Does Puntland need a Guurti assembly (House of Elders)

[NASSIR]

For apparent reasons, House of Elders can stand as a bastion of strength when an internal instability is inevitable or when the balance of power seems to be hanging over the cliff, for instance, the recent incident when Gunmen loyal to the minister of planning Farole stormed the city hall of the parliament in Garowe in which three persons were killed.

 

Prof. Said Samatar explains it,

 

 

"How the Italians managed to impose a semblance of order on the Somalis for eighty years remains a matter for astonishment--no doubt by methods that would be considered extraordinary in this human-rights-sensitive age. Italians, please, do come and re-colonize us again. The long-necked Somali lasses are there, still waiting for you. (Mama mia, come dolce, Khadija!â€)

 

On a serious note: while the British neglected British Somaliland by merely using it as Aden's “butcher shop,â€(a supplier of meat to their Aden garrison), British development energies being spent in nearby Kenya, the Italians, by contrast, made a serious attempt to develop and modernize Italian Somalia. They created the vast banana plantations and varieties of citrus fruits that in time came to constitute Somalia's leading export earner. To this day Somali bananas remain the wonder of culinary connoisseurs. Then why, one should duly ask, does Somaliland republic enjoy a semblance of peace and stability that has eluded Italian Somalia? The answer is as simple as it is discouraging: Ex-Italian Somalia is too changed to leave an effective role for the traditional institutions of elders and shirka, or assembly, debates and too unchanged to accommodate modern methods of governance. She is stuck in a limbo, between the rock of pre-industrial outlook and attitudes on the one hand and the hard place of half-baked modernization on the other. "

 

 

What are your suggestions? The Ex-Italian Somalia and its system of rule, which doesn't take into consideration the contribution of the elders into the polity, might be the source of our thriving warlordism. The elders can act as clan intermediaries on the peace-building aspect of our fragile states and might influence public policy makers

 

Since we can't eliminate problems associated with the destructive paradigm of our clan segmentation that in turn spawn division and disintegration, could we then invite elders in to the discussion. This was a remarkable idea and whoever came with it first time deserves national recognition.

 

Some of us may ask questions like how can we invite the Guurti into our conciliatory negotiations when they have had no educational background or work experiences related to processes of state formation and nation building?

I do not know how the system of Guurti works in Somaliland but I am sure they are knowledgeable and have been very helpful in overcoming clan hostilities. Besides, given the power to appoint a political candidate the Guurti should influence the activities and decision making of the government.

 

"Formally, the role of the elders is to ratify, reject or propose amendments to laws passed by the House of Representatives (HoR). The *** must approve all laws, except those on financial matters. The *** will base their assessment in compliance with religion and tradition, bearing the security of the nation and population in mind. However, apart from the formal role of the Guurti in the legislative process, their role as a non-political mediator of conflict is still respected, although†Somaliland

[NASSIR]

This is probably a best way to look at the need for a Guurti assembly, or is it incompatible with the region as far as history is concerned?

 

 

Doesn’t Garoe have a police force responsible for security? Since it does, then what was the reason for sending in the presidential guard instead of the police force? Furthermore, why was the administration so quick to use guns instead of diplomacy? The bloody incident in the central Garoe exposed a weak administration and its lack of proper procedural protocol. When armed militiamen captured Parliament House, it was the duty of the police to engage the militias, not for the presidential guard to interfere. The militiamen, while armed, neither shot nor killed anyone but were there to express their grievance against the injustice incurred upon “some†ministers, while others are given the green light. Puntland prides itself as a region where law and order reign supreme; yet, the president’s personal security forces were quick to break the law. Because of poor judgment on the part of the administration, several families lost their loved ones.

 

Also, the people of Garoe have guns and could’ve responded violently against the presidential guard’s murderous tactics. But, as with the whole of Puntland, the mediation and wisdom of the Issims, or traditional elders, was given priority. As the Issims of Nugal region calmed the tense and potentially volatile situation in the Capital, the president called in more heavily-armed reinforcements to encamp himself in a “Green Zone†not unlike the American one in Baghdad! Why did the president reinforce his personal security forces if he’s not guilty of anything? What does he have to fear today that he didn’t have to fear the day before the bloody gun battle in Garoe?

