settled areas to follow suit, ultimately leading to form of political federation. More commonly known as the ‘building blocks approach’, it was less an ‘approach’ than an acknowledgement that people-driven political processes and the functional, responsible authorities they produced might eventually afford the basis for a national settlement.

 

In this context, the President of Djibouti convened a Somali peace conference to be held at Arta, Djibouti, in August 2000. The conference resulted in the declaration of a Transitional National Government (TNG) for Somalia, including a president, parliament, and transitional charter. Its promise, however, has not been realized.

 

Although an uneasy international consensus has endorsed the Arta framework as the basis for future peace-building efforts in Somalia, the lack of real progress so far towards establishing peace in Somalia calls for a new and more creative approach. At issue are not the qualitative merits or demerits of the TNG and its leadership, but rather the need to rethink the whole system of government of a future Somali state. The choice of appropriate and sustainable political institutions will be the pivotal factor in deciding whether a peace initiative succeeds or fails, and whether or not stable, democratic government evolves in Somalia over the long-term.

 

First Principles

 

Prior experience of political reconstruction in Somalia provides critical ‘lessons learned’ upon which future international engagement can build. Some of these lessons have become so sharply defined that they might serve as a set of “first principles” in pursuit of establishing sustained and meaningful dialogue leading to a durable, positive peace and a democratic system of government.

 

Somali-driven

 

The agenda and structure of the dialogue must reflect the individual and collective concerns of the key Somali actors. This will require considerable investment in process-design together with Somali leaders if they are to be convinced that it is in their interests to come to the bargaining table. Other measures to ensure an appropriate level of Somali leadership and commitment within the peace process may include the establishment of independent Somali advisory bodies and/or a Somali venue for parts of the process.

 

 

Issue-oriented

 

The definition of appropriate institutional arrangements, electoral systems, and instruments of justice is essential to a lasting peace and functioning democracy in Somalia. The fundamental issues of compensation, occupied territory, justice and self-determination must also be adequately addressed if peace accords are to have real substance. External technical support to the peace process could help to elaborate options for Somalis to consider and facilitate the deliberation of such issues.

 

Impartial

 

The peace process must not be perceived to favour one actor over others or to subvert key political actors. Since the Arta Conference, some external actors have aligned themselves with the TNG, whose claims to national leadership are disputed within the country and thus this alignment represents an obstacle to dialogue. Likewise the TNG’s perceived ‘ownership’ of the Arta process renders it an unattractive framework to other Somali leaders. While a new initiative may build on the achievements of the Arta conference, it should represent a new chapter in the Somali peace process in which the TNG leadership is encouraged to see itself as part of the solution, in cooperation with other de facto Somali authorities.

 

Federative

 

Broad consensus exists that Somalia’s future system of government will be federal (or confederal). The TNG Charter proposes it and Puntland insists on it; the only hope of peacefully reuniting Somaliland with Somalia depends on it. But the final form of Somalia’s government is less important than the process through which it comes together. In other words, Somalia needs a federation less than it needs a ‘federative’ process in which the founding members collectively transfer a limited amount of power to a jointly established central authority.

 

Iterative

 

It is unrealistic to seek full and simultaneous agreement on all aspects of the Somali crisis. The ambitious objectives of previous peace initiatives have inadvertently imposed an ‘all-or-nothing’ logic on the process, tackling reconciliation, sovereignty, constitutional arrangements and power sharing all at once. The failure of such comprehensive accords negates what limited agreement may have been reached on specific issues. A future peace process needs to be flexible enough to accommodate incremental or interim solutions such as the staggered engagement of Somali leaders, phased implementation of an agreement, or asymmetrical sovereign arrangements.

 

 

Three dimensional

 

o Time: previous initiatives have lasted for several weeks or at best several months; resolution of the Somali crisis will require sustained engagement over longer periods, as in Burundi, Western Sahara, Northern Ireland and the Middle East.

 

o Depth: a successful process must engage the broadest possible participation at all levels of Somali society, not just political and civic ‘elites’, in order to ensure that agreements and decisions are deliverable. Public opinion in different regions must be accommodated within the process, not confronted ex post facto.

 

o Breadth: previous accords have been of a general nature, postponing negotiation of specific issues (i.e. occupied land, war crimes, compensation etc.) until later. Their resultant superficiality has rendered them fragile, and of short duration. Future processes should take the form of parallel negotiations on multiple issues; the agreements reached on specific issues could then eventually be conflated in a single umbrella accord.

 

Together, the above principles suggest a path by which democratic institutions, practices and beliefs could be built and strengthened in Somali society, and the development of a system of government in which competition and conflict are managed through established institutions and procedures rather than by resort to force. Lasting peace will require more than the momentary goodwill and determination generated in the heat of high-profile conferences: it will require the patient, painstaking restoration of trust of Somalis in one another, and in the institutions of government they will inevitably create.

