SOMALILAND�: Haunted by its Founding Mythology?

[QabiilDiid]

ALLAAHU AKBAR, AFKU KUMA GO’O, A. Hirad.....

You deserve to have your name written in GOLD. I am from Hargeisa, too AND I am not less able than the Tigranyan boys who are determined to hold different nationalities and races together in a nation-state including my own race of Somalis. Indeed it is an insult to Africa if few armed bands/gangs who are taking advantage of the power vacuum in Somalia succeed in having a forum with South African government to dismember a sister state which happens to be the purest of her children. Let the hired pens of the separatists [sNM gangs] satiate themselves from sand dunes.CIIDAA HA KA DHERGEEN

 

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By: Abdalla A. Hirad

Sunday, April 16, 2006

 

The recurrent and insistent claim by the oligarchy of “Somaliland†that all the clans within the region are committed to and supportive of the secession has never been substantiated and is ethnographically and politically refutable. The fact that militia from “Somaliland†and “Puntland†are facing each other in a dangerous confrontation in Adhi Caddeeye, between Burao and Lasanood, hundreds of miles short of the claimed boundaries of “Somalilandâ€, says it all. The fact also underscores the prediction that the war fronts will multiply should the oligarchy and their cohorts push their luck any further, with or without the full reconstitution of Somalia. There is, therefore, also a greater degree of probability that the hard won peace in the region might be tested to its peril if the secession is pushed to the limit.

 

 

“Somalilandâ€, at best, has, therefore, been a face-saving concoction by—a strategically contrived excuse for the alliance of—the clan elite seeking the secession as matter for falsely demarcating their claimed jurisdiction of influence, in their jockeying for power at the national or regional level. A large proportion of the people of the North—comprising all clans—do not indeed subscribe to the motto and the mantle of the secession. The fact that the people of “Somaliland†had their share of sectarian violence under the banner of :â€Somaliland†and have had their equitable share of power resources in the Transitional Federal Governmentâ€, attest to the fact that “Somaliland†is still a murky political undertaking, if primarily regional rather than national; that, in essence, even the Issac, the majority clan in the area are divided on the issue; and that, as an issue, the question of the secession can be a quick sand for those not fully informed. Professor Iqbal Daood Jhazbhay comes in handy as one of those victims of ignorance.

 

However, even if we come to consider some of the experiences of countries like Ethiopia and Eritrea as a cine qua non example for the argument towards the fission of Somalia, which the professor celebrates as a great example for the purpose of confusion, the phenomenon did not take place in many other countries, which have survived their civil and political conflict. Countries such as Uganda, Rwanda (which experienced the greatest genocide in modern history), Burundi, Congo, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast all make cases in point, as examples in Africa, in this regard. There have been even some countries elsewhere that have fused again including the two Germanys and the two Yemens, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some are still struggling in the process of re-amalgamation as in the cases of the Sudan and its south, the two Koreas and China and Taiwan.

 

Finally, and by way of concluding remarks, the unionist constituency in the region has been struggling to outwait the saber-rattling of the secessionists for war, as Jhazbhay confirms, in the above quotation from the leadership of “Somalilandâ€. They have been waiting for a government of Somalia to come to power as an ultimate option for solutions. And that, in my considered view, has been the safer option than to directly confront the secessionist constituency on a head on collision course, in order to avoid violence in the short term. It seems therefore a stronger pull out of the myth of “Somaliland†by the union oriented clans in the North is as dangerous as a stronger push for the secession by the secession oriented clans.

 

In the long term, however, one hopes dialogue and compromise on all sides will avert an approaching tragedy as a way out. The next safest thing to do is for the region to break up into its constituent clans to avoid unnecessary tension and civil war, so that those clans who wish to secede can freely do so and those who wish to stay united with the rest of Somalia can freely do so. Thus, in all cases, the mythology is bound to crumble for each sub-entity to return to its original state of nature and “shift for itself†as it sees fit. It is a matter for the constituent clans to choose between the scenarios. And it takes all to make it one way or the other.

 

The frightening thing is that people of Professor Jhazbhay’s mind are of the opinion to push so recklessly for the secession to incite civil war within the region, even sooner than the TFG can ever intervene! And that is the other worse kept secret! Confronted with the efforts of the international community to uphold the territorial integrity and the national unity of Somalia, if possible at all, as a constraint, the Professor simply dismisses the international position as simply “ignorantâ€, as he wrongfully argues that“these uninformed perspectives are held arguably due to sheer ignorance, stupefied indifference, or a lethal combination of both.â€

 

So much for professor Jhazbhay’s claimed love for “Somalilandâ€, wisdom in resolving the problem and for his international expertise on the question of Somalia, if at all! Sool: A thought for Puntland†– A Responseâ€, posted inWardheerNews.com on April 12, 2006 correctly writes:

“… and there’s a perfectly solid reason for that: in the aftermath of the disintegration of Somalia’s central government, the Somali people reverted back to the next level of political unity: the clan. Mogadishu was once the most integrated Somali city in the Horn of Africa region. Today, it is dominated by a single Somali clan-family whose “claim†is grounded on the ideology of traditional land ownership. Under that same ideology, the SNM rebel movement “liberated†Waqooyi Galbeed [NW] regions of Somalia from the former military dictatorship and declared unilateral independenceâ€.