[Suldaanka]

Well, I think the House of Guurti is mostly mistaken as being a house for clanleaders. That is not true.

 

Members of the House of Guurti are everyday men, and include Doctors, Educators, Poets, Mediators, Lawyers, Sheekhs, Elders etc... or anyone that is wellknown within his community for his qualities as a community leader and is respected by other communities aswell for being a selfless person, charitable, peacemaker etc. The House of Guurti is a constitutional house made up of 82 members, who are chosen on merit and character aboveallelse.

 

On the other hands, you have the House of Suldaans, this includes clanleaders like Suldaans, Boqors, Garaads, Caqils, Ugaas etc... The House of Suldaans is recognised non-consitutional house, that supports other organs of government when the need arises.

[codetalker]

Does Puntland need a Guurti assembly (House of Elders)?

In my opinion, no, I don't think Puntland needs to establish a strict legal framework for the mediation of the Issims. The Issims' success in northeastern Somalia (Puntland today) in the post-91 era has been largely due in part to their functioning within their comfort zones, i.e. outside the system. Traditionally, the Issims' mediation role wasn't dictated by written constitutional laws - they succeeding by using the Somali way of mediation, which is not limited, if you will, by written laws.

 

Take Islaan Ciise Islaan Maxamad's role in the Garoowe incident. What constitutional role does that type of mediation fall under? I think turning the Issims into members of a government risks the chance of politicizing their traditional role and attracts criticism from all corners. They should stick to their current role as mediators between the various social groups in the region.

 

p.s. Remember during the Col Yeey-Jama Ali Jama power struggle, the Issims came under fire for their interference in strictly political matters? It was a very ugly episode and they came under fire from all directions.

[raadamiir]

Originally posted by codetalker:

quote:Does Puntland need a Guurti assembly (House of Elders)?

In my opinion, no, I don't think Puntland needs to establish a strict

legal

framework for the mediation of the

Issims

. The

Issims'

success in northeastern Somalia (Puntland today) in the post-91 era has been largely due in part to their functioning within their comfort zones, i.e.

outside

the system. Traditionally, the

Issims'

mediation role wasn't dictated by

written

constitutional laws - they succeeding by using the Somali way of mediation, which is not limited, if you will, by written laws.

 

Take Islaan Ciise Islaan Maxamad's role in the Garoowe incident. What

constitutional

role does that type of mediation fall under? I think turning the

Issims

into members of a government risks the chance of politicizing their traditional role and attracts criticism from all corners. They should stick to their current role as mediators between the various social groups in the region.

 

p.s. Remember during the Col Yeey-Jama Ali Jama power struggle, the

Issims

came under fire for their interference in strictly

political

matters? It was a very ugly episode and they came under fire from all directions.

I somewhat agree with your brother but it's the 21 century Issims don't seem to have the respect they use to have. What you have to understand is Issims are politicians themselfs. So they need to be in the government for their voice to be heard. Somali politics is clan politics.

[Sayyid]

I totally disagree of Puntland having a so-called "House of Elders" similiar to the house of lords the upper house in the UK parliament.

 

Due to the fact that our elders do not engage into politics and it's affairs, this is solely left to politicians, the politics that is!

 

Issims, boqoro, caaqilo (cukaal), salaadiin, suldaano, islaano, ugaaso, garaado are respectable "traditional" elders, who are very much respected in the Puntland State of Somalia. It is regarded that people in those regions give issims much more respect, even more respect than they give to their parents. People who disrespect or talk back to the issim are regarded as "cursed" and handicapp in those regions!

 

Their prime duty is mediation and reconciliation e.g. in the grand conference of the establishment of the PSS, Islaan Maxamed illaahay ha unaxariistee, was the "shir-gudoon" chairman and prime mediator between the clans and politicians and if they're given "political" power, they would have other "ambitions" and simply the issims in our regions don't do "politics".

 

On the other hand we got so-called "issims", who talk war instead of peace! This is unheard off! Issims don't talk about invading other people's lands like a certain issim from the north-west said "give me weapons, I'll go all the way to Bosaso!

 

This is "dhaqan-xumo" and alien character of the issims, who preach peace and reconciliation in all matters, however I believe this "dhaqan xumo" in this particular case stemped/came from the "politicsation" of the "issims"!

