Identity Politics and the struggle for liberty and democracy in Ethiopia

[Abtigiis]

The following is an excerpt from an article written by Dr. Birhanu Nega of Bucknell University. Dr. Birhanu Nega, the son of prominent Ethiopian millionaire and coffee exporter Nega Bonger, is from the Gurage ethnic group and was one of the leaders of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) party, which headed for a landslide victory in the 2005 elections in Ethiopia, before a violent crackdown.

 

 

Ethiopia Under EPRDF: Identity politics and Dictatorship

 

So, when the TPLF came to power in 1991, it came with a determination to make identity politics the mainstay of Ethiopian politics. Its Marxist ideology always secondary to its Tigrean identity and with Marxism going in disrepute after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the only thing left was to pursue the ethnic agenda with a pseudo democratic mask. In addition to creating allied ethnic organizations representing various ethnic groups, it invited primarily ethnic based groups to discuss and determine the future of the country during the conference establishing the transitional government. Being an ethnic based organization representing a small minority, the TPLF was conscious of two potential dangers threatening its power. The first was the emergence of any kind of pan Ethiopian nationalist politics. The second was the emergence of a strong ethnic based organization that is independent of TPLF influence in the sense of having its own ambitions for power both at the national or regional level.

 

In relation to the former, it started a very vicious propaganda campaign against any form of Ethiopian nationalism. Taking its cue directly from Walleligne, it used the mass media that it controlled to push the line that there is no Ethiopian nationalism as such. It is a fake nationalism. Any one speaking in the name of Ethiopian nationalism is simply an Amhara chauvinist (or a Neftegna) that is trying to reinstate the old order. In pursuing this line, the TPLF used not only the other ethnic organizations that were allied with it, but also the independent ethnic organizations, who believed that the main enemy against their ethnic aspirations was still “Amhara chauvinism” although that political current has been out of power for a very long time. In other words, this assessment essentially asserts that the 17 years of Derge rule is simply a continuation of the imperial period when it comes to the issue of ethnic oppression. The various measures taken by the Derge to address the economic and cultural basis of ethnic oppression, in this view, have not changed one iota the fundamental structure of Ethiopian politics. Furthermore, the TPLF worked diligently to ensure that identity is defined in one and only one form in its legal and political manifestations; that of ethnic identity with language as the primary marker. This position was pushed to such an absurd level, that citizens with mixed ethnic heritage were forced to choose one of them to get official identification in places like Addis Ababa. In making this identity as supreme, this position also relegated other competing identities (for example class, gender, religion…etc) to a meaningless secondary role. The propaganda was so relentless and the political marginalization for those who refuse to play this game so serious, that some Ethiopian nationalists decided to organize as Amharas to participate in the political process. This part of TPLF’s activity can be seen as largely successful, at least till the 2005 election.

 

Among the many things that changed in 2005, probably the most important for our discussion here is the emergence and articulation of a liberal politics for the first time in the country’s history. As I suggested earlier, although there were liberal opponents of both the imperial and Derge regimes, they were almost totally muffled by the dominance of radical Marxist and ethnic political discourse. This liberal political plank took advantage of the relative opening of the political space and presented its case to the public effectively exploiting the opportunity presented by the election. What is important about this position was that it brought two critical issues to the forefront. The first was the issue of individual rights while also respecting the concerns of identity based groups. This was presented along with respect for human rights, political equality, justice…etc. as an important requirement for a genuinely democratic politics. As rights issues, these were issues that even those that give primacy to identity politics can easily relate to. The argument that respect for individual rights does not and should not conflict with group rights and that on the contrary those that claim to respect group rights will not genuinely commit to such rights without accepting individual rights had resonance to a wide audience including those that were intensely partisan to identity politics, but who suffer abuses from the TPLF regime. The second plank, that of national integrity within a democratic framework, was also presented in a more sensitive and practical manner rather than as a rigid dogma that supersedes the respect for basic rights and the political equality of citizens. The secession of Eritrea and the numerous internecine conflicts among ethnic groups even after the official acceptance of ethnic based self rule, the endless fratricidal conflict within the same ethnic group in neighboring Somalia, clearly revealed the dangers and the potential rough edges of identity based politics. For many ethnic minorities, it was very natural to feel more secured within the ambit of the broader nation/polity than with a multiplicity of ethnic based states. Accordingly, the increasing hostility towards the EPRDF regime, combined with the appeal of these liberal positions to a larger than expected populous mostly in urban areas but also in rural regions heralded the serious ideological and political challenge to identity based politics in Ethiopia since the 1970s. To be sure, this presentation of the liberal position in the 2005 election has served as a broader tent to disparate groups to come together to challenge the EPRDF rule. Some in this broad coalition might espouse more radical positions towards the question of integrity or might have very little tolerance to identity based politics. Some could even be down-right chauvinists covering their deeper identity based positions under the ambit of liberalism or national integrity. The fact remains, however, that in the realm of ideas the liberal ideas I presented above were the organizing ideas of that movement.

