''Somalia's Islamists Resume Their Momentum and Embark on a Diplomatic Path''

[SOO MAAL]

''Somalia's Islamists Resume Their Momentum and Embark on a Diplomatic Path''

After appearing to stall in mid-September, the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.), which aims at establishing an Islamic state in Somalia, recovered its momentum, taking the key southern port city of Kismayo on September 24, resuming its program of social reconstruction and responding favorably to Washington's moves to open a "diplomatic channel."

 

By assuming control of Kismayo, the I.C.C. extended its sphere of influence into Somalia's Middle and Lower Jubba regions in the country's deep south, running up against the Kenyan border and filling out its presence to consolidate all of Somalia south of the border of the breakaway sub-state of Puntland.

 

The I.C.C.'s success in the deep south further weakened the internationally recognized, but impotent Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), which is now thoroughly isolated in the provincial town of Baidoa and dependent on external military support from Ethiopia, which reportedly rushed a convoy of troops to Baidoa on September 25 to defend the town against any move by the I.C.C. to take it.

 

Expanding its control into the deep south was in the I.C.C.'s perceived vital interest in averting the deployment of African peacekeepers in Somalia who would protect the T.F.G. In mid-September, the African Union (A.U.) had approved a peacekeeping mission that would begin in early October to function under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.) -- a regional cooperation organization of Somalia and its immediate neighbors -- and would be staffed, in its first wave, by Sudanese and Ugandan troops.

 

There is little likelihood that the I.G.A.D. mission will deploy: the United Nations Security Council would have to lift its arms embargo on Somalia, which it has been unwilling to do; the A.U. and I.G.A.D. countries do not have the resources to support an effective mission and are unlikely to receive help from external donors; and I.G.A.D. itself is deeply split, with Eritrea and Djibouti opposed to the mission, Sudan unwilling to participate until the I.C.C. and T.F.G. reach a power-sharing agreement, and only Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya backing the mission.

 

Despite the low probability of deployment, the I.C.C. turned its major attention in mid-September to attempting to block the mission, which would enter Somalia through the south, by moving into the Jubba regions where it knew it would face opposition. The I.C.C. has now established a front line on the Kenyan border and controls Somalia's southern coast, raising a serious, if not insurmountable obstacle to the deployment of the I.G.A.D. mission.

 

Kismayo

 

Somalia's third largest city, capital of the Lower Jubba region and the commercial hub of the deep south, Kismayo has been ruled in recent years by the Jubba Valley Alliance (J.V.A.), a loose coalition of four warlords led by Col. Barre "Hirale" Adan Shire.

 

As the I.C.C. swept through central Somalia after expelling warlords from the country's official capital Mogadishu in early June, the J.V.A. split on the issue of whether to resist the Courts movement's expansion into the deep south or to receive the I.C.C. and negotiate terms for governance with it.

 

Determined to resist, Hirale succeeded in having himself named as the T.F.G.'s defense minister in the new cabinet of Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi and immediately proceeded to try to win the T.F.G.'s backing for an autonomous Jubbaland state that would include the Gedo and Middle and Lower Jubba regions. Hirale's goal was to create a governmental structure in the deep south that could block penetration of its regions by the I.C.C., as Puntland has thus far been able to do in the north.

 

As Hirale maneuvered and dispatched missions to towns in the deep south to prepare the way for the new administration, the I.C.C. found an ally in another Kismayo warlord -- Mohamed Roble Jim'ale Gobale -- who mobilized a pro-I.C.C. militia to advance on Kismayo and entered the city in mid-September to negotiate the reception of the I.C.C. Meanwhile, another column led by I.C.C. Shura Council member Sheikh Hassan Turki advanced into Middle Jubba to prepare resistance against the introduction of foreign peacekeepers, secure the Kenyan border and prevent Hirale from forming the Jubbaland state.

 

On September 18, the I.C.C.'s senior security chairman, Yusuf Indha Ade, announced that the Courts movement would take Kismayo and would not negotiate with Hirale, despite the fact that he had declared his opposition to the presence of Ethiopian forces in Somalia. On the same day, a convoy led by Hirale supporter Abdirashid Hiddig was engaged in a firefight in Lower Jubba near the Kenyan border by local militias and I.C.C. forces, reportedly commanded by Turki and led by Sheikh Aweys. Hiddig had been on a mission to promote the Jubbaland state in Lower Jubba's Doble region, which was under Hirale's control, but the armed resistance forced him to return to Kismayo.

