Somalia's Political Future Appears to be its Pre-Courts Past

[Castro]

During the first two weeks of January, the domestic and external actors with interests in Somalia's political future strove to adjust to the new balance of power created by Ethiopia's successful invasion of the country that drove the previously dominant Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.) out of the official capital Mogadishu and installed the weak, unpopular, clan-based, warlord-riven and internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) in its place.

 

On January 13, the Ethiopian forces had driven the last hardcore holdouts of the I.C.C. from their last redoubt in Ras Kamboni at the forested southern tip of Somalia, ending the I.C.C.'s existence as an organized movement and leaving its leaders and supporters to retreat into their sub-clans, attempt to reconcile with the T.F.G., or try to mount an armed insurgency against the T.F.G. Having split into conciliatory and militant factions even before the Ethiopian invasion, the I.C.C.'s elements are, for the moment, minor players in Somalia's conflicts. Their role as protagonists in Somalia's political drama has been taken by Addis Ababa, the T.F.G. executive and clan leaders and their warlords, locked into a tense conjuncture.

 

The events of the first half of January confirm PINR's forecast in its January 1 report on Somalia that the most likely scenario would be "a return to the pre-I.C.C. period of extreme decentralization, warlordism and state failure, either with or without an Islamist insurgency -- the latter being the more probable outcome." That conclusion is based on the underlying judgments that clan and warlord interests in security and control currently outweigh any more general interest in a viable Somali state, and that external actors are unwilling to expend the military, financial and diplomatic resources necessary to bolster the T.F.G. and to influence favorably a process of national reconciliation aimed at the formation of a unity government embracing all the major sectors of Somali society, including conciliatory Islamists.

 

With the T.F.G., which would form the basis of a central government and is presently unopposed by any organized national movement, dependent for its existence on Addis Ababa's military support, Ethiopia is, for the moment, the major player in Somalia. Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, has announced repeatedly that Addis Ababa's forces would end their occupation of Somalia within several weeks and that he is not prepared to commit Ethiopian resources to state building and reconstruction in the country. Having eliminated the possibility of an Islamic state on its eastern border and having sidelined its regional rival Eritrea, which had supported the I.C.C., Ethiopia would, in the best case, like to have Somalia as a client state. Addis Ababa, however, is convinced that this is impossible and is therefore content to leave the country weak and divided. Indeed, on January 10, Zenawi remarked that the elders and residents of Mogadishu "can pacify the city" by themselves -- a judgment that is shared by no other actor.

 

Addis Ababa's position has been described succinctly and precisely by Canadian journalist Jonathan Manthorpe writing in the Vancouver Sun on January 11: "A return to factional instability will be a happy outcome for Ethiopia, which has a host of historic disputes with Somalia and does not want to see a united and effective government."

 

Zenawi's threats to withdraw Ethiopian forces from Somalia rapidly have added a sense of urgency to the efforts of actors interested in the formation of a stable Somali state to prevent a reversion to Somalia's pre-Courts statelessness. Those efforts have focused on the introduction of African Union (A.U.) peacekeepers into Somalia to replace the Ethiopians, who are resented by most Somalis; encouraging the T.F.G. to accede to a reconciliation process that would broaden its base and might result in a new constitution; and attempts by the T.F.G. to assert itself as a guarantor of security, which it must at least appear to be if it is to be granted legitimacy by Somalia's population and for African states to commit themselves to providing peacekeepers.

 

It is telling that alone among all the actors, save the T.F.G., Zenawi has said that the T.F.G. is "sufficiently comprehensive" as it stands to reconcile Somali society. Since 1977, when Ethiopia won a bitter war initiated by Somalia to annex the former's ethnic-Somali ****** region, Addis Ababa has successfully derailed attempts to unify Somalia, and it is doing the same now. Having crushed the I.C.C., Addis Ababa is likely to work carefully to prevent the T.F.G. from becoming viable, despite pressure against that strategy from its patron Washington, European donor powers and most of the regional states. With vital interests in Somalia that no other actor has and a long practice of playing divide and rule, Addis Ababa will be expected to exploit the inherent decentralizing tendencies within Somalia to thwart reconciliation.

 

As Addis Ababa settles into its accustomed strategy, the other actors with less intense interests are likely to give way. In the last 15 years, there have been 13 unsuccessful attempts to broker unity governments in Somalia and there is no reason to believe that present efforts will bear any better fruit. Again, Manthorpe puts the matter precisely: "There are no signs of anyone coming up with the money to pay peacekeepers or finance Somalia's reconstruction."