 

The second part of TPLF’s activity aimed at weakening or even eliminating any kind of independent ethnic politics that it cannot control. After eagerly pushing the independence of Eritrea to eliminate a potentially powerful rival for power if it stays within the union, it didn’t wait long before it pushed the OLF and the small agglomeration of Southern parties out of the transitional government. Other ethno-nationalist forces such as the ONLF quickly followed as it became clear that their aspiration is not going to be achieved under TPLF. It more or less decimated the unprotected army of the OLF by force and made it clear that it has no tolerance to any one, no matter what their ideology or political views that can challenge its power and the control over resources that this power bestows on it. Showing footages of the brutality allegedly committed by OLF activists, it presented the OLF as a reactionary secessionist force bent on dismantling the country and brutalizing all other ethnic groups if it gets a chance. Since, in addition to the conscious promotion of cultural communities that started after the revolution, the TPLF also provided pseudo “self government” for ethnic groups, it couldn’t see any legitimate reason for complaint against its rule. Secession is a legitimate issue only when it is a response to ethnic oppression. Under a “progressive” regime that recognizes ethnic rights including self government, the constitutional right to secession is there to appreciate the generosity of TPLF to oppressed ethnic groups but not to be seriously practiced.

 

We now have the rather odd situation where by the political organization that firmly established the primacy of identity politics in Ethiopia and that characterized Ethiopian nationalism as a reflection of Amhara chauvinism brutalizes ethnic groups that wish to genuinely administer their own affairs, in the name of national integrity in order to protect its power and continue pillaging the country. Its brutal actions in the Oga.den, Oromia, Gambella, Keffa-Sheka, Afar, Amhara, Sidama, Benishangul and other ethnic communities where there was some challenge to its rule or some semblance of independent activity, confirms that when it comes to its power, it has no mercy. With a voracious appetite to pillage and benefit a narrow group that it claims to represent, it cannot settle for equitable share of national resources that genuine equality would necessarily imply. What is made clear from this experience is that such regimes could bring all kinds of opportunists from all identity groups to share the loot, it could even allow cultural communities to develop their cultural heritage, but it will never provide the liberty for individuals to live in freedom or for groups to genuinely administer their own affairs. This is because these two rights are interrelated and that both rights emanate from a broader understanding of the sovereignty of citizens in a political community. As I will try to argue later, only a meaningful liberal democratic politics is capable of weaving through the maze of conflicting identities and provide individual liberty while also protecting and nurturing diversity. But, for that to happen in Ethiopia, a real meaningful and sensitive conversation has to take place between those that espouse political liberalism with those that prioritize identity politics as their destiny is thoroughly intertwined.

 

http://nazret.com/blog/index.php?blog=15&title=identity_politics_and_the_struggle_for_l&more=1&c=1&t b=1&pb=1

[Land_Soldier]

Its brutal actions in the ******, Oromia, Gambella, Keffa-Sheka, Afar, Amhara, Sidama, Benishangul and other ethnic communities where there was some challenge to its rule or some semblance of independent activity, confirms that when it comes to its power, it has no mercy.

So many other peacefull and beuatifull communities in Ethiopia besides those Tigray and Habashi people. Wonder what they will do when the O**** free themselves and leave Ethiopia.

 

Who will lead them, free them, guide them? Or will they all estabilish their own little Lands?

[Abtigiis]

Political Liberalism and Identity politics: Conceptual Issues and Practical Problems.

