Prime Minister Geedi Commits a Major Political Gaffe!

[Xudeedi]

Prime Minister Geedi Commits a Major Political Gaffe!

 

Faisal Roble

November 19.2005

 

On November 11, 2005, Mr. Ali Mohamed Geedi, Prime Minster of the ailing Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, had committed a serious political gaffe, which came as a result of a multi-faceted interview with the BBC Somali Service where Somali listeners were given opportunity to call in. Mr. Geedi said (1) that his government does not mind and would not oppose if the international community is willing to recognize the breakaway region of North Western Somalia, also called Somaliland, and (2) there are no Somali people under a colonial rule in Ethiopia that he is aware of.

 

 

 

I respectfully disagree with his Excellency’s lapse of judgment, which is identical to the animalistic behavior of what Somalis refer to as “a camel that eats up its own protection or “Awr heeryadiis cunay.†How else can you read about a Prime Minister in the forefront in an onslaught of his nation?

 

On Somaliland recognition: For Prime Minster Geedi to give a green light to the dismemberment of his own country is the worst form of any political gaffe in memory. His acquiescence with a possible recognition accorded to the breakaway region by the international community could have the most far-reaching negative impact on the policies and even viability of the TFG in Jowhar. Those Somalilanders who support secession also may use the Prime Minister’s carelessly uttered statement to their advantage.

 

The political position of Geedi on the secession of Somaliland first surfaced last month. Iqbal Jhazbay at the University of South Africa and a lobbyist and consultant to Somaliland, has first reported on this issue and surprised everyone, including his employers, the Somaliland administration. Mr. Jhasbay gave a talk at a closed informational session hosted by the United States, Department of State, in collaboration with the U.S. Congressional Research Service’s Africa Unit. Mr. Iqbal Jhazbay said that he met with Geedi not long ago in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the seat where Somalia has been and would ultimately be undone, where Geedi confided and told him that the TFG does not oppose the secession of Somaliland if the international world is ready to offer recognition.

 

Many assumed at the time that Jhazbay’s claim was a fabrication and a shrewd strategy to boast the political propaganda of Somaliland’s secession advocates. However, we learned from the horse’s mouth himself, Geedi, that whatJhazbay has reported to US policy makers indeed reflects the belief of Mr. Geedi and his administration in Jowhar.

 

Is the rest of leadership of TFG and the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) also on board with Geedi on this matter? What does this say about the recently drafted constitution of Somalia that upholds the unity and territorial integrity of the Somali Republic? Or, is what Geedi said just the result of an inexperienced Prime Minister’s slip of the tongue – a simple political gaffe hence leaving behind a mere embarrassment? Whatever the answers to these questions may be, it is clear by now that Geedi’s gaffe did not receive any further explanation either from the president himself or from his foreign minister.

 

While drafting this commentary, reliable sources told me that Geedi’s alibi, when confronted by members of his administration, is totally unacceptable: that he is an individual and it is the constitution and not his opinion that matters is too little too late.

 

We have seen the same phenomenon in Minister Edna (foreign Minister of Somaliland) that old style of managing political affairs, merely based on charisma, does not work well in today’s media savvy and politically sophisticated world. Ms. Edna has had so many gaffes that even her staunch supporters started to worry and wondered where she was headed with her unguarded comments and repeated gaffes that almost undermined her administration. Many in Somaliland are quietly rejoicing at the low profile that she lately has assumed.

 

Likewise, if Geedi’s political gaffe is as a result of lack of experience in the diplomacy field, lest the prime minister has no prior credentials in international diplomacy, then it is time to quickly back track from his earlier mistakes and apologize to the millions of Somalis who are for united Somalia. If the TFG’s policy is one that stands for unity and territorial integrity, Geedi needs to do some serious explaining and quickly move on drafting his language of national apology. This issue will not easily go away, at least in the minds of some commentators and in Sool, and Sanaag regions, which already have officially requested an explanation of the Prime Minister’s gaffe.

 

If he stands by his statement, then let him explain to all sides his rationale as to why he would not mind if the international community recognizes the secessionist wing in Somaliland, and start preparing his people on both sides to the issue and for the eventual dislocation of the country.

 

While on the subject, the TFG leadership (Yusuf and Geedi) may better get served if it lets able ministers in the administration, who have experience in diplomacy and better understand the intricacies of international diplomacy and the opportunistic press corps that often thrives on politicians’ missteps, do their rightful jobs at which a lot of them are good and command broader experiences.

 

On the Somali-Ethiopian Question: It was unprofessional and amateurish for Prime Minister Geedi to belittle and play a revisionist on the painful history of Somalis in Ethiopia. The almost 4.5 million Somalis in Ethiopia (the second largest Somali population) have been conquered by emperor Menilink II of Ethiopia in the late 1890s. Between the regimes of the twin evils of Menilik II and Meles, (and you had the deceitful regimes of Ras Mekonen, Haile Selassie and Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam in between), unspeakable atrocities, debasement and dehumanization only paralleled by that exacted on the Palestinians Arabs.

 

If the massacres in the aftermath of 1948-1957 Geri uprisings which culminated in the public hanging of 12 martyrs, the Aysha'a killing fields of 1960, the Dhagahbuur mayhem of 1964, and the repeated wanton massive massacres in Qorahay, Faafan and Gaashaamo from the 1940s through 1980s did not serve as lessons of oppression and colonization to the good Prime Minster, nor would this November’s killing of 23 people in Qabridahar’s heavily populated streets which took place only days after the Prime Minster’s poor comments aired on the BBC air waves.

 

Owing to factors of religion and myths that augment Ethiopia’s standing in the community of nations versus the inferior image of Somalis, the world kept a blind eye to the pains of this people under Ethiopia’s primitive colony. It is doubly sad that a Somali Prime Minister joins the blind choir who are indifferent to the blight of Somalis in Ethiopia.

 

The radical movements of the 1970s in Ethiopia, however, have belatedly recognized the colonial status of the Somalis in Ethiopia. Suffice here to reiterate what Tilahun Gizaw, a radical student leader in the movement who had blood ties to the late wife of King Haile Sellasie, Empress Etige Menon, of Walloye blood line, said in a 1969 speech at the then Haile Sellasie University: “Ethiopia is a prison of nations….. There is the Oromo nation, ……, the Guragay nation… and however much you may not like it, there is the Somali nation.†He was underscoring the fact that Somalis are the most oppressed of all the oppressed in Ethiopia, yet even mentioning the name “Somali†or acknowledging their existence in Ethiopia was a crime.

 

The existing Ethiopian constitution, which Meles and his victorious Tigriyan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) drafted at gunpoint 1991, recognizes the colonization and oppression of nationalities and nations in Ethiopia for whatever worth it is (The Tigriyans were forced to recognize the right of nations, mainly due to the latent Oromo nationalism). To safeguard the rights of hitherto colonized nations, Article 39 of the Constitution speaks to the rights of nations including secession. Despite that some Somalis were critical of his politics, the late Abdul Majid Hussien Barre fought hard (as the chairman of the subcommittee of constituent assembly that adopted the constitution) for the inclusion of this Article in the constitution. And Somalia’s Prime Minister flatters Meles by saying that he does not know of any Somalis under any colonial rule? Call it either political timidity or intellectual bankruptcy, the Prime Minster royally erred it and behaved irresponsibly.