 

Reversion Gets Underway

 

PINR's judgment that Somalia is reverting to its pre-Courts past is based on the unfolding facts on the ground that portend instability and on evidence of the external actors' lack of political will to fill the security vacuum that will appear after Ethiopian forces withdraw with a peacekeeping mission. The failure of the actors to make serious efforts to start a genuine reconciliation process is another factor.

 

With its highest priority establishing credibility in and control over Mogadishu, the T.F.G. moved to disarm the city's many clan-based militias and private security forces on January 1, when the T.F.G.'s prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, announced a deadline of January 4 for voluntary disarmament, after which weapons would be seized.

 

Reluctant to surrender their arms in a climate of radical uncertainty, Mogadishu's population and factions failed to respond to Gedi's decree, and the deadline passed without any T.F.G. action to seize weapons. On January 6, there was a violent demonstration in the city against disarmament and the Ethiopian occupation. Immediately following the demonstration, the T.F.G. abandoned its disarmament plan. T.F.G. deputy defense minister, Ali Salad Jelle, announced: "The disarmament operation which was due to start today has been postponed after a local ****** clan asked the prime minister to set disarmament for another time and not now."

 

As the disarmament initiative ground to a halt, there were sporadic attacks on Ethiopian forces and T.F.G. militias in and around Mogadishu. The T.F.G. responded by adding checkpoints on the city's streets and sealing off neighborhoods, which angered local residents. After a grenade attack on an Ethiopian convoy on January 10, following skirmishes on the three preceding days, Ethiopian forces initiated house-to-house searches for weapons, breaking with their policy of keeping a low profile in order to avoid a popular backlash against their occupation. Few weapons were confiscated in the raids because small arms had been buried and heavy weapons dismantled.

 

Opposition to the T.F.G. and the Ethiopians was centered in neighborhoods dominated by the ****** clan, particularly the Ayr sub-clan, which had been a support base for the I.C.C. On January 4, Ayr leadership sent a communiqué to Gedi calling for "politically inclusive dialogue" and a halt to efforts by the T.F.G. to impose a state of emergency in Somalia.

 

On January 12, the T.F.G. parliament, still meeting in the south-central town of Baidoa, where the T.F.G. had been based prior to the Ethiopian invasion, approved the state of emergency by a vote of 154-2. On the same day, the T.F.G.'s president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, met with warlords who had returned to Mogadishu and extracted from them an "agreement in principle" to integrate their militias into a national army. No date was set for the turnover and a committee was proposed to work out its arrangements. Outside the meeting, a dispute over parking spaces erupted between T.F.G. security guards and members of warlord Mohamed Qanyare Afrah's militia, in which eight of the militiamen were killed.

 

Civil society groups and businessmen met on January 13 at a Mogadishu hotel to express opposition to the state of emergency, which they judged to be "an obstacle to reconciliation" and a "danger to freedom."

 

Inter-clan fighting, resistance to the occupation and political conflict between T.F.G. officials and local leaders also surfaced in the western Hiraan region, the central Galguduud and Middle and Lower Shabelle regions, and the southern Lower Jubba region. Aid agencies reported looting and harassment of civilians by roving gangs in the south-central Bay region. Journalists in Mogadishu reported the appearance of roadblocks manned by clan militias extorting tolls from travelers, and noted a tendency of "reclanization," as families moved into areas dominated by their sub-clans to seek security.

 

Taken as a whole, developments on the ground do not bode well for the success of a T.F.G. lacking significant popular and external support. No faction is willing to consider disarming until all the others do so. The ******, fearing reprisals from the rival ***** clan, of which Yusuf is a member, are particularly resistant to giving up their weapons and ceding control over their neighborhoods. The Ethiopians are in a mode of force protection, allowing resistance to organize and criminal gangs to function. T.F.G. interior minister, Hussein Aideed, told the Washington Post's Stephanie McCrummen: "We have a symbolic government. Ministries we don't have, a military we don't have. We're limited." Mogadishu's police commander, Ali Mohamed Hassan Loyan, admitted that any weapons confiscated from the population would be needed to arm his own forces.

 

Aideed did not help matters when he suggested that the boundary between Ethiopia and Somalia be erased; he quickly took back his words and they were repudiated by the executive, but they fanned public distrust of the T.F.G.'s aims.

 

As the T.F.G. stalled, Ethiopian troops backed by air power and T.F.G.-allied militias were destroying the last vestiges of I.C.C. military resistance in Somalia's deep south, with the aid of a United States naval blockade, border controls imposed by Kenya and U.S. special forces and intelligence support.

