Northern Somalia: Gathering Storm or Trade Winds? Let the Entities Choose!

[General Duke]

Northern Somalia: Gathering Storm or Trade Winds? Let the Entities Choose!

 

By Ali A. Fatah

 

Recently, commentaries concerning political conflict that may or may not be brewing in Somalia’s north were bandied about. Some assertions were clearly uninformed and quite reckless to the point mouthing off offensive statements that have no basis in fact regarding the people of Sanaag and Sool regions. The purpose of this short article is not to refute the pejorative-laden musings of every Dick and Harry who feels compelled to putting forth tired propaganda dating back to the days when underlings of the British Somaliland Protectorate commissioners routinely peddled misinformation. Rather, the aim is to provide proper perspective to Guled Absiye’s seemingly commonsensical article: “Somaliland: Gathering Storm on the Eastern Front” that was published in Hiiraan Online some days ago.

 

Mr. Absiye’s piece ostensibly foreshadows a looming geopolitical dilemma facing the northern regions of Sool and Sanag, due to alleged political high jinks by Col. Abdullahi Yusuf of Puntland. Unfortunately, the article in question is riddled with major flaws on many levels. To begin with, it is predicated on the mistaken premise that the breakaway republic of Somaliland has a legal leg on which to stand in the community of nations, meriting international recognition. This is not the case, for a number of reasons. Needless to say, the ill-advised quest for an outright secession is failing miserably and will not, in its present formulation, be able to garner the desired political recognition.

 

The Somali society as a whole is nothing, if not a collection of clan communities that hold dominion over contiguous territories, which they jealously guard as sacred trusts, entrusted with them by their respective forefathers. The British Protectorate Administration in the North recognized this fact, and accordingly began its 70-year tenure by negotiating separate, verifiable agreements with all the major clans under the aegis of the “Somaliland Protectorate”. When the question of self-government arose in the months leading up to June 1960, the Sultans, the Grads and the other traditional clan leaders of note, from throughout the Protectorate, were gathered to assume collective responsibility for the imminent era of independence. They did so in a virtual consensus agreement that the people of the wider region will, at the earliest opportunity, be unified with their southern brethren, who themselves were in line to be independent within the week. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the resulting Somaliland entity was, from its inception, a caretaker government lasting a total of four (4) days (June 26-July 1, 1960) during which period it did not apply for nor was it granted registration with the United Nations (a requisite first step to nationhood). This was no accident. All the clans of the former Somaliland protectorate saw their region then as an integral part (in waiting) of the soon to emerge Somali Republic.

 

Among other issues, Mr. Absiye’s piece is further hampered by a conceptual problem. It has to do with the way he tried to dance gingerly around the central point of his argument, namely the centrality of the clan in Somali politics. He employed euphemisms and regionalism when he really wanted to discuss clans and their historic role in the weighty matter of governance within the Somali peninsula. His mixing of metaphors no doubt confused some readers. Still, one can appreciate his not so academic reasoning in taking that circuitous route. For once he mentioned Warsangeli and Dulbahante, which are the two clans he targeted for psychoanalysis treatment, he would be, of necessity, forced to discuss the perceived roles of other clans in the neighborhood including his and Col. Riyale Kahin’s (President of Somaliland) Gadabursay clan, among others.

 

On the question of where do the Warsangeli and Dulbahante clans stand Vis á Vis Somaliland and Puntland’s claims and counter claims regarding their allegiance, there is no hard and fast rule. It boils down to direction(s) these communities ultimately choose for themselves (whether separately or together). At the moment both seem to be of two minds (to say nothing of the considerable pro-union constituencies in both communities), because the two clans straddle the two would-be “mother countries” on key intersections. More importantly, the two clans’ settlements are by no means limited to these two jurisdictions contending for their affiliation. Take the Warsangeli. The fact is beyond the traditional heartland of Sanaag, the Warsangeli is the most spread-out of Somali clans, in terms of geographic location. You can practically find them in large numbers in most regions of the Somali peninsula and beyond, thus making this defuse community the most quintessential Somali clan. For this community or a part thereof to, therefore, choose one region over another, connoting finality in political demarcation is silly as it is unwise in the extreme. The historic role of the Warsangeli is that of peace-maker and a bridge between communities. This is the only honorable role that the clan aught pursue concerning any conflict that may be brewing between the two neighboring regional entities: Somaliland and Puntland. The clan is inextricably linked both regions, but neither entity has the right to make a unilateral claim upon the Warsangeli (and the Dulbahante for that matter). Sultan Said Sultan Abdisalam of the Warsangeli clan was, in the long tradition of his progenitors, a key mediator of the recent agreement that brought peace to Puntland—a role which the clan is well suited to play between the two contesting regional governments.