 

But “Somaliland†does not factor in as a clan territory. The former British Protectorate comprises the land of a number of sub-clans lumped together by the colonial masters of old—particularly the British—without the wishes or will of the natives themselves. “Somalilandâ€, like all the other partitions, therefore, has been a superimposed reality on the Somali nation, including the Italian colony in the south, later known as the “Italian Trusteeship Territory of Somaliaâ€â€”which also comprised—still does—a bunch of subclans. The evidence of this fact is widely reflected in the recent history and the nature of the civil war—clan feud being one of its manifestations.

 

It is, therefore, morally disrespectful to the people of the region, if not to the nation as a whole, to try and re-impose those colonial divisions on the people of the Somali Republic, more than half a century after the British and Italians have left. Needless to mention that it sure feels insulting to the South African people and government—after liberation from apartheid—and to the nations of the African continent as whole, to see a South African drumming up support for the dismemberment of Somalia. I am of the strong conviction that, fortunately, that is not the policy of the government of South Africa.

 

History attests to the fact that no sooner than they obtained their independence from the British and the Italians, the entities (the British and Italian colonized parts) signed an un-negotiated, unconditional union, to break the manacles and political division imposed by the colonial powers. Indeed, the visiting delegation from the North to Mogadishu, for reunion with the South, immediately after 26 June, refused to negotiate with the SYL leadership in, when they were offered to delay the union by sometime, on the grounds that the visiting delegation had no mandate to discuss option, other to commit to the act of union. Indeed, the SYL recalled the delegation for continued talks, history goes, only after the masses in Mogadishu took on rioting against the SYL leadership within the next two days or so. And a reunion was committed without any negations. The North had to accept the initiations of the South which had the benefits of ten years of preparation under the UN trusteeship arrangement.

 

To argue that those clans would seek to return to the state of colonization, after an independence of more than fifty years, or accept an icon of that colonial era as a symbol for their new existence is flawed in theory and insulting to the free spirit and the fabric of the Somali society, and particularly to the people of the region. After all, it took only four days for the people of the then newly independent Somaliland to join their brethren in the other part—the Italian colony—who were, in turn, also anxiously counting the days until they obtained their independence from the Italians—only to amalgamate with the North, the same day they attained their independence, in July 1, 1960.

 

And it was not a matter of coincidence that the British Protectorate obtained its independence only four days before the independence of the Italian South. It was actually as a result of a conscious and popular demand by the people of the then “Somalilandâ€, despite the persuasions of the British and its sympathizers from within to wait a little longer for the protectorate to mature into a state, before its union with the South. But with the Haud and Reserve area given away to Haile Selase’s Ethiopia, a few years back; with a suspicion that the British may never leave later; with rumors that Ethiopia was engaged in secret negotiations with the European powers, demanding the annexation of more Somali territory; or, simply, the Somali people fearing a re-amalgamation might never materialize later, immediate reunion was an early and an inevitable choice in the Somali psyche of that day.

 

Therefore, the “Somaliland Protectorate†had never transpired into a state of its own right to return to in 1991, as some have falsely claimed thereafter. I must re-emphasize that it had only existed for four days in which, essentially, preparations were being made for travel and, in effect, reunion with the other part. Hence, to speak of “Somaliland†ever being a state is also a very flawed assumption. “Somaliland†was, at best, defined by its colonial history not by its independence of only four days before immediate re-union with that other part of the partitioned Somali nation. A return to the state of “Somaliland†represents a platitude or an empty inanity, at best.

 

As to the argument that it has been the only option for those clannish sub-entities, comprising “Somalilandâ€, to “shift for themselves†into a reunion under its banner, after the collapse of government in 1991, one easily finds the banality of the statement in the fact that Somalis in all parts of Somalia have returned to “their state of natureâ€â€”the clan organization—as a base to renegotiate from, for reunion. Hence, there has been no entity—no state—in place for “Somaliland†to secede from, as of the day when the government of Somalia collapsed in 1991. There were only clusters of clans everywhere, including the bunch that make up the claimed myth of “Somalilandâ€. What makes “Somaliland†so different, one might ask, from the rest of the nation in its structure, for its people not to return to the “state of natureâ€â€”the clan structure? Or, is it different at all?

 

On the contrary, one does not need to look hard for the answer in this regard. The dispute over Sool and Sanaag (formerly two regions of the former British Somaliland) between the existing “Puntland†and “Somaliland†stems from the fact that the subclans in those two areas belong to the larger D-a-r-o-o-d clan, and would rather stay with “Puntland†comprising their kinsmen than be hurriedly bulldozed to become part of a “Somalilandâ€, which is not of their choice. And there lies one worst kept secret, for Professor Jhazbhay to note, if he would!