 

The prime Minster does not have to please Ethiopia by trying to denigrate or drum up a reactionary, albeit revisionist political history of Africa’s vexing home grown colonial phenomenon – the Somali peoples colonization by Ethiopia. It is time that we collectively remind the good Prime Minister that if Somalia is to die, it is better that it dies a dignified death, or “hadaad dhimanaysona dhareerkaa la’iska duwaa.â€

 

A chronic dependency on Ethiopia for arms and fuel notwithstanding, the late General Mohamed Aidid Farah was confronted with a similar question on the Somalis in Ethiopia, when interviewed in 1992 for the Vanity Fair Magazine by Harold Marcus, a prominent Ethiopianist. Like any seasoned politician, Aidid admitted the existence of positive changes that Meles’s government brought to the Somali region, but quickly added the painful history of colonization of the Somalis. With “democracy and “policies of inclusion†being implemented in Ethiopia, Aided said Somalia need not worry about the problems of Somalis in Ethiopia. With such a vague and polemic language, Aidid predicated his bowing down to Meles with the concepts of “democracy†and “policy of inclusion†being applied to Somalis in Ethiopia. If Ethiopia fails to do so, as it is doing now, well, Aidid is covered and his diplomatic stance on Ethiopia would easily be justified to retract his bowing down to strong man Meles.

 

No one should expect Geedi to go into tirades of praises and sloganeering in support of greater Somali Nationalism. The concept of greater Somali nationalism does not seem to be sexy in today’s reality. Even with such a reality on the ground, the Prime Minister needs to respect the history and feelings of Somalis under Ethiopia, no matter what.

 

A dose of reality to the Somalis in Ethiopia is in order: The majority of Somalia elites’ attitude towards the noble idea of Somali unity and Somali nationalism has changed with a permanent political mutation. The ugly reality of clanism has plagued our shocked and shame-ridden memory. Due to the general disintegration and fragmentation of the Somali social fabric and the absence of any credible leader on the scene, Somalia is no longer capable to play the role it had played in the past in burdening the responsibility of Somali unity in the horn of Africa. Perhaps for the good of all concerned.

 

Therefore, Somali Ethiopians should not depend on Somalia like the dependency syndrome, that Winthrop Jordan, an antebellum historian, called “The White Man’s Burden.†In other words, Somali Ethiopians should grow up, stand on their own feet and start char.ting their own map for their survival while honoring and upholding the good traits of Somali unity.

 

The Prime Minster’s gaffe on Somaliland’s secession and his tacit endorsement of a possible world recognition is expected to have serious repercussions and has already tainted his hitherto clean image. His wrongful reading of the history of Somalis in Ethiopia must be treated as only a sign of troubling intellectual bankruptcy and symptomatic of the absence of leadership in today’s political landscape of Somalia. Which prompts one to revisit what Professor Said Samatar said in the wake of Somalia’s defeat in the 1978 Ethio-Somalia war in whose aftermath several opposition groups chose Addis Ababa as their center for undoing Somalia, “ Oh! Somalia too far from God and too close to Ethiopia.â€

 

Faisal A. Roble

Los Angeles, California

E-Mail:fabroble@aol.com

 

Wardheer News Portal

[Xudeedi]

Someone siad, i think it was Bill Ainashe's recent article, that Somalia warlords and leaders speak freely as if they couldn't be held accountable of their utterance, reflecting the nature of our oral society. In todays' world, everything is recorded, retrieved and can be used against unwary persons with important positions with regard to a statement made by them. Indeed, Geedi needs a political adviser.

[SOO MAAL]

Dr.Geeddi: "Dowladdii Cabdiqaasim haddaan been la sheegeyn waxaa dumiyey Ethiopia, mana ahan inaan annagu maanta isku dirno Ethiopia ee waa inaan xiriir dhow la sameysanaa. "

“Waa laga soo gudbay markey Soomaaliya ahayd Soomaaliweyn. Distoorka Ethiopia ayay ku taallaa in gobol kasta go’i karo markii afti laga qaado dadka ee ay ku codeeyaan inay go’aan, sidoo kale NFD waxay ku jiraan Baarlamaanka Kenya, Djibouti-na waa xor oo waa dowlad gaar u taagan, mar walbana Soomaaliya waa la shaqeynaysay gobolladaasâ€

 

 

Question To Gheedi:

 

1) IF Ethoipia destroyed Arta Government led by AbduQaasim Salad Hassan, Do we Somali people surrender to Ethoipia, and let Ethoipia to decide whatever it wants about Somalia?

2) If we abandoned Pan-Somalia (Somaliweyn), are we going back to colonial era, and colonial borders? Or we allowing every somali people/regoen self-determination, right to secede?

3) Why do we care Ethoipia’s constitution? Where is Somalia’s constitution? Are you saying Ethoipia’s constitution is answer to Somalia crisis, and Somaliland’s quest for secession? After 15 years (1991) Since Ethoipian constitution was created, today where are the promises of Ethoipian constitution for people of western Somalia and other nation-states within Ethoipian like Oromo and Anfar? Does our Prime minister think that somali in Western Somalia and NFD gained their full freedoms and rights under african colonials of Ethoipia, and Kenya?

 

[Taleexi]

Mr. Geedi owes us no less than an apology. Case is closed

[Xudeedi]

^^^^Toohe Jr,

 

Two weeks ago, news from the transitional federal government TFG has circulated and was published in a number of Somali websites. It states that the transitional government has set up a process to divide Somalia into five or six political units as part of the federal system. Somaliland and Puntland would be the frontrunners of the system and serve as an adminstrative mechanism for which other regions in Somalia should copy and adopt. The aim is to decentralize power in Somalia from the bottom up. To many, the intimation sent shocking waves to people who call these regions home. It was a feeling of betrayal and withdrawal of trust since 99% of the people in these regions voted in favor of Puntland’s administration over their regions.

 

The connection and the degree of involvement of these regions under the Puntland umbrella were widely received throughout Mogadishu and Hargeisa circles. Based on such firm beliefs, Sool, Sanaag, Haylaan and Ain regions and their political setting have often been invoked as mere Puntland. But precisely on that pragmatic basis in conflict with the recent development, a fact-finding team (politicians, elders, and MPs and educated individuals who hail from the SSHA regions) should have to challenge for hitherto unresolved issues of the ambiguous position of the TFG towards the self-declared region of Somaliland.

 

We don’t want to face the saga from the South of Somalia, which is rife with social and political turmoil, often involving clan warfare, extended anarchy, extreme poverty and continuous environmental degradation.