 

Hirale responded to the I.C.C.'s pressure by announcing a mobilization to defend the Jubba regions and insisting that he opposed the introduction of foreign peacekeepers and would not allow Kismayo to be used as a debarkation point for them. Local media reported that Hirale had not yet held talks with Roble or with J.V.A. warlord Yusuf Mire Serar.

 

By September 22, I.C.C. forces had approached Kismayo and had boosted their presence on the Kenyan border. Hirale's militia entrenched itself at Kismayo's airport and prepared for battle.

 

As tensions mounted, many residents fled Kismayo to look for safety in Kenya, which hosts the largest number of Somali refugees. On September 23, the T.F.G. warned the I.C.C. against attacking Kismayo, threatening retaliation and cessation of the T.F.G.-I.C.C. peace talks in Khartoum, the next round of which is scheduled for October 30. The I.C.C. ignored the T.F.G. and accused the J.V.A. of receiving weapons from Ethiopia.

 

With its noose around Kismayo tightening, the I.C.C. consolidated its gains in the Jubba regions, taking control of the Jilib district in Middle Jubba peacefully and then moving south to the Kamasuma area in Lower Jubba. Hirale condemned the I.C.C. takeover of Jilib, vowed to defend Kismayo and said that he would work in concert with the T.F.G.

 

Kismayo fell to the I.C.C. peacefully on September 24 as its militia -- led by Turki -- entered the city in force. Hirale reportedly fled to his clan base in the Gedo region with his militia. Hirale's deputy, Yusuf Mire Mahmud, who stayed on in Kismayo and threw his support to the Courts, told local media that in the final hours Hirale had rejected appeals to negotiate with the I.C.C. and had instead sought support from Ethiopia, which Mire said was "the last straw." Roble and Serar surrendered their battlewagons to the I.C.C. and accepted its authority. Turki told pro-Courts demonstrators in the city that foreign fighters had participated in the takeover.

 

A deeply divided city, Kismayo does not fit the I.C.C.'s pattern of moving in only when it has negotiated a deal with local notables; the Courts movement abandoned its preferred strategy there because of its insistent perceived interest in warding off a peacekeeping mission. As a result of acting in the absence of an accord, the I.C.C. faced a violent anti-Islamist demonstration of several thousand people in Kismayo on September 25 that its forces broke up by firing machine guns at the crowd, leaving one person dead. In the wake of the clash, the I.C.C. banned demonstrations and took up positions throughout the city.

 

Addis Ababa responded to the I.C.C.'s takeover of Kismayo by dispatching a large force of 100 battlewagons led by T.F.G. legislator Abdirizak Isak Bihi to cut off a possible I.C.C. advance on Baidoa. The T.F.G. renewed its call for peacekeepers and international help, and denounced the takeover as a violation of the cease-fire agreed upon at the Khartoum talks. Gedi blamed Western powers for adopting a "wait and see" attitude while the I.C.C. spread violence and oppression. Indha Ade warned that "the incursion of Ethiopian troops is a declaration of war on Somalia," adding that unless the international community persuaded Addis Ababa to withdraw, "the consequences of insecurity created by Ethiopia will spread to neighboring countries and East Africa as a whole."

 

Despite the possibility that Hirale's forces will mount a counter-offensive and that it will face popular and clan resistance to its rule, the I.C.C. appears to have extended its control into the deep south and has positioned itself to follow its familiar strategy of setting up local courts administered by local clerics and protected by clan militias -- and their warlords -- who have pledged loyalty to the Courts movement. If it sustains its advance and consolidates its gains, the I.C.C. will have achieved preponderant power in the regions of Somalia south of the Puntland and Somaliland sub-states, in both of which it is gaining supporters. By taking Kismayo, the I.C.C. has left the T.F.G. with its eroding international recognition and Ethiopian military support as its only bargaining chips.

 

The I.C.C. Regains Revolutionary Momentum

 

With enhanced power on the ground, the I.C.C. has assumed the stance of affirming the Khartoum peace process, in which it has a decisive advantage over the T.F.G., and has even committed to free national elections as part of a power-sharing deal. The I.C.C.'s favorable position in the balance of power is why it has turned its attention so intensely to preventing the deployment of foreign peacekeepers, which would prop up the T.F.G. and take pressure off Ethiopia.

 

In late September, the I.C.C. stepped up its military mobilization against foreign intervention by setting up a military academy in Mogadishu where middle and high school students will be trained for resistance operations. The I.C.C. also organized demonstrations against peacekeepers throughout the areas of Somalia that it controls and opened an office for volunteers for its security forces in Mogadishu, promising regular salaries.