 

I am for a legislative upper house of "saints" "religious" figures made up by popular religious figures men like (Sheikh Cabdulqaadir Faarax and Sheikh Daahir), who give their advice and opinions to the cabinet and president if certain legislations are compatiable with Islaam.

 

They should have total control of the "Goolaha Garsoor" (judiciary) of the Puntland State of Somalia and they should act as a "majlis-ashuura" to the cabinet (Xuukuumadda and President), that's my take on it, Issims should well clear stay out of politics because they're men of peace, mediation and reconciliation and no lies and deceit!

[miles-militis]

My dear Camir – Whilst I admire the role of the Issims, I am absolutely in disagreement with the introduction of Gurti into the political machination of the state provided a departure from traditional methods of running state affairs is the desired object with modern nation state institutions to be had.

 

In its stead, I would argue for an effective constitutional High Court with jagged, razor-sharp teeth out of which even Cadde himself could not wriggle of. Allow me to divulge.

 

You see, traditional systems, such as the Gurti derived from tribal ways of resolving and managing clan squabbles, have inherent flaws which are incompatible with modern nation state proceedings. If the state is to move forward, state institutions are to take the centre stage, and mature political system is to be had, then the role of Issims ought to remain as is. For instance, nation state requires holistic institutions whilst Issims along with their traditional modes work around the institutions. The former loses its value with the injection of the latter whereas the latter loses its worth and respect amongst the general public with the introduction of the former, therefore would go as far as to argue the two to be mutually exclusive factors. Having said that, (and I am not contradicting myself here), I trust as seen in the past, the two could compliment one another to some extent and in certain cases. Somaliland, Puntland and TFG are case in point. The former would surely benefit from the former as needed whilst the latter’s influence is being minimised; in other words whilst traditional elders’ role is being observed, but not defined, theirs should be disengaged from the wretched modern politics of the state – here you would not have Issims dabbling in the affairs of the government, and their movement and political inclinations would not be subject to government policies. The two could be informally married, as is the case in Puntland, without legitimising the former for doing so shall usher in a host of multifarious troubles unique in nature and thorny is profile.

 

I recall, if memory serves me right, at the time of the inception of Puntland, the debate of introducing Gurti into the political process was raised by some who saw some value in it, and was tossed aside more so by the proponents of the state including the late Garad A/Qani and Islam Mohamed amongst others. The said good men did not see their role as one of muddling in the politics of the state, rather reconciliatory of the finest order and purely on need basis.

 

Allow me to depart from the subject at hand for a moment and dispel some historical misinterpretations entertained in some peculiar seatings. You see, contrary to popular belief or perhaps what some might argue, and Mr Oodwayne springs to mind here, political systems in the former Somalilands, British and Italian were of different kind, not because the latter had been stripped of culture and deprived of tradition whilst the former sustained customary mechanism, thusly survived political bedlam in post-Somali state collapse where the latter could not. This is purely historical gaffe and factual misrepresentation of the political process and maturity between the former Somalilands. It remains a belief of mine, and many a student of history and political observers of the said regions would concur, that the disparity as to why Gurti would appeal more to the North and not to the South could be summarised as follows: the political system in the South is far more progressive and complex than that of the North, thusly a departure of traditional mechanism has taken aground in the South whilst the North still finds components of it not only applicable, but also highly attractive solely for the political process and state structure in the two regions was, remains to date, of different sort.

 

If history is anything to go by, and one was to look back on the political processes in the said regions in the late 1800s, when Somali nationalist sentiment was at its strongest and independence movement sporadically sprung up in small pockets in the country, though Sayid Mohamed and his dervishes were gaining ground on the British in the Sool plateau, areas in Hawd and Nugal valley terrain, it was the South that conceptually formulated the nationalist standard along with nation state framework earlier on and in a far greater intensity than the North. This suggests the South to have adopted pseudo modern state configuration a lot earlier campaigning on the bandwagon of Somali nationalism; it does not however suggest the North to have lacked esteem, however theirs was not as organised, remained up until the late 50s more tribal, and leaned more towards the establishment of tribal mode of configuration with clan orientated theme discouraging modern nation state formation taking the centre stage. Modern nation state apparatus was seen as an “infidel†protocol that had no place in Islamic tradition. Things were different in the South, and it was no accident the South negotiated the acceptance of Somalia into the UN and the inclusion of the Somali state into the union of nations as early as 1954 with the proviso of the two Somalilands forming a republic.

