What will be the fate of AMISOM?

[General Duke]

Somalia: The Armed Opposition vs. AMISOM [Analysis]

7 Aug 7, 2009 - 2:20:20 PM

 

By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

 

On July 12, forces allied with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) launched an offensive against its armed Islamist opposition, which a week earlier had succeeded in driving the T.F.G. back to small areas of Somalia’s official capital Mogadishu that are protected by an African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM). The offensive, which saw for the first time AMISOM forces in the streets moving proactively against the opposition and providing at least back-up support to the T.F.G. fighters, initially gained back much of the territory that had been recently seized by the opposition. The T.F.G.’s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, immediately declared a “historic victory.”  

 

Then AMISOM withdrew to its bases and the T.F.G. “victory” was reversed as its forces retreated and the opposition moved back in.  

 

AMISOM, which is obviously the only support preventing the T.F.G.’s extinction, was quick to deny that it had overstepped its United Nations peacekeeping mandate by moving proactively and becoming a combatant on one side of a civil conflict. AMISOM’s spokesman, Maj. Barigye Ba-Hoku, explained that its forces had been attacked and had “pre-empted” future attacks by “securing supply routes.” He denied that AMISOM had engaged in “active combat,” saying, instead, that it had made a “show of force” in self-defense. It all fell within AMISOM’S mandate, he said. Then Ba-Hoku seemed to flip his rhetoric, asserting that from then on AMISOM was “allowed to go to all parts of Somalia,” including key cities held by the armed opposition.  

 

Since July 12, AMISOM has not engaged in “peace enforcement” or “shows of force,” and the situation in Mogadishu has reverted to what it was before then – a T.F.G. encircled by the armed opposition that is composed of the Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen or Youth Mujahideen Movement (Y.M.M.) and Hizbul Islam (H.I.), with AMISOM tanks the only barrier to an opposition takeover.  

 

Although armed clashes have continued, they have not substantially changed the balance of power in Mogadishu. Both sides – AMISOM and the armed opposition – are frozen in place; it is not the T.F.G. that the armed opposition wants to defeat but its protectors. The T.F.G. has already been defeated.  

 

AMISOM is in a severely compromised position. It and its African Union sponsors and favorable regional states have repeatedly called for the expansion of its mandate to include peace enforcement. That call has not been answered by the international coalition of donor states and organizations that recognize and claim to support the T.F.G. – the U.N., the United States, the European Union, and Western European powers that hold the purse strings and legitimacy card tightly in their hands. The refusal of the international coalition, which gets its dominant influence over the A.U. by opening and closing the money spigot, to resolve the battle for Mogadishu by force has left AMISOM locked into a restricted perimeter and in a state of siege. AMISOM is a casualty of the international coalition’s policy. How long will it be politically and perhaps militarily sustainable for AMISOM to remain in Mogadishu.?  

 

The armed opposition understands AMISOM’s situation and has based its strategy on it. The stand-off in Mogadishu has allowed the armed opposition to regroup, re-arm and consolidate in preparation for an attack that would be aimed at breaching AMISOM’s lines. If such an attack were successful, if not in routing the peacekeepers, then in demonstrating their vulnerability, the opposition would have changed the balance of power decisively.  

 

AMISOM also understands its predicament full well. Although its force of between four thousand and five thousand troops from Uganda and Burundi can defend key infra-structure, government installations and supply routes, it could not enforce peace throughout Mogadishu, even if given the mandate. Uganda has said that 16 to 20 thousand forces would be needed for that.  

 

On August 4, Ugandan Army land forces commander, Lt.-Gen. Katumba Wamala said that AMISOM was “waiting for the green light” from the U.N. Security Council to attack the Y.M.M. Outgoing U.N.S.C. president, Ugandan diplomat Rukuhana Rugunda, responded that an enhanced mandate for AMISOM was not on the Council’s agenda. AMISOM clarified that its forces would only go on the attack if the mission were taken over by the U.N., which is very unlikely to happen.  

 

As the opposition sharpens its knives and the international coalition ties AMISOM’s hands behind its back, the coalition has diverted itself by pursuing a half-hearted strategy of “capacity building” of the T.F.G.’s armed forces, through training and material support; and increased support for AMISOM. A tactical rift has appeared between the E.U., which believes that present T.F.G. militias are unfit to receive weapons directly, and the U.S., which has already supplied forty or more tons of light weapons to the T.F.G. and is likely to give more. The Europeans argue that current T.F.G. forces are likely to carry their weapons back to their clans, sell them to the opposition or on the arms market, or even join the opposition. On July 16, A.U. special representative to Somalia, Nicolas Bwakira, said that A.U. officials were “alarmed at the high ratio” of trained T.F.G. troops “returning to clan-based warfare immediately.” The Europeans prefer a “multi-layered” approach that would take time, which AMISOM does not have. Washington likes a quick fix that ends up in its throwing good money after bad.  

 

Washington’s self-made predicament was precisely described by a “Western diplomat” who was  interviewed by Mike Plantz of Great Britain’s Daily Telegraph newspaper and said that although the T.F.G. needs military support, if Washington provides it, then the Y.M.M. will get stronger by appealing to Somali nationalism and casting the T.F.G. as a stooge of colonialists and foreign anti-Muslims. “It’s a vicious circle,” said the diplomat.  