 

------------------------------------

 

 

Somalia and the International Community: Two Ships Passing in the Night

 

Ali A. Fatah

November 19.2005

 

The past 15 years saw Somalia weather horrendous upheaval marked by internecine wars and resultant man-made disasters set in motion by the collapse of the National Government towards the end of 1990. During much of this period, Somalis faced heaps of dreadful conditions at home and abroad due, in large measure, to statelessness and its corollary—anarchy. Meanwhile, in the era of hyper-nationalism, rich nations were getting exacerbated with poor, self-mutilating nations’ perennial cries to be saved from the consequence of their own irrational policies. Yet, when displaced Somalis made enquiries to international institutions for assistance in restoring a sense of normalcy in their lives, the response was almost always the same: “put your house in order first and the international community will help your society to pick up the piecesâ€.

 

Somalis must have taken that encouragement to heart. For they once again defied the odds by unexpectedly putting their collective shoulders to the wheel, stayed the course during two years of difficult negotiations, and at the end of the day, elected, by wide margins, a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Suddenly, the cheer-leading on the part of several international agencies, save the regional governments, came to a screeching halt. These previously supportive international agencies (which are also known as the International Community) began to express doubts about the very process they professed to champion few short months before an historic, all-faction-election conference resulted in the formation of the TFG in October 2004. Thus, a strange new atmosphere was taking shape and it had the eerie look and feel that key international actors and the TFG were ships passing in the night!

 

So, what went wrong with the promised international support to help get Somalis stand on their own feet, once they took concrete steps towards peace and reconciliation? And, how does this international community supposed to work anyway? Was there a universally accepted system or does the IC operates on the basis of contradictory impulses? Not surprisingly, the term “International Community†is defined differently by different people: 1) ‘All the lands represented by the United Nations’, 2) ‘The people of the lands all over the world’, and 3) ‘A term of convenience’ coined for super power purposes, etc. Whatever the case may be, it is regulated by international law and its principles are applicable to international security. To its credit, the TFG has conscientiously sought to observe the extant rules of the road of the international community. However, they have been less than sure-footed in making their case convincingly against admittedly determined foes. Hence, most of their formal requests seem to have all but fell into deaf ears.

 

To take stock of the situation, this much is clear regarding obstacles that the TFG needs to overcome soon: the consortium of nations that populate world institutions such as the UN, EU, AU, Arab League, etc, and their member states are by no means equal in terms of power and influence. They belong to different tiers of definite pecking order in terms of relative authority that must be understood in the all-important arena of public diplomacy. In this pecking order, the United States is far and away the top dog. What US government says carries much more weight than, say, the AU and the Arab League combined. The EU is a close second rung in this order but its power does not constitute a viable alternative to America’s reach and influence.

 

To date, about a year since Somalia’s TFG has been inaugurated in Nairobi, Kenya, and six months after it moved into Somalia, the United States has been cool to the new Somali national government headed by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi. Somali Analysts cite many different reasons for this unmistakable detachment. They point to the aftereffects of the 1993 skirmish in Mogadishu between US forces assigned to the UN and the militia of the late warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed in which 18 American servicemen were killed; the efforts of a small but energetic band of half a dozen or so boosters of the secessionist cause that is being waged by politicians seeking to make Northwestern Somalia a country called the “Republic of Somalilandâ€; and, finally, the TFG’s seeming slowness in making the case for their vision for Somalia. The Analysts posit that the cumulative effect of these factors plus the instability of Mogadishu under warlords, and their religious allies, have conspired to influence US policy to withhold crucial endorsement from the TFG.

 

Taken together, these factors could pose formidable challenge to overcome, however, as separate issues, a reasonable remediation can be brought to bear to each one of them. For example, while Aideed is dead and gone, splinter groups from his faction are now wreaking havoc on parts of Mogadishu and nearby regions, including organizing piracy operations on important sea lanes, with deadly results. Clearly, the TFG needs outside help to be able to stop their multi-faceted banditry once and for all. With regard to the small, eclectic band of self-styled champions of the cause of secessionism in Northwestern Somalia, it is important to note that they are not a monolithic group. They include two well-placed true believers, a.k.a. the “in-laws†who will do and say anything in furtherance of secessionism. The TFG should have no problem in organizing a successful challenge to this group by simply telling the truth at every turn. Then there are a couple of academics who are enamored with the form, if not the substance, of staged “voting†events in parts of northern Somalia—events which the opposition there calls sham, every time; they too can benefit from a concerted effort by the government aimed at setting the record straight. The secessionists also seek assistance from registered lobbyists, who take clients from all over the world, for a fee. The TFG would be well advised to consult with them (or others in that profession) to counter the misinformation being disseminated by the first group. Lastly, there is the recently emancipated South African middleman, who is not acquainted with either Somalia or the truth, for that matter. His case illustrates Napoleon’s dictum: “In politics, ********* is not a handicapâ€.

 

Back to the international community, US support is vital in international relations. The AU, and its East African subset, IGAD, though well-meaning, lack the socio-economic and political wherewithal to back their regional policy goals and are therefore a little more than paper tigers. The EU has, over the past few years, shown some interest in assisting the new Somali government but its member-states are loathe to getting involved in nation-building type of ventures that are not fully sanctioned by the United States. The same goes for Japan. The oil-rich Arab states too take their cues from the US. (Wherever they see a green light, they go head over heels, including unzipping their fat wallets in a New York minute!)

 

This is not a bad system as the world needs more order, not less; for its part, the TFG needs to become not only a quick study of the politics of pragmatism but to model it without delay.

 

Behind the scenes, there is high-stakes geopolitical struggle for Africa (of a different sort) and China is deeply involved in that looming tussle. Needless to say, they have already telegraphed their interest in Somalia (particularly in oil and gas exploration). At the moment, China appears to be practicing Zen-like patience by waiting in wings. Their expectation may be that Somalia will soon lurch in their direction after that country’s overtures are rebuffed, albeit gently, by the leading western powers.

 

All in all, the retail, nickel and dime diplomacy that the TFG has been conducting up to this point is proving to be a total waste of time and that nothing good is likely to come out of it. So, the Somali Government needs to start engaging in high-level diplomacy beginning with senior US Officials.

 

Recommendations:

 

The TFG should get a credible diplomatic representation in Washington to be able to set the record straight and not cede the diplomatic arena to their opponents who are busy spreading misinformation with abandon.

The TFG should enlist all the potential allies they can identify in an effort to mount an effective truth-telling campaign about their vision for the country and the stark reality on the ground including ‘The good, the bad and the ugly’. Oil companies and others who may be interested in investing in Somalia can be helpful in this regard.

The Mogadishu warlords are united by fear, not hope. Thus, the TFG should disavow the resumption of fraternal war in the Somali peninsula to be able to peel off the less strident warlords, who are mainly interested in protecting their ill-gotten wealth from their alliance of convenience with the unremorseful war mongers; this would isolate the latter and thus render them harmless.

Develop a strategic plan of peaceful socio-economic and political development that is free from neo-clanism and other forms of discrimination.