 

The myopic and rather destructive politics of TPLF in the past 19 years has brought havoc to the country’s body politic and alienated a large section of the population. Organized opposition to the TPLF led regime comes from a variety of groups and a multiplicity of political views and positions. For our discussion, we can categorize them into four major groupings:

 

1. Ethnic based political groups that have maintained the old and more extreme position of secession as a solution to the ethnic problems of the country. In other words those who do not see any change in the nature of the political question in the country since 1974, save for the replacement of the Amhara by a Tigrean ruling elite;

2. Moderate ethnic based political groups that wish to renegotiate the nature of the political community to address ethnic based concerns, particularly related to the implementation of genuine federalism within the context of Ethiopia as a political community;

3. Political moderates who are uncomfortable with identity politics and are very much concerned with the integrity of the nation but feel that the solution to the country’s problems can be addressed within the framework of political liberalism that acknowledges the diversity of the country but that wishes to build the political community within the framework of citizenship and:

4. Radical integrationists who feel vindicated by the mess that is created by the TPLF and contend that the experience of the last 19 years is nothing but a confirmation of the dangerous nature of ethnic politics. Even more, in its extremist version, it is a position that rejects the claims of ethnic oppression by ethno-nationalists. This voice simply rejects any kind of ethnic based political engagement including ethnic federalism. It also rejects any cooperation with such forces as it sees such cooperation as a recipe for the future disintegration of the country.

 

This, of course, is not an exhaustive categorization. But I believe it is sufficient for the purpose of this paper. There are variations within each group and there might even be groups that might be difficult to put under any one of the above categories. But, for a variety of reasons, not least of which is their relative insignificance both in the debate that is shaping contemporary politics and their practical political significance, we can concentrate on the four categories above without losing much by way of clarity or practical import.

 

Of the above four political positions and persuasions, the first and the last are, in my view, more ideological than practical political propositions. I say this not because of a total rejection of the validity of their claim, although there is quite a bit in their respective positions that are intellectually disagreeable. A selective reading of history that exaggerates their own claim while totally ignoring or rejecting relevant history that counters their position is a very common feature of these groups. Instead, it is their limited practical value in resolving the political conflict that reduces their practical import. Their fixation with history and their unwillingness to look forward; their inability to empathize with the concerns of the other and their almost total obsession with their own pain make it very difficult to find common ground for solving contemporary, practical and urgent political problems. Their willingness to sacrifice the interest of the current and future generations for the purpose of settling historical scores; their almost religious like certainty about the rightness of their positions and their unwillingness to entertain solutions less than their ideologically defined optimum prohibits a rational give and take politics that the time requires. A politics dominated by such extremes will never lead to an amicable solution. Since my ultimate concern in this paper is to outline the possible route for constructing a more peaceful, tolerant and free political community in Ethiopia, I will not spend time in analyzing these extreme positions. Instead, in the remainder of this paper, I will concentrate on the two moderate positions and try to address both the theoretical and practical impediments that hitherto prohibited the possibility of a unified action against tyranny despite the fact that they are all victims of the same political system.

 

In the realm of ideas, the first and important point to note is the inherent exclusiveness of identity based politics. By definition, identity politics is a politics of difference. Its very existence requires defining itself in opposition to the other. And its political claims are always presented in the form of protecting or promoting the rights of a particularly defined group in relation to the larger political community. The reason for particularly defining that group as opposed to another could be based on a particular historical event, a uniquely defined cultural tradition, a result of the economic position of the group or whatever. We can agree or disagree on the basic premise of the issue that caused it. The important point is that it is uniquely defined and can be presented in separation to the other. On the other hand, political liberalism presumes political communities that are essentially diverse and different on most basic and fundamental values, and hopes to create a political community on the basis of citizenship, where every individual in that society is presumed to be equal in politics and in law. These conflicts in the realm of ideas present a host of issues that are practically relevant in establishing stable functioning democracies. In the introduction to a book entirely dedicated to this topic Seyla Benhabib presented this politics of difference and the problem it poses to democratic politics in the following way:

 

“Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference. One is a Bosnian Serb to the degree to which one is not a Bosnian Moslem or a Croat…What is shocking about these developments is not the inevitable dialectic of identity/difference that they display but rather the atavistic belief that identities can be maintained and secured only by eliminating difference and otherness. The negotiation of identity/difference…is the political problem facing democracies on a global scale”.

 

For liberalism, the first challenge that identity politics presents is the choice of identities and the value that one gives to the multiplicity of identities that we all possess. In fact, the real issue is the degree to which an individual human being can be uniquely categorized to belong to a single identity (be it on the basis of religion, ethnicity, gender…etc.) or the rationale behind picking one particular identity and provide it with a privileged position compared with other competing identities. This “solitarist approach” according to Sen, emanates from the “odd presumption that the people of the world can be uniquely categorized according to some singular and overarching system of partitioning.” But such partitioning will not help us to understand fully the real identity of a person. In fact as Sen put it:

 

“A solitarist approach can be a good way of misunderstanding nearly everyone in the world. In our normal lives, we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups—we belong to all of them. The same person can be, without any contradiction, an American citizen, of Caribbean origin, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a woman, a vegetarian, a long-distance runner, a historian… Each of these collectivities, to all of which this person simultaneously belongs, gives her a particular identity. None of them can be taken to be the person’s only identity or singular membership category. Given our inescapably plural identities, we have to decide on the relative importance of our different associations and affiliations in any particular context…Central to leading a human life, therefore, are the responsibilities of choice and reasoning.”

[NASSIR]

but also the independent ethnic organizations, who believed that the main enemy against their ethnic aspirations was still “Amhara chauvinism”

Well, from my own personal experience, I know of an old classmate from ethnic Amhara who still believes that Eritrea is part of Ethiopia and that retroceding it should be a high priority for any future Ethiopian government.

 

It's hard to slough off centuries old attitude and practice of ethnic Amhara superiority that is the reason the minority TPLF has been very successful in building a robust coalition against their return to power.

 

 

What are ur thoughts, abtigis?

[Abtigiis]

This of course is an issue that requires deep understanding in relation to specific conditions. The existence of multiple identities in Ethiopia is obvious. For moderate pan Ethiopian nationalists the primacy of ethnicity based on language (as opposed to religion or even specific cultural practice for example) is problematic as it will not answer the whole question of identity that prevails in the country. Such definitions of identity, when insisted upon as a political basis, say for self government, then bring a host of questions related to practicability. Why should we have nine ethnic based federal regions, when there are over eighty different language based identities in the country? Why is a Sidama with 3.5% of the population or a Gurage with 4.3% of the population is not a federal region with self government rights while the Afar, (1.9%) the Benishangul Gumuz, (0.9%) the Gambella (0.4%) or the Harari (0.2%) have their own self administrative regions? What would it mean if people want to categorize their identity on the basis of religion than ethnicity, for example? These are thorny practical questions. To raise these issues is in no way to undermine one’s ethnicity or to belittle the identification of the group. It is only to raise the complicated nature of the issue we are dealing with and even more to emphasize the need for choice and reasoning to tackle these issues.

[NASSIR]

Another good article..

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/cruel-ethiopia/?page=2

[Abtigiis]

Waryaa Nassir,

 

Dr. Birhanu waa macalinkaygii oo 4th year Aggregate Economics ii dhigay, markaa kama hor iman karo.

 

Wax badan oo sax ah ayuu ka hadlayaa oo uu run ka sheegay. Waana nin xog-ogaal ah.

 

In 2005 when the opposition leaders refused to accept the fake results announed by Meles, Meles called Dr. Birhanu to his office and said to him, " Adigu reerahan ishaysta maad ka dhex baxdid?" Yacni Axmaaro ayaan is haynaa. Hadaad diido taasna, adiga laftigaaga ayaan xataa Gurage (uraagada) matallin'e, jilibkaaga 'ISHA' (waa qoys hoose oo Dr.ku ka dhashay) orod la bax oo 'Isha Liberation Front' samayso. Hadii kale, kursiga ay u dhinteen kumanaan Tigre ah, warqad sanduuq (ballot box) lagu riday ku qaadi maysid. The Dr. wrote about those issues in a book, Ye netsanet goh si qadi (when the dawn of freedom breaks), written in Amharic while serving life sentence which was later rescinded.

 

Markaa, my issues with Meles and TPLF is that they behave clannishly and they want others to serve their clannish aspirations. Yet, they attack organisations like OLF and ONLF as narrow-mided clannish fronts. Waxaa lala heshiin karaa dad qaba fikirka Dr. Birhanu oo kale. Laakin isaga laftigiisu Midnimada Ethiopia inuu muqadas kadhigo ma aha. He has a lot of valid points about why a unified Ethiopia which respects diversity and where individual rights are respected is the best deal; but if some still see it as not attractive enough, they should have the prerogative to leave it. He is not radical enough for me, but I can live with the deal he is offering for now.

[NGONGE]

Of the above four political positions and persuasions, the first and the last are, in my view, more ideological than practical political propositions.

