Rethinking the Somali State

[NASSIR]

Rethinking the Somali State

 

 

Ali A. Fatah

 

 

June 24,2005

 

The task of reconstituting a viable Somali state is proving to be a bridge too far. To appreciate the complexity of the underlying problem consider the backdrop of the past fourteen (14) years of statelessness during which fifteen (15) successive “peace and reconciliation†conferences have all ended up in abject failure. The monumental cost in lives lost, squandered national treasure—in the midst of mind-numbing, man-made ecological disasters—has not even been calculated. The one saving grace, in all of these, has been the Somali people's willingness to stay the course in their earnest quest to set the nation aright. Through abiding faith and sheer determination, they have able to see the 16 th and, most probably, the last such conference to fruition.

 

To the relief of many, the Intergovernmental Association for Development (IGAD) sponsored, two-year conference ended on a buoyant note. With the election of an interim national assembly (Transitional Parliament) and a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the long-dormant national spirit was rekindled and with it a promise for better governance. Suddenly a number of unexpected snags gathered momentum and began to pour cascading cold shower on the new government's parade. Before long, the Somali people's mood shifted from one of anticipation to apprehension. Thus the elation that greeted the new government was short-lived. Still the TFG seemed a wee bit too self-assured though events were not necessarily breaking their way. Moreover, when it came to action, they waffled. For awhile, the TFG's standard operating procedure was basically to express annoyance at the warlord-led opposition's audacity to challenge the Government (at every turn). So the opposition out foxed the TFG by exploiting the interim Government's miss-steps, of which there were a few. Consequently, their otherwise mulish campaign threatened to all but derail the TFG's agenda, several months before the Government's maiden journey home.

 

The opposition's main complaints centered around two highly contentious demands: 1) exclusion of Ethiopian troops from “peace keeping†duties in Mogadishu , and 2) insistence on relocating the Government to Mogadishu in spite of the City's notorious reputation for lawlessness. The TFG too was not interested in backing down in the face threats posed by an opposition coalition a good number of whom are also counted as members of the Government.

 

After many months of fits and starts, there was much consternation all around. Thus, the polite but stern eviction of the TFG and Transitional Parliament from their cozy accommodations in Nairobi hotels has imposed certain drive on the otherwise lackluster Somali body politic. Fortuitously, this action was a good thing for the TFG. It enabled them to implement the Government's long planned move to Somalia . The extent to which the move will help restore the dwindling reservoir of goodwill that Somalis initially expressed towards the new Government or enhance its somewhat sagging overall credibility remains to be seen. At any rate, the TFG has probably realized, and rightly so, that the move home will more than likely strengthen its hand. Because, from this point forward, they have to work around real socio-political and economic issues as they relate to the existing reality on the ground.

 

The decision to select Jowhar, a stable town that is about an hour's drive from Mogadishu—even on temporary basis—as the principal seat of government was a masterful stroke of planning on the part of the Executive Branch. Governor Mohammed Omaer Habeb deserves much credit for stabilizing the Middle Shebelle region and for hosting a sizable TFG entourage, until the Government stands on its feet, in the coming weeks. Taken together, these events should waft beneficial winds beneath the TFG's sails. The necessities for navigating the chubby political waters ahead would, however, require a fresh approach to governance in the Somali peninsula.

 

Chaos Theory and the Historic Capital— Mogadishu

 

Lately, lots of ink has been spilled on the lack of basic security in Mogadishu with discussions centering on the patently obvious: that the city is frighteningly chaotic. Yet there is more to the situation than meets the eye. That is, there exists a definite order underneath the apparent disarray. As a direct consequence, a new social relation is dividing the population into mutually antagonistic camps of winners and losers, by degree. Those who control the illicit trade of kat importation, the drug trade and the Isbaaro , extortion centers, through wild-eyed militias have been, thus far, winners. The hundreds of thousands of peace-loving innocent residents of Xamar, who are being held hostage by the occupying warlords, are the real losers in this new, troubling dispensation. Meanwhile, the rest of Somalis who want the nation made whole again are in a holding pattern, hoping that the TFG will be able to restore the rule of law. The foregoing is Chaos Theory personified. Unless this skewed social relation is altered, the prevailing unhealthy scheme will continue to fester.

 

There are other important groups in Mogadishu . The legitimate business community is one such group. They often exert influence to maintain a semblance of peaceful co-existence within the City. Beyond that they seem to have opted out of the limelight, particularly in regard to the on-going feud between the local warlords and the TFG. They are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. They do not like what is going on in Mogadishu under the tutelage of the Warlords but they dislike an all-out war even more. Along with the Courts, they wisely counsel peace and bide their time.

 

The Subsidiarity Paradigm

 

The Somali civil war and its bloody aftermath hinged on few negative impulses including fear, mistrust and greed, among others. This resulted from the ravages of rampant mismanagement that left the society poor and quite destitute, and the clans virtually on each other's throats. Thus factions of the urban elite, who tasted few imported creature comforts, decided to fight to the finish (with other peoples' kids as their private militias) in pursuit of political power and ill-gotten wealth. Their tool of choice in this misguided struggle has been neo-clanism (which is distinctly an urban phenomenon that has little to do with the Xeer-centered clan system as practiced in country side).

 

So, it stands to reason that the new federalism is implemented in accordance with both the letter and the spirit of the articles of federation that have been promulgated by the interim authorities less than a year ago. In particular, the TFG should abide by the imperative for Subsidiarity: to allow that social, economic and political decisions are made at the lowest sensible levels in society (without sacrificing sovereignty or weakening national consciousness).

 

The principle of Subsidiarity is not new concept. The successful, early Islamic administrations have flourished by using decentralized system of government (akin to Subsidiaity). The Catholic Church has adopted it long ago as did the European Union. All have benefited from it, because it fosters the free movement of goods, services and above all information. It allows appropriate decisions to be made by citizens at the places where they live and conduct business. In Somalia such an approach will usher a new paradigm of governance that would expand the economy, enhance freedom, while markedly reducing the ill-effects of bureaucratic inertia (and its corollary: rabid neo-clanism). For if the federal authorities fail to read the governing documents there is the danger of reverting to that which is familiar, namely the failed practices of the past. And, debilitating corruption will not be far behind. Should that unfortunate scenario come to pass, any social progress in the country will be spotty at best and it will be hardly sustainable.

 

Finally, in dealing with hardened warlords, the TFG should consider using carrots and sticks. Some faction leaders will probably be willing to work with interim Government if their concerns are dealt with forthrightly. Others may be set on their ways and would rather continue with their attempts to foil the new administration. To them politics may very well be something of a zero sum game. If so they will probably keeping goading the TFG into playing ball in their own way!

 

Equally important is the imperative for the TFG to abide by the articles of federation concerning the Subsidiarity principle. Positive action in this regard (or lack thereof) can make or break the new federal Republic that is being re-established in Somalia today. Lets hope that the federal authorities would rethink anew the role of the state with respect to the need for a free and dynamic society that would be able to uplift the beaten but unbowed Somalis throughout the country.

 

Ali A. Fatah

Washington, DC

E-Mail: amakhiri@aol.com

 

Source: Wardheernews