''Faint Signs of Political Evolution Appear in Somalia's Devolutionary Cycle''

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''Faint Signs of Political Evolution Appear in Somalia's Devolutionary Cycle''

 

From mid-July through mid-August, the political picture in Somalia became mixed, as insurgent violence spiked in the country's official capital Mogadishu at the same time that a National Reconciliation Conference (N.R.C.) was held without interruption in the city.

 

The image of the conference as an island in a sea of strife captures the current dynamics of Somalia's politics, in which the devolutionary cycle into primary solidarities deepens, yet hints of evolutionary processes emerge. Since the ouster of the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.) in December, which had gained control of much of Somalia south of the sub-state of Puntland in 2006, by an Ethiopian military intervention backing the country's weak and internationally-recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), and supported by the United States, PINR has consistently argued that Somalia is reverting to a condition of political fragmentation and conflict. Now, for the first time, counter-tendencies have appeared, although they do not necessarily indicate evolutionary momentum.

 

PINR's analysis of Somalia's politics is based on the polar variables evolution-devolution, consolidation-fragmentation, convergence-divergence, and integration-disintegration, all of which define -- with slightly different shades of meaning -- movement of a political community toward regularized processes of conflict resolution and movement toward self-help by sub-units of the community in conflict situations, respectively. Unlike most conflict-analysis organizations, PINR does not advocate peaceful conflict resolution; it simply describes the interplay of tendencies. During the past 15 months, PINR emphasized evolution during the rise of the I.C.C. and devolution since its fall, depending on its assessments of events on the ground and in the conference chambers. The justification of a sustained conflict-monitoring project is the value of grasping change in the making, which provides resources for predictive intelligence.

 

Devolution Deepens

 

As Congo's ambassador to the United Nations, Pascal Gayama, said on August 14 -- in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the U.N. Security Council to intervene more robustly in Somalia -- the country "is one of the most difficult among all the conflict situations pervading the world."

 

During July and August, the level of violence rose in Mogadishu as insurgents spearheaded by the radical jihadist Youth Mujahideen Movement (Y.M.M.) attempted to disrupt the N.R.C. and undermine its credibility, and the Ethiopian occupiers and T.F.G. forces mounted crackdowns in order to protect the N.R.C. and provide it with at least a semblance of credibility. The result was that the Y.M.M. and its hardcore ******-clan and nationalist allies were unable to torpedo the conference, and the Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces were unable to pacify the city.

 

After the opening of the N.R.C. on July 15 was disrupted by eight rounds of mortar fire, the Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces began intensive weapons searches, going house to house and through markets, arresting suspected insurgents, closing commercial roads and reportedly engaging in looting, beatings and shootings. The insurgents responded by launching grenade and mortar attacks on occupation and government patrols and bases, engaging in shoot outs and roadside bombings, and carrying out targeted assassinations of government officials. A cycle of violence ensued in which an insurgent attack would be met by indiscriminate return fire, searches and lockdowns, followed by new attacks spreading throughout the city. The majority of killed and wounded in the violence were civilians caught in the crossfire or in the attacks. Residents began to flee Mogadishu, hospitals were over-strained, and aid deliveries were impeded, leading to a humanitarian crisis that continues.

 

PINR logs violent incidents day by day from multiple sources, checking them against one another and sorting them out. On an average day, at least five incidents are recorded; there has not been a day without violence and on some days there have been more than ten incidents.

 

A sense of the conditions on the ground can be gained by listing the incidents recorded for a single day. August 9 was one of the more violent days and is chosen because it includes a representative sample of the kinds of incidents characteristic of the conflict in Mogadishu.

 

The major incident on August 9 was a two-hour gun battle in the northern Huriwa district sparked by an attack on a government battlewagon and leading to face-to-face combat. Men and young boys reportedly fled the neighborhood to escape arrest. No casualty figures were available.

 

In other incidents, one person died and three were injured when Ethiopian forces opened fire on civilians after they were attacked near the SOS Hospital. Three people died when Ethiopian troops fired on people in the Suuq Holaha livestock market in an attempt to disperse them during a search operation. A government battlewagon was attacked in the Suuq Holaha neighborhood and two grocers were killed in the return fire. An officer with the T.F.G. security forces was assassinated in a home invasion. A former official in the Darkinley district was gunned down after he left a mosque. Two people -- one of them an employee of a currency exchange -- were gunned own in the Yaqshid neighborhood with no apparent motive.