In conclusion, it appears that the TFG has bought into a ruse early on its tenure. According to knowledgeable people, they were told by highly placed international agencies—while still in Nairobi—that, to qualify for assistance from the international community, the TFG should: A) establish a working government in Somalia, B) pacify the heedless warlords and their allied, armed religious groups in Mogadishu, through peaceful means. The TFG successfully accomplished the first task, but the second one requires a great deal of resources, which the TFG does not have. The problem is compounded by the fact that the government is dealing with warlord foes that are armed to the teeth and are not shy about using such weapons. They routinely conduct high profile killings of individuals with institutional memory of the workings of the Somali nation-state, maritime piracy, kidnappings, extortion, drug running and the like. They have brazenly tried to assassinate the Premier twice in the past six months, while he was on official visits to his home town of Mogadishu.

 

For the TFG to find its sea legs, therefore, in such a hostile environment, the support of the international community is indispensable; it is not the other way around. Furthermore, the success of the TFG should not be viewed solely in terms of assisting in the stabilization of Somalia or as participating in the dreaded activity of “nation-building a failed stateâ€. Such support has far more implications for the peace and security of the world as a whole. For one thing, it will help deny terror groups lurking in the shadows from establishing a foothold in the strategic Horn of Africa region. From this perspective alone, US-led international support for the TFG would be a win-win for all parties concerned (except of course the bad guys). The TFG, for its part, has to find a credible way to state as emphatically as possible its vision for leading a prosperous Somalia that is at peace with itself and with its neighbors.

 

Ali A. Fatah

AMakhiri@aol.com

[SOO MAAL]

[Gabbal]

Originally posted by Maakhir:

Indeed, Geedi needs a political adviser.

He was appointed a capable one, but it seems the advisor cordially declined the post.

 

What does "Political Advisor" for the Prime Minister mean?

[SOO MAAL]

Regrettable Episode Unfolding Again!!

(Special report for WardheerNews)

 

 

A. S. Faamo - Roobdoon Forum

 

November 21, 2005

 

Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Ghedi’s recent comments on the issue of “One Somalia†principle (or Somali Weyn concept) raised some eyebrows [1]. The Prime Minister spoke about the relations between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the neighbouring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia, pointing out that there is no territorial (and people) dispute between them. Ghedi’s comments underlined that Somalia and its neighbours together, as IGAD members, could form the starting point for securing stability in the region and building an economic and political cooperation. This, in turn, can guarantee the basis for a new socio-political framework of permanent well-being of all Somalis in the Horn of Africa.

 

This “optimistic outreach†has been interpreted differently, especially by Somalis in the Diaspora. However, the majority of the Somalis in the Diaspora insist that Ghedi chose to shorten his journey to political ascendancy; and more importantly, the new TFG which also opted to mute Somali Weyn cause will surely find itself navigating in unmarked, maybe dangerous waters, like the elected 1967 civil government. To realize the extent of the problem, many Somalis in the Diaspora have never, to begin with, accepted the peace-brokered efforts of Ethiopia and Kenya as genuine; they believe that it was a carefully orchestrated scheme set up to lead Somalis to relax its Somali Weyn vigilance. In gathering places, you see Somalis fiercely debating whether any peace brokered by Somali neighbours could be real!

 

Furthermore, some political analysts have recently drawn to the conclusion that the Somali nation-State, as it was before the civil wars, is hardly to re-emerge. Yet, as an ethnic group, Somalis do play a vital role in the stability and the development of the region. This paradox is seemingly but exceptionally contradictory. Somali nomads were roaming in the Somali Peninsula for centuries, mostly without a Central Authority. Despite the many instances of clan-warfare, dismemberment, and anarchy, Somalis have always maintained the capabilities to deflect any permanent domination/occupation. There is always a common Somali denominator in the minds of the nomads, even though it does not manifest in their dealings of clan-politics. Therefore, foreign observers often find difficult to read nomads’ clan-politics; and therefore reach an elusive conclusion which frequently manifest itself in futile. This short paper will therefore attempt to reflect on the history of foreign complicity and manipulation in making “One Somalia†principle somehow redeemable.

 

Since 1991, Somali neighbours (particularly, Ethiopia and Kenya) have launched a series of political maneuvers to realize their determination of convincing the general Somali populace to swallow the unassailable Somali Weyn identity and unification. Taking advantage of the current Somali debacle, our neighbours have regularly intimidated Somali clan-elders, faction leaders/warlords, and regional leaders to first and foremost abandon any attempts that unify the Somalis and thus regenerate challenges against the existence of artificial boundaries inherited from the European colonial administrations in the region. Thus, whenever a Somali peace reconciliation conference is held in Ethiopia or Kenya, the host takes a more drastic, but obvious covert actions to indicate to the Somalis that its toleration of any tendencies of Somali Weyn is wearing thin. However, failure of such political maneuvers to generate the desired intimidating effect will surely force the neighbouring countries to resort to either more reckless military attacks on Somalia or galvanize the West to “contain†Somalia for them. To measure Kenya and Ethiopia’s success or failure in resolving the territorial disputes, one has to look back the 1960s conflicts in the region.

 

The 1960s Scenario

 

At the inception of the Somali Republic in July 1st 1960, Somali leaders openly put forth their ambitions to rehabilitate the sovereignty of all Somalis in the Horn of Africa, including the ****** region of Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District/Province of Kenya. This political line has immediately strained the relations between the new born Somali Republic and Ethiopia. For some time, the two sides accused each other for territorial violation and armed aggression on its borders.

 

 

The late Premier Abdirashid A. Shermarke (1960 - 1963)

These border clashes led Somalia to seek military aid from the former U.S.S.R. On an interview conducted in English at his office in November 30, 1963, the Prime Minister of Somalia, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, declared that “military aid promised by the Soviet Union is being accepted only because Somalia must defend itself from the Ethiopian attacks and pillaging of the Somali peoples.†Premier Shermarke also explained Somalia’s critical dilemma from an economic stand point in which he underlined that “ Somalia’s treasury could not much longer cope with the problem of feeding and sheltering thousands of Somali refugeesâ€, escaping from the mayhem caused by the Ethiopian soldiers in the ****** region [2].

 

 

F.M. Abdullahi Isse Mohamud (1960 -1963)

Extensive Political and media provocations between the two sides have instigated a sudden but sporadic bloody border clashes, as early as January of 1964. The Somali Foreign Minister, Abdullahi Isse Mohamud had submitted an official protest letter to the Ethiopian Ambassador in Mogadishu, Ahadu Sabura. By March of that year, the conflict widened into a full-scale war, both arms confronting at border between Somalia and Ethiopia. In these border clashes, Ethiopian military planes destroyed numerous police posts and civilian houses inside Somalia. Ethiopian military campaigns caused indiscriminate killings of civilians and wounding many others. Ethiopian border soldiers raided livestock belonging to Somali nomads and opend fire when the nomads resisted.