 

Today, the roles almost seem reversed with the pro-British regions of the North (western Somaliland) gaining ground in the formation of democratic process, the foundation for modern nation state whilst the South, including the anti-British eastern Somaliland regions, are picking on the pace, in a speedy increment one might add. Even so, one could observe how dissimilar the political process in the two administrations in the North (Somaliland and Puntland) is albeit Issims have fundamental roles in both. The latter clearly appears to want to minimise the influence of the Issims in the political system whilst at the same time having no trouble in seeking their influence not only in social quandaries but in also diffusing political quagmires. It indeed is a sign of a political body struggling with itself. On one hand, it desires to depart from traditional modes, yet recognises the flaws of its own state institutions which are partly incapable of resolving political situations. A case in point, Cadde’s primary course of action was to seek the arm of the state police to disperse armed militias seeking to disrupt parliamentary proceedings, yet when the mud hit the fun, his secondary course of action was to utilise the Issims – both courses of action are indicative of the predicament the state and Cadde himself find themselves in: a struggle with modernisation as a departure from tradition is sought.

 

Equally intriguing is what motivated Farole to resort to armed confrontation with the state, a member of which he remained to the last moment. Yet another indication of failure of political reasoning, and the use of political force prevailing as the last resort! A good time, I say for him to bare hit buttocks lest mislead the general public in future governments.

 

I shall leave it there for the day,

 

Tata …

[NASSIR]

Thank you for the long essays, esp Oodwayne and S-Warrior. You have answered most of my questions, but i would like to delve into the subject deeper should time permits. I have been quite busy with school. Hopefully, i will respond with my own critique.

[NASSIR]

Originally posted by samuraiW:

 

though Sayid Mohamed and his dervishes were gaining ground on the British in the Sool plateau, areas in Hawd and Nugal valley terrain, it was the South that conceptually formulated the nationalist standard along with nation state framework earlier on and in a far greater intensity than the North. ,

 

Tata …

Samuria, Though the English harmed our country more than the Italians, they supported and funded the SYL up until the referendum when the leaders from both parts of Somaliland, seeking the independence of our country, had the chance of which country they should elect to be as their temporary trusteeship. We voted for the Italian , for we believed that Italia was more trustworthy than English.

 

I disagree with how you interprated the need for the House of Elders or lack thereof. Most developed countries have House of Elders or the Upper House. They just employ different political terms but they happen to be the same in terms of meaning.

 

The Senate of the U.S serves the same objectives as the house of Guurti even though they are more complex and politically modernized than our Guurti. "The Framers of the Constitution created a bicameral Congress out of a desire to have two houses to check each other. One house was intended to be a "people's house" that would be very sensitive to public opinion. The other house was intended to be a more reserved, more deliberate forum of elite wisdom. "

 

Besides, the word senate was derived from "senex" According to this Wikipedia online, which means "old man".

 

The House of Elders, i believe, could hinder the power to set up a potential stalemate in the government by any president harboring a disservice to his counntry. They can enforce the constitution, limit the power of the president, and respond with an effective solution. For instance, the U.S president cannot sign a treaty or reach an agreement without the ratification of the senate .

 

 

--------

This is just a rough draft of me. I hope to leave my two cents worth should time permits.

[miles-militis]

Dear Camir,

Not trustworthy, but weak for Italy lost the war whereas Britain was groomed as the potential empire. And with that the young, inexperienced SYL and their supporters favoured Italy thinking they could easily snatch the rein should matters got complex. These are the words of one of the 2 surviving members of SYL. Nonetheless, care not I for either Italy or Britain, as neither furthered the Somali cause, not that I would expect that, with each abusing its influence at its own gain.

 

You raise a valid point on the case of Gurti, however allow me to further comment as to my displeasure with having Gurti similar to that of Somaliland or the House of Lords in Britain in the political process of Puntland. In the case of UK, which is the prototype after which Somaliland's Gurti is modeled, successive governments, both Labour and Tories, including the current administration sought, unsuccessful thus far due to pressure from the monarchy from where the House of Lords derives its origins and influence, to minify the powers rested in the House of Lords (grand 700+/- in number). Abolished once and reinstated later for political reasons by none other the one who must be obeyed, there, to this date, are voices to rid the House of Lords or have it legitimised through the ballet box.

 

Unlike the US Congress, of which 2 Houses [the Senate (2 per State = 100 - 5 year term) and Reps (400+/- based upon State population - 2 year term)], which is an elected body, neither the House of Lords nor the Gurti are elected bodies or true representative of the populace, thusly theirs remain of murky affair. You see, the House of Lords is hereditary whereas members of the Gurti are appointed, thusly remain allegiant to their masters, as it were, and not to the general public unlike the US Congress which is not beyond reproach should their dealings are found to be dishonourable. For instance, King Henry VIII, Edward II, and others including Elizabeth R applied the House to further own gains. Similarly, whenever the late Egal, the master who created the Gurti, found himself in the political slums, he then secured a side briefing with the Lords, thereby turning the tables on his opponents.

 

It is that which I reject. Having said that, if one was to suggest something similar to the elected US Senate, irrespective of the number or tenure [perhaps 5 from each region or 1 from each sub-clan as one's heart desires], then perhaps I could be more in favour of a such body. I do not see that transpiring at this juncture with Puntland's current leadership with Adde/Afqudhac/Dalmar at the helm, and the roles and influence of federal government yet to be defined or determined.

 

Now, on to the case of Puntland, I concur with the founding Issims's wisdom to exclude Issims from the political process, however keeping their influence as one of reconciliatory nature and status, for traditional forces, the most notable sectors being clan elders and religious leaders, wield more clout in present day Somalia, and whomever leader succeeds in exploiting the said influence shall lay claims, legitimate or otherwise, to the throne. Fall foul with the Lords, and you are toast. More importantly, if it is modern, secular state institutions that which is desired, then traditional forces ought be relegated to the terrace; if not, then secularity must be abolished as a political concept, thereby giving way to traditional forces to take the reins. Hope now you see my rationale for going against it in the case of Puntland.

 

Now, allow me to further comment on the Majiyahan skirmish which pitched Adde's forces against the locals, which I trust prompted your impulse in raising the question. It should have never been an issue had it not been Adde's lack of confidence in himself and his administration, lack of respect for traditional forces, lack of creativity, and his being regarded as a stowaway from afar distant from the actuality on the ground. This is the 5th unprecedented incident involving his forces trying to assume the role previously held by traditional forces notably the Galkacyo, Garowe (twice), Bosaso and Majiyahay encounters all of which prove Adde as being a man with questionable modality and prowess in transacting in human affairs. Each of the said incidents, all of which eventually fell onto the shoulders of traditional forces who masterly demonstrated at each time Adde's shortcomings in hatching winnable resolution, could have easily been averted had it not been Adde's stubbornness and lack of tactic. Let me further elucidate as to the reasons that shall earn him this title, and shall precipitate his eventual downfall. You see, Adde and his contemporaries were cadets of the colonial legacy trained in the art of killing, but not administering, and do sustain the mindset of using force in resolving contentious issues and glutinous conflicts for their schooling dictated not process-driven negotiating modalities out of sticky situations. Worse however, is his desire of a Puntland where the rule of the law reins with government agencies setting the standards, guidelines and procedures: the only thing he knows. Anything short of that is non-governable in his mindset, hence must be eliminated; however, the situation in Somalia today is of a different genre, thusly demanding creative thinking, genius leadership and genuine autocrats none of which he acquires. Learn, the hard way, he shall.

 

Will he, or will he not apply the ingenious maneuvering of his predecessors, Hashi and Yusuf both of whom successfully orchestrated formulae which sought to conjoin traditional forces with state institutions: the most sure thing out of this uniquely Somali quandary.

 

Shall leave it there for the day,

Tata ...

[NASSIR]

Now, allow me to further comment on the

Majiyahan

skirmish which pitched Adde's forces against the locals, which I trust prompted your impulse in raising the question.

C'mon. How could you be so sure that the Majihana conflict prompted my impulse in raising the question?

 

Anyway, I thank you for the contribution , you and Oodwayne. I will be more active after the next two weeks. If Allah says.

[miles-militis]

Caamir – I agree, one could not be so sure at all; just though you were a clever chap who desires to reflect upon murky affairs from afar!