 

Washington took advantage of the disruption of the I.C.C. to target suspected al-Qaeda operatives, whom it had linked to the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in an airstrike that failed to achieve its aim and resulted, according to reports by local media, in civilian deaths. Washington's action received the approval of Yusuf, the acquiescence of Zenawi, expressions of "concern" from international and regional organizations, and the disapproval of Arab states, Djibouti, from which the mission was launched -- officially without its consent -- and the European Union, opening up a trans-Atlantic rift. The major result of the airstrike was to weaken the T.F.G.'s credibility by making it appear to be a pawn of Washington.

 

Washington had given cover for Ethiopia's invasion at the United Nations, had tacitly approved it and had provided support for it, from a shared interest with Addis Ababa in preventing the emergence of an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. The airstrike -- Washington admitted to one, but there were reports of several more -- was piggy-backed on the Ethiopian operation as part of the "war on terrorism." An anonymous U.S. Defense Department official told Agence France Presse: "It was a target of opportunity we had to take." The failed mission does not indicate increased U.S. military involvement in Somalia; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer has made it clear that Washington intends to "lead from behind" in Somalia. The airstrike simply added another destabilizing shock to an already insecure situation and weakened Washington's diplomatic influence and narrowed its options.

 

As the T.F.G. showed few if any signs of consolidating its control on the ground and becoming an effective authority, external actors struggled to find a military and political formula, which might stabilize Somalia, in a whirl of diplomacy that continues unabated and has as yet achieved no conclusive results.

 

The centerpiece of diplomatic efforts was a conference in Nairobi on January 5 that was sponsored by the Washington-inspired Contact Group for Somalia (C.G.) -- composed of former European colonial powers in Somalia and European donor states, plus the sole African representative Tanzania -- and was attended by all the external actors interested in Somalia: the A.U., the Arab League (A.L.), the European Union, the United Nations and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.) -- the regional organization comprising Somalia and its neighbors.

 

The purpose of the meeting was to find a way to prevent a security and power vacuum from forming in Somalia after Ethiopian forces withdrew that would gain the assent of all the external actors.

 

The meeting produced a consensus in favor of deploying an international "stabilization force" in Somalia to prop up the T.F.G. and of pressing the T.F.G. to begin immediately an "inclusive process of political dialogue."

 

The unaccustomed agreement among organizations representing states and regions with often divergent interests in Somalia was abstract and masked serious differences in interpreting the practical meanings of "stabilization force" and "inclusive process of political dialogue," and their relation to one another. Those differences have surfaced in the days following the Nairobi conference, stalling progress toward the achievement of either goal. The U.S. airstrike served to harden opposed positions.

 

At the heart of disputes over interpreting the consensus statement is the question of which goal needs to be realized first. The T.F.G., Ethiopia, the United States and -- with some reluctance -- Kenya, which was forced by Ethiopia's military campaign and Washington's support of it to collaborate with them to the dissatisfaction of its ethnic-Somali and larger Muslim population, are insistent that a peacekeeping mission sponsored by the A.U. be deployed immediately. The E.U., A.L. and Djibouti counter that a peacekeeping mission would be likely to destabilize Somalia were it introduced before progress was made on reconciliation and broadening the T.F.G.'s base. The African states that would contribute to a mission pay it lip service, but refuse to commit troops, save Uganda, or to deploy until there is security on the ground and adequate funding from Western powers.

 

Eritrea is opposed to a peacekeeping mission and holds that the T.F.G. should be scrapped as the basis of reconciliation talks, and the T.F.G. and Ethiopia claim that the transitional institutions are already sufficiently inclusive. The European Union has conditioned financial support on a satisfactory reconciliation process, has broached the idea of a U.N. force given the over-straining current peacekeeping obligations of African states, and envisions a political solution that would supersede the T.F.G. constitution. The T.F.G. and its patrons view the transitional charter as the political structure for a unity government.

 

Given the divergent interpretations of peacekeeping and reconciliation, and of their relation to one another, it is not surprising that no peacekeeping mission has yet been formed, despite the strenuous efforts of Nairobi to gain commitments; and that no reconciliation talks have yet been scheduled, despite efforts by Yemen to mediate between conciliatory elements of the former Courts movement and the T.F.G., which alternates between offering to dialogue with the Islamists and dismissing them as a spent force of criminals.

 

The conflicting interpretations of the consensus statement reveal that the same alignments of conflicting interests in play before the Ethiopian invasion are still in force. Addis Ababa and Asmara continue to use Somalia as an arena for their longstanding conflict; the United States and the Europeans, save Great Britain, continue to duel over the advantages of military and diplomatic measures; the states to the north of Somalia, which had leaned toward the I.C.C., remain determined to prevent Ethiopian hegemony in the Horn; and African states to the south are eager to please Washington, but are wary of injecting their forces into an unstable situation that would force them to be peacemakers rather than peacekeepers, and would put them in harm's way. Washington's notion of "leading from behind" has little substance in light of its support of Addis Ababa and the airstrikes.

 

There are too many conflicting interests and there is too little political will among the external actors for them to exert sufficient concerted influence to stabilize Somalia.

 

The question of how a stabilization mission would be funded illustrates the gulf between aspiration and serious commitment. Washington has offered US$16 million for the mission; the European Union has offered $19.5 million contingent on the T.F.G entering serious power sharing talks; the A.U. Peace and Security Council estimates that the projected 8,000 troop mission would cost $160 million for a six-month deployment.

 

Only Uganda has committed troops to the mission -- up to a maximum of 1,500 -- and its parliament has yet to approve deployment. Due to internal opposition to Uganda's participation, its president, Yoweri Museveni, has demanded to know the exit strategy for the mission, its rules of engagement and the sources of its funds, none of which has been determined and all of which are subjects of dispute.

 

Aid for reconstruction, which is essential to the T.F.G.'s survival, is even less adequate, with commitments of approximately $28 million over direct short-term humanitarian donations. Now that the Courts have been defeated, Somalia returns to its status as an international step child and custody case.

 

Conclusion

 

With the T.F.G. haltingly struggling for power and authority, and determined to avoid genuine power sharing; the clans and sub-clans, and their warlords asserting themselves; and an incipient Islamist insurgency forming that will league with disaffected sub-clans and warlords, reversion to political fragmentation is underway in Somalia.

 

With Addis Ababa threatening to withdraw its forces and giving, at most, half-hearted encouragement to reconciliation, regional and international actors -- riven by divergent interests and unwilling to make Somalia a high priority -- are unlikely to be able to arrest the drift toward political entropy; their inability to coordinate mirrors Somalia's centrifugal tendencies -- it is also political entropy.

 

It is always possible that PINR's judgment is mistaken, that -- as hopeful actors and analysts repeat -- the defeat of the Courts has opened a window of opportunity for a genuinely representative government in Somalia. Looking at the facts on the ground and the discussions in the conference halls, PINR sees no indication that Somalia is moving toward political integration.

 

The Courts were a genuine attempt at Somali national unification; the T.F.G., however, remains another of the many efforts to achieve integration through external pressure and tepid support -- none of those efforts has reconciled competing domestic factions or insulated Somalia from the self-serving interventions of external actors. Somalia's political future appears to be its pre-Courts past.

 

Report Drafted By:

Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

Power and Interest

[Castro]

The most lucid and cogent analysis I've read on the state of Somalia today and the near future.

 

If you have the time, this is a must read.

[BiLaaL]

Having crushed the I.C.C.,

Addis Ababa is likely to work carefully to prevent the T.F.G. from becoming viable

, despite pressure against that strategy from its patron Washington...

The TFG crowd at SOL are delusional to think otherwise.

 

With vital interests in Somalia that no other actor has and a long practice of playing divide and rule,

Addis Ababa will be expected to exploit the inherent decentralizing tendencies within Somalia to thwart reconciliation

.

More to the point.

 

The Courts were a genuine attempt at Somali national unification

; the T.F.G., however, remains another of the many efforts to achieve integration through external pressure and tepid support

Castro, thanks for digging up this assessment from PINR. I've read earlier assessments and have been impressed thus far.

[SomaliThinker]

A very goo read, something most SOL members should read.

[Castro]

It is a good read. I've read just about every pundit's analysis on Somalia in the past few weeks. On Iraq, PINR wrote many good reports that very accurately predicted the mess we witness today. They don't claim to know everything but whatever they claim, they often back up with a sound argument.

 

The sad thing is, their assessment will likely come to pass.

[Peacenow]

Yes, the PINR is a consistently good read. The TFG backers should be made to read this.

 

We have to deal with and find a final solution to the Ethiopia problem, once everyone sees this, then we can work towards Somalia for the Somalis.

[-Nomadique-]

Great read. Worrying outlook.

[Jacaylbaro]

I like PINR too ,,,,,,,,,,,,,