 

Moreover, Ethiopia and Kenya agreed to form a mutual defense pact that they referred as “a joint measures of dealing with the Somali disturbances†– a move which Somalis considered “as contrary to the spirit of the OAU†[3]. The few reconciliation efforts, in regional level, that have been arranged also failed to produce any peace settlements. At the Organization for African Union (OAU) Summit Conference in Cairo (July 23, 1964), African leaders have attempted to reach a ‘Resolution’ that satisfies on both sides; however, it failed to do so. Somali News in Mogadishu published that “Somalia will not be bound by the OAU ruling [which states] that its member-States’ present frontier are to be maintainedâ€, in which the Somali National Assembly had passed a motion against OAU ruling, in October of 1964. That is, the Somali government officially rejected the outcome of the Cairo Conference, regarding on frontier issues.

 

In a net assessment of the outcome of the Somali-Ethiopian border skirmishes is that Super Power interventions in the region have officially began. Somalia sought the military and technical aid of the Soviets; while the Ethiopian regime involved actively in convincing, as it seems, the American Administration to tackle Somali Weyn cause.

 

In September 1974, a conference held in Washington, sponsored by the Center for the National Security Studies has presented proceedings and papers on the subject of “The CIA and Covert Actionâ€. Roger Morris and Richard Mauzy presented a comprehensive piece of research which is, as they state, based on both written sources and many oral conversations that they had with US decision-makers and foreign policy officials who supplied them many of their research discourse [4]. The title of their research paper is: Following the Scenario: Reflection on Five Case Histories in the Mode and Aftermath of CIA Intervention.

 

 

The late Prime Minister Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal (1967 - 1969)

Morris and Mauzy unveil that the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency had been clandestinely funneling mainly a financial support to the political actors in Somalia since mid 1960s, in an effort to ward off Somali Weyn tendencies inside top brass leadership. In 1967 election campaigns, for example, the CIA provided thousands of dollars to assist in the election of the late Prime Minister Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal and some of his fellow Somali Youth League (SYL) members. Here is a selection from Morris and Mauzy’s case history of CIA ‘campaign of financing’ in the 1967 Somali elections:

 

An impoverished land of less than three million along the northeastern coast of Africa where the Indian Ocean meets the Gulf of Aden, Somalia was of concern to Washington for a number of reasons.

 

 

The late Emperor Haile Selassie of Ehtiopia

Irredentist claims threatened border warfare with both Kenya and Ethiopia, the latter a long-time U.S. client state under Haile Selassie and the site of a major intelligence base. Somalia was also an early recipient of Soviet aid in Africa, and its coastline held potentially strategic ports for any future rivalry in the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean, an interest shared by France and Britain. At that, however, the country was appar­ently not an urgent concern in U.S. diplomacy. When Somalia pre­dictably rejected a 1963 American offer of "defensive" arms, conditioned on the exclusion of all other supplies, the State Department leaked its "displeasure" but seemingly did no more.

 

Over the next four years, 1963-1967, official U.S.-Somali relations were distant and U.S. aid next to nothing while Somali leaders visited the Soviet bloc, Somali newspapers published anti-American forgeries planted by Soviet intelligence, and the country fought a brief but bloody border war with Ethiopia. Then suddenly, early in 1967, history took a turn for the better. President AbdiRashid Shermarke was elected for a six-year term as President in June and in July appointed as Premier Muhammad Egal, American-educated and avowedly pro-Western. By fall, U.S. aid was resumed in amounts twice the previous total since independence, and Somalia had concluded a border agreement with Ethiopia [see the footnote to read the 1967-68 Somali Border Agreements with Ethiopia and Kenya] [5]. In 1968 Egal visited the United States, following a visit to Somalia by Vice President Humphrey, and was hailed by President Johnson as "enormously constructive in a troubled area of Africa." What the two leaders did not discuss, say official sources, was how "constructive" the CIA had been for Mr. Egal, whose rise, to power was reportedly facilitated by thousands of dollars in covert support to Egal and other pro-Western elements in the ruling Somali Youth League party prior to the 1967 Presidential election.

 

In retrospect, this clandestine bankrolling in Somalia seems very modest by CIA standards, only a tiny fraction of what the Agency has spent in a month in Southeast Asia or even what it spent in the Congo in the early sixties. And its immediate benefits-in rising U.S. influence, in the detente with a grateful Ethiopia-no doubt seemed real enough at the time. In any event, several sources say the subsidies were discontinued in 1968. But the withdrawal was to be perhaps too late. On October 15, 1969, while Egal was again visiting the United States, President Shermarke was assassinated. A week later the Army seized power, dissolving the National Assembly and Constitution and arresting the entire Cabinet, including Egal. Among the charges against Egal would be corruption of the electoral process and complicity with foreign intelligence services. Ironically, the bizarre CIA political contributions before 1967 may have been a decisive factor in the eventual fall of the Agency's candidate [6].

 

Reflecting the unwise decisions made by the CIA about its covert political interventions and subsidies, Premier Egal’s government lasted less than three years. In October 21st 1969, a military led coup d'état replaced the civilian government, detaining and charging (as mentioned above) the civilian Prime Minister of ‘complicity with foreign intelligence’. The military men have actually spoiled the CIA agenda – whether this was also instance of complicity of another foreign factor/s or genuine local revolutionary respond that vehemently opposed to the unfolding scenarios of border agreements, is debatable. However, one thing was sure: the military takeover was a bloodless transition that succeeded to frustrate the pro-American elements in the country and ended the American subsidiary civilian government. Italian writer, Luigi Pestalozza, who observed and recorded the early unfolding events of the Somali military Revolution states that “No tears were shed for the men who thus left the stage forever, disappearing from the [political] history of Somalia [7].â€

 

The military regime soon declared to the commitments of “Greater Somali†doctrine, stressing that colonialism comes in all shades: White and Black – i.e. there are both White (European) and Black (referring to Ethiopians) colonizers. Despite the ousted government’s ‘marathon’ Border Agreements, the revolutionary regime simply regarded all border treaties as null and void; and thus an atmosphere of “no war and no peace†was created in the region.

 

 

Gen. Mohamad Siyad Barre -

The Somali military leadership also declared without hesitation that they will employ the use of force, as an ultimate answer, to unite Somalis in the region and resolve the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. The leader of the Somali Revolution, Mohamad Siyad Barre, expressed his dissatisfaction with the OAU and the UN efforts to solve the prolonged Somali dilemma; and subsequently, he prepared the Somali nation to go to war.

 

Therefore, the lessons to be learned from the 1960s’ foreign intervention in the politics of the Somali State have been disastrous. So far, all the previous means utilized by foreign forces/agencies to intervene in Somali politics – including misinformation, manipulation, and conspiracy against the Somali nation-State – produced bad harvests or may I say remained in the memories of few Somali individuals.