 

As Washington agonizes over its dilemma and is stricken with what psychologists call “hesitation neurosis,” the other members of the international coalition look on and dabble in capacity building. AMISOM remains stopped at the red light.  

 

How long can the international coalition expect AMISOM to hold on in its present form? How long can the international coalition keep leaning on AMISOM?  

 

Cracks have begun to appear in AMISOM’s lead contributor, Uganda. On August 3, Uganda’s major opposition party, The Front for Democratic Change (F.D.C.), came out formally for the removal of Ugandan forces from Somalia. Its chairman, Dr. Kiza Besigye argued that AMISOM was no longer a peacekeeping operation, but had become involved in a “civil war” at the behest of “other selfish states.” Besigye counseled Uganda’s president, Yowahari Museveni to devote himself to “peace efforts” in Somalia.  

 

On April 6, Uganda’s major independent newspaper, The Monitor, published an editorial calling for withdrawal of international support for the T.F.G. and the removal of AMISOM from Somalia. Following in the line of the “vicious circle” diagnosis, the editors argued that U.S. support for the T.F.G. is “only making Somalia a more attractive destination for radical Islamists.”  

 

What is to be done, said the editors, is to leave Somalis to themselves. Presenting the hypothetical that the Y.M.M. and H.I. take over Somalia (the international coalition’s nightmare), the editors argued that getting rid of the T.F.G. and Sh. Sharif would probably end up allowing clan interests to emerge and render an Islamist regime at least ineffective. Less likely would be the emergence of a “rogue” Islamist state in Somalia. Should that happen, said the editors, a military invasion of Somalia by East African states “is still a better proposition than open-ended support of the T.F.G.,” which perpetuates a “religious war which obscures the political contest underneath.”  

 

Whatever their present political clout might be in Uganda, the F.D.C.’s and The Monitor’s analyses indicate at the very least divided opinion in Uganda’s political class about the country’s continued participation in AMISOM. How long will Museveni be able to carry the AMISOM millstone around his neck?  

 

Analysis  

 

From the standpoint of rudimentary political analysis, the analyses of the F.D.C. and The Monitor are accurate. AMISOM is involved as one of the two major participants in a civil war and is being used as a pawn in the service of the failed strategy of the self-interested international coalition. AMISOM did not bring this situation on itself; the situation has been forced upon it.  

 

On May 14, after AMISOM’s “proactive” move, Y.M.M. spokesman Ali Dhere announced a “second phase” of the “war,” which would have “deadlier consequences.” The centerpiece of the second phase would be an insurgency against AMISOM of the same kind that it had undertaken against the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia (wearing it down). “The war methodology has given us positive results and we are going to repeat it,” said Ali Dhere.  

 

The Monitor gets to the heart of the matter in its judgment that support of the T.F.G. by the international coalition perpetuates a religious war that obscures and distorts the underlying clan political divisions in Somalia. Where the editors are most perceptive is in realizing that it is too late to uproot the Islamic political formula as the discourse of all domestic Somali actors. Thus, the editors argue that Somalis should be left to sort out their conflicts themselves, regardless of consequences – a position that goes beyond the confines of analysis.  

 

That is not to say that AMISOM is simply an innocent victim of the international coalition. Uganda’s and Burundi’s leaders made a political calculation that they would win the favors of the international coalition and would receive adequate support for the mission – the same mistake that Ethiopia’s prime minister, Meles Zenawi, made when Washington gave him a “green light” to invade and occupy southern and central Somalia at the end of 2006, in order to defeat the Islamic Courts, some of the factions of which now form the armed opposition. Zenawi ended up complaining that the international coalition was whipping and starving the Ethiopian horse, and withdrew his forces at the end of 2008. Only AMISOM was left.  

 

What is to become of AMISOM? The armed opposition expects it to be worn down and weakened so as to become vulnerable to attack. The international coalition is unlikely either to back up its rhetoric with muscle or to pull the plug on the T.F.G., thereby prolonging a stop-gap measure until AMISOM cannot or will not take it anymore. “Capacity building” is a policy of deferral. It is a euphemism for beating the AMISOM horse.  

 

Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein,   Professor of Political Science, Purdue University weinstem@purdue.edu

[GAAROODI]

they will end up in puntland protecting the "president" from alshabab fighters as soon as they arrive in garowe.

 

loooool.

[Muriidi]

many regional alliance around the world have put together troops as a part of their application to join the u.n. troops ,the scandinavian nordic battle group the western african batallion,nato,au troops like amisom.if these alliances can learn to put their shortsighted interests aside, maybe their troops will be integrated into the u.n. military program like india,guatemala,moro cco and a few others.

 

the following didn't fulfill the criteria for u.n. troops

 

amisom (a.u. troops)

french troops

nordic battle group (scandinavia)

 

they were representing their own regional interests instead of global interests :

standardizing the military worldwide...people in tajikistan and nigeria both use aspirin...the same rules apply for security measures!

 

to answer your question:

 

amisom will have to fill out a new application...

 

sincerely yours

 

u.n. ???