 

Institutional Options

 

To a certain extent, the institutional contours of a future Somali state enjoy broad consensus among Somalis:

 

o a constitutional republic enshrining Islam as the state religion and the Shari’a as the basis of law

o a high degree of decentralization, probably within a federal framework

o a democratic system of government characterized by some form of proportional representation and regular, competitive elections

o a semi-presidential (possibly presidential) executive.

 

This is not to deny the existence of alternative points of view, nor to endorse these features as representing the best institutional choices for Somalia, but simply an attempt to identify a common denominator. Unfortunately, these few points of consensus are far outnumbered by the points of contention– including the fundamental issue of whether or not the Somali Republic should be reconstituted as a single state. This section will attempt to describe the principal institutional options promoted by political elites from different clans and territorial affiliations. Such a categorization is necessarily simplistic, but it helps to describe the broad parameters of the debate.

 

1: The Arta Framework

 

Federal or decentralized unitary structure, devolutionary process

 

The framework developed at Arta, embodied in the transitional charter, assigns responsibility to transitional, national (read: ‘central’) institutions for the leadership of the national reconciliation process and the drafting of a federal constitution.

 

The TNG represents an integrative approach to reconciliation, encouraging the formation of political alliances across lines of conflict within centralized transitional structures. The Arta process has been largely successful at securing participation from most main regions and clans, but in so doing it has to a large extent sacrificed meaningful representation, political influence, and administrative control.

 

The Arta process posits an approach to future institutional arrangements that is devolutionary and distributive: during the interim period, sovereignty and authority are vested in centralized institutions, which will subsequently devolve specified powers to subordinate regions. The distribution of posts, territorial/administrative boundaries, executive responsibilities etc. will be centrally defined. Although the transition charter proposes a federal Somali government, such a process might de facto produce a decentralized unitary state.

 

This approach has failed to win the support of other de facto Somali authorities who accept neither the TNG’s authority, nor its pre-eminent role within the Arta framework.

 

2: Building Blocks

 

Federal structure, multilateral associative process

 

This approach has primarily been advocated by Puntland’s leadership, but has at times been associated with the Rahanweyne, and also with ***** groups in the Juba valley. The ‘multilateral’ or ‘building blocks’ approach proposes a federal government comprising a limited number of states (probably four or five).

 

The principal difference between this approach and the Arta framework is that the Arta framework emphasizes a federal outcome, while the ‘building blocks’ approach requires a federative process. In other words, the ‘building blocks’ approach proposes that de facto Somali authorities come together to establish a new central government. The powers and responsibilities of the national government would be negotiated between the federating entities, not devolved from the centre.

 

One obvious drawback of this approach is that de facto authorities only exist in some parts of Somalia, not all. Another is that the definition of the internal boundaries of a federal state could become a major bone of contention within the peace process.

 

3: Re-unification

 

Confederal structure, bilateral associative process

 

This approach has emerged as an implicit proposal of the current Somaliland leadership and probably represents the minimum set of conditions through which Somaliland might be peacefully persuaded to accept continuing political association with Somalia.

 

This approach implies a confederal union of two sovereign entities: Somaliland and Somalia. The rationale for this approach is based on Somaliland’s current de facto sovereign status and its prior existence as an independent state. Essentially, this approach represents an attempt by the Somaliland leadership to renegotiate an association of Somaliland and Somalia on more favourable terms than those agreed to in the failed 1960 union.

 

This approach is unpopular within Somaliland, where it is perceived as a betrayal of Somaliland’s aspirations to international recognition, and also in southern Somalia where it is perceived as awarding to Somaliland political importance and prerogatives disproportionate to its population and territory.

 

Confederation could potentially provide an alternative to Somaliland’s secession, but does not provide an institutional solution for the South.

 

4: Secession

 

Unilateral or negotiated dissolution of union

 

This platform is associated only with Somaliland; no other Somali political entity aspires to independence from Somalia.

 

Proponents of this view typically argue that Somaliland has de facto already exercised its right to self-determination: dissolution of union was affected by the 1991 declaration of independence and subsequently reiterated at the conferences of Borama (1993) and Hargeysa (1996). The referendum of May 31, 2001, technically speaking, was not a plebiscite on the question of independence, but a vote in favour of a new constitution that reaffirms Somaliland’s sovereign status.

 

A variation of this position acknowledges that achievement of de jure international recognition may be expedited by a negotiated settlement between Somalia and Somaliland: for example, were a friendly southern Somali government to recognize Somaliland or were attempts to negotiate a new confederal union to fail.

 

Like confederation, secession fails to provide an institutional solution for the South.

 

5: Unexplored Options

 

It appears that no single option described above can provide an institutional solution for Somalia. A combination of alternatives, or some other creative arrangement, would have a better chance of accommodating Somalia’s diverse political preferences.