 

Premier Ghedi’s Remarks: Flippant or Optimistic Outreach

 

 

P.M. Abdirizak H. Hussien (1964 - 1967)

Unless we overturn Premier Ghedi’s remarks (on Somali Weyn issue) and read it in the context of ‘optimistic outreach’, mainly catered to the ‘spirit’ of IGAD propositions and efforts of regional stability and cooperation, the 1960s futile strategies of “I jiid aan ku jiidee†scenario inside the Somali parliament seems unfolding again. For example, in mid 1964, an uproar and misunderstanding created a heated debate in the parliament, splitting the Somali National Assembly when the then Prime Minister, Abdirizak Haji Hussein put forth a sensitive program on the table, regarding the issue of Somali Weyn. Regrettably, the program was named: “The Destiny of the Somalis Living in Ethiopian Territory and NFD.†The importance and the sensitivity of the Somali Weyn feelings, inside the walls of the Somali Parliament, have been recorded expressively by Jeanne Contini in this manner:

 

All opposition speakers chose to interpret the reference to “in Ethiopian territory, etc.†as government acknowledgment of Ethiopian and Kenyan Sovereignty over Somali inhabited areas, thus concluding that the government had no intention of liberating the territories under foreign rule. The Prime Minister explained that there had been a misprint in the first published version of the program, and that the reference was later corrected to read “The Destiny of Somali Territories under Ethiopian and Kenyan Domination.†In countering the attack, he also called the attention to the fact that a Minister (without portfolio) for Somali Affairs had been included in the Cabinet for the first time, and that his function was expressly to deal with the problems of “Greater Somalia.†(One deputy thereupon criticized the title of the new Minister as having been inspired by foreigners, because it should have been “Minister for the Somali Affairs under Foreign Ruleâ€) [8].

 

Bearing in mind the history of Somali Weyn controversy, conventional wisdom also informs us that due to the current tragic situation the TFG would not dare now to risk losing the support of Ethiopia and Kenya for the sake of Somali Weyn Principle. In addition, the clan-infested Somalis of today might also be reluctant to deal now any border disputes with their neighbours. Although we could not be certain about how Ethiopia and Kenya may respond to the re-emergence of Somali Weyn tendencies in Somalia, a military option will be their least option. Our neighbours are aware of the fact that Somali clannism presented them a valuable gift – i.e. an opportunity for covert operation. An open conflict between Clan-loyalty and State-loyalty is now fighting on the common grounds of Somalia once again. It is therefore very difficult to tell a Somali from a Kenyan or Ethiopian; in fact, all sides are represented by Somali clans. A token subsidy can provide opportunities for recruiting clan-oriented Somalis as foreign agents.

 

 

P.M. Ali Mohamed Ghedi

Publicly, Prime Minister Ghedi should not however risk appearing to be too soft on “One Somalia†Principle because, as he is aware of it, recruiting Somali nomads by foreigners will not last that long. After all, nomad-loyalty is like a moving cloud which often betrays, and often shows us the nakedness of the true blue-sky. Thus, he should rather be remembered for achieving a “truce’ and understanding with our neighbours, without creating a political blunder. Yet, he has also to make sense to attract Somalis in order to look credible and trustworthy.

 

In doing so, the Prime Minister freezes his local enemies without a battle; he alienates them without insulting them and crushes their Isbaaro fiefdoms without military operations. To succeed in this strategy, the Premier has to convince all sides of the equation that he is prepared to act as a goodwill politician who is willing to avoid flippant remarks, irrespective of the consequences. In this way, the Prime Minister can reason his intent to tone down his declamatory speeches on the issue of Somali Weyn, unlike the forthright declamation speeches delivered by his predecessors. Finally, he should remind the Somali populace to espouse and commit their efforts to rebuild their shattered Somali Republic; and only then, when the Republic earns the rightful international recognition for the status of “recuperated†Somalia, can the issue of border talks resume on an equal footing.

 

A. S. Faamo

[SOO MAAL]

1967-68 Somali Border Agreements [1]

 

Roobdoon Forum Chronicles

November 09, 2005

 

 

Somali-Ethiopia Border Agreements

Preliminary Agreements on Territorial Dispute

 

KINSHASA MEETING SEPTEMBER 1967

 

At the Organization of African Unity Heads of State Conference in Kinshasa during September, 1967, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and the Somali Prime Minister, Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, agreed that Ministers from both countries should meet to prepare groundwork for a future conference of the respective Heads of State with a view to re­solving their long standing border dispute [2].

 

In accordance with this agreement, a Somali delegation, led by the Minister of Interior, Mr. Yasin Nur Hassan, visited Addis Ababa on September 19th, 1967. A communiqué issued at the end of the talks said Somali delegation had two meetings with the Emperor and that these exploratory talks were aimed at “paving the way for a future meeting between the Heads of State of the two countries to discuss major issues.â€

 

ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT SEPTEMBER 1967

 

The Somali and Ethiopian delegations:

 

I agreed to set up a joint military commission to deal with any complaint of violation of the pro­visions of the Khartoum Agreement, March 1964;

II declared their willingness to abide by the letter and provisions of previous agreements reached in Khartoum and Accra, October 1965, providing for an end to hostile propaganda campaigns;

III agreed that steps be taken to remove conditions which affect adversely relations between the two countries, irrespective of the nature of these conditions;

IV agreed to lift all restrictions on the movement of their respective diplomatic representatives and staff and to accord for their treatment and freedom to the nationals of the other party in its territory;

V agreed that Ethiopia should return the Cessna aircraft seized by her, and the Somali Republic the Ethiopian Dakota aircraft now held by Somalia at a future date to be decided upon jointly;

VI agreed to set up a joint commission to investigate cases where property, either private or public, had been taken over by either side from nationals of the other party;

VII agreed that the commission should report immediately its findings to the two Governments; (viii) agreed that the respective Governments should ensure the safety of persons who take refuge in the Somali Embassy in Addis Ababa and the Ethiopian Embassy in Mogadishu and grant immediately exit permits to these persons enabling them to leave their respective countries;

VIII agreed that the regional governors and administrators of both sides should meet once ever, three months, or earlier if necessary, with a view to co-operating in matters affecting both sides of the border-the meetings to be held alternately in the two countries;

IX agreed that cases of persons imprisoned or held by one country, but who are claimed by the other country as its nationals, should be examined carefully-such persons should not be intimidated and immediate steps should be taken to release them;

X agreed that the current talks should be followed by a meeting in Mogadishu at a future date to he fixed jointly by both sides.

