The Djibouti TFG-ARS peace deal

[money]

The Djibouti TFG-ARS peace deal:

A Critical review and some recommendations

 

 

 

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

The National Civic Forum (NCF)[1] has organized this year a series of panel discussions for Somali professionals and intellectuals to analyze and contribute to the Somali reconciliation efforts. The first entitled Somalia: options for reconciliation was held in March. This was followed by The UN-led peace initiative: contributions and the way forward which was convened in April and focused specifically the then proposed initiative for the revival of the Somali peace talks outlined by the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Somaia, Ambassador Ould-Abdalla. The recent Agreement in Djibouti between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), called for an in-depth analysis of the content and implications of the agreement. The current document is the product of a panel discussion held in Nairobi 20-22, June 2008. It presents a critical reflection on the agreement, highlights its strengths and weakness, and offers some recommendations for a reconciliation outcome that considers beyond short-term political and diplomatic expediency. This document is meant to convey the views of the panelists to the negotiating parties and their allies, the UN mediator and the observers of the Djibouti peace talks. It constitutes an integral part of the wider civic action, in search for a lasting solution.

 

2. Significance of the agreement

The Somali reaction to the Djibouti meeting is mixed, but on the overall it is considered positive and timely. The panelists identified several positive outcomes of the Djibouti meeting.

 

a. Firstly, it is the most important reconciliation step undertaken since December 2006, and has allowed the re-opening of the peace dialogue and the first direct contacts between the two warring parties.

 

b. Secondly, it showed that it was possible to break the deadlock and negotiate on critical issues through compromises, even when the Somalia case seemed hopeless.

 

c. Thirdly, it has created a sense of hope for a cessation of the violence throughout the country, particularly in the South-central regions of Somalia.

 

d. Fourthly, the reinvigorated mediation has played a crucial role in launching the negotiation efforts; furthermore, the unified leadership of the mediation under the UN, has reduced the chances for parallel initiatives by various international actors.

 

e. Lastly, the reengagement of the international community reflects their increased commitment to the peace process as stakeholders in the crisis.

 

The strengths of the meeting lie in the following:

 

i. The development of a timeframe is an approach that ensures proper follow up. The 30 days given for the enforcement of the cessation of armed confrontation starting from the agreement signing date, provides an adequate time for the negotiators to brief, further persuade and consult their respective constituencies. The initial 90 days ceasefire period, is also of appropriate length and allows both parties to complete their respective assigned tasks within that critical period.

 

ii. The meeting has addressed the most critical issue at the heart of the current dispute: the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops from Somalia. It had accommodated the concerns of the TFG and its ally, Ethiopia, through a phased exit and avoidance of a vacuum, and had the ARS accept the deployment of international forces. At the same time it had given assurances to the ARS that there will not only be a withdrawal but a discontinuation of the Ethiopian troops’ involvement under any future international stabilization forces.

 

iii. The meeting makes provisions for follow up mechanism, in the form of joint committees chaired by the United Nations. This arrangement seems to indicate that the Djibouti deal is preliminary for a subsequent more in-depth and focused dialogue on security, political and justice issues. The outlining of general mandates of the committees and the timeframe for the establishment of these are appropriate references for follow up. The chairing role of the UN is important at this stage of high mistrust; a neutral and impartial management of the mediation is most likely to impart credibility and legitimacy to the process in the eyes of the Somali people.

 

iv. The acknowledgement by both parties of the need to allow unrestricted humanitarian access to the suffering people is a positive move. This should lead to a more systematic humanitarian dialogue that could open up of inaccessible areas and a safer environment for the local and international staff.

 

3. Shortcomings

The Djibouti meeting has following shortcomings:

 

i. The biggest limitation of the Djibouti agreement is that it suffers from the same shortfalls of the previous national reconciliation efforts: the boycott by a group. While the TFG was highly represented at the meeting and there have not been any official contradictions within its ranks, so far, the negotiating power of the ARS as the voice of the armed opposition was weakened by its internal dispute and split over its participation in the peace talks. This seriously undermines the full implementation of the agreed cessation of armed confrontation in the country. The best that can be expected from the agreement is a reduction of the violence not its cessation.

 

ii. The agreement refers to allies, but these are not specified. There can be no reconciliation without a proper identification of the key actors and their involvement in the peace process. The Somali conflict is multifaceted encompassing national, regional and international dimensions. Through the observer participation of USA, UK and France, the meeting had fully covered the international dimension, but only partially factored the regional dimension. While Ethiopia was present in Djibouti and had a certain degree of direct involvement, the other regional conflict player, Eritrea, and its close ally were not party to the agreement.

