NASSIR Posted October 31, 2006 Altho I abridged the article from its starting point, I find these three options articulated in the form of viable recommendations interesting. By Burci Hamza October 29, 2006 Options for the TFG It is beyond our scope to duplicate policy options that have already been articulated, but we must reiterate the fact that it is in no one’s interest to leave Somalia in a state of eternal oblivion just to fulfill the Ethiopian government’s strategy of obstructing the reconstitution of the Somali state. The TFG with its current composition is perceived as being a government that is entirely dictated by Addis Ababa. It is nowadays referred to as “a feeble and weak government that is protected by Ethiopian troops”. To dispel this perception and subsequently garner the support of the Somali people, the TFG must soberly reflect on what to do next. It must first and foremost recover from this widely held assumption that it is “Ethiopia’s pawn inside its own territory”. It must portray the image of a government that is committed to protecting its territorial integrity and national independence. It must cleanse its cabinet of the elements that have shown overt predilections to Ethiopia’s agenda. The President, with the help of the Parliament must ultimately embark on the establishment of a government of national unity. The TFG must engage all neighbouring states in its efforts to achieve peace and stability in the region. It must build good relations, mutual cooperation and understanding with the government and people of Ethiopia. But the latter must recognize the fact that TFG’s best interests can be served only when the territorial integrity and national unity of Somalia is fully respected. The TFG should reciprocate by acknowledging that peace and tranquility along the common border with Ethiopia is of a strategic importance for both countries. The TFG must accept to pursue serious negotiations with the ICU. It must build on the agreement signed in Khartoum, which calls for the ICU to accept the legitimacy of the TFG, and the TFG to recognize the reality of the existence of the ICU. Options for the ICU The ICU must reconstitute itself to recover from the perception that it is a clan-based movement and that some of its top leaders are connected to Al-Qaeda and that it harbours foreign terrorists, including members wanted by the US for the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. It must also cleanse the movement of any elements that have been previously incriminated for human rights violations and land grabbing by force. Its top priority at this juncture must be the consolidation of peace and the disarmament of militias in Mogadishu and in the areas currently under its control. But over the long term, it should consider to be an important partner in the design and implementation of the Somali post-war recovery plan. ICU is perceived as being a force that has emanated to weaken the fledgling Transitional Federal Institutions and its leadership. To dispel this notion, the ICU must make a better use of its “soft” power of diplomacy to accommodate the Transitional Federal Institutions and not just rely on coercive, “hard” power. It should be very careful not to jeopardize or offend the outcome of Embagathi Peace Process whose fundamental tenets underpin the only hope left for the Somali people. The ICU must be in a position to articulate a vision that resonates with the aspiration of the people of Somalia. It must provide a guiding framework that can help the country stand back on its feet again and embark on post-war peacebuilding and (re)construction. The ICU must forge good relations with the legitimate civil society organizations inside Somalia and in the diaspora. It must recognize the fact that the existence of civil society organizations is a pre-requisite for the enhancement of democratic values. The civil society organizations are the vehicles through which the abusive power of the sate is balanced. Options for the International Community The international community, particularly the International Contact Group should immediately embark on a dialogue with both the moderate and militant groups of the ICU. Professor Ken Menkhaus(5) recently argued, “The best the United States and Ethiopia can do now is to help create conditions that deny the Somali hardliners what they most want — jihad against a threatening external enemy — and force the Islamists instead to face the difficult, mundane, and divisive policy questions of governance. Engaging in everyday politics and administrative responsibilities in Mogadishu and surrounding areas could force the ICU to adopt more moderate and pragmatic policies. If it refuses to adapt, its radicalism will be increasingly exposed, and its local and external opposition will multiply. U.S. policymakers will be tempted to invoke the formulaic call to "empower the moderates" and "marginalize the radicals." We concur with Prof. Menkhaus’ argument that the US should force the ICU to adopt more moderate and pragmatic policies. We do not, however, believe that the “marginalization of the radicals” and the “empowerment of the moderate” would lead to the fragmentation and weakening of the ICU. On the contrary, it will consolidate their coordinated efforts and make them much stronger. Those who follow situation on the ground assert that it is the radical wing of the ICU that currently wields more power. And this being the case, the United States and other members of the International Contact Group must be in favour of undertaking negotiations with both the moderate and the radical groups. Should the US use Ethiopia as its proxy for a military showdown with the ICU, the entire Horn will turn into another quagmire for the US. With the current insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are becoming increasingly intractable, the US would find itself entangled in another type of insurgencies in the Horn, which would involve all countries of the region and cause further destabilization and engender a devastating humanitarian crisis and a wave of refugee displacements. The International Somali Contact Group should make an attempt to engage the Somali diaspora in shaping the vision of the ICU. And because the diaspora can profoundly affect local politics, Somalis in the diaspora – credible and prominent former political figures, religious and traditional elders, scholars, women, and members of the civil society organizations – can play an important role in shaping the vision of the ICU. They can put forth a set of pragmatic policy options which can help determine the future political choices of the ICU: Adopt a moderate stand and dispel the perceived radical direction purportedly pursued by some of its leaders; co-exist with the government of national unity; consolidate security in Mogadishu in collaboration with the legitimate regional authorities and the central government; accept pragmatic peace-seeking policies by endorsing the outcome of Embagathi Peace Process, which is supported by the neighbouring countries and the international community as a whole; and assist in strengthening the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia. http://www.wardheernews.com/Articles_06/October/29_Ethiopia's_Meddling_Burci_Hamza.html Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
General Duke Posted October 31, 2006 Another good read, the author touched upon all the main concerns I had. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
NASSIR Posted October 31, 2006 Indeed it is a good read. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