 

My dear Mr Oodweyne,

Insolent conjectures are awful human blemish: a propensity awash in our shores, would you not agree, old boy? You seem to have managed to circumvent, duly perhaps, the gist of the argument put forth, unless of course you did so solely to part with forced inner particles, or perhaps were on an impulse to find space for Mr Dhimbil’s piece which I must admit is grossly short-sighted adding less value to the discussion at hand. Be brief, I shall try as I speak to the subject matter, albeit not an easy task particularly when wanting to induce purpose into engagements of this genre with blether of a chap like you…hope you shall see the comical nature of it.

 

Allow me to reintroduce or perhaps elaborate on my original departure for not doing so would be a disservice to the dialogue, for you seem to desperately want to veer off the debate to a familiar soil. You would have noted, should you have worn your monocle to your good eye and paid close attention to my axiom on the subject of Gurti or Lords in the political system, and their differences as adopted in their respective places, that I see little value in having Gurti introduced into the political machinery. I highlighted how Somaliland’s, a replica of the UK’s grand House of Lords, appeals to me not, for the simple reason of their being unelected, thusly being accountable to no one. I further elucidated as to how the elected US senatorial system would be far more suitable model should an alternative is being sought. Further, you would have noticed had you halted for a moment for a dose of clarity that whilst desiring the introduction of neither into the political system, much favour I would the latter. Having said that, inject a foreign tradition or an ideological concept into Somalia’s brittle political assembly with no regard for the traditional forces is not an argument I wish to entertain for doing so is akin to a chap farting upwards in a windy day in the company of his would-be in-laws – put slightly differently, such practice bears the signature of Somalia’s spurious scholars who arbitrarily somersault into the political tumult with much credulity and little command with respect to traditional forces in the Somali context; thusly, be a good chap, if you will, as to reserve that tête-à-tête with the said group to which I should like to think of myself of not belonging.

 

I shall not comment on the political concept of social contract and Somali’s experimentation with various political systems, for I trust one would not do justice for the subject matter herein as it demands a thread solely for itself. However, I do wish to shed further light as to my reservations with respect to unelected bodies such as the Gurti, and why in my view it is no different from Adde’s recently introduced government advisory committees (GAC) comprising of technocratic, seasoned politicians, or retired civil servants and former government officials with a track record of sort in administrative and government dealings, of which role is clearly defined as “… avail consultations to the administration in matters as far extending as budgetary, political or constitutional crisis, social, security and conciliatory initiatives.†Here, one would appreciate the expertise one brings in and greatly required in order to advise any government of the said matters, hence find Adde’s model (GAC) quite appealing rather than Egal’s (Gurti). One should also recount Gurti’s credulity in non-traditional matters principally involving state affairs, constitutional or otherwise, for which they [the Gurti] could hardly assume, for the said resides well beyond their simpleton stricture. And there lies my primary trepidation with the Gurti despite their being non-elected.

 

Further, as much as I respect the role of traditional leaders (Issims) and their ancient, custom-based modus operandi in resolving conflict, reservations I have of their having political role in the undertaking of state matters or their meddling in government affairs. Grisly is a repetition of what recently transpired in Somaliland where the chairman of the Gurti openly noted that in ending the gridlock that pitched political parties in the recent parliamentary elections, they, the Gurti disregarded the constitution, thereby ruling in favour of the opposition parties. Inferred was an antecedent which preceded the said concession, in which the Gurti (by its then head, the late ina Sh Madar along with others incl. haji Warabe) ruled in favour of the ruling party in the preceding presidential election which saw Silanyo whistle to the wind with Riyale fortifying his claim to the coveted presidency. Masterly, many hailed the finale. Sunken opportunity, I viewed the anticlimax. Here, what many regard as being the honourably role of the Gurti, that of resolving all issues, I see it as a failure of the political process. I trust an opportunity has been squandered and a political experimentation had been forfeited, for a solution of political groundwork should have been sought to pacify a political quandary in lieu of resorting to the ancient, comfy traditionalist model of injecting non-political elements into the process. Equally disturbing in the case of Puntland, is Adde’s timid, befuddled advances [more like retreats] of tip-toeing between traditional methods and state driven modalities in easing political challenges put in his path. Of the said impositions, all disregard state constitution along with state agencies. Some evolution of political process, would not you agree?