 

The recurrent and insistent claim by the oligarchy of “Somaliland†that all the clans within the region are committed to and supportive of the secession has never been substantiated and is ethnographically and politically refutable. The fact that militia from “Somaliland†and “Puntland†are facing each other in a dangerous confrontation in Adhi Caddeeye, between Burao and Lasanood, hundreds of miles short of the claimed boundaries of “Somalilandâ€, says it all. The fact also underscores the prediction that the war fronts will multiply should the oligarchy and their cohorts push their luck any further, with or without the full reconstitution of Somalia. There is, therefore, also a greater degree of probability that the hard won peace in the region might be tested to its peril if the secession is pushed to the limit.

 

“Somalilandâ€, at best, has, therefore, been a face-saving concoction by—a strategically contrived excuse for the alliance of—the clan elite seeking the secession as matter for falsely demarcating their claimed jurisdiction of influence, in their jockeying for power at the national or regional level. A large proportion of the people of the North—comprising all clans—do not indeed subscribe to the motto and the mantle of the secession. The fact that the people of “Somaliland†had their share of sectarian violence under the banner of :â€Somaliland†and have had their equitable share of power resources in the Transitional Federal Governmentâ€, attest to the fact that “Somaliland†is still a murky political undertaking, if primarily regional rather than national; that, in essence, even the I-s-s-a-c, the majority clan in the area are divided on the issue; and that, as an issue, the question of the secession can be a quick sand for those not fully informed. Professor Iqbal Daood Jhazbhay comes in handy as one of those victims of ignorance.

 

However, even if we come to consider some of the experiences of countries like Ethiopia and Eritrea as a cine qua non example for the argument towards the fission of Somalia, which the professor celebrates as a great example for the purpose of confusion, the phenomenon did not take place in many other countries, which have survived their civil and political conflict. Countries such as Uganda, Rwanda (which experienced the greatest genocide in modern history), Burundi, Congo, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast all make cases in point, as examples in Africa, in this regard. There have been even some countries elsewhere that have fused again including the two Germanys and the two Yemens, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some are still struggling in the process of re-amalgamation as in the cases of the Sudan and its south, the two Koreas and China and Taiwan.

 

Finally, and by way of concluding remarks, the unionist constituency in the region has been struggling to outwait the saber-rattling of the secessionists for war, as Jhazbhay confirms, in the above quotation from the leadership of “Somalilandâ€. They have been waiting for a government of Somalia to come to power as an ultimate option for solutions. And that, in my considered view, has been the safer option than to directly confront the secessionist constituency on a head on collision course, in order to avoid violence in the short term. It seems therefore a stronger pull out of the myth of “Somaliland†by the union oriented clans in the North is as dangerous as a stronger push for the secession by the secession oriented clans.

 

In the long term, however, one hopes dialogue and compromise on all sides will avert an approaching tragedy as a way out. The next safest thing to do is for the region to break up into its constituent clans to avoid unnecessary tension and civil war, so that those clans who wish to secede can freely do so and those who wish to stay united with the rest of Somalia can freely do so. Thus, in all cases, the mythology is bound to crumble for each sub-entity to return to its original state of nature and “shift for itself†as it sees fit. It is a matter for the constituent clans to choose between the scenarios. And it takes all to make it one way or the other.

 

The frightening thing is that people of Professor Jhazbhay’s mind are of the opinion to push so recklessly for the secession to incite civil war within the region, even sooner than the TFG can ever intervene! And that is the other worse kept secret! Confronted with the efforts of the international community to uphold the territorial integrity and the national unity of Somalia, if possible at all, as a constraint, the Professor simply dismisses the international position as simply “ignorantâ€, as he wrongfully argues that “these uninformed perspectives are held arguably due to sheer ignorance, stupefied indifference, or a lethal combination of both.â€

 

So much for professor Jhazbhay’s claimed love for “Somalilandâ€, wisdom in resolving the problem and for his international expertise on the question of Somalia, if at all!

 

Abdalla A. Hirad

E-mail: MHirad@aol.com

[RedSea]

ASSALAMU CALAYKUM,

 

Nacayb iyo cudur aan daawo lahayn ayaa kaa buuxa ninaw. Wax kale oo aanan maqal mahaysaa sxb.

 

peace.

[Sophist]

Well argued article that deserves to be read with an open mind.

[RedSea]

Assalamu Calaykum,

 

I would have responded to it in how you put it with " open mind", but I sense Mr. Nayruus has some other intentions that I wouldn't want to get involved, check out the words that HE highlighted and tell me what they mean. We have seen such articles posted here before and they don't usually fair well here. So good luck finding an "openminded" person to respond to this "good" article in a "rational" way. :rolleyes:

 

assalamu Calaykum.