Somaliland watches the Kenyan election

[Jacaylbaro]

Both Somaliland and Kenya are in full electioneering mood. Both have vibrant plural democracies that have a twinge of cultural overtones; ethnicity in Kenya and clannism is Somaliland.

 

Another similarity is the tussle over the composition of the election bodies going on between the ruling group and the opposition. The parallels do not end there as in both countries, the debate on resource distribution between the central and the peripheral areas is dominating the political debates. And in both countries the incumbent ruling parties or coalition are facing a possible defeat.

 

But unlike Kenya, Somaliland is finding it extremely hard to adequately finance the plebiscite. Somaliland nascent democracy is way ahead of its economic development. As a country with no international recognition, its international trade is severely limited and access to international fiscal resources, both public and private, is nonexistent.

 

The meager handouts from the voluntary sector cannot possibly finance a proper national election estimated at 5 billion in Kenya. However, as was demonstrated in the first plural election in Somaliland, when the freedom of an aspiring population is on the line, budgets become secondary to the actual execution of democratic will. Given the continued reluctance by the international community to accept Somaliland's quest for sovereign existence, the same spirit, it is hoped, will come to play in undertaking the offing elections.

 

That as it may, and despite the complete ignorance of Kenyans about the electoral going-on in Somaliland, politicians in Somaliland are following Kenya's electioneering with a deep sense of anticipation. Though the diplo-speak is that they are neutral, the reality of the matter is that there is a gleeful hope that ODM's Raila emerges the absolute winner.

 

The schism between Somaliland and Kibaki's regime is based on the general belief that Kibaki adopted President Moi's foreign policy which was generally conservative and thus not predisposed to accommodate the emergence of Somaliland as independent state.

 

Despite meeting Mr. Riyale, Somaliland's current president, at statehouse when he came calling, Kibaki has shown that he is not completely convinced that Somaliland be allowed to exist separately. His bellicose support for Abdillahi Yusuf, the current president of the interim government in Somalia, does not wash well in Somaliland. Paule Muite and Maoka Maore are the only established Somaliland friendly voice within Kibaki allied parties.

 

On the other hand, if Raila succeeds in December as currently predicted in the opinion polls, he will be the first African Head of State who has a first hand knowledge of the sacrifices and aspirations of Somaliland. Raila had a very successful visit to Somaliland during the tenure of the late President Egal and since then had repeatedly expressed his personal admiration of this country described by some as Africa's best kept secret.

 

Despite Paul Muite, Maoka Maore and Oloo Aringo constituting formidable support, however, given the current governance structure in Kenya, presidential persuasion is key to a positive change in the diplomatic fortunes for Somaliland. A Raila presidency may just give Somaliland that break.

 

The general perception is that if Raila's ODM wins, Kenya will have a stronger parliamentary system and thus give such voices as Muite, Aringo and Maoka amongst others, a wider space to effect a parliament led policy change as regards Somaliland. The main reasoning behind this general perception is the belief that a presidential system is less likely to lead diplomatic support for Somaliland than a parliamentary system.

 

In addition to this, Raila has also shown that he is not overly Ethio-phile and hence less likely to blindly follow Ethiopia's schemes in Somalia. Despite the general view that Ethiopia has a rather well developed relationship with Somaliland, it has dawned on Somaliland that Ethiopia's interest in Somalia and Somaliland is anything but the emergence of a viable post conflict state or states. Its reluctance to embrace Somaliland declared sovereign independence which in effect will have buried the resilient Somali irredentism, attest to their ambiguously suspect interests in Somalia.

 

Kalonzo Musyoka, on the other hand is largely seen in Hargeisa as the embodiment of Moi's Somalia policy. He is viewed as the man who let the Ethiopians hijack Mbagathi initiative and install their own crony as the president. He is also seen as the man who schooled Kibaki's administration into Moi's foreign policy outlook during his re-installation at Old Treasury when Kibaki took over. Kalonzo has also been bellicose supporter of the resurrection of pre-1990 centralized Somalia. His current poll rating is received with a measure of relief in Somaliland.

 

The only fear is the plausibility of Kalonzo using his expected minority presences in parliament to enter into a coalition alliance with the winning group and negotiate for himself the foreign docket. Such scenario is seen as extremely plausible given the current positioning within the other political groupings that in effect deny him the possibility of demanding any other significant cabinet position other than the foreign docket. His repeated talk about his closeness with 'foreign investors', on regional peace and Somalia in particular can be viewed in this context.

 

The best scenario, officials in Somaliland are hoping for, is a speedy enactment of the proposed constitutional changes that will results in the establishment of a strong parliamentary system in Kenya and preferably with Raila at the helm. As for Kalonzo, it is hoped that he either perform poorly enough to be unable negotiate anything or strong enough to get something better than the foreign docket and hence not intimately involved in foreign policy development.

 

The writer works on Policy Development for the Horizon Foundation

 

 

Source: Kenyaimagine