The woes and worries of president Yusuf of Somalia

[Koora-Tuunshe]

This article published @ WardheerNews prior to the sacking of PM argues that the president still retains the power to sack the PM just to save the TFG from complete collapse and to foil an attempted coup by the opposition in the form of an impeachment that could have resulted from the additional 275 members as per the contraversial agreement in Djibouti. Hirad outlines a brief history of Yusuf's political impasse with the determined but splintered clan and religious-based opposition group in a chronological order. Great article

 

"Constitutionally speaking, though, the President still retains the power to sack the PM and replace him before he is impeached. Politically speaking, it can be more difficult to do, given the environment in the arena. Other woes for the President include that he may be partially blamed as the President who has finally dismantled the State, because all indications lead to final and complete disintegration of the State of Somalia beyond repair." From the article

 

THE WOES AND WORRIES OF PRESIDENT YUSUF OF SOMALIA

By Abdalla Ahmed Hirad

December 12, 2008

 

When President Yusuf of Somalia was elected in October of 2004, by the newly assembled Parliament in Embagathi, Kenya, it became a shock to his foes and a feeling of triumph to his friends and political allies. Given the fact that his election was overwhelming, it sat well with the aspirations of most Somalis and the hopes of the international community alike. Or, so it seemed at the moment. Not least because the Conference at the end of which he was elected, had lasted two years with the support and tirelessness of the international community. It finally bore fruits against the odds, given the continuous fears of abortion and failure because of the temper tantrums of the Somali politicians.

 

 

Alas! No sooner than the first session of the Parliament was held, after his election, we saw that the initial feeling of euphoria had dissipated into gloom and melancholy, not only in terms of the political future of Mr. Yusuf, but also indeed the future of the whole nation, in magnitudes that have never been experienced before; and remains bleak by the standards and assessments of all political persuasions. The reasons for the grand failure of Abdullahi Yusuf and his successive governments are many. And I hastily add that the second Prime Minister is in power since the President took the office. Granted, the severity of his failure depends on the spectacles one is wearing in relation to the contentions within the political arena in Somalia.

 

President Yusuf ascended to power with an assumption that Somalia required a strongman to deal with the host of security related issues that were and remain rampant in the country and the region. He also assumed that the international community was very worried and tired of Somalia being a breeding ground for terrorism, drug trafficking, even production, and Islamic radicalism to fester, which goad the international community would readily and urgently contribute with economic resources and international troops. It seems that his overwhelming election by the 275-member parliament further confirmed to him yet another assumption—that being one of the first dissidents against Mohamed Siyad Barre’s regime in 1978, among other things, qualifies him more than all his peers in the Conference to become the President at this stage.

 

Thus he made a request for a large contingent of international troops before he even nominated his Prime Minister, which in addition to being in the wrong with the adopted Charter, it gave all his adversaries the first dose of fire power to label him as a despot and a dictator. This is despite the fact that the act of bringing international troops to pacify Mogadishu (the Capital) was contained in an agreement signed to by all the political factions in the country as denominated by clans or warlords thereof. In addition, the troops were supposed to bring about security in the capital and to make it safe for the future government that was expected as a result of the Conference. It was also part of this agreement that all warlords would have demobilized their militia or contributed to the national army to ensure the security in the country, especially Mogadishu.

 

Another mistaken assumption was the notion that by assigning the warlords, a good number of whom were already the allies of Colonel Yusuf against the government of his predecessor—Mr. Abdiqassim Hassan—Cabinet posts, would bring them on board and galvanize them further to support him. But above all, it was most surprising to President Yusuf, and to most observers, that the Speaker to the house of the new Parliament himself, not only had joined the opposing warlords, but has gone so far as to lead the opposition. This had divided the Parliament and it did indeed make Abdullahi Yusuf and his supporters to take Capital in Jowhar, a city to the north of Mogadishu.

 

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) remained so divided for a while until President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen negotiated a truce between the Speaker and the President. It was a sigh of relief for the world, when Ali Abdullah Saleh’s truce resulted in the first session of the Transitional Parliament in Baidoa, to the north west of Mogadishu, in about March 2006—a year and five months since the election of President Yusuf. Hence, the TFG moved its seat from Jowhar to Baidoa. In the mean time, the Mogadishu warlords remained in control of Mogadishu, staunchly opposed to the TFG, unconverted by the Aden Accords or the reconciliation between their leader, Sheriff Aden, the Speaker to the House, and the President. The TFG leaders spent the next three months courting the Mogadishu warlords to recognize the government of which the later were members of its Parliament, and even members of its Cabinet, but to no avail.

 

But it was a surprise, if not a shock, to both contending parties, when all of a sudden, the so-called Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) defeated the warlords and in a few days Mogadishu fell into the flank of the UIC. Shortly after that they extended their control as far north as Dusamareb in the central regions and as far South as Kismayo in the Deep South. The warlords fled for their lives from Mogadishu from the Islamists and eventually ended up in Baidoa to claim their positions in the TFG as members of Parliament and government Ministers.

 

The TFG toothless and probably willing to side with the devil to take its seat in Mogadishu accepted the re-alliance with them against the Islamists. In the mean time, the Arab League tried to intervene between the TFG and the Islamists and held talks in Khartoum, Sudan, to no avail. Throughout the failed process of potential reconciliation between the TFG and the UIC by the Arab League, the UIC was agitating the TFG, making it plain—in no uncertain terms—that had its eyes on toppling the fledgling TFG and conquering Baidoa, the only town in the South that remained free from their grip.

 

The TFG, on the other hand, sought assistance from African countries and particularly the neighboring countries—IGAD countries—to save itself from a fatal onslaught from the Islamists. Only Ethiopia—which was already involved in training the TFG militia—responded, amid assertions by the opposition that it did handpick President Yusuf and his PM of the day—Mr. Ali Gheddi—at the end of the Embagathi process, which resulted in the formation of the TFG in 2004. In any case, Ethiopia defended the TFG against annihilation in the hands of the UIC, when the Islamist finally tried to attack Baidoa—the seat of the TFG. Not only did Ethiopia rescue the TFG, but it helped the Government take control of the Capital for the first time since its inception two years ago.

 

But Ethiopia came to the support of the TFG not because it essentially liked President Yusuf or PM Gheddi than any other Somalis, nor that it preferred his clan to any other clan in Somalia as alleged by the opposition. This is a fact that can be discerned from the reality now in the ground. A case in point is that by all indications Ethiopia has dropped its alliance with President Yusuf and his government and is now courting actors form another clan which has remained hostile to Ethiopia until now—therefore, confirming, once again, the expression that “in politics, there are permanent interests but there are no permanent friends”. Ethiopia indeed has had strategic interests to support the TFG.

 

One such interest was the fear of Ethiopia for its security, if Islamic radicals took over the control in Somalia. The fact that some elements within the coalition of Islamic courts had openly threatened to invade Christian Ethiopia which has a good proportion of its population as Muslims, and that the people in its eastern most region are ethnically Somalis at that. Generally speaking, Ethiopia represented the west in its trial to reconstitute a Government in Somalia and to pacify the troubled land to avoid every thing the West is worried about including Islamic radicalism and terrorism, drug trafficking, mass immigration and human trafficking. The allegation of the US that Islamists in Somalia were harboring a number of Al-Qaeeda terrorists may have been the immediate rationale. Therefore, Ethiopia may have been playing a proxy role on behalf of the Bush Administration.

 

However, President Yusuf and company failed to celebrate the victory over the Islamists in the scramble for the control of Mogadishu and the southern regions because its leaders had become divided over their relations with the UIC. Once again, the Speaker to the House who only signed a truce with the President less than a year ago under the aegis of President Saleh of the Yemen has pulled off once again to become swayed towards the Islamists who were already crushed by the TFG with the support of Ethiopia. The Speaker together with some members of his Parliament—so-called free Parliament—forged an alliance with the Islamist and established camp in Asmara, Eritrea, which already had a hatchet to burry with Ethiopia. Sheriff Hassan Adan has once again proven to be a not only nemesis of President Yusuf but probably a formidable enemy of the TFG, whatever his reason. The TFG, in turn, replaced him and most of his followers from the Free Parliament as they call themselves.

 

Whatever the Ethiopian motivations to help Somalia were, they remain and will remain the same, especially if they were negative as some allege. If, however, the motivation was positive then the Somalis have lost the momentum to maximize the benefits, or, may have already possibly missed the opportunity. And the irreducible net benefit for the people of Somalia from Ethiopia’s offer would have been to inherit the reconstitution of the Somali government—even an imperfect one—in accordance with the Charter of the Embagathi Conference. Indeed, that was the hope of most Somalis and the international community. But it seems it was never meant to be up to now. For, even when the UIC was crushed it continued its insurgency by melting into the population, especially those of Mogadishu—as indeed they did strategize as soon as Mogadishu changed hands, in the words of Sheriff Ahmed, the Chairman of the Executive Committee and mouthpiece of the UIC before they fled Mogadishu. The mayhem, the bloodshed, the bombing and the suicide attacks continue, not only in Mogadishu, but are extended to more comparatively peaceful parts such as Puntland and “Somaliland”.

 

Whether President Yusuf’s assumptions of self were erroneous, in terms of his political potential to restore the Somali State or reconstitute government for Somalia, will be left for history to determine. And many had held the same assumptions about him as a leader. In any case, the opportunities the political reality offers, so far, do not seem to match that claimed potential. Whether he totally fails or partially succeeds remains to be seen. The story is not yet complete. But all indications lead to the negative. For example, it has been difficult for him to work with other leaders of the TFG, whatever the reason. We have already discussed how the former Speaker has twice vanished to lead an opposition against him, thus dividing the Parliament and the cabinet. It is also reported that he has differences with the current Speaker. The current Prime Minister (Nur Adde) is also the second incumbent of that post since the inception of the TFG in October, 2004.

 

The differences he currently has with the PM have bordered on constitutional crisis, which may bring down the TFG as we know it. The crux of the matter seems to be a difference in policy regarding the ongoing process of reconciliation between the TFG and the Islamists-led opposition, sponsored by the United Nations, and the Government of Djibouti under the aegis of the IGAD countries. The process spearheaded by the PM on behalf of the TFG has in the end succeeded in splintering the opposition, whereby the radicals in the coalition including Hassan Dahir Aweys, the spiritual leader of the Islamists in Somalia; together with the Qaeda-trained Al-Shabab remain staunchly averted to reconciliation with the TFG. But the group also includes some secular politicians. On the other hand, some seculars including the former Speaker and the former Chair of the Executive Committee of the UIC have accepted what has come to be known as the Djibouti Accords.

 

Despite the commitment of the PM and others to the truce, the President and others in the Parliament and in the Cabinet are averted to it. However, if the PM is correct in the principle that differences with the opposition should be resolved through dialogue and compromise, it seems he lacks a lot as far as the constitutional process and procedures are concerned. The PM has negotiated with this splinter of the opposition that the TFG would provide them two hundred and seventy five seats in the Parliament—a ridiculous idea in itself, since it will double the Parliament seats Imagine the costs it entails for an already impoverished people such as the Somalis are. Think also of the precedent and economic consequence; if one day in the future, the remaining splinter of the opposition or “Somaliland” decide to negotiate a truce with the TFG. When, however, the President refused to buy into the deal and rejected to endorse individuals that the PM wants to appoint as members of a new Cabinet, the PM is seeking the ratification of the deal and the vote of confidence for his members of Cabinet by the Parliament without the agreement of the President. The action is tantamount to an attempt at a coup, if not an impeachment of sorts of the President.

 

For the time being, President Yusuf has so many things to worry about including a possible impeachment. Indeed, it is the only possibility for his opponents to dispose of him as quickly as possible. But the risks are high and very expensive for all, because this option may lead to the crumple and peril of the TFG sooner and for good. Constitutionally speaking, though, the President still retains the power to sack the PM and replace him before he is impeached. Politically speaking, it can be more difficult to do, given the environment in the arena. Other woes for the President include that he may be partially blamed as the President who has finally dismantled the State, because all indications lead to final and complete disintegration of the State of Somalia beyond repair.

 

Islamists have already taken the power in the lower Juba and they are working hard on regaining control of Mogadishu and Baidoa. They have already captured other towns in the central regions. Puntland has already threatened to withdraw from the Union if the current outcomes of the Djibouti Accords are adopted—that is, this could only happen, if President Yusuf, for some reason, is no longer the incumbent in that seat. Speaking of Puntland, the State is no longer what it was, when Abdullahi Yusuf had created it mainly as a stepping stone for himself to the presidency at the national level. But it has served a better purpose than that for Somalia, while it remained intact. It has been a thorn in the throat for “Somaliland” as far as the latter’s secessionist goal was concerned up to now! Puntland is no longer the same since President Mohamoud Musa (Adde) replaced Yusuf. In fact, Lasanod, the capital of one of the regions of Puntland has fallen into the flank of “Somaliland” militarily and perhaps also politically, since Musa took over the helm in Puntland. But this also happened under the watch of President Yusuf. It should therefore be one of his woes.

 

“Somaliland” had already declared its independence, and the chance of it rejoining the union has depended very much on the establishment of strong effective government in Mogadishu and the possibility of successful negotiation between that government and the administration in “Somaliland”. This also becomes one main woe of Abdullahi Yusuf, if “Somaliland” is finally recognized by the world. Note, this trend will lead to the ominous scenario contained in the European-funded study entitled “A Study of Decentralized Political Structures for Somalia”, a Menu of Options, , prepared by I. M. Lewis, et al, from the London School of Economic s and political Science, in August 1995. That scenario entails a lot of fighting over strategically, poetically and economically symbolic population centers, over demarcating clan boundaries and over scare resources such as water and grazing resources, and arable land—all of which are important for a nomadic-pastoral society such as Somalia is.

 

Abdalla A. Hirad

Email:

MHirad@aol.com