 

Many toil with the argument that Somalis trust not state institutions, thusly traditional modalities i.e. Gurti ought to have a role in the political process till comes the time. Further, others argue that the process should not be harried, rather political experimentation ought to take its course. To the former, one bellows in shame in this day and age whilst to the latter one could venture there being no genuine political experimentation on sight as much as there truly being no authentic leadership that commands the respect of the locals for such experimentations to bear attractive results. Some prospect to look forward to, eh?

 

If it is adopting foreign political ideologies or not that which we are to prick, then perhaps one should first study the trend in Somalia’s political process as far back as the 40s to the current direction, most notably Somaliland’s adoption of the Gurti purely modelled after the ancient British House of Lords, or the democratic process that is being pursued, some more successful than others, in regions of Somalia. Aboriginal, I think none are. Worse yet, one could observe not a single genuinely indigenous political framework in application other than perhaps the use, or abuse as the case might be, of the tribal system in negotiations entailing clan power sharing where all else fails – Buroa, Garowe, Arte and Eldoret being prime instances of those.

 

Dwell on an island, not are we; thusly one must isolate not oneself for the pasture is most certainly not greener elsewhere, and Somalia is not unique in this predicament as it is equally shared by struggling nations. And if history is anything to go by, industrial nations had gone through experimental stages modelling various formulae at one time or another; therefore to asphyxiate one whilst espousing another is a shameful arrogance only observed in certain school of thought. Further, reflect for a moment, if you will, the stimulus Rome, Constantinople, London and presently Washington, all empires at their prime times applied in seeking not only injection of own cultural stream into that of lesser nations with the object being dilution of aboriginal customs which ultimately had far greater bearings than one care to recount, but in essence ordained far-reaching effect in matters as fundamental as governance, political doctrine, lifestyle to name a few. Now, tell me, why would you not want to experiment with US’s senatorial practice (elected, mind you), yet seem so fervent of UK’s (non-elected)? Queer case of logic quarantine, would not you say, old chap? Or is yours a case of desiring to nibble Her Majesty’s ever so obsequious bosoms more so than George’s? Or had you all along convinced of yourself the Gurti is an ingenious creation of Somaliland’s? Or perhaps it is one of those customary, age old legendary folklore tales familiar in Hargeisa’s Marfishs where the congregation ever so often engages in self-aggrandising ritual dipping of braggart with relative narratives of how wisdom is of monopoly and culture is of commodities ala Somaliland, vastly scarce elsewhere in the Somali inhabited terrain, with dexterous of a leadership whilst all the while failing to observe the void in practice and emptiness in authenticity: an encore of sort as the assembly for one last round bites into the juicy fillings of bashing the ever so sufferable South Somalis [or should I say Italian Somaliland], for their inferiority in all things cultural and good judgement?

 

I shall leave there for the day,

Till then tata…

[codetalker]

To Adeer TOLTOY:

 

This question is per my earlier argument that politicizing the role of the "elders" [Guurti in SL] has the potential of attracting [politically-motivated] criticism that might/might not hamper them from properly carrying out their important duties, including the monumental task of keeping the peace.

 

In light of the recent Guurti vote for a 4-year term extension, a debate of the legality of such an act has already sparked on SL's internal political scene. In Jamhuuriya's commentary, they conclude as follows:

 

"Si kastaba ha ahaatee, mashxarada guurtida ee xiligan, waxay qolofta ka riddi doontaa karaamadii duqayda isla markaana iyagoo la mid noqon doona goolihii wakiilada ee hore ee dhig dhexda qabsaday, mana noqon doono mid bulshada taageero looga helo."

 

How can the House of Guurti continue to carry out its duties in light of a political debate of this kind? Remember, their legitimacy [and even honor] has already been put into question.

[miles-militis]

My Oodweyne – here is an interesting debate very much pertinent to the discussion at hand. Questions, I have about the constitutional role of the Gurti [not what is on paper] as opposed to the MPs, ‘cos if I am not mistaken it is not quite as clear as I initially imagined, which sort of stimulates the discussion. There seem to be confusion ‘ween the judicial, political etc., roles of the two bodies? See if you could speak to the matter when you decide to stir from the self-induced hibernation.

 

http://www.radiowaaberi.org/voice/06/05/12.ram

 

Tata…

[Xudeedi]

Hello Everyone

 

 

Though we never moved up to this phase of forming an all-inclusive assembly for the clan heads, the political participation of Sultans and Garads selected from the segmentary lineages is not something new in both regions: North and South. It has its precedents; the cultural construction of our lineage segmentation---creating the dynamics of dominance—then configuring the patterns of the lacerating violence in Somalia based on hidebound views, the system, adopted for traditional roles in any government, worked effectively prior to the colonialism, had subsequently operated under the colonial system, and the former regime of Somalia. As part of the Indirect Rule and a measure to preempt political consciousness that crosscuts clan and lineage civil disobedience, the chieftaincy in a non-traditional authority was employed all over Africa, the Middle East and Asia. “Old men who employed the power of tradition and the trust of their own people in order to support and justify a non-traditional authoritarian head of State,†writes Nuruddin Farah, one of the best novelists we have today in our continent in his book, “Close Sesameâ€.

 

These figures, and their position as chieftains, were used as instruments of power to govern the ungovernable and to pacify their grievances. Our ancient name, Berber, (now designated this area as Berbera and the rest of Red Sea), for instance, the First Century Greek Merchant Alexandrine , wrote about the “Berber†or “Berberi†as “are very unruly†an exact description of Somalis as Prof. Abdi Ismail also writes, in his paper “Destruction of State and Society in Somalia.†Similarly, Richard Burton described the Somalis as very “turbulent and fierce race of republicans.†In essence, Somalis have no commitment to state government unless some form of political thesis is laid to resolve this farcical reality built around the swirl of clannism.

 

The traditional role playing in our body politic is as important as the cabinet ministers. Their task has always been to serve government as selected representatives from top-down management. Well, the mechanism is to cement further splits, factionalism, or total chaos as is now in Moagdisho—South (the Death Triangle). In the last government, the traditional chiefs were awarded titular political power and a salary. They were made responsible to state authorities like governors and district commissioners. They negotiated vexed issues of political and economic discontent between the masses to which they represented and the government.

 

Historically, this system was a form of rule or an extension of power by one nation into another. Its derivation could be dated as far as in the Eighteen century. First, it was employed in Somalia by the Egyptian viceroys, acting as the absentee landlords of Somalia. The Egyptians themselves learnt from the Tukish empire “delegating of powerâ€. Before the partition of Africa, when Berbera, Bulhar and LasQoray were under the Khedive rule of Egypt, such institution of delegating power to the traditional elders were employed and it “changed with every new colonial government, “ according to Farah. The intensification of Mahdist movement in Sudan effected the departure of Egypt after which Germany , the fist time in history, filled the void by negotiating with elders and merchants of Somalis from Sanaag in Berbera with which they intended to establish their influence and rule over the locals. “"To some extent it was German intrusion into Somaliland which forced the British to take the above action. The Germans, already established on the EAst African coast to the south, also aspired to control Berbera when it became apparent that the Egyptians would withdraw from there, and they negotiated to this end with both the ******** and the Egyptian Governor at Berbera. At this stage the British stepped in, †states Ray Beachey “From Early European Contact with Somalilandâ€. But before the agreement crystallized and materialized, the English was signposted of Germany’s interest in the region,. The British, therefore stepped in and signed the treaties of 1884 with the local clans.

 

If you haven’t read or head of the terms used by both the colonies and the last regime of Somalia., Jawaadheer was used by the English for the political participation of elders in their adminstration. Capo Capila was used by Italy. Nabad-Doon or peace-keepers was used by the Somali government prior to the state collapse—their role duties is discussed above.

 

Now Adde, the current governor of Puntland, for it boils down to the discussion of why Puntland Is obverse to the integration of traditional Sultans and Garads into the political process of the state to help the state apparatuses make informed decisions about the proposals and implementation of initiatives, projects of public and health services, infrastructure, and the natural progress of the society concerned. The answer is very simple. He is a corrupt , hateful warmonger, an incompetent cretin who is there to advance his self-interested scheme so that he can collect the crumbs of mineral and oil exploitation as a reclaim of recompense for his catherticc experience during his crestfallen rebellion that claimed the lives of thousands of people. I don’t put the blame squarely on his shoulders alone but the whole blood-sucking members of this Puntland fiefdom regardless of which clan they hail from.