 

MOGADISHU AGREEMENT FEBRUARY 1968

 

As a sequel to this visit, an Ethiopian delegation led by the Foreign Minister, Alo Ketema Yifru, arrived in Mogadishu on February 5th, 1968. A joint communiqué issued on February 8th stated that agreement had been reached as follows:

 

I both sides re-affirmed their adherence to both the spirit and letter of the Khartoum and Accra Agreements of 1964, and 1965, respectively and stated their determination to implement them;

II in order to improve relations between the two countries, special joint commissions shall be set up comprising governors and police officers or commandants on the provincial or regional levels, which will meet once every three months, or at any time, at the request of either country;

III it was also agreed that the joint military commission established by the Khartoum Agreement should be reactivated, and should meet as and when necessary;

IV the claims in respect of public and private property submitted by both sides were examined and, in some cases, agreement reached, that certain properties, would be returned on 20th March, 1968, at Tug Wajali while remaining claims would be investigated further:

V both sides re-affirmed the previous agreements reached in Addis Ababa (see above) that nationals of either country who might have been held against their will, would be permitted to leave at any time it they so wished;

VI both delegations expressed great satisfaction at the progress achieved in the improvement of relations between the two countries and agreed to continue the talks in Ethiopia at a date to be agreed upon through normal diplomatic channels;

VII it was agreed by both sides that these discussion were a continuation of the exploratory talks, commenced in Kinshasa and continued in Addis Ababa in 1967 (see above). It is the sincere hope of both Governments that the present discussions would be finalized speedily so that a Summit Meeting on major issues might follow soon.

 

 

 

ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT SEPTEMBER 1968

 

The Somali Prime Minister, Mr. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, visited Addis Ababa from September 1st to 5th, at the invitation of the Emperor, for official talks with the Ethiopian Government. A communiqué issued after the talks said that the two Governments had agreed as follows:

 

I Both Governments reaffirmed previous undertakings to remove all causes of tension, and under­took not to engage in subversive activities against each other.

II The two Governments have agreed to give over flight rights, and an agreement to this end will be concluded soon. In the meantime, the Imperial Ethiopian Government has graciously permitted the Somali Airlines to use the existing international routes.

III In conviction that the suspension of the emergency regulations would contribute to the strengthening of good neighbourly relations between the two sister-countries, the Imperial Ethiopian Government has agreed to suspend existing emergency regulations along its border with Somalia as of September 16th, 1968.

IV The two Governments have finalized the settlement of public and private property claims submitted by both sides. The exchange of property will take place at Tug Wajaleh on September 25th, 1961.

V a The Imperial Ethiopian Government has submitted a draft cultural treaty which will be studied by the competent authorities in Somalia prior to its signature in the near future.

b The two Governments have agreed to open forthwith negotiations over establishment of a tele­communications agreement.

c The two Governments have agreed to conclude a trade agreement. In the meantime traditional trade between the two countries in the border areas will continue.

VI The two Governments have reaffirmed the usefulness of the Special Joint Commissions set up by the two Governments in Mogadishu in February, 1968 (see above). They have further agreed to establish a Joint Ministerial Consultative Committee which will meet periodically to discuss major and miner problems between the two countries and submit recommendations to their respective Governments­

VII Both sides expressed - ear satisfaction at the progress achieved so far in the improvement o, relations between the two countries.

VIII The two sides emphasized that these talks are of an exploratory nature aimed at the eventual settlement of major issues.

IX H.E. the Prime Minister and members of the Somali delegation expressed their gratitude to His Imperial Majesty, the Government and people of Ethiopia for their warm welcome and generous hospitality accorded to them during their stay.

 

 

 

Somali-Kenya Border Agreement

Rapprochement over Territorial Dispute

 

KINSHASA AGREEMENT SEPTEMBER 1967

 

The Somali and Kenya Governments agreed during the Organization of African Unity Conference at Kinshasa in September, 1967, to accept an invitation from the Zambian president, Dr. Kaunda, to hold a meeting in October “to work out ways of settling their differences and establishing normal co-operation.†[3] The following agreement was con­cluded between the Somali and Kenya Governments at Kinshasa:

 

I Both Governments have expressed their desire to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of Paragraph 3 of Article III of the OAU Charter;

II the two Governments have further undertaken to resolve any outstanding differences between them in the spirit of Paragraph 4 of Article III of the OAU Charter;

III the two Governments have pledged to ensure maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the border by preventing destruction of human life and property;

IV furthermore, the two Governments have agreed to refrain from conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such as radio and the Press against each other;

V the two Governments have accepted the kind invitation of President Kaunda of Zambia to meet in Lusaka, during the later part of October, 1967, in order to improve, intensify, and consolidate all forms of co-operation.

 

The OAU conference, in a resolution recording this agreement, expressed "its sincere gratitude and congratulations to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia as well as the Governments of Kenya and Somalia for their positive efforts to overcome differences in a fraternal manner."

 

The conference requested "the Governments of Kenya and Somalia, as parties to the declaration, and the Government of the Republic of Zambia, as host and convener, to submit a progress report on the proposed meeting in Lusaka to the Secretary-General of the OAU."

 

ARUSHA CONFERENCE OCTOBER 1967

 

President Kaunda convened a conference at Arusha (Tanzania) on October 28th which was attended by President Kenyatta (Kenya) and Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal (Somali), with President Nyerere (Tanzania) and President Obote (Uganda) officiating as observers. President Kaunda took the chair.

 

During the conference, which lasted seven hours, officials of the three delegations accompanying the three Heads of State and Government, were asked to leave the hall from time to time whilst Presidents Kaunda, Kenyatta, and Prime Minister Egal conferred on their own. The final session, which approved a communiqué, was also attended by President Nyerere and President Obote as observers. President Kenyatta thanked the Somali Prime Minister for requesting that he, Mr. Kenyatta, should lead the Kenya delegation.

 

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

 

The following is the text of the "Memorandum of Understanding" signed by the President of Kenya and the Somali Prime Minister on October 28th and witnessed by the President of Zambia:

 

Desirous of consolidating the Kinshasa Declaration on Kenya/Somalia Relations and recognizing the need to restore normal and peaceful relations between Kenya and Somalia, the two leaders reached agreement on the following points:

 

I Both Governments will exert all efforts and do their utmost to create good-neighbourly relations between Kenya and Somalia, in accordance with the OAU Charter.

II The two Governments agree that the interests of the people of Kenya and Somalia were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries.

III They therefore reaffirm their adherence to the declaration of the OAU conference at Kinshasa (see above), a copy of which is attached to this memorandum of understanding.

IV In order to facilitate a speedy solution to the dispute and to ensure the maintenance of continued stood relations, both Governments have agreed to:

a the maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the border by preventing destruction of human life and property;

b refrain from conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such as radio and the press, against each other, and encourage propaganda which promotes the development and continuance of friendly relations between the two countries;

[NGONGE]

Oooh! Things are hotting up! Pragmatism takes over I see. Something tells me though that most Somalis will not read these comments as being purly those of Mr Geedi. Indeed, I wont be surprised if the cry has not already gone round that ‘Mr Yusuf has sold the people of Sool & Sanag down the riverâ€!

 

The Somali-wayn issue was always a thorny one and no matter who was the Prime Minster (President) of the TFG, they would have also reached the same conclusion. One can’t talk or even consider ‘occupied’ lands when one’s own (free) country is in a total chaos. The pragmatist (any pragmatist) will have to play the diplomatic game and sooth his powerful neighbours with sweet words and assurances about his lack of enthusiasm for a greater Somalia (it was always a wild dream to begin with).

