Warbixinta Qaramada Midoobey: Dhuxul

[Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar]

Maritime activities and revenue: charcoal, fisheries and piracy

 

The Somali coastline is 3,333 sea miles in length, with an exclusive economic zone that extends 200 miles offshore. Somalia continues to be without an effective central Government to control and administer its coastal waters. As a result, Somali coastal waters are under the control of a number of different local administrations or self-appointed militias, led by a faction leader.

 

This patchwork control of the Somali maritime environment has created or promoted three significant income generators for local administrations:

 

1. The export from Somalia of, among other commodities, large commercial quantities of charcoal.
2. Unrestrained foreign access to Somali marine resources and fisheries by foreign fishing vessels and © widespread piracy.

Charcoal

 

There are no regularly scheduled shipping services to Somalia, but individual ships from anywhere in the region, or the world, carry cargo to or from any of the more significant Somali seaports — Kismaayo, El Ma’an, Marka, El Adde (Mogadishu), Berbera and Bossaso. The Monitoring Group has learned that each of the these ports is controlled by a local administration, as defined above in the present report, that demands the payment of royalties by importers and exporters of goods and the payment of protection money while a vessel is in Somali coastal waters. Arrangements for the protection of a vessel are made by a vessel owner or operator through the services of an agent who works on behalf of a local administration. At the port of departure an advance payment is made to the agent, who then arranges for a clearance for the vessel at the port of arrival. This fee also guarantees a vessel’s protection while in Somali waters. Dhows and general cargo ships that use the above-mentioned ports are subject to the payment of these fees. Large cargo ships using the ports typically transport livestock, scrap metal or charcoal.

 

The charcoal trade has been mentioned in past reports of the Monitoring Group and the Panel of Experts as a considerable source of revenue for factions engaged in arms embargo violations. Its relevancy is particularly important in the south-central regions of Somalia. Major markets for charcoal originating in Somalia are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen, where businesses do a lucrative trade in the commodity. It is also a means to obtain United States dollars through the foreign-exchange process.

 

Ports in Somalia where charcoal is known to be exported are Kismaayo (the largest quantity), El Ma’an, located 30 kilometres north of Mogadishu, and El Adde, the local seaport of Mogadishu.

 

Even though the charcoal trade is linked to the livelihood of some workers in the areas of production, the overwhelming majority of the profits generated in Somalia will remain in the hands of those in charge of the local administrations, not the people that produce charcoal, who are very poorly paid for their labour. The following are the different stages involved in the process:

 

1. Production: cutting, burning and bagging (Somalia).
2. Collection: gathering product, loading onto lorries and delivering to seaports (Somalia).
3. Trading: shipping costs, sales price negotiation, terms of sales (Somalia).
4. Importation: wholesale and retail businesses (foreign country).

The price associated with each stage of production and collection is estimated

at $0.30 per 25-kilogram bag. At the trading stage, © above, at the port of loading,

the actual price is at $1.50 per 25-kilogram bag (including transport fees from the collection point to the port). The final sales price is $5 per 25-kilogram bag or $200 per metric ton (at the port of Kismaayo). The wholesale price at the importation stage, (d) above, is not known by the Monitoring Group. However, the retail price (price to the consumer) at stage (d) of the same 25-kilogram bag is $15 to $20.

 

The Monitoring Group has learned that those in charge of the local administration in Somalia are in charge of the stages of production, collection and trading, and as a result will receive the great majority of the profits generated; any collateral benefits accruing to the local population are negligible. A portion of the profits will be used to buy arms and reinforce the security apparatus of the militias

of the local administration. As an example, in May 2005 it was reported that Colonel Barre Hirale contributed funds and logistical military support to Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade in his fight with TFG forces for control of Baidoa.

 

UN Report

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The reality of Dhuxul trade, a virtual guide:

 

Mango trees ready to be cut down. God knows how long years these trees took to grow into that stage.

 

 

 

[Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar]

Why warlords' belly get fatter and fatter.

 

On dhuxul trade accounting.

 

 

 

Kismaayo port made in three months almost six million dollars ($6000,000) of dhuxul trade. You can just imagine the majority of this coffer falling in the hands of warlords. Oh, Lord.

 

Qofkii qabqable ka sugaayo inuu dalka wax u taro, waa u jeediin kuligood inay yihiin calooshooda u shaqeystiyaal, never even caring about the country being on the verge of a desert and desolate.

[Jabhad]

What did the so called Somali government do about it. Nothing. They did not even pressure Arab governments such as UAE and other Gulf States to stop buying from the warlords.

[Gabbal]

It is unfortunate dalkeen in sidaan loo baa'basanayo. If all our trees are cut down, what will be the result? Complete desertification? Allaw dadkaan caqliga kusoo celi.

[Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar]

L ivestock killed by drought in Somalia.

 

A serious drought has taken hold in parts of southern Somalia and thousands of people are facing significant water and food shortages, a minister of the transitional government told IRIN on Thursday.

 

Muhammad Abdi Hayir, Minister for Information of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), said the drought was most acute in the regions of Gedo and Middle Juba and parts of Lower Juba.

 

"The poor Gu rains [of March to June], coupled with the almost total collapse of the rural water system, were the cause of an impending crisis," he said.

 

A 200-liter drum of water was selling at around 200,000 shillings (about US $20), a sum of money the majority of the population cannot afford, he said.

 

He added that if the Deyr rains [normally due in October/November] are poor or late, "then we have a serious crisis on our hands". Reports the government was getting indicated "large numbers of livestock and a number of people have already died", he said.

 

The UN World Food Programme (WFP) Deputy Country Director for Somalia, Leo Van der Velden, said aid agencies were in the process of delivering 2,400 tonnes of food to some 225,000 beneficiaries there, but insecurity and logistical problems had hampered operations.

 

"We are aware of the situation. It is aggravated by civil strife. In Lower Juba, for example, you have marginalised groups which are vulnerable," der Velden told IRIN on Thursday. "Aid agencies do not have complete access to these people due to insecurity and logistical problems."

 

Hayir said the livelihood of most of the people in Somalia revolved around livestock and if livestock, already weakened by lack of water and pasture, started dying "then it is only a matter of time before people start dying".

 

The deteriorating situation was already leading to the massive movement of people and livestock toward the river Juba area, which would cause environmental problems and could also contribute to insecurity.

 

"Somalis are nomads and most often fight over water and grazing," he added.

 

The TFG was calling on the international community to assist before the situation turned into a catastrophe, he said. Trucking water to the most affected districts should be a priority, as well as feeding those who had lost their livestock, he stressed.

 

Der Velden said efforts to deliver food aid had also been affected by recent hijackings of ships off the Somali coast. Two of the ships had been chartered by WFP to carry food to Somalia.

 

"We had problems with the vessels that were hijacked, but we are looking for alternatives, including bringing in food by road," he added.

 

NAIROBI, 27 Oct 2005, Reuters/IRIN

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It was unheard of or very, very rare a drought to occur in Jubbooyinka before the war, and now it is increasinly becoming a commonplace. Also in the other day, the environment minister of Kenya was attributing the increasingly droughts happening in NFD to the desertification of Jubbooyinka.

 

Another warlods-made catastrophe. :mad: