(Repost) Sentiment and Sensibility (in Politics): Rejoinder to Vision to Reality

[Paragon]

Just one of our predictions of what may come to pass in Somalia if views didn't change. Over the years we've given out many other predictions that have come to happen. Let's hope our next 'indha-indhayn' into possible outcomes and which one to choose will find willing ears.

 

-----

 

 

SENTIMENT AND SENSIBILITY: A REJOINDER TO (THIEIRY's) Vision to Reality (Post made in SOL before the 10th Oct. 08. Mysteriously missing)

 

In line with our (Thierry, Xiin et al.) school of thought, and its alternative strategic propositions on the way forward out of Somalia's current quagmire, and also in honest support to our mutual friend (in the TFG's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic corps), I herein intimate a rejoinder, which I hope will contain additional thoughts in the furtherance and advancement of brother Thierry's topic (entitled: Somali Empire (vision to reality , also posted in Somalia Online politics section). In his write-up, good Theirry has put forth noble ideas, and has sincerely advocated for the consideration of ONE fundamental need, which reasonable men and women of this forum must vitally recognize; that is, if they genuinely desire to undertake the monumental task of ensuring our beleaguered nation's survival, endurance, and potentially, its emergence as a formidable nation or empire in the future. That fundamental NEED which he has so ably highlighted, is that it is each and every Somali's national duty, and responsibility (not to partisan or sectarian politics/clan-ism but) to the transcendent welfare of our peoples, in whichever region they may inhabit.

 

 

As such, he urges us all to be intelligent enough to differentiate between two important things: (1) pursuing a futile short-term war, destined for failure and informed by a super-ego that rejects all efforts of reconciliation at the aggrandizement of the nation, which, on the same token, has only achieved to create daily civilian carnage, suffering and mass displacement, all in the name of a supposed national interest, and; (2) a well considered and conciliatory, strategic plan, driven by the long-term desire to cleverly survive the tricky and dire situation we are in, and spare our nation from a divisive civil war, occupation, and possibly, the bleak reality of total non-existence.

 

Thus, in a nutshell, our good Thierry envisions, and with quite a good qualification and validity, the opportunity beyond the potential hazards of the current political impasse and occupation, pointing us all to catch a hopeful glimpse of the bright horizon of a bigger picture. The BIGGER PICTURE I speak of, which takes a great deal of personal soul-searching to see, is one that animates the reasonable mind to question, interrogate the struggles it currently considers to be vital national interests, and finally PRIORITIZE them into two important categories: (A) risky, violent, fruitless and terminal national struggles that will cost us the very ethnic and territorial existence we seek to protect, which culminates in a Sentimental Struggle (B) opting for (while keeping in mind our current condition of severe limitation in political will, man-power and resources for waging an effective resistance), a long-term strategic plan, well thought out and carefully executed, that guarantees or ensures the nation's ethnic continuation and territorial integrity. Which, in other words, finds its strength in a Sensible Struggle.

 

Category (A) The Hazards of Sentiment

 

Defensive human impulses, have the natural tendency to react violently in resisting the evil of aggression of the other, especially that of occupation. The impulse to resist another's deliberate transgression, the moment we perceive his actions as an insult to our honour, come natural to every Somali man, and surely, both pride and patriotism lend him a righteous hand. Now, considering these natural entitlements to wage a decisive war against the current Ethiopian occupation, it is highly plausible that many well intentioned fighters (of religious and nationalist denominations) in the re-liberation movements, to insist that the only remedy to occupation is nothing but concerted war. These well intentioned brothers and sisters will also assert that the war for re-liberation, is not just merely another unwarranted internal war like others before, but in fact one deservedly justified by a majority national sentiment. And guess what? They are right and I wholeheartedly concur with this assertion.

 

In fact, as everyone in SOL forum is aware of, I am an unflinching supporter of the re-liberation war not only when writing on Somalia, but also I have been, and still am, an active participant in many real life campaigns, demonstrations and organisation ,in an effort to get rid of the tragedy and indignity of occupation, which has been callously visited upon my nation. But I must honestly admit that all my activism, and that of many others, have been solely driven by an emotional, nationalistic and religious 'sentiment' and not much sense. Of course I acknowledge that sentiment is good, and very important at this junction of our history, but what is equally important is, that sentiment is only side of the coin when it comes to undertaking an effective and successful struggle. Especially in a struggle as important as the current one.

 

The other side of the coin, I believe, is unmistakably 'sensibility'. While sentiment is crucial in uniting and emotionally motivating the entire populace to concerted action against injustice, without the guidance of sensibility on the part of leaders, sentiment is prone to short-sightedness, which would certainly lead us into pitfalls. Thus, what is currently needed is a presence of 'vision' in a leadership that sensibly plans for the country's long-term, strategic goals. There is absolutely nothing to be gained from sentimentally, which, although good in its own way, is insufficient in the face of many practical difficulties that hinder or reduce the effectiveness of the war for re-liberation. I believe these practical problems have been evolving for a long time, and not overcoming them means ineffectiveness and failure. What we must consider is that:

 

• Historically, we currently live in a period of time in which we have been severely weakened by a twenty year old civil, making us the most vulnerable nation of today's world. And Ethiopia, as a state that has always followed and monitored our general social conditions for centuries, waiting for the right opportunity to invade, has used our self-inflicted vulnerability and occupied us. Additionally, our long-standing clan hatred and antagonisms have given Ethiopia the golden opportunity to territorially dismantle our country into fiefdoms. Thus, fighting Ethiopia, while the country is in this dire state, becomes that much more difficult and even the sentiment of 99% of our people now seems to be in vein. And it is for this reason that we must now critically plan for an alternative route to re-liberation.

   

  -

• The other difficulty that also faces us is in nature global, in that were we to hope that global sentiment would be sympathetic to our cause for we are the wronged party, that doesn't seems to be the case. If anything, global sentiment appears to be working in our disadvantage. Why? Because the United States and Ethiopia have made sure of that.

   

  -

• The third obstacle we must contend with is internal to us as Somalis, in that there already exist many irreparable splits within the movement of the re-liberation front. As brother Thierry has already touched on in one of his posts, there are multiple fronts in the re-liberation movement, some of which (Khalid Bin Walid) coming into existence as recent as three weeks ago. These fronts now total 10, and we are still counting. The older fronts include the different wings of Al-Shabaab (Mogadishu and the Jubbas group), the former UIC (Asmara and Djibouti group), The Jubba Islamic Brotherhood Movement, various Nationalist groupings and so on and so forth. And what is now common knowledge is that these groups or wings follow very different and conflicting approaches in their fight for re-liberation. The main religious wings, such as the UIC and Al-Shabaab, see each other as sworn enemies, let alone their views towards other non-religious and nationalist fronts. These religious wings are increasingly becoming hostile to each other, and further splits or division within them cannot be ruled out. A case in point is the recent creation of Khalid Bin Walid group, whose very aim of formation is said to be a rejection of Al-Shabaab's unilateral closure of Mogadishu Airport. The Khalid Bin Walid group have recently declared that their main objective is to fight, not against Ethiopian occupiers, but to counter Al-Shabaab's monopoly on command and, possibly, violence. So, if that is all it takes another group or front to form, then I must ask you, isn't the situation becoming so chaotic as to expect more catastrophic wars all over again? I hope not.

   

  -

• Another equally serious problem is related to the above point (3), and concerns the future consequences of ever increasing fronts making impossible the joint agreement to table alternative rule of law in post-occupation Somalia. If Ethiopia is successfully defeated and driven out of the country, then the question is, what awaits Somalia that will find itself under multiple factional controls within compartmentalized territories? Another bout of twenty or fourty year old ideological civil way? Such a future is what worries me most, even more than the current TFG and Ethiopian occupiers. Now, at the present time, what we must start planning for is the sort of structural frameworks for stability and governance will be in place in post-occupation Somalia. I strong hold the view that it was our failure to plan ahead is what has led us into civil war, before even Siad Bare was ousted from power. And surely, that mistake has precipitated current Ethiopian occupation. Do we wish to repeat the same mistake? I hope not. As someone who has put a great deal of thought and effort into gaining some insight into our current condition, and the prospects of the future that awaits our nation, my advice is this: be visionary, think beyond today in order to catch a glimpse of the bigger picture while still paying attention to history.

   

  -

• Another dangerous precedent that flows from our previous failures or mistakes of thinking ahead, concerns what I would call the 'lost generation of the war'. this means, the thousands of youths that were born in Somalia during the years of 1991 to the present, who, their short lifetimes, have not known only war and its strife. This generation, which has no tangible social knowledge or social school and semblance of governance structures, have previously fallen prey to warlords and we used to fan the flame of clan-based war. The fact that this generation was a major factor in the continuation of the civil war is not their fault; the fault lies elsewhere I believe. However, during the rise of the UIC and, subsequently, the Al-Shabaab, the radical indoctrination of these youths has dramatically increased, taking a different religious orientation. Thus, this marks the advent of mass radicalization in the fight ( previously) against the warlords, (and now) the TFG and Ethiopian occupiers. Personally, I don't see such radicalization as a problem, if these youths will at later times be institutionalized and absorbed into a future post-occupation state apparatus. But such an institutionalization can not altogether be guaranteed, as there exist future strategic plans to do so. Thus, if such plans are not quickly put in place, then in post-occupation Somalia, we will certainly be in for the continuation of civil. What makes that likely is that it is presently observable that some religiously radicalized youths, and their minders, seem apprehensive toward comprise in reconciling with their fellow freedom fighters, even when peace may solely depend on reconciliation. So, what if these youths and their minders insist that, having sacrificed life and limp in liberating Somalia, they will not share the victory with the rest of the re-liberation movements? Should we then expect another face-off between what before use to be 'freedom fighters' at the expense of an already weary nation?

   

  -

• Last but not least, granted that we overcome all the difficulties I touched on in the above five points, will there a future post-occupation Somalia that is able to survive, for long, the overtures of and interventions of neighbouring countries, and the international community (especially the US)? I hope that we survive and prosper into strong and promising Somalia, amen. But then again, what if it doesn't? Will it not be wise to complete ways to make sure Somalia outlives all its enemies? Think about it. Certainly this is why I and brother Thierry are proposing the acceptance of the Djibouti Reconciliations.

 

CATEGORY (B) The Fortunes of 'Sensibility'

[Thierry.]

Good stuff P I look forward to part two

[Paragon]

^It's hard to write the second part! There's mist in the horizon. But when that subsides I'll write in a flash.