 

The events of August 9 illustrate the conditions on the ground in Mogadishu by spotlighting the unremitting insecurity brought on by the cycle of attack, counter-attack and preemptive operations. Abstracting from the severe human costs, which have been documented by several U.N. agencies and non-governmental organizations, the inability of the occupation and the government to quash the insurgency, despite proactive measures, marks a defeat on the security front. PINR's monitoring of Y.M.M. statements indicates that the jihadist element of the opposition is becoming ever more radical and uncompromising and is taking credit for more incidents. Meanwhile, the measures of Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces increasingly alienate the residents of Mogadishu, making the ability to protect the N.R.C. come at a steep price.

 

PINR sees no early end to the insurgency in Mogadishu because the Ethiopian-T.F.G. crackdown cannot be sustained indefinitely and is not succeeding in any case.

 

Signs of a deepening devolutionary cycle also were evident in Somalia's regions, which are covered almost exclusively by local media and escape international attention.

 

In the strategically important central Hiraan region, which borders Ethiopia, there have been persistent problems with roadblocks set up by militias to extort money from travelers, leading to efforts by Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces to eliminate them. On July 21, a major operation took down ten roadblocks, but has not stopped the practice.

 

In order to tighten control over Hiraan and to build a machine co-opting former warlords, the T.F.G.'s president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, appointed Yusuf Dagabed -- an ally of Mogadishu's mayor, Mohamed Dheere -- as governor of the region, sparking opposition from the incumbent governor, Hussein Ahmed Moalim and sectors of the population allied with him.

 

On July 30, a truck transporting water to an Ethiopian base on the outskirts of Hiraan's capital Beledweyne was attacked by grenades. The Ethiopians responded with intensive searches for suspects and weapons, and then shelled parts of Beledweyne, killing three people. Local media also reported an attack on an Ethiopian convoy and on the Ethiopian base.

 

On August 4, Dagabed was in the Jalalaksi district of Hiraan meeting with district officials and militias loyal to him in order to mobilize support against Moalim who asserted his claim to be the "legitimate" governor. Local media reported that factions in Beledweyne were preparing for a showdown as 1,000 Ethiopian troops waited in the wings. Meanwhile, five people were killed in inter-clan fighting in the Mahas district.

 

On August 6, Dagabed was back in Beledweyne announcing that members of the I.C.C. would not be harmed if they "lived peacefully." On August 7, Dagabed took a tougher line, threatening to arrest families and relatives of criminals and insurgents if the latter evaded arrest, and defended the Ethiopian shelling as a necessary response to attacks.

 

In the past two weeks, the situation in Hiraan has remained tense, but there have been no reports of clashes between Dagabed's and Moalim's supporters.

 

In the deep-southern Lower Jubba region, dominated by the key port city of Kismayo, the administration of the city remained under the control of militias of the ******* sub-clan of the ***** clan family, which had ousted the region's governor from the ********* sub-clan of the *****, who had been appointed by President Yusuf, also a *********, as part of his machine-building project. Through late July and into August, inter-clan fighting occurred in different towns of the Middle and Lower Jubba regions.

 

On August 14, the former ******* warlord of the Jubba regions and ex-T.F.G. defense minister, Barre Hirale Shire, was reportedly in Addis Ababa, attempting to convince Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, not to permit the T.F.G. to launch an armed operation against Kismayo. Hirale's aim is to establish an autonomous "Jubbaland region" that would recreate his Jubba Valley Alliance, which ruled the Jubba regions before the rise of the I.C.C.

 

The situation in the Jubba regions was further complicated on August 17 by the visit of Abdulqadir Haji Mohamud Dhaqane -- one of the dissident members of the T.F.G.'s parliament who are based in Eritrea -- to the capital of Middle Jubba, Buale, where he conferred with local leaders on the transfer of their allegiance from the T.F.G to its exiled political opposition. Dhaqane vowed that the political opposition would take control of the Jubba regions.

 

Apparent sectarian violence flared up in the central Mudug region on August 14, when two people were killed and seven were wounded in an attack on a religious center run by the moderate Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a movement in the region's capital Galkayo. Local officials blamed the incident on the fundamentalist al-Ittihad al-Islami movement, a predecessor of the I.C.C.

 

Inter-clan fighting was reported over the past month in the Mudug, Galgadud and Bay regions. Extortionate roadblocks were reported on major roads throughout Somalia.

 

The return of warlords to prominence in Hiraan and the Jubba regions, widespread inter-clan violence and criminal activity throughout the country, the appearance of sectarian violence, and instability where warlords are attempting to assert control, either under the T.F.G.'s aegis or against the government, point to the deepening of the devolutionary cycle in much of Somalia outside Mogadishu. Coupled with the unabated insurgency in Mogadishu, conditions in the regions indicate that the T.F.G. remains weak and dependent on Ethiopian support, and has not made headway toward effective governance.

 

Signs of Political Evolution

 

After opening on July 15 and then being abruptly adjourned after insurgent mortar fire targeted its venue, the N.R.C. resumed on July 19 and conducted regular sessions into the second week of August when it adjourned for a week after discussions on resource policy broke down into acrimonious disputes and elements of the ****** clan family participating in the conference began talks with ****** rejectionists in order to find "common ground."

 

The fact that the clan-based conference is taking place at all and has not been disrupted by violence shows the limits of the insurgency and indicates that substantial sectors of Somali society have at least acquiesced in the reconciliation process and are willing to try to see if it can work. Although the political opposition to the T.F.G. has boycotted the N.R.C. and has its own clan support, the N.R.C. is not entirely composed of President Yusuf's allies. There has been genuine debate and the conference has not served as a rubber stamp for the T.F.G. executive.

 

It is on the basis of the appearance of serious political debate -- not any concrete steps toward reconciliation -- that PINR counts the N.R.C. on the side of evolution. That opposing actors are willing to air their interests and encounter one another in discussion constitutes the germ of the genuinely political process that the N.R.C.'s international backers -- the U.S., European Union and U.N. donors to the T.F.G. -- wanted to engender and hoped for when they pressured Yusuf to hold the conference.

 

Having noted that the N.R.C. is being taken seriously by its participants, it is necessary to add that it has not produced impressive results and has been confused and confusing. Staged by Yusuf as an attempt to reconcile clans and not to address questions of political organization, the N.R.C. has shifted -- under pressure from donor powers -- to embrace a political agenda, rendering its future uncertain.

 

Originally scheduled to spend its projected 45 days on inter-clan issues, such as disarmament of clan and sub-clan militias, and compensation for property stolen in previous clan conflicts, the chair of the N.R.C.'s organizing committee, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, announced on August 1 that the conference had concluded that work and would not move on to political issues.

 

Mahdi's announcement was met with surprise by local analysts and observers, and ****** conference participants, because none of the issues among clans had been practically resolved. Instead, the N.R.C. came to broad agreements on principles: a cease-fire was declared without enforcement mechanisms, an intent to disarm clan militias was proclaimed -- again without enforcement mechanisms, and promises were made to restore looted property to its original owners. Implementation of property compensation is to be vested in a committee that would hear and adjudicate claims. In sum, nothing concrete came out of the "first phase" of the N.R.C., and inter-clan conflict has continued since Mahdi's declaration of "Cease-Fire Day."

 

On August 9, the spokesperson for ****** participants in the N.R.C., Abdullahi Sheikh Hassan, disputed Mahdi's claim that the conference had successfully addressed inter-clan issues, noting that non-participating ****** elders had not signed on, and calling for an extension of the first phase, triggering the conference's adjournment for a week.

 

Even before the ****** withdrawal, the N.R.C. was bogging down on the political issues. The first of those to be considered was the definition of religious extremism, which touched off debates between delegates in favor of isolating radical Islamists and those who did not want to endorse a politically-defined interpretation of what forms of Islam are legitimate. The delegates decided to defer the issue by setting up a committee of clerics to discuss it.

 

The next issue -- resource policy -- was even more contentious, and discussion of it was compromised by the T.F.G. executive's effort to enact a hydrocarbons law that would preempt any decisions of the N.R.C. Garowe Online reported on August 9 that debate over a proposed Somali Petroleum Corporation (S.P.C.) became so heated that "the N.R.C. hall burst into dispute," leading to the suspension of deliberations.

 

As the N.R.C. entered its "second phase," donor powers pressured Mahdi to reach out to the political opposition, based in Eritrea and composed of the political wing of the I.C.C. led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the dissident "Free Parliament" led by former speaker of the T.F.G. parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, nationalists, and some ex-warlords.

 

On July 29, Mahdi invited the political opposition to meet with him anywhere except Asmara, and the T.F.G.'s prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, said that the N.R.C. was "still open" to the T.F.G.'s opponents. On August 5, Mahdi stated that he had been contacted by the opposition, which proposed a meeting in Djibouti.

 

The opposition quickly denied Mahdi's statement and repeated its objections to the N.R.C. Sharif called Mahdi's offer a "ploy" to gain donor support, and Hassan said that although he welcomed dialogue, it would have to focus on removing Ethiopian occupiers from Somalia. Both leaders remained firm in their plans to convene an alternative national conference on September 1 in Asmara.

 

On balance, the N.R.C. has thus far been a practical failure, having achieved neither concrete agreements nor inclusiveness. Skeptics argue that the delegates have remained at the meetings because they are being compensated financially for their attendance, a point that is not discounted by PINR. Yet, it is worth repeating that elements of a political process have been present in the N.R.C., tenuous though they may be.

 

Another faint sign of political evolution in Somalia has been the assertion of factions in the T.F.G.'s parliament attempting to check the powers of the T.F.G.'s executive, which is unprecedented since the ouster of the Asmara group of parliamentarians and has gone unreported in international media. As in the case of the N.R.C., PINR counts the emergence of political opposition within the T.F.G. as evolutionary because it represents an institutional assertion of divergent interests -- a political process.

 

On July 23, parliament began debating a motion to hold the executive accountable by requiring timely reports on its activities. Discussion of the motion, which had been signed by 100 of parliament's 225 members, became acrimonious and, on July 30, a parliamentary session was adjourned when no compromise on the motion could be reached. Meanwhile, Gedi met with parliamentary speaker, Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nuur -- an ally of the T.F.G. executive -- on how to deal with the revolt.

 

On August 1, debate resumed with Deputy Defense Minister Salad Ali Jeele saying that "the time is not right" for accountability and adding that he "rather expected compliments from the transitional parliament." Dissident parliamentarians responded by calling for a vote of confidence on Gedi and urging Yusuf to come to parliament to attempt to resolve the issue.

 

On August 5, Gedi addressed parliament and said that his "government is ready to be taken into accountability," although it had been doing a "great job." Madobe announced the formation of a nine-member committee to study the accountability motion.

 

Since then, parliament has been gearing up to debate a controversial media law and the proposed hydrocarbons law, including the terms of exploration agreements with foreign energy companies, which have begun trying to make deals with the T.F.G., generating confusion and opposition. Although Somalia's oil reserves are unproven, small energy companies, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (C.N..C.) and reported proxies for energy multinationals are interested in assessing the country's potential. At present the situation is clouded, with reported splits between Gedi and Yusuf; tensions with Puntland, where previous agreements have been signed; and mounting political resistance based on suspicious that Yusuf and Gedi are planning power and money grabs. PINR will explore Somalia's oil policy when the political configuration becomes clear; the looming debate on the hydrocarbons law will be a test of parliament's independence.

 

It is too early to tell whether the transitional parliament will function effectively as an independent institution that can check the executive and represent broad sectors of Somali society. Parliament's track record in the past has been poor, but its use as a tool of political opposition indicates incipient political processes.

 

The most marked evolutionary development in Somalia came on August 1, when a locally chosen governor was installed in the west-central Bakool region, with the blessing of the T.F.G. According to the new governor, Mohamed Abdi Mohed, the electoral process, which was aided by the Center for Research and Dialogue (an N.G.O.), the Italian government and the United Nations Development Program, was based on "interest and principle" rather than clan divisions. In contrast to other regions in Somalia, Bakool appears to have institutionalized a political process from the bottom up and the T.F.G. has had to acquiesce in it.

 

Given the more unstable conditions in the other regions of Somalia, where governors have been imposed by the T.F.G. -- as in Hiraan -- or local warlords are bidding for control in the name of clan or sub-clan loyalty, the probability is low that the Bakool model will be replicated elsewhere in the short run. Nonetheless, if a political process becomes rooted in Bakool, its example would be influential in the long term.

 

Conclusion

 

On balance, the devolutionary cycle in Somalia has deepened from mid-July through mid-August, with an unabated insurgency in Mogadishu led by increasingly militant jihadists, an external domestic opposition adamant in its refusal to participate in the N.R.C., persistent inter-clan conflict in the regions, the appearance of sectarian violence, and resistance to the T.F.G.'s authority in key regions.

 

With the exception of the Bakool region, where opposition has begun to be regularized in a political process, signs of political evolution reside in the emergence of institutionalized opposition in the N.R.C. and the transitional parliament. The latter developments are not yet sufficiently rooted to alter PINR's consistent forecast that devolution is likely to persist, yet they indicate alternative possibilities for Somalia if they gain momentum and become strong enough to provide a check on the T.F.G. executive.

 

Report Drafted By:

Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

Source

[Ibtisam]

How simplistic, It almost sounds tenable situation