 

Setting aside, for the purposes of this paper, the question of Somaliland’s independence, possible scenarios might include:

 

• a ‘one-country, two (or more) systems’ arrangement in which authorities of differing levels of autonomy co-exist within a single recognized state;

• a north-south confederation, with a unitary state in one part and a federal government in the other;

• an interim confederal or federal arrangement including a phased timetable for integration over the longer term (similar to the European process of integration);

• focus on a southern Somali peace process prior to resolution of the North-South problem, leading to effective partition of the country (like Cyprus) over the mid- to long-term;

• a period of international trusteeship (similar to that of East Timor) while new national institutions are negotiated and put in place.

 

When combined with possible transitional considerations like those outlined in the next section, a great number of combinations and permutations are possible. Setting in motion a process that will ultimately define an option for Somalia rooted in the principles elaborated above should be the primary objective of a future Somali peace process.

 

Transitional considerations

 

Appropriate institutional arrangements constitute a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a lasting political settlement in Somalia. This section suggests some of the issues to be addressed if Somalia is to complete a successful transition to democracy. The list is by no means comprehensive and additional issues are certain to be raised by Somali leaders and their constituents during the course of a dialogue.

 

Reconciliation

 

Although peace has been achieved throughout most of Somali territory, reconciliation will take much longer. Left unresolved, some critical issues could yet undermine the force of a negotiated settlement. The most commonly raised concerns include the following:

 

o Restoration: The issue of restoration of squatted homes and stolen property will be an important consideration, particularly in urban areas and the capital, Mogadishu.

 

o Withdrawal: Military occupation of land obtains principally in areas of Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba, but may occur elsewhere on a smaller scale.

 

o Compensation: Compensation for loss of life and/or property is a primordial component of Somali customary law. However, while compensation may still be relevant in local disputes, it is likely to be of only secondary importance in a national settlement.

 

Electoral system

 

An appropriate electoral system will contribute much to the perceived legitimacy of elected leaders and is more likely to contain political competition within agreed, non-violent parameters; an ill-conceived system may bring about the disengagement of disaffected groups from the democratic process and ultimately a return to armed conflict. Given the ‘segmentary lineage’ character of Somali society and the perceived importance of clan representation in political institutions and the civil service, an electoral system designed to produce an inclusive form of proportional representation will provide a degree of stability in the transitional period that majoritarian systems cannot deliver.

 

The peace process must give Somali leaders the opportunity to study and deliberate different types of electoral systems in order to agree on the most appropriate choice for the transitional period.

 

Transitional justice

 

Like many conflicts, the Somali civil war has witnessed war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. Prospects for transitional justice arrangements are complicated by the involvement of senior officials of the Barre regime and alleged war criminals in the leadership of most Somali factions and administrations. However, it is unlikely that any peace accord will stick unless it includes some provisions for coping with the past. Possible options include:

 

o Amnesty of alleged war criminals. In the long term, however, amnesty could undermine the legitimacy of future government by failing to satisfy a sense of justice among certain groups. Failure to bring known war criminals to account might also tarnish the moral authority of the new leadership and threaten democratic consolidation.

 

o An international criminal tribunal could help to address crimes committed by government forces in northwest Somalia in the late 1980s and, on a smaller scale, in northeast Somalia in 1978-9. Factional militia have been accused of war crimes during the early 1990s, notably in Bay region, Kismayo and Mogadishu.

 

o Disqualification (“lustration”) of certain categories of officials of the former government, or of faction leaders, might accomplish many of the same objectives as criminal prosecution with fewer political risks.

 

o A truth commission, with limited powers of prosecution or punishment, could meet with greater political acceptance than more assertive strategies for coping with the past, but - like an amnesty - it may fail to satisfy the desire of aggrieved communities that justice be done, diluting the potency of the peace process.

 

Here again, no single option may address Somali needs and perceptions of justice. An appropriate combination of measures needs to be considered within the framework of a future peace process.

 

Rule of law: legislatures, legal traditions and the judiciary

 

The vitality and integrity of the legislative and judicial branches can provide important checks on executive power. The development of these institutions in parallel with a new administration could help to broaden the opportunities for power-sharing, while limiting the real and perceived potential of a future Somali state to repeat past patterns of abuse. Their current weakness represents a serious handicap to the processes of peacebuilding and democratization. Strengthening of legislative and judicial institutions – before and after a comprehensive Somali peace settlement - will be crucial to the emergence of a stable democratic order.

 

Military, security and police forces

 

Given the record of abuses and atrocities perpetrated within Somalia by the military and security forces, the reconstitution of these institutions is especially sensitive. In addition to the many factional, commercial and freelance militia around the country, Somaliland, Puntland, and the TNG all possess standing military and police forces. In the short term, disarmament – a term too often used in Somalia to camouflage one-sided military consolidation – can only succeed if it is firmly situated in a comprehensive confidence-building process; over the longer term, a political settlement must accommodate concerns about clan and regional balance, integration of regional security forces and civil-military relations.

 

A Way Forward?

 

The principles and scenarios described above help to give shape to a possible Somali peace initiative. The final section of this paper suggests what a peace process might look like. But such a process will not materialize on its own: an element of international leadership, as well as some degree of co-operation from concerned governments, will be preconditions for its success. The suggestions that follow are intended to stimulate reflection and debate on a possible way forward, not to be prescriptive. How best to proceed can only be determined in consultation with – and preferably by – the Somali leaders themselves.

 

 

Talks About Talks

 

Over the years, the Somali peace process has been characterized by irregular, urgent spurts of dialogue in high-pressure conferences – the timing for which is decided by their international sponsors. Such meetings are not terribly different from inviting Somali leaders to enter a dark room, switch on lights, and strike a deal with whomever else they find there. Inevitably, critical issues are addressed inadequately, if at all, and agreements fail to take hold. Instead, the first phase of a new initiative should involve a period of conciliation intended to establish conditions favourable to a direct dialogue between the principal actors, to identify major issues of contention, and to map out a way forward.

 

This will likely require intensive ‘shuttle mediation’ over a period of several months between Somali leaders, concerned governments and regional/international organizations. Through such consultation, it is almost inevitable that issues such as institutional alternatives, transitional justice, occupation, compensation and disarmament will be put forward as proposed items for the agenda.

 

The outcomes of this phase should emphasize ‘process design’: the agenda for dialogue, the structure of negotiations (including the role of any third party), and possibly a declaration of “principles” governing the dialogue. In this phase, Somali civic leaders, professionals, and associations might play an advisory role, proposing items for the agenda and acting as a sounding board for specific elements of process design.

 

Two-Tier (‘Research-based’) Dialogue

 

The second phase might involve a ‘two-tier’ dialogue: a first ‘tier’ of formal negotiations between political leaders and a second “tier” of informal, country-wide, research-based consultations engaging a broad cross-section of Somali society.

 

The formal dialogue could be structured as decision-making plenary group, supplemented by working subgroups. The plenary would serve as the formal decision making body, capable of confirming agreements reached by subgroups. A number of “standing” subgroups would probably be assigned to address separate agenda items, but ad hoc subgroups might also be required on specific issues. One evident advantage of this format would be the simultaneous involvement of several dozen people (almost certainly over 100) in the formal negotiating process, broadening the scope of negotiation beyond a select few.

 

Given the contentious nature of many issues, and the futility of discussing them in the abstract, each working group would dispose of the services of a facilitation team whose responsibilities might include:

 

o documenting the deliberations of the working group

o conducting research and providing background materials upon request

o organizing field visits and public consultations for members of the working group on specific issues (second tier dialogue).

 

Second-tier dialogue would provide ‘research’ inputs from a broad-cross section of Somali society for the consideration of the working groups. At the same time, it would ensure that the public remain informed and engaged in critical issues under discussion in the first-tier negotiations. Ideally, members of the working groups would participate in second-tier consultations, allowing them to test particular moves or concessions with a broader constituency, while helping to engender a real and immediate sense of accountability among leaders towards their constituents. Since political leaders are unlikely to agree to be bound by the outcomes of ‘second tier’ deliberations, these should be perceived as a resource, not a substitute for, formal political dialogue.

 

Judicious involvement of the media and civic education activities dedicated to key elements of the first tier dialogue would enhance the level of public engagement in - and influence on – the process.

 

Cumulative, conditional outcomes

 

The agreements achieved by each working group would eventually be formalized and amalgamated within a final ‘umbrella’ accord. However, it is highly unlikely (and possibly even undesirable, in light of past experience) that a comprehensive agreement can be realized immediately upon conclusion of the process.

 

Instead, an iterative (and possibly conditional) implementation of the accords may be necessary. This might mean:

 

• some groups may insist on withdrawal of militia from occupied lands as a precondition for disarmament;

• disqualification of certain individuals from holding public office, or other transitional justice measures, may be demanded by some groups as a precondition to political integration;

• the return of land and property to its rightful owners may be a necessary precursor to successful elections;

• regional parliaments may remain intact until elections can be held;

• leaders of administrations may require ratification of peace accords by their respective legislative assemblies before they can join a new power-sharing executive.

 

No single option can hope to satisfy everybody. Any process will fail to match the dogmatic prescriptions of the ideologues in the various camps; it will move too fast for some, too slowly for others; and it will be neither as inclusive nor as exclusive as its detractors would like. But if a new initiative persuades a critical mass of the Somali people that a new agreement serves the interests of all, not of some, and that the way forward holds promise, not menace, then it will have broken new ground in the search for peace in Somalia.

 

February 2002