I say this not because of a total rejection of the validity of their claim, although there is quite a bit in their respective positions that are intellectually disagreeable. A selective reading of history that exaggerates their own claim while totally ignoring or rejecting relevant history that counters their position is a very common feature of these groups. Instead, it is their limited practical value in resolving the political conflict that reduces their practical import. Their fixation with history and their unwillingness to look forward; their inability to empathize with the concerns of the other and their almost total obsession with their own pain make it very difficult to find common ground for solving contemporary, practical and urgent political problems. Their willingness to sacrifice the interest of the current and future generations for the purpose of settling historical scores; their almost religious like certainty about the rightness of their positions and their unwillingness to entertain solutions less than their ideologically defined optimum prohibits a rational give and take politics that the time requires. A politics dominated by such extremes will never lead to an amicable solution. Since my ultimate concern in this paper is to outline the possible route for constructing a more peaceful, tolerant and free political community in Ethiopia, I will not spend time in analyzing these extreme positions.

Even though the author is talking about ONLF (and other groups), it still reminds me of A&T talking about SL. Oh the irony, the irony.

[Abtigiis]

I know he is talking about ONLF and OLF in the first catagory. And he is right. Still, there is nothing wrong in that position. Dr. Birhanu's ideas are good but not necessarily right.

 

It applies to SL as well; I didn't see that side of it first.

[NGONGE]

His ideas are good and interesting for him and him alone. His political agenda here is clear; he is against the TPLF and would support any (TPLF) opposing groups as long as their ideas don't veer widely from his own. Therefore, you and I are on the same side here. That is the beauty of politics, saaxib. It throws up the strangest of bedfellows.

[PasserBy]

Dr Birhanu Nega is derisively called Dr Birr Ahun ( Money now)- by his adversaries. He is known to collect money from gullible TPLF-hating Ethiopians (including ONLF supporters) promising them he’ll end TPLF's rule in 3 months (that was 3 years ago). Many suspect he is using the money for his own ends. The hustler is too comfortable in the good old USA to sacrifice time, sweat and blood to stop Meles.

 

Furthermore, when he was a member of an opposition coalition called CUD in 2005 he was a rigid chauvinist. He wanted to end article 39. He wanted to bring back Assab port from Eritrea (today he is one of Isaias Afewrki’s clienteles). He wanted to eliminate the ethnic based federal system of government. He was basically more Amhara than the Amharas (He is Gurage). Today he is preaching a different gospel. The guy will say and write anything he thinks will get him to Menilik palace. The problem is he no longer enjoys support from Amharas. His core supporters are Gurage like himself. In a nutshell, he is a spent force.

 

The funny thing is A&T is so desperate he’s clinging to words of a has-been Ethio politician to sooth his battered ego. I feel your pain, A&T.

[Abtigiis]

Falsehoods. Dr. Birhanu doesn't need to collect money from Diaspora cabby-drivers. Who owns Global Hotel? Who owns Semen hotel? Passerby sounds like one of these TPLF cadres who use Amhara-phobia when it suits them, only to revert to 'one-ethiopia' mode later. This kind of machberber (cheating) is about to end.

 

You have lied about Dr. Birhanu's position on Assab in 2005 elections and you know it.

 

By the way, I don't know how posting a recent analysis by a prominent Ethiopian opposition politician makes me look desperate and 'clinging to his words'. This type of labelling is the hallmark of TPLF and I am getting more and more convinced Passerby is 'testa'-loving (head-butt loving) Tigre. i already said I don't agree with the Dr.'s recommendations. For me, Ethiopia is an empire and the only solution is to end it like Yugoslavia ended. Six small countries in its place!

[SayidSomal]

^Soomaalidu isma gumaysato!

[SayidSomal]

Oddey Oodweyne,

 

No, but your assertion lent that way.

 

 

There is a difference between oppression and colonisation and there are agreed ‘universal definition’ of colonisation.

 

As for the "theoretical frame-work” regarding Ethiopia’s constitution as it pertains to gaining independence for certain communities and your political analogy as it pertains to nullifying the union of Somalis – would have fared better if you; yourself and like minded people were arguing for nullification of the union to be done through Somalis under acacia tree rather bending backwards by way begging at halls of western world.

[SayidSomal]

Saxiib you defensive verbiage inevitable always leads you to your trademark tirade of obscure wrangling and clear subjectiveness.

I do not get what you are on about “primary and secondary issues” – you don’t have to argue for the sake of it even when you agree with my stance on the issue (as you seem to indicate albeit sheepishly).