Ethio-Somaliland Relations Post-1991: Challenges and Opportunities

[Jacaylbaro]

Dedication

 

I would like to acknowledge those who have helped me at every step along the way from the tentative conception of the paper to its completion. To the friends whose suggestions were invaluable and without their generous advice and assistance the paper could not reach the standard.

 

 

 

Methodology

 

The finding of this study is primarily originated from four week research mission to Somaliland late 2009 and early 2010. The study is concerning the growing relations between Ethiopia and the Republic of Somaliland with particular emphasis Post-1991. The study interviewed people, including political figures, academicians, retired military officials, member of parliamentarians, ambassadors, journalists and business communities both in Ethiopia and Somaliland. The bulk of this research was carried out in the capital Addis Ababa, Hargeisa and Togochale. However, this study is not going beyond indicating the relations between the two countries and critically highlights the challenges and opportunities of these relations. Similarly, it optimistically tries to understand the mutual concern of these relations.

 

 

Abstract

 

It deserves to mention the two neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa, namely Ethiopia and Somalia were having distressed relations. The two were using tit-for-tat policy against one another by hosting the dissident groups of their respective states. Eventually, these rebellion groups managed to overthrow the long-time rulers of the two neighboring states. The history of Ethio-Somalia relations is marred by distrust, hostility and war. Suspicion and political fanaticism is deeply rooted in their relation. Consequently, when the Somali state collapsed and the country disintegrated, the situation has changed. Ethiopia established both diplomatic and economic relations with Somaliland which declared its separation from the rest of Somalia and became closest bilateral partner, while it remains the only country that maintains a significant diplomatic presence in Hargeisa- a trade office which effectively serves as a Consulate. Ethiopia is one of Somaliland’s most important trading partner and Ethiopian Airlines flights between the two capital cities Addis Ababa and Hargeisa serve as one of Somaliland’s primary physical links with the outside world before it suspended its flights. This may be understandable since the trade office of Ethiopia was one of the main targets destroyed by the terrorist suicide bombs, including the Presidential Palace and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) office in Hargeisa on 29 October 2008. The attack also led to 28 persons to perish. With the exception of this terrorist act, the two countries normally have friendly ties, with landlocked Ethiopia providing trade and security assistance to Somaliland in return for using Somaliland’s port of Berbera.

 

 

 

Background

 

The uneasy relations between Ethiopia and Somalia basically emanate from claiming people and land in the adjacent area (irredentism), which led the two neighboring countries to go to bloodiest wars ever-witnessed in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War era. Although, the Haud, Reserve Area and surrounding areas are inhabited by Somalis, they were incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire during the ‘Scramble of Africa’, on the basis of treaties and agreements signed between Ethiopia and its European ‘neighbors’. This historically determined status quo has been rejected by the newly independent Somalia, which has made it a sacred obligation to struggle for the ‘decolonization’ of the whole region (Amare, 1989: 482-3). However, for over four decades, relations between successive Ethiopian governments and Somalia have not been smooth and easy. Principally, Ethio-Somali relations were full of mistrust and political hostility between the two regimes. Consequently, every regime was plotting against one another and hosted their respective dissident groups (tit-for-tat) such as, the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and United Somali Congress (USC) sponsored by Ethiopia; while Somalia sponsored the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Eritrean Popular Liberation Forces/Front (EPLF). The major concerns of these two regimes were to weaken and ultimately destroy each others’ government respectively.

 

The conflict in the Horn has involved swiftly changing series of cross-cutting alliances which has made the outcome uncertain. For example, at one time both the Soviet Union and Israel were on the Ethiopian side, giving considerable military aid. While the Soviet Union also maintained a military presence in Somalia during the early part of the confrontation, and the Saudis promised unlimited petro-dollar support if the Somali government would abandon its Socialist-oriented policy in favor of Islamic ones (Bereket, 1980: 129). However, historically Saudi involvement in Somali politics has been deep (Medhane, 2002: 171). In the same way, the strategic content of U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa must be seen in terms of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, predominantly Southern Africa, for two reasons: The first has to do with the position toward the struggle in the Horn adopted by the dominant Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the second with position expressed in the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) by the black African governments. U.S.-Arab cooperation in the Horn is determined by a mutual interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the Arabs’ long-term policy on oil (Bereket, 1980: 136). As for the African consideration, the African governments’ interest in preserving the postcolonial status quo puts them on the side of Ethiopia to Ethio-Somalia conflict, which Somalia viewed as an aggressor. However, the Soviet turned to Ethiopia’s side over the Ethio-Somali conflict stole the tactical political thunder from the United States of America (Ibid).

 

In the late-1970s, the Ethiopian government at that time gave support to two movements that began sporadic armed opposition to the Siad Barre dictatorship in Somalia. The first was the Somali National Movement (SNM) which operated in the northwest, in part of what had been British Somaliland, essentially among the ***** clan. The other movement to benefit from Ethiopian assistance was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which operated in the northeast, largely appealing to those clans, particularly *********, of the ***** clan other than Siad’s own, the *******, which also saw themselves as marginalized (Lionel, 1999: 91). Ethiopia’s support to the above-mentioned two Somali rebellious groups, especially the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM), was to use against its enemy Siad Barre. Somalia retaliated by giving support to the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) – a guerrilla organization sponsored by the Somali government (Berouk, 2004: 18). In addition, the Barre government was also the major sponsor of other Ethiopian armed rebellious groups. The current ruling party of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) which is an umbrella of different parties such as Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) that took part the overthrow of the Derg regime, received assistance from Somali authorities and a number of the EPRDF leaders reportedly carried Somali-issued passports (Ted, 2009: 18). Other rebel groups, including the ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), also received assistance from Somalia.

 

On the other hand, the down fall of the Siad Barre government and the absence of a central authority in Somalia ended support for Ethiopian armed groups. Although Somali factions continue to support the ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Ethiopia’s major concern was preventing the growing influence of the Islamists in Somalia which it sees as potential threat to its security and that gets support from particular Gulf States like Saudi Arabia. In the same way, Saudi Arabia was uneasy about the emergence of the EPRDF and EPLF which it saw as movement of leftist orientation. It was then seen as sympathetic toward the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO) which operated in eastern Ethiopia (Kinfe, 2004: 256).

 

As it was discussed above, following the collapse of the Somalia central authority in 1991; Somaliland which previously united with the Italian Somaliland in 1960, declared its independence from the rest of Somalia, claiming the boundaries which the British government handed over on 26 June 1960. Although unrecognized by any country or inter-governmental organization since its unilateral declaration of separation from Somalia, Ethiopia maintains close relations with that de facto Somaliland. Ethiopia became the first State that de facto recognized it by opting to send diplomatic mission to Somaliland and opened a trade office that serves as a Consulate in Hargeisa.

 

 

 

Coming Soon Part Two

 

 

Nasir Mohamed Ali

Addis Ababa Ethiopia

[Jacaylbaro]

Table of Contents

 

 

Dedication

Methodology

Abstract

Background

Ethio-Somaliland Relations Pre-1991

Ethio-Somaliland Relations from 1991-1993

Ethio-Somaliland Relations from 1993-2002

Ethio-Somaliland Relations from 2002-Present

Ethiopia’s Relations with Somaliland: Political or Economic?

Ethiopia’s Recognition to Somaliland: De facto or De jure?

Ethio-Somaliland Relations: General Perception of the Citizens

Challenges and Obstacles to the Relationships

Future prospects of Ethio-Somaliland Relations

Conclusion

References

Endnotes