The Era of Islamist Warlords

[Meiji]

Nuune,

 

The conflict is between islamist factions: Alshabab/Xisbul Islam vs ICU and gov't militia.

 

It is mainly a clash between ''wadaado''.

[nuune]

Fine, if you say so, then Amisom is there too, do you put them in the category of ICU and gov't militia!!

[Meiji]

Nuune,

 

This topic deals with the Islamist warlords.

 

I have denounced the foreign mercenaries in other topics.

 

The foreign mercenaries too should leave.

[Paragon]

I warned about this outcome in October 2008, and knew things will come to ahead sometime before that. Here's the totality of what I wrote then - in a SOL topic that has strangely gone missing. Good that I have back-up.

As such, he urges us all to be intelligent enough to differentiate between two important things: (1) pursuing a futile short-term war, destined for failure and informed by a super-ego that rejects all efforts of reconciliation at the aggrandizement of the nation, which, on the same token, has only achieved to create daily civilian carnage, suffering and mass displacement, all in the name of a supposed national interest, and; (2) a well considered and conciliatory, strategic plan, driven by the long-term desire to cleverly survive the tricky and dire situation we are in, and spare our nation from a divisive civil war, occupation, and possibly, the bleak reality of total non-existence.

 

Thus, in a nutshell, our good Thierry envisions, and with quite a good qualification and validity, the opportunity beyond the potential hazards of the current political impasse and occupation, pointing us all to catch a hopeful glimpse of the bright horizon of a bigger picture. The BIGGER PICTURE I speak of, which takes a great deal of personal soul-searching to see, is one that animates the reasonable mind to question, interrogate the struggles it currently considers to be vital national interests, and finally PRIORITIZE them into two important categories: (A) risky, violent, fruitless and terminal national struggles that will cost us the very ethnic and territorial existence we seek to protect, which culminates in a Sentimental Struggle (B) opting for (while keeping in mind our current condition of severe limitation in political will, man-power and resources for waging an effective resistance), a long-term strategic plan, well thought out and carefully executed, that guarantees or ensures the nation's ethnic continuation and territorial integrity. Which, in other words, finds its strength in a Sensible Struggle.

 

Category (A) The Hazards of Sentiment

 

Defensive human impulses, have the natural tendency to react violently in resisting the evil of aggression of the other, especially that of occupation. The impulse to resist another's deliberate transgression, the moment we perceive his actions as an insult to our honour, come natural to every Somali man, and surely, both pride and patriotism lend him a righteous hand. Now, considering these natural entitlements to wage a decisive war against the current Ethiopian occupation, it is highly plausible that many well intentioned fighters (of religious and nationalist denominations) in the re-liberation movements, to insist that the only remedy to occupation is nothing but concerted war. These well intentioned brothers and sisters will also assert that the war for re-liberation, is not just merely another unwarranted internal war like others before, but in fact one deservedly justified by a majority national sentiment. And guess what? They are right and I wholeheartedly concur with this assertion.

 

In fact, as everyone in SOL forum is aware of, I am an unflinching supporter of the re-liberation war not only when writing on Somalia, but also I have been, and still am, an active participant in many real life campaigns, demonstrations and organisation ,in an effort to get rid of the tragedy and indignity of occupation, which has been callously visited upon my nation. But I must honestly admit that all my activism, and that of many others, have been solely driven by an emotional, nationalistic and religious 'sentiment' and not much sense. Of course I acknowledge that sentiment is good, and very important at this junction of our history, but what is equally important is, that sentiment is only side of the coin when it comes to undertaking an effective and successful struggle. Especially in a struggle as important as the current one.

 

The other side of the coin, I believe, is unmistakably 'sensibility'. While sentiment is crucial in uniting and emotionally motivating the entire populace to concerted action against injustice, without the guidance of sensibility on the part of leaders, sentiment is prone to short-sightedness, which would certainly lead us into pitfalls. Thus, what is currently needed is a presence of 'vision' in a leadership that sensibly plans for the country's long-term, strategic goals. There is absolutely nothing to be gained from sentimentally, which, although good in its own way, is insufficient in the face of many practical difficulties that hinder or reduce the effectiveness of the war for re-liberation. I believe these practical problems have been evolving for a long time, and not overcoming them means ineffectiveness and failure. What we must consider is that:

 

• * Historically, we currently live in a period of time in which we have been severely weakened by a twenty year old civil, making us the most vulnerable nation of today's world. And Ethiopia, as a state that has always followed and monitored our general social conditions for centuries, waiting for the right opportunity to invade, has used our self-inflicted vulnerability and occupied us. Additionally, our long-standing clan hatred and antagonisms have given Ethiopia the golden opportunity to territorially dismantle our country into fiefdoms. Thus, fighting Ethiopia, while the country is in this dire state, becomes that much more difficult and even the sentiment of 99% of our people now seems to be in vein. And it is for this reason that we must now critically plan for an alternative route to re-liberation.
• The other difficulty that also faces us is in nature global, in that were we to hope that global sentiment would be sympathetic to our cause for we are the wronged party, that doesn't seems to be the case. If anything, global sentiment appears to be working in our disadvantage. Why? Because the United States and Ethiopia have made sure of that.

The third obstacle must contend with in internal to us as Somalis, in that there already exist many irreparable splits within the movement of the re-liberation front. As brother Thierry has already touched on in one of his posts, there are multiple fronts in the re-liberation movement, some of which (Khalid Bin Walid) coming into existence as recent as three weeks ago. These fronts now total 10, and we are still counting. The older fronts include the different wings of Al-Shabaab (Mogadishu and the Jubbas group), the former UIC (Asmara and Djibouti group), The Jubba Islamic Brotherhood Movement, various Nationalist groupings and so on and so forth. And what is now common knowledge is that these groups or wings follow very different and conflicting approaches in their fight for re-liberation. The main religious wings, such as the UIC and Al-Shabaab, see each other as sworn enemies, let alone their views towards other non-religious and nationalist fronts. These religious wings are increasingly becoming hostile to each other, and further splits or division within them cannot be ruled out. A case in point is the recent creation of Khalid Bin Walid group, whose very aim of formation is said to be a rejection of Al-Shabaab's unilateral closure of Mogadishu Airport. The Khalid Bin Walid group have recently declared that their main objective is to fight, not against Ethiopian occupiers, but to counter Al-Shabaab's monopoly on command and, possibly, violence. So, if that is all it takes another group or front to form, then I must ask you, isn't the situation becoming so chaotic as to expect more catastrophic wars all over again? I hope not.

 

 

* Another equally serious problem is related to the above point (3), and concerns the future consequences of ever increasing fronts making impossible the joint agreement to table alternative rule of law in post-occupation Somalia. If Ethiopia is successfully defeated and driven out of the country, then the question is, what awaits Somalia that will find itself under multiple factional controls within compartmentalized territories? Another bout of twenty or fourty year old ideological civil way? Such a future is what worries me most, even more than the current TFG and Ethiopian occupiers. Now, at the present time, what we must start planning for is the sort of structural frameworks for stability and governance will be in place in post-occupation Somalia. I strong hold the view that it was our failure to plan ahead is what has led us into civil war, before even Siad Bare was ousted from power. And surely, that mistake has precipitated current Ethiopian occupation. Do we wish to repeat the same mistake? I hope not. As someone who has put a great deal of thought and effort into gaining some insight into our current condition, and the prospects of the future that awaits our nation, my advice is this: be visionary, think beyond today in order to catch a glimpse of the bigger picture while still paying attention to history.

 

* Another dangerous precedent that flaws from our previous failures or mistakes of thinking ahead, concerns what I would call the 'lost generation of the war'. this means, the thousands of youths that were born in Somalia during the years of 1991 to the present, who, their short lifetimes, have not known only war and its strife. This generation, which has no tangible social knowledge or social school and semblance of governance structures, have previously fallen prey to warlords and we used to fan the flame of clan-based war. The fact that this generation was a major factor in the continuation of the civil war is not their fault; the fault lies elsewhere I believe. However, during the rise of the UIC and, subsequently, the Al-Shabaab, the radical indoctrination of these youths has dramatically increased, taking a different religious orientation. Thus, this marks the advent of mass radicalization in the fight ( previously) against the warlords, (and now) the TFG and Ethiopian occupiers. Personally, I don't see such radicalization as a problem, if these youths will at later times be institutionalized and absorbed into a future post-occupation state apparatus. But such an institutionalization can not altogether be guaranteed, as there exist future strategic plans to do so. Thus, if such plans are not quickly put in place, then in post-occupation Somalia, we will certainly be in for the continuation of civil. What makes that likely is that it is presently observable that some religiously radicalized youths, and their minders, seem apprehensive toward comprise in reconciling with their fellow freedom fighters, even when peace may solely depend on reconciliation. So, what if these youths and their minders insist that, having sacrificed life and limp in liberating Somalia, they will not share the victory with the rest of the re-liberation movements? Should we then expect another face-off between what before use to be 'freedom fighters' at the expense of an already weary nation?

 

* Last but not least, granted that we overcome all the difficulties I touched on in the above five points, will there a future post-occupation Somalia that is able to survive, for long, the overtures of and interventions of neighbouring countries, and the international community (especially the US)? I hope that we survive and prosper into strong and promising Somalia, amen. But then again, what if it doesn't? Will it not be wise to complete ways to make sure Somalia outlives all its enemies? Think about it. Certainly this is why I and brother Thierry are proposing the acceptance of the Djibouti Reconciliations.

CATEGORY (B) The Fortunes of 'Sensibility'

[Raamsade]

Only the myopic or those who want to bring down this government call for the departure of AMISOM. I have yet to hear a sensible argument against AMISOM's presence other than empty platitudes like "Somalis can solve their own problems." There were no AMISOM or other foreign troops during C. Qaasim's government and there were still groups opposing it. We must accept the reality that there are powerful vested groups that don't want to see the restitution of the Somali State. And they're willing to defend that position to the bitter end and at any cost.

[Meiji]

Another equally serious problem is related to the above point (3), and concerns the future consequences of ever increasing fronts making impossible the joint agreement to table alternative rule of law in post-occupation Somalia. If Ethiopia is successfully defeated and driven out of the country, then the question is, what awaits Somalia that will find itself under multiple factional controls within compartmentalized territories? Another bout of twenty or fourty year old ideological civil way? Such a future is what worries me most, even more than the current TFG and Ethiopian occupiers. Now, at the present time, what we must start planning for is the sort of structural frameworks for stability and governance will be in place in post-occupation Somalia. I strong hold the view that it was our failure to plan ahead is what has led us into civil war, before even Siad Bare was ousted from power. And surely, that mistake has precipitated current Ethiopian occupation. Do we wish to repeat the same mistake? I hope not. As someone who has put a great deal of thought and effort into gaining some insight into our current condition, and the prospects of the future that awaits our nation, my advice is this: be visionary, think beyond today in order to catch a glimpse of the bigger picture while still paying attention to history.

 

.

