AFRAID OF CLANNISH COURTS

[Kamalu Diin]

Afraid of Courts?

 

MAT BRYDEN

 

 

First, the Courts have revived the pan-Somali nationalist sentiment that, between 1960 and 1978, caused three wars between Ethiopia and Somalia, a long-running insurgency in north eastern Kenya and a short-lived urban guerrilla campaign in Djibouti. On November 17, Courts chairman Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys forcefully reiterated that position in an interview, asserting: "We will leave no stone unturned to integrate our Somali brothers in Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live with their ancestors in Somalia."

 

Second, the Courts have hosted and supported Ethiopian rebel groups - namely the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF) since at least March 2005. Since October 2006, the ONLF and the Courts claim to have been co-ordinating military operations inside Ethiopia. The Courts leaders probably feel that such actions are justified by the presence of Ethiopian troops on Somali soil, but they have never indicated whether the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops would be matched by suspension of support for cross-border insurgents.

 

Third, and perhaps most serious, are the Courts' alleged links to terrorism. Addis Ababa holds Sheikh Aweys and other senior figures of the Courts Council to be responsible for a series of terrorist attacks in Ethiopia between 1995-6. Other members of the Courts have been linked to the murders of Western aid workers, journalists and Somali civil society leaders in Somaliland and Mogadishu.

 

And the US government, among others, believes that elements of the Courts are sheltering transnational terrorists, including members of al-Qaeda responsible for major terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania. Courts leaders have been dismissive of these allegations.

 

Last weekend in Djibouti, the Courts signed a communiqu with the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) that spoke for the first time to these concerns. They promised to respect the territorial integrity of Somalia's neighbours, deny sanctuary to insurgent groups, and condemned all acts of terrorism. It remains to be seen whether they are willing and able to deliver on those commitments.

 

It is tempting to view the looming conflict as simply another chapter in Somalia's seemingly interminable civil wars, but the current dynamics are far more complex and the potential consequences more dire than in the past. This time, the stability and security of the entire Horn of Africa, not only of Somalia, are at stake.

 

At its most parochial level, the current confrontation is a grudge match between two old foes who have clashed before. TFG President Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed and Courts chairman Sheikh Aweys, both former Colonels, last fought each other in a vicious campaign in northeast Somalia in 1992. Yusuf's militias decimated Aweys's al-Itihaad forces and expelled them from the region.

 

Perhaps inevitably for Somalia, the situation also involves a clan dimension. For many Somalis, the conflict conjures up memories of the early days of the civil war, when ****** and ***** clan militias engaged in bloody clashes from Kismayo to Gaalka'yo. In much of Somalia, the Courts are perceived simply as a vehicle for ****** clan interests. Conversely, President Yusuf, a *****, is widely believed among the ****** to seek revenge against their clan.

 

But clan dynamics, though relevant, fail to capture the Courts' national character and ambitions. The militant wing of the Courts, known as the Shabaab, includes Somalis from most major clans and is determined to wage "jihad" until every corner of Somalia falls under their control. This poses a direct challenge to the stability of Puntland (an autonomous region in northeast Somalia) and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, which possesses a functioning constitutional democracy and seeks recognition as an independent state.

 

Not for the first time, the Ethio-Eritrean border dispute has spilled over into Somalia. In 1998-9, Ethiopia helped the Rahanweyne Resistance Army in its struggle against the Eritrean-backed forces of Hussein Aideed. Today, Eritrean support for the Courts, and indirectly for the ONLF and OLF, has prompted Ethiopia to augment its military presence on both sides of the Ethio-Somali administrative boundary. (Much of the frontier between Ethiopia and Somalia is disputed, making it a provisional boundary rather than an international border.)

 

Several thousand Ethiopian troops are already deployed in Somalia, most of them dug in around the TFG seat at Baidoa. Ethiopian troops have also deployed in strength to Gaalka'yo in support of the Puntland administration and heavy fighting broke out there on Tuesday morning.

 

Eritrea has reportedly sent several hundred troops and trainers, as well as considerable quantities of arms, to prepare the Courts for its confrontation with Ethiopia. If true, the Eritreans bring with them not only weapons, but also an invaluable first-hand experience of Ethiopian capabilities and tactics. Eritrea also hosts and trains forces from the OLF and ONLF, so its relationship with the Courts is doubly irksome for Addis Ababa.

[Kamalu Diin]

Not for the first time, the Ethio-Eritrean border dispute has spilled over into Somalia. In 1998-9, Ethiopia helped the Rahanweyne Resistance Army in its struggle against the Eritrean-backed forces of Hussein Aideed. Today, Eritrean support for the Courts, and indirectly for the ONLF and OLF, has prompted Ethiopia to augment its military presence on both sides of the Ethio-Somali administrative boundary. (Much of the frontier between Ethiopia and Somalia is disputed, making it a provisional boundary rather than an international border.)

[Wisdom_Seeker]

You comparing Eritrea with Ethiopia is like comparing oranges with apples.

 

They are two different fruits but at the end of the day they are both categorized as fruits. Now the Ethiopians and Eritreans are different from each other, but at the end of the day they remain our enemies, but it is wise to pick the weaker one over the stronger one. So you could use one to crush the other and then deal with the weaker one later on.

[Kamalu Diin]

Horta maxaa la'isku waydiin la yahay Hort USC/ICU yey u haystaan Eriterian and Al-Qa'eda. I guess for their brothers.