 

iii. Article 7 is the most important and yet most controversial. The whole peace compromise is founded on the assumption that the UN will resolve to authorize and deploy an international force that will replace the Ethiopian troops. This is envisaged to occur within 120 days from the signing of the agreement. Experiences from the UN operations do not support the feasibility of this deployment within the stated timeframe. Although it is most likely that the UN will pass a resolution to this effect and that it will be possible to raise required resources in time, it is very unlikely that the UN will manage to mobilize troops from countries and station them in Somalia within four months. It is clear that this is likely to delay the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops and thus weaken the faith of the ARS and the Somali people in the agreement. This might also affect the balance between the two ARS factions, in favour of those who have rejected the peace negotiations. This makes the foundations very shaky.

 

iv. There are four other flaws in Article 7.

 

o Firstly, it does not clearly state that the TFG will request the Ethiopian Government to withdraw its troops; its statement “the TFG will act in accordance with the decision that has already been taken by the Ethiopian Government to withdraw its troops from Somalia after the deployment of a sufficient number of UN forces” is ambiguous and creates room for dispute over the implementation. It is incomprehensible that a government can act in accordance with the decisions of another government.

 

o Secondly, the article assumes that the Ethiopian Government has one unequivocal position on the withdrawal of its troops. However, the fact is that the Ethiopian Government position has changed over time, from “two weeks” in January 2007, to “when international forces are deployed” reiterated on several occasions to a recent Prime Minister’s speech at the Ethiopian Parliament in which he stated that the troops will remain in Somalia until “terrorists are defeated”.

 

o Thirdly, the article is conditional not only on the deployment of the international force but on the size of its contingencies. The “sufficient number” has not been specified. This might create disputes because of arbitrary judgments.

 

o Fourthly, the article obliges the ARS to condemn any fighting from other opposition groups, but fails to demand the same from the TFG on any violations of the agreement by its troops and/or ally. The acceptance of this requirement by the ARS shows its commitment, but a fairness treatment is also crucial for the buying in by both constituencies.

 

v. The agreement fails to address the fate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces currently present in Somalia.

 

4. Recommendations

The panelists made following recommendations:

 

(i) It is clear that so far, the Djibouti process has produced only:

 

a) an understanding between the negotiating parties – i.e., the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), and

 

b) a draft agreement that needs to be formally signed by the involved parties, including the observers who would also act as guarantors.

 

The essence of the Djibouti meeting is the agreement on the critical issue of the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops, which has been an impediment on peace talks. Since the implementation of the peace accord depends primarily on the implementation of Article 7, we believe that the responsibilities for the next steps are shouldered on the Ethiopian Government and the international community. We, therefore, strongly call for the Ethiopian Government to issue an official statement on the outcome of the Djibouti meeting. We likewise urge the UN Security Council to consider the effective utilization of the available limited time and undertake concrete measures towards a resolution on the immediate deployment of the international peace forces in Somalia.

 

(ii) The renewed interest of the UN in the Somali reconciliation should benefit from its previous experience. All precautions should be taken to avoid a repeat of the United Nations Operations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) era of political miscalculations and biases as well as the associated malpractices.

 

(iii) The peace process has a good start and the UN leadership is producing tangible results. However, the mediator should undertake all necessary measures to avoid further fragmentation within each negotiating party. It is also important that the mediator ensures the inclusivity of the process, and walks the extra mile to encourage that all armed groups participate in the peace talks. It is only when the guns are silenced that peace, tranquility and normalcy are restored and efforts can be concentrated on the reconstruction of the country.

 

(iv) For the mediation to be effective, the mediator is advised to address also the international dimension of the conflict, and guarantee a cessation of external military interventions as part of the general ceasefire agreement that is sought.

 

(v) The participation of the Somalis in a mediation capacity is also important. The panelists propose the formation of an advisory committee of eminent Somali personalities that assist the Special Envoy of the UNSG. These shall be selected on the criteria of intellectual caliber, experience, integrity and commitment to the national interest; they should come from both the Diaspora and those who remained in the country sharing the suffering with the people.

 

(vi) The increased risk for indigenous humanitarian organization workers and national staff of international organizations calls for and adequate urgent response on the basis of a humanitarian dialogue with existing political entities. The mediator can play an instrumental role in facilitating that dialogue.