Another dangerous precedent that flaws from our previous failures or mistakes of thinking ahead, concerns what I would call the 'lost generation of the war'. this means, the thousands of youths that were born in Somalia during the years of 1991 to the present, who, their short lifetimes, have not known only war and its strife. This generation, which has no tangible social knowledge or social school and semblance of governance structures, have previously fallen prey to warlords and we used to fan the flame of clan-based war. The fact that this generation was a major factor in the continuation of the civil war is not their fault; the fault lies elsewhere I believe. However, during the rise of the UIC and, subsequently, the Al-Shabaab, the radical indoctrination of these youths has dramatically increased, taking a different religious orientation. Thus, this marks the advent of mass radicalization in the fight ( previously) against the warlords, (and now) the TFG and Ethiopian occupiers. Personally, I don't see such radicalization as a problem, if these youths will at later times be institutionalized and absorbed into a future post-occupation state apparatus. But such an institutionalization can not altogether be guaranteed, as there exist future strategic plans to do so. Thus, if such plans are not quickly put in place, then in post-occupation Somalia, we will certainly be in for the continuation of civil. What makes that likely is that it is presently observable that some religiously radicalized youths, and their minders, seem apprehensive toward comprise in reconciling with their fellow freedom fighters, even when peace may solely depend on reconciliation. So, what if these youths and their minders insist that, having sacrificed life and limp in liberating Somalia, they will not share the victory with the rest of the re-liberation movements? Should we then expect another face-off between what before use to be 'freedom fighters' at the expense of an already weary nation?

Brilliant piece!

 

Alliances of convenience always fragment without visionary leaders able to keep the mosaic together.

 

That will happen with the current alliance of convenience: Xisbi Islam & Alshabab.

[Paragon]

^Thanks, Meiji. Illaaheey ha qaboojiyo dabkan1.

[Meiji]

One of the most respected and knowledgable Somali wadaad has today called the war between the Islamist factions: FITNA and they should PRACTICE WHAT THEY PREACH and OBEY SHARECADA ISLAAMKA.

 

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Sh Cumar Faaruuq oo Dagaalada Muqdisho Fitno ku tilmaamey.

 

Sh Cumar Faaruuq oo ka mid ah Culimada Soomaaliyeed kuna sugan Dalka Sacuudiga ayaa isaga oo u waramayey Idaacada Hornafrik ee Muqdisho waxaa uu ka Hadley Dagaalada maalmihii ugu danbeeyay ka dhacayey Magaalada Muqdisho.

 

 

 

Dagaalada ayuu ku tilmaamey kuwo Fitno ah oo aan Shareecada Islaamka aan ku saleysneyn sida uu hadalka u dhigey isaga oo ugu baaqey dhinacyada is haya inay ilaahey ka baqaan oo wixii u dhaxeeyana ku dhameystaan wada hadal.

 

 

 

Sh Cumar waxa kale oo uu sheegay in Dagaalada noocan oo kale ah ay ka dhalanayaan dhibaatooyin ka sii waaweyn oo aan la daba qaban kain, una baahan inta ayna fogaan in la daba qabto.

 

 

 

Waxa uu sidoo kale ka Hadley is Rideynta oo uu sheegay inay ka dhalanayaan Islaamka oo la iska saaro iyo Dhiiga oo la xalaashado ay dhibaato weyn oo ah Gaalnimo inay ka dhalaneyso waxa uuna ku baaqey in laga fogaado ilaaheyna looga baqo.

 

 

 

Umadda Soomaaliyeed ayuu sheegay inuu labo arin xasuusinayo oo ah inay Ilaahey ka baqaan, dhexdoodana ka shaqeeyaan Dibu heshiisiin & dhex dhexaadin, dhanka kalase laga fogaado fal walba oo aan lagu mahadin dhibaatana ka dhalan karto.

 

 

 

Dhinacyada Dagaaladu u dhaxeeyaan ayuu sidoo kale baaq xabad joojineyd uu u direy, waxa kale oo uu ugu baaqey inay Shacabka u turaan, isaga oo xasuusiyay in Hal qof oo Muslim ah oo la dilo ilaahey agtii uga dhow dahey Aduunka oo dhan oo baaba’a.

 

 

 

Hadalka Sh Cumar ee ku aadan Dagaalada Muqdisho ayaa qeyb ka ah baaqyo nabadeed oo horey loogu direy dhinacyada is haya ee dirirtu u dhaxeyso, waxaanse la ogeyn go’aanka ku aadan ee ay ka qaadan doonaan.