 

Socially and culturally, both the Warsangeli and the Dulbahante are at home with their Isaak brethren in Somaliland. This is due to links that have been forged during many decades of close contact and social interaction. It makes no sense whatever to sever these critical links on account of “bloodline” shared with the ********* and other ***** Darods in Puntland. It would similarly be irrational for, say, the multitudes of the Warsangeli who call Bosaso (and other Puntland locales) home to pull up stakes because a visionless politico from afar (who maybe nursing a bruised ego) wants to arbitrarily change the demarcation of the natural borders.

 

Still, real politick has its considerations. There is no gainsaying that members of the Warsangeli clan participated in all the Gurti meetings held in various towns of Somaliland, and pledged their support. It is also true that these people genuinely believe that the clan’s interest lies with Somaliland and that they enjoy some following within the community. Likewise, others equally vehement chose to attend all the Puntland meetings and are convinced beyond doubt that the clan belongs with Puntland for many reasons including the so-called “bloodline” rationale to which Mr. Absiye alluded. There is yet a third—some say a silent majority—constituency that advocates regional autonomy until such time as a federal national government is established.

 

In the final analysis, all three blocs are promoting the predominance of their stance within the Warsangeli community through peaceful means. The Sultan, the Àagils and the wise elders are all united that this whole matter of regional affiliation can only be won through political persuasion. Furthermore, they are resolute in their belief that whichever entity that resorts to armed conflict in the land in an attempt to force the issue one way or the other is the clear enemy that must be defeated.

 

Due to accident of geography and by inclination, this community, though more than capable of turning back aggression, prefers peaceful interaction to belligerence and violent confrontation. This is in keeping with clan’s long standing tradition of observing trade winds (rather than fomenting political storms)!

 

In recent years, many Somalis from different clans, present company included, have gone out of their way, in any number of forums, to lend moral support to the Northwestern regions now calling themselves the Republic of Somaliland as well as Puntland on the basis of these entities’ apparent decisions to pursue peaceful social development by their own bootstraps. The thinking has been that, if Puntland and Somaliland succeeded along this path, they would be credible models for other floundering Somali communities to emulate. Naturally, the unmitigated failure of the Somali national government more than a decade ago, made them—as hopeful pilot projects—all the more appealing.

 

One last comment about the political usefulness of these self-declared entities. When they stay on mission to uplift the social conditions of their respective communities, they represent glimmers of hope for the otherwise rudderless Somali nation. On this score, they deserve the support of not only Somalis but people of goodwill everywhere. The danger arises when bungling politicians overreach, as they are wont to do. For example, master politicians like the late M. I. Egal would never have done what the current president of Somaliland, Riyale Kahin, did last year: drive a caravan of several “technicals” to Las Ánod without having a sentila of actionable assurance that the political climate in the area was favorable to his government. As a result, his intrusion was rebuffed in no uncertain terms. The question now is: how much, if anything, did the ensuing Riyale Kahin fiasco contribute to the potential for conflict that Mr. Absiye predicts between the breakaway Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland regional government? Conversely, how much potential goodwill and socio-economic cooperation that the people of Sanaag and Sool promote tirelessly will evaporate as a result of the said fiasco and its ominous aftermath?

 

Finally, it is past time for the opposing entities to choose a wise course of action and allow peace to reign on the land to be able to reap its just rewards: sustainable socio-economic development towards prosperity society for all.

 

Ali A. Fatah

Washington, DC

E-mail: amakhiri@aol.com