 

Still, the real ‘gaffe’ in this issue is the Prime Minster’s opinions regarding Somaliland. What political ends do they serve? What possessed him to walk into such a trap? Is it really all down to his political naivety or is there some sort of hidden deal?

 

If it were a gaffe, then it’s a great one for the Somaliland propagandist to make use off. It’s a great one for the Capital’s Ministers to dissect and spread and it’s a great one for the dissenters (if any should be found) in Puntland to hold up and wave in the face of their own President (I’m not talking about Abdullahi Yusuf here – it’s ok. Many still make that mistake).

 

The whole Somali world, apart from Prime Minster Geedi, his immediate family and some uninformed Africans, know that the real control resides in the hands of the great ventriloquist, Abdullahi Yusuf.

 

So far, Mr Yusuf did not make any comments denouncing his Prime Minster’s blunder! How dare the hero of Sool and Sanag abandon his people in such a way? Do they really not matter to him anymore? Or have the glittering lights of the TFG made him forget his humble beginnings? Is he the type that would sell his own beloved Puntland to the highest bidder, if political necessity calls for it or is it merely Sool and Sanag that he would sell? Where does all of this leave the people of S&S?

 

I am, of course, being extra mischievous here. However, I can’t help wondering if, today, there are a few S&S people questioning their commitment and loyalty to Puntland (it were Yusuf that embraced them and it seems to be Yusuf that’s letting them down)! Regardless of what I say or any other opportunistic passers-by say, the paranoia has set in and the people of S&S shall not view Puntland the same way again. Time to setup a new republic to counter Somaliland and Puntland, methinks. What will they call it though, I wonder?

 

I expect President Rayaale to make an announcement any minute now rejecting the comments of Prime Minster Geedi and reaffirming the independence of Somaliland. We don’t need any confirmation from Geedi or his boss to prove the existence of Somaliland, he will wildly say.

 

Somali politics. Don’t you just love it?

 

Can just imagine a young maid dancing barefoot on top of her wash bucket and getting engrossed in listening to the Somali BBC coverage of the latest political gaffes. Every time she hears of a new one, she gasps and stamps on the water harder and harder. Every time she does, a bit of dirty water escapes the bucket and lands somewhere on the floor! Sooner or later, the water will run out and the girl will hang her clean clothes up to dry. Most people will complain about the wasted water, I on the other hand, am enjoying the chance to see a bit of leg.

[AYOUB]

Originally posted by Maakhir:

Therefore, Somali Ethiopians should not depend on Somalia like the dependency syndrome, that Winthrop Jordan, an antebellum historian, called “The White Man’s Burden.†In other words, Somali Ethiopians should grow up, stand on their own feet and start char.ting their own map for their survival while honoring and upholding the good traits of Somali unity.

And what brotherly advice would Mr Roble give to Somalilanders?

[Baashi]

Originally posted by AYOUB_SHEIKH:

And what brotherly advice would Mr Roble give to Somalilanders?

And which Somalilanders are we talking about here? Secessionists or unionists?

 

The two above articles are very informative articles. Somaliweyn waqtigaa ka hiiliyay.

 

Waqtiga yayga hiishaye Jadamiyow kuma wareersheene,

Walaal kuma iraahdeen inta wiiqa soo dhigo e.

 

That one is too deep for Geedi's and Inna Yussuf's of the world, I suppose.

[axmed_fiqi]

The sadest case in the world is somalia. A nation of collapse and chaos. It's so sad really.

 

Somaliweyn was a dream of wanaag and jacayl. Brotherhood the somalis of the horn of africa felt for each other. Many intlectualls allways said that the idea of somaliweyn would ultimatly be the reason we would be destroyed. It seems they are right. Somalia is totaly in disintegrated, Bunch of Lands can claim to be sovergin but is total dependant on other somali "lands".

 

regarding Somalilands, I as a southerner Dont have any problem with them becoming an indpendent countrey. We cant force people to be part of somalia. Somalia was created for somalis to have love for and desire, not be forced to, Maybe one day after southern somalia becomes stable and somaliland will unite, Just as Northern Yemen did with South Yemen?

 

 

Peace at Home, Peace to the World (Nabadda guriga, Nabadda Dunida)

[Taleexi]

Ahmed-Fiqi welcome to the nomads forum. The word Somaliland has two connotations one being esoteric and the other exoteric therefore first of all acquire the all implications of the word-Somaliland and then take a position.

[Taleexi]

---------"Two weeks ago, news from the transitional federal government TFG has circulated and was published in a number of Somali websites. It states that the transitional government has set up a process to divide Somalia into five or six political units as part of the federal system. Somaliland and Puntland would be the frontrunners of the system and serve as an adminstrative mechanism for which other regions in Somalia should copy and adopt. The aim is to decentralize power in Somalia from the bottom up. To many, the intimation sent shocking waves to people who call these regions home. It was a feeling of betrayal and withdrawal of trust since 99% of the people in these regions voted in favor of Puntland’s administration over their regions. "

 

Mr. Maakhir, some short-sighted people may take this out of context and treat this betrayal of Somalis whether it is TFG or Ethiopia as a conspiracy theory or fabricated lies rather than deciphering deeply the causes and the effects that it will have onto the entire Somali peninsula and its inhabitants.

 

Regardless who gains some incentives in the short term or who suffers from this storm, it will converge into one thing, the demise of Somali nation, needless to say that Somaliland's, Puntland's and X-land's directives are predetermined by Ethiopia, and these enclaves are instructed what to do by proxy.

 

Let me high light some points of how the decay of our nation is progressing, in the case of Somaliland, it is crystal clear that Ethiopia is landlocked and is so desperate to have an access somewhere on the Somali coast , Berbera being a good port in a stable area and closest to it geographically, this triggered Ethiopia to became more sympathetic for pro-secessionist in the north, apparently the old divide and rule strategy surfaced here, Ethiopia again meddles the internal affairs of Puntland, and tells it to be mute about anything regarding the destiny of the people of SSHA as long as that serves its (Ethiopia's) overall interest. Neither Ethiopia and secessionist nor pro-ethiopian-Puntlanders have any desire of changing the status quota as long as their explicit detrimental interest ain't minimized.

 

The TFG's president Mr. Yusuf is suffering power-hunger syndrome and a reflection of his record attests to this, therefore we don't need to waste our time and energy about his persona, and he is also a puppet of Ethiopia even though I must admit here that Somalis elected him in a parliamentarian platform Which dictates me somewhat to be respectful and go with the consensus. In any rate, for him nothing is wrong appeasing whoever is catalyzing his perseverance of power.

 

As Ngonge ka dhawaajiyey “Time to setup a new republic to counter Somaliland and Puntland, methinks. What will they call it though, I wonder?†----- Mudane Ngonge Sounds jocular however, coining a name would not have been that appalling to me but my question is; will the people of these territories self-empower themselves and leave their mark in history or will they let their neighbors with the help of our de facto colonizer Ethiopia to be swallowed?.

 

In any event how the dynamic of the Somali politics unfold is something intriguing to keep eye on. :confused: