Che -Guevara Posted August 3, 2009 Roobdoon Forum August 01, 2009 This month, Puntland leadership is marking a new day of struggle for the creation of a semi-autonomous region. The day is now instituted by its administration in memory of August 1st, 1998. In commemorating the occasion, Puntland Diaspora communities are pronouncing an official holiday, pledging Puntlanders everywhere to participate in the political process by which the design of Puntland flag, symbol, and anthem will be adopted. As the lessons from the secessionist Somaliland show, independence can not be promptly attained merely with the adoption of slogans, flags, and militant songs (such as the new tune “ku dayo Puntland”). This anniversary has a particular undertone, in view of the completion of the SSDF’s long-awaited goals. The emergence of Puntland Regional Administration and its efforts to transcend a regional level and attain a complete independence from the rest of Somalia are dealt with extensively in this short paper. What Kind of Anniversary? As Puntland is celebrating the 11th anniversary of its establishment, as a regional administration, some bitter questions about its future are arising. Its leaders now can’t resist expressing dismay at the growing fanaticism and clanism in the ranks of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). Propagated by the TFG’s new leadership, the Mogadishu-centered mentality, which the existence of regional federalism was meant to be eradicated, is not a shared vision among all Somalis. Therefore, this year’s anniversary will be different from what it has been in the past. Puntlanders who take part in this year’s celebration will be stepping on each others feet. The fanfare occasion could even become the turf to exact old wounds. Those who often get emotionally identified with Puntland (zealous SSDF veterans) and regard themselves as “true” Puntlanders will surely celebrate with new tunes and certain manifestations of profanation. They speak with mounting anxiety about the growth of Islamist influence in the south and the threat that it could pose to the interests of Puntland. More recent developments in Mogadishu have also suggested that this fear of the Shabaab take-over is not exaggerated. This view gradually gained ground in Garowe and its reaction to Mogadishu debacle is predictably hostile. In the period immediately following President Abdullahi Yusuf’s forced resignation, December 29, 2008, many voices from Puntland were heard saying “Somalia is sliding back into chaos. IGAD is putting everything where it was before etc”. To my understanding, Puntland’s new mood may perhaps be ascribed directly to Yusuf’s resignation. This momentous event accelerated a mutual distrust between the already strained relations between Puntland and Mogadishu, and this could impede Somali unity. Zealous supporters of Puntland argue that those who forced their hero, Abdullahi Yusuf, to resign from the presidency without finishing his term, had ulterior motives. They now pronounce, without a fear, secessionism; and claim that this anniversary will underline Puntlanders’ ability to discover a new confidence of political ascendency and possibly an independent state. Zealots feel that their leaders have been too lenient with Mogadishu clans for too long. They say: before the European invasion, almost all of what is now Puntland had always been completely under one ruler. They believe that it is the right time to reclaim that old glory and establish an independent State under their supervision. This group has already designed their personal flag and symbols that ought to be adopted by Puntland. However, many Puntlanders are reluctant about this idea of statehood, and anxious to show that Puntland leadership still masquerades under false pretenses. They believe that Puntland has yet to be liberated from the shackles of pirates, clanism, and fear complexes. A Quisling Scheme or a “Bottom-Up” Approach! Roobdoon Forum finds numerous writings about the rise of mini-states in Somali websites, in Western media, and the books of Somali contemporary history. In these writings, one can glean from these sources information about Puntland’s efforts to follow the footsteps of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland and to establish a quisling regime in the northeastern regions of Somalia – i.e. to secede from the rest of Somalia. Many Somalis have been reassessing literatures about the rise of such mini-states. Some of these literatures, though written through the lenses of euphoria, regarded the disintegration of Somalia Proper as signaling the end of Somali Unity and the emergency of clan-fiefdoms. This new interest can as well be seen within the Somali Diaspora communities, where the renascence of the ideas of clan-enclaves leads to rather favourable reappraisals. In fact, the achievement of a regional administration in northeastern parts of Somalia has already, to a certain degree, checked the idea of Somali Weyn national sentiment. Similarly, in northwestern Somalia (Somaliland), hopes of unity gave way to a sense of anticlimax, the resurgence of clan loyalties, and the adaptation of old artificial colonial borders. Indeed, the trauma of unsuccessful Somali Weyn doctrine is enormous in these regions. Is this Puntland/and Somaliland trend reversible? Perhaps, though it seems less likely. The 18 years of Somali civil wars have, if truth be told, shattered Somali unity and diminished the cherished Somali Weyn conviction. Still, the choice that Puntland makes these coming months/years will be momentous, not only for themselves, but also for Somali unity. For some, my speculation about the immediate future of Somalia seems doomsday thoughts rather than a political concern. In any case, since no credible solution is as yet in sight, this frightening prospect and its possibility are worth to be reassessed. The October Revolution On closer examination of the Somali crisis, the 1960-69 civilian governments shrank to the role of relatively insignificant player in the drama that then unfolded. Instead, at the center stage, one finds 21 years of military and one-party rule. Some scholars argue that there is a dearth of serious accounts of the causes of the Somali revolution – i.e. accounts honest enough to explain the circumstances that framed the revolution. Conversely, the “memorandum of understanding” with Kenya signed by former Somali Prime Minister, Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, at Arush, Tanzania, on October 28, 1967 are believed to be one of the main issues that ignited discord among Somali elites and led to charges in Mogadishu that Egal’s government had betrayed Somali interests in Kenya’s North-Eastern Province (aka NFD). Somalia’s ruling party, the Somali Youth League (SYL), was in a state of disarray, with disturbances and quarrels among its ranks. Many MPs have called the Arusha understanding a “sellout of the NFD” and demanded from the SYL Central Committee to expel Egal from the party, on the grounds that he acted against the interest of the party and the nation. To ease the situation and pave the way for reconciliation, Abdirizak Haji Hussein have resigned as the SYL’s secretary-general and subsequently the Committee nullified the expulsion of Prime Minister Egal from the party. Nonetheless, the tensions within the parliamentarians created the almost total erosion of the government institutions – the weakening of the legal system and the increasing venality of the deputies, which eventually led to coup d’état by the army. Premier Egal’s government lasted less than three years. It was in October 21st 1969, when the popular coup d’état replaced the civilian government, detaining and charging the civilian Prime Minister of ‘complicity with foreign intelligence’. [1] Somalia was just one of many African nations that experienced what was then referred as “coup-struck” nations – the 21st African nation in the scoreboard of military coups in Africa. Scholars with in-depth African experience formulated the theory that states: the civilian governments have been supplanted by the army forces because of the fact that the military men controlled the weaponry and had the capacity for organized violence. However, in all fairness, the army-led Somali coup was popular and quick to justify its actions, based on a number of grounds including corruption, nepotism, and clan favouritism. It was the ruling SYL cliques who were not able to take their rhetoric of democracy in its literal sense and dispense with the need for a military takeover. The first six years of the military rule (Oct 1969-1976) generally proved more stable and progressive than its predecessor. In an interview with Siyaad Barre conducted by Yugoslavia’s POLITIKA in March 26, 1976, he said: In the country, in the six and half years since the army overthrew the corrupt civilian administration, five times more industrial facilities and seven times more roads have been built in the country than in the preceding decade. [2] Despite the sweeping programs of social and economic developments witnessed, the military regime had met its major frustration in 1977-78. Siyaad Barre launched his campaign of liberating Somalis in the ****** region, since the restoration of the territories of the Somali ethnic group was and still is the heart of Somali Nationalism. The ****** war represented the most serious disappointment in Somalia. Its outcome was a severe psychological blow to the morale of the Somalis. Siyaad Barre’s major political miscalculation was that knowing the Americans decided not to arm Somalia – by toeing a straight OAU line – he kicked out the Russian and Cubans from Somali soil. As a result of this, the general mood of the public was at its lowest peak, after more than 60% of the country’s army equipment, such as heavy armoured, was either destroyed or captured in the war. Siyaad Barre’s position inside Somalia came under severe pressure. With the help of the Russians, Cubans, and Yemenis, Ethiopian forces became victorious, forcing Siyaad Barre to withdraw Somali forces from the ******. Factionalism in Somalia Many scholars have noted that the ****** debacle are attributed for triggering or motivating, at least, much of the long-standing clan animosities toward Siyaad Barre and his clan. It was however a year before the Somali-Ethiopian war, the beginning of 1976, when a group of ********** elites formed an opposition group called Somali Democratic Action Front (SODAF), in Addis Ababa. [Read below]. In July 01, 1976, Siyaad Barre’s regime refurbished itself into one-party rule. The Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) transferred the power and authority of the country to Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP). Siyaad became secretary general of the SSRP and the president of Somali Democratic Republic. His aspiration was to transform his power, which came through coup d’état, to a government managed by a civilian-military elites – i.e. a regime no longer organized by just the Supreme Revolutionary Council, who were all military men. It took him not that long when he realized that to move between the two worlds of military and civilian authority is not an easy proposition; and it did not help his authority to lump them together under a single barrack. Siyaad Barre’s guess was perhaps transferring the responsibilities to SSRP would create a cohesive, modern, and progressive institutions; however, these changes brought no real change. Intractable clan rivalries in the administration and in the army have actually increased. Siyaad Barre began to experience increasing opposition to his rule. In fact, an opposition group crystallized in that year (1976), as Siyaad sought to legitimize his rule as an elected leader who gained the confidence and the majority vote of the new socialist congress. Many observers thought that Siyaad has been genuine in his attempts to destroy clanism in Somalia, despite the fact that he has protected his own position by surrounding himself largely with relations and clansmen from his own clan. The new opposition group, Somali Democratic Action Front (SODAF) noted and used as a justification a secret document signed by President Siyaad Barre, in which SODAF viewed it as an institutionalized clanism that marginalized certain group of the Somali society [see the secret letter below]. This insignificant group of 13 people (SODAF) appeared no coherent opposition to Siyaad Barre. The group was led by Osman Nur Ali “Qonof”, former Minister of Justice (1969-1970),) and Mohamoud Gelle Elmi “Dhurwa”, former Minister of Industry and Commerce (1969-1970). The opposition group in exile was made up largely of one clan, ******teens, and was operating clandestinely from Addis Ababa. The ******teens therefore have largely isolated themselves from other clans in Somalia. Not only by making a narrow clan issue of their opposition to Siyaad Barre has ensured SODAF’s own suicide but also the group “has explicitly stated it does not wish to unite Somalis outside Somalia by force.” [3] Furthermore, a widespread disgruntlement felt in Somalia when a ********** dissident quoted in Nairobi as saying: “My brother’s enemy is my friend. We are prepared to join hands even with Israel to bring down this dog.” [4] In Addis Ababa, one of their rare news conferences, SODAF leaders affirmed that the creation of the new organization “fulfills the need for all Somalis to liberate themselves from dictator Siyaad.” SODAF leaders deplored that Ethiopia (led by Mengistu Haile Mariam) “stands by passively, without the slightest reaction to Siyaad Barre’s regime.” SODAF’s attempt to forge relations with Mengistu, who himself came to power through the barrel of a gun, was interesting. Mengistu was a ruthless dictator who pretended to be a communist. He hung on to power only by force and he ruthlessly killed many civilians. Once, Mengistu’s wife and children were abducted for ransom by disgruntled army officers. He responded with a note of his own saying, “Boil them and eat them for all I care. The officers freed his family.” [5] Yet, the 1977-78 war provided the catalyst to capitalize on broader anti-Siyaad feelings; and in the aftermath of the war debacle, some of the embittered field grade officers (again, most of them were from ********** clan) expressed their resentment towards Barre’s handling of the war. And this resentment took shape in the attempted (but failed) coup of April 09, 1978. A diplomat in Mogadishu described the coup as ‘ill-timed, ill-planned, ill-supported and tiny.’ [6] As many sources also indicate, the coup collapsed quickly of mainly Siyaad barre’s advance knowledge of the event, which permitted him to move ahead against the coup leaders. Subsequently, there have been no major disturbances in Mogadishu or Hargeisa – soon after brief clashes in Mogadishu surroundings, government forces succeeded to round up most of the coup plotters, including the Mogadishu-based ring leader, Col Mohamed Sheikh Osman “Cirro”. Government-owned Mogadishu Radio in Somali stated in one of their lead stories, in that week, that the government have been patient in the face of frequent provocations by this tiny group, who make use of “political brokerage” (afmiinshaarnimo) as a habit. [7] Nonetheless, the major ring leader of the abortive coup, Col Abdullahi Yusuf, with thirty junior officers escaped into Kenya and then to Ethiopia. Col Abdullahi Yusuf masterminded an opposition group, the Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF), absorbing the already Addis-based front, SODAF. [Read below]. Again, SOSAF was perceived as a clan-oriented party of the ******teens, and indeed they did provide the bulk of his followers. [8] In August 02, 1979, SOSAF was incorporated with other dissident groups and became Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), still though a **********-based opposition group. In order for SSDF to gain legitimacy and to be projected as an alternative ruler for all Somalis, Abdullahi Yusuf and other SSDF top brass should have sought a multi-clan movement that would transcend the interests of the ******teens. The Emergence of Puntland Regional Administration Prior to Puntland’s establishment in 1998, some hundreds of thousands people fled or were driven from their homes to places outside the capital city of Somalia, Mogadishu, and its surroundings – including refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. This human tragedy, which led to the emergency of national disintegration, was placed in motion when (May 18, 1991) a northern part of Somalia declared itself to secede from the rest of Somalia. Also, in the summer of 1998, delegates from five regions in northeastern part of Somalia expressed their hope of contributing to strengthen the general security and stability in the Horn of Africa region, particularly in Somalia. These delegates from not so friendly clans gathered and formulated a regional state. In regard to the proposals offered by the delegates, the new regional administration, Puntland, was represented as a model applicable to the settlement of the war torn Somali crisis. The delegates pledged to unite all clans in northeastern Somalia and thereafter make peace with their neighboring regions. They believed that the success of the process of national reconciliation is intimately related to the reconciliation based on “bottom-up” approach – i.e. “clan-reconciliation -first” approach. From the inception of the Administration however, as we know it, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) veterans have expressed a strong feeling of marginalization directed towards their sub-clans during the long period of Siyaad Barre's regime. The initial reaction of the other non-SSDF clans in the region was to curb the SSDF veterans’ fear and allowed them to handle the new Regional Administration's helm, as a compensatory gesture to draw popular unification. Soon the new Regional Administration simply invented sub-clan hegemony where it did not exist before; and, to many, the compensatory gesture from the delegates turned into bitterness which generated administrative sub-clan demarcation. It is therefore less surprising that the struggle to appropriate “a fair share” of the new Regional Administration's resources have suddenly assumed sub-clan distinctiveness. Many elders have now sought in various ways to remedy this shortcoming. They understood that their efforts was for long, mistakenly, directed to satisfy SSDF veterans beyond the limit. The moment still seems opportune to derail the previous gestures – of waiting on the sidelines – and initiate a more to direct action, and to try and wrest the destiny of Puntland from SSDF clique. Furthermore, the prime objective of Puntlanders should not, as on previous occasions, rely on or even look up to as a guide for the current leadership. We are deluding ourselves if we fail to recognize the existence of anti-democratic feelings among the top Puntland leadership. These anti-democratic feelings have been expressed in various ways. The most striking is how in the last three elections its top leaders were elected by a lousy Legislative Body, mere 66 in composition; and the Administration has yet to strive for direct elections (universal suffrage). Equally important is how Puntland leadership has, in the past, consciously helped sea-piracy to become a widespread phenomenon in Puntland. Undoubtedly, another example that will create resentment towards the current leadership will be if it tries to toe the line with the current mood of over-zealous supporters of Puntland, who are pushing the idea of an independent state entity, without referendum. If this happens, Puntland leadership alone will be held responsible for Somali Weyn humiliation. In this short paper, it is not possible to draw up the long list of grievances against Puntland leadership, all which can be described as the principal cause of discord. Failing to incorporate fully into its administration to Sanaag, Sool, and Cayn regions is one of the most important, however, there are many others – the Mijiyahan incident, Laascaanood debacle, sea piracy, corruption and venality in the administration etc. Finally, Roobdoon Forum forwards to its readers the following letter and news-coverage, which may have a special interest and deserve to be made accessible to a wider circle of readers. Reference [1] Rogers Morris and Richard Mauzy, “Following the Scenarios: Reflections on Five Case Histories in the Mode and Aftermath of CIA Intervention”, in The CIA File (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1976), edited by Robert L. Borosage and John Marks, p. 3-38. [2] Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian, March 26, 1976, pg 2 AU. [3] Africa Confidential, February 14, 1979, Vol. 20 No 4. [4] The Weekly Review, Nairobi, February 16, 1979. [5] The Globe and Mail, January 12, 1978, in “Power factions rise in Ethiopia. [6] The Guardian, Manchester, 10 April 1978. [7] Mogadishu Radio Domestic Service in Somali 0930 GMT Oct 26, 1978. [8] It is worthy to note that even though Yusuf masterminded the formation of SOSAF, its first general-secretary was however Mustafa Haji Nur (from the ***** clan). Similarly, SODAF had a non-********** leader, in the beginning of 1979 before it dissolved, and their leader was Omar Hassan Mohamoud (from the ****** clan). Roobdoon Forum Toronto, Canada Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Che -Guevara Posted August 3, 2009 Secret Document Signed by President Siyaad Barre Africa Confidential September 26, 1975, Vol. 16 No. 19, pg: 8 SOMALI OPPOSITION. In our last issue we pointed to the Somali government`s undoubted success in handling the very difficult situation caused by the drought. Opposition to the regime continues, however. We have recently seen a secret document signed by President Siyaad Barre and circulated to all ministries, the armed forces, regional and district commissioners and top members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, which announces an official campaign against all the civil servants and businessmen of Mudug region and particularly its capital Galkayu. The region has long contained many people critical of the military regime. President Siyaad`s remarkable document says that officials appointed to the region have displayed very little experience or ability, that the traders and businessmen of Galkayu are capitalistic and anti-revolutionaries and that “all sic) civil servants and members of the police and army from Galkayu by birth are committed to tribalistic thinking.” As a result, says the document, they have combined to bring about doubt and disruption of progress in the region. Before now patience and leniency in dealing with such a situation could have been counselled. “It now appears to me” writes Barre “that this dire lack of principles, responsibility and patroitism can no longer be tolerated . . . therefore it is essential to wipe out this disease as speedily and as mercilessly as possible.” The document says the following actions are to be taken. a)Any person born and working in Galkayu must he transferred from it immediately, b)The anti-revolutionary traders and business men of Galkayu must receive the severe punishment they deserve. c)The leaders of regional government must increase their control and inspection and forcefully impose upon (the people of Galkayu) the political orientation (of the SRC). “Any person who tries to resist these objectives must be punished harshly while being treated in a fair manner. “I have every confidence that the ministries, agencies and commands of the armed forces will faithfully implement the directive of the present circular letter.” The letter was dated August 23 [1975] and already Galkayu civil servants are being thrown out of regional jobs while businessmen fear that their businesses will be taken over by the state or by SRC officials. The Galkayu people are not represented on the SRC itself and have few voices to speak up on their behalf though they number many civil servants in Mogadishu. The danger is that the Mudug province will find itself entirely occupied by “foreign” officials, a situation that could only lead to further alienation. There are now rumours in Mogadishu that the turn of other regions will follow. Opposition to the regime in Hargeisa district (ex British Somaliland) would put it next in line but Hargeisa would be a much tougher nut to crack with many supporters in the SRC itself. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Che -Guevara Posted August 3, 2009 Defector Discusses Attempt Nairobi Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 8 May 1978 [Excerpt] Col Abdullah Yusuf, a former Somali officer who defected to Kenya, said told that his group defected to Kenya after the abortive coup attempt to oust General Siyaad Barre after losing the ****** war. Colonel Ahmad said the coup failed because the groups involved had no means of communication as President Siyaad Barre had concentrated the troops at the Somali-Ethiopia border without transportation facilities. He claimed further that Siyaad Barre had only sent troops who were not members of his clan to die in the ******, while some 10,000 troops of his own clan were concentrated around Mogadiscio to protect him and his close friends. Colonel Ahmad said further that President Siyaad Barre had run away from his presidential palace and hidden in a slum on the day of the attempted coup. He also accused President Siyaad Barre of banking the financial assistance sent to him by Arab states in his special account in Europe. He observed that the Somali ambassador to France, a relative of Siyaad Barre, has bought two huge villas in Paris with the money that has been given to Somalia for development. Colonel Ahmad has appealed to Arab countries and the Muslim World to stop giving aid to Somalia, because that aid would only be used to oppress the Somali people. He also appealed to the Western World to stop arming Somalia for the same reason. The Somali defectors accompanying Colonel Ahmad have applied for political asylum in Kenya and their applications are being considered. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Che -Guevara Posted August 3, 2009 Executions carried Out Hong Kong AFP in English 0704 GMT 26 Oct 1978 [Text] Mogadiscio 26 Oct, (AFP) – Seventeen people were executed by firing squad before a crowd of several thousand today for taking part in an abortive coup last April against Somali President Mohamed Siyaad Barre. The executions were carried out on a patch of waste ground on the outskirts of the capital. Several thousand people were, warned in advance of the executions by Mogadiscio Radio, massed in silence on the sandy hillside overlooking the execution site. Streets in the vicinity were closed to traffic and army reinforcements were called in to help police control the crowd. The seventeen, who were sentenced on September 13, 1978, were: 1. Col Mohamed Sheikh Osman “Cirro” 2. Maj Siad Mohamed Jama 3. Maj Ibrahim Mohamed Hersi 4. Maj Siad Jama Nur 5. Capt Mohamed Ahmed Yusuf Aganeh 6. Capt Abdisalan Elmi Warsame 7. Capt Bashir Abshir Isa 8. Capt Abdillahi Hasan Nur 9. Lt Abdi Osman Ugas 10. Lt Abdirahman Maalin Bashir 11. Lt Adan Warsame Abdillahi 12. Lt Abdillahi Mahamud Guled 13. Lt Mohamed Abdullahi Husein (Gorod) 14. Lt Abdulwahab Ahmed Hasim 15. Lt Abdulqadir Gelle Omar 16. Sgt Farah Mohamed Halwo 17. Director Abdulqafar Warsame Abdilleh Sentences Announced for Coup Conspirators Mogadiscio Domestic Service in Somali 1115 GMT 12 Sept 1978 According to Mogadishu Radio, the National Security Court of Mogadishu sentenced the above 17 accused to execution, having found them guilty as per Chapter 1 Law 54 of 9 October 1970 of the crime of having participated on 9 April 1978 in an abortive coup against the unity, peace and sovereignty of the Somali nation, thereby causing many deaths and injuries and much other damage. The Security Court however found not guilty and discharged: 2nd Lt Mohamed Muse Kaynan and Mah Abdullahi Gelle Yusuf. The Charges against Capt Mohamed Ahmed Guled and Lt Abdilatif Sheikh Ismail were dropped because they died before they could be brought to trail. A Second group, 46 in number, were charged under article 1 of Law 54, 10 September 1970. They were accused of aiding the first group who organized the coup plot of 9 April 1978. The court named them as: Lt Omar Ahmed Gab Lt Hasan Haji Abdi Lt Abdullahi Ahmed Shire Lt Abdullahi Mohamud (Wardhere) Lt Mohamud Mohamed Afrah Lt Dahir Maalin Elmi Lt Yusuf Ismail Awale 2nd Lt Mohamud Rashid Jama 2nd Lt Mohamud Sheikh Mohamed (Yilgor) 2nd Lt Yusuf Madar (Egeh) The court has found the above guilty of full participating in the crime, and each of them is sentenced to 30 years imprisonment and their property has been confiscated. The court has also [words indistinct]; Lt Ismail [words indistinct]; Lt Sharif Sheikh [words indistinct]; 2nd Lt Jama [words indistinct], 2nd Lt Muse Farah Guled; and 2nd Lt Dahir Mohamed Hasan, and sentenced them to 26 years imprisonment and the confiscation of their property. The court has also sentenced each of the following to 20 years imprisonment and the confiscation of their property: Lance Cpl Said Botan Elmi; Pvt Suleiman [words indistinct]; Cpl Isa Yusuf Araleh; [words indistinct] Cpl Ahmed Farah Jama; Lance Cpl Abdulqadir [words indistinct]; (Cpl) Jama Hersi Jama; Corporal [words indistinct]; (Cpl) [words indistinct] Yusuf Farah; private [words indistinct]; Lance Cpl (Ismail) Ahmed Diriye; 2nd Lt Jama Ahmed (Gedi); (Cpl) Abdi Mohamed Mahadalle; (2nd Lt) Aidid Ali (Diro); Lance Cpl Yusuf Ali Elmi; Lance Cpl Hasan Mire Nur; Cpl Mohamed Ahmed Diriye. The Court has also ordered the release of the following, for lack of sufficient evidence: Maj Yusuf Mohamed Osman; Lt Elmi Ahmed Iman; Lt Abdullahi Duale Mohamud; 2nd Ali Abokar Sheikh Ahmed; Lt Mohamed Omar Ali; Lt Markali Amin Munyo; 2nd Lt Mohamud Mohamed Dahir; Lt Ahmed Mohamed Hasan Bilal; Lt Mohamed Farah Jama Bodi; Lt Hasan [words indistinct] Mustafa; 2nd Lt Mohamed Husein Lolow; Cpl Hasan Nur Dinlo; Lance Cpl Muhyadin [words indistinct] Gaid; Pvt Said Muse Dualleh; and Cpl Abdi Warsame Awad. The Court has also sentenced Brig Gen Abdullahi Mohamud Hasan (Ma Tukade) to 28 years imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 [denomination unspecified]. He is convicted of favoritism under the article 10 of law No 67, of 1 November 1970, on which count he received 20 years; encouraging tribalism under article 2, on which count he received 5 years; and contravening article 22 of law No 54, of 10 November 1970, on which count he received 3 years. Maj Yasin Ali Yusuf has been sentenced to 3 years imprisonment under article 22 of Law 54, 10 September 1970 for failing to report to the authorities while having prior knowledge of the plot. The Court has discharged the following: Lt Col Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf, Capt Shaykdon Abdulle Elmi; Lt Ali Farah (Tifow); and Lt Abdullahi Ali Ahmed; who were charged with having prior information and failing to report it. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Che -Guevara Posted August 3, 2009 here's rest Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
GAAROODI Posted August 3, 2009 looooooooooooooooooo ol, good stuff!! i new this was the case but many didnt see it. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Che -Guevara Posted August 3, 2009 ^Did you even read the articles? Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