 

The I.C.C. also continued curbing non-Islamist sectors of Somali society, forbidding the large celebrations of World Peace Day that had been mounted in previous years by civil society organizations and banning political meetings. On September 22, the I.C.C. extended its application of Shari'a law by holding its first public execution of a man found guilty of killing a businessman while attempting to steal his cell phone.

 

The military and repressive side of the I.C.C., which had dominated mid-September, was accompanied in late September by a renewal of advances in social services. On September 29, Sheikh Muhudin Mohamed Omar, the I.C.C.'s chief health officer, announced a ban on the importation of expired foods -- most of which come from the United Arab Emirates -- and said that the Courts would set up a customs service to inspect goods entering Somalia.

 

In a revealing article on conditions in Mogadishu published on September 24 in the New York Times, Jeffrey Gettleman reported that the I.C.C. is delivering social services, has appointed university professors to key administrative positions, has allowed some movie theaters to reopen, is not enforcing its ban on business activities during prayer times, is allowing girls to be schooled, has mobilized neighborhoods in clean-up and restoration activities, and has issued "tolerance edicts," all of which indicate that the moderate and pragmatic elements of the Courts movement are asserting their influence, which is essential if the I.C.C. is to avoid a popular backlash against severe applications of Shari'a law and zealous moral policing. Gettleman quotes local human rights activist Ahmed Mohamed Ali as saying that the I.C.C. has brought clans together.

 

That there is still clan resistance to the I.C.C. in Mogadishu is evident from the call by the chair of the Courts' Shura Council, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, for clan-based courts outside the I.C.C.'s jurisdiction to disband and join the I.C.C.'s "unified structure" that "is not based on lineage."

 

The I.C.C.'s revolutionary momentum depends on defending its gains effectively against external threats, facilitating the normalization of Somali society by providing order and social services, and pursuing its project of rule by Shari'a law incrementally with due regard for public opinion. Although the picture is mixed, developments in late September indicate that the Courts movement is restoring a balance that had appeared to be in jeopardy.

 

The I.C.C. Takes a Diplomatic Path

 

With foreign intervention the major obstacle to the I.C.C.'s ascent, the Courts movement has attempted to isolate Ethiopia and its allies Uganda and Kenya by establishing cooperative relations with Washington.

 

On September 21, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the chair of the I.C.C.'s Executive Council, said that the I.C.C. was holding indirect talks with the United States, focusing on preventing the deployment of peacekeepers. On September 22, Shura Council Chairman Aweys elaborated, saying that Washington had asked for the talks, which were being mediated by an Arab state, in order to understand the I.C.C.'s positions and how it operates. Aweys said that the I.C.C. had not requested aid from Washington and was willing to talk with any party that respects Somalia's independence and desists from interfering in its internal affairs. Meanwhile, Ahmed was in Qatar, urging Doha to tell Washington that the I.C.C. is not a "terrorist" group and remarking that the I.C.C. had achieved agreement with Washington on several unspecified issues.

 

From Washington's side, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer told Reuters that the United States had held direct talks with I.C.C. leaders in Kenya and had requested that the Courts hand over suspected terrorists to Washington. She reported that the I.C.C. had denied that there were any terrorists under its protection, adding that Washington was pursuing "normal diplomacy" with the I.C.C. and had "opened a channel," confirming Washington's tilt away from the T.F.G., Addis Ababa and the A.U.

 

Washington appears to have decided that the I.C.C.'s power advantage is, at least at present, insurmountable and that it serves its interests best to deal with the Courts movement and to back the Khartoum talks rather than the A.U. peacekeeping mission or -- as some analysts have speculated -- an Ethiopian offensive. By backing away from Addis Ababa and the T.F.G., Washington has strengthened the I.C.C.'s and come down on the side of the Arab bloc, which has brokered the Khartoum process, against the African bloc.

 

Washington's willingness to open a channel to the I.C.C., which runs against its general policy of opposing the emergence of Islamist regimes, reflects the facts on the ground, its need to win favor with Arab states on more conspicuous regional issues and its fear that an armed confrontation between the I.C.C. and foreign troops could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.

 

Confident about the advantages that it has in peace negotiations and of its popularity in Somalia, the I.C.C. is willing to mount a charm offensive and give Washington enough cover to accept it as the major player in Somalia.

 

As Washington tilted toward the I.C.C., the interests in favor of a peacekeeping mission persisted in their efforts to carry it off. On September 27, the foreign ministers of states advocating the I.G.A.D. mission are scheduled to petition the U.N. Security Council to lift its arms embargo -- an unlikely eventuality. The I.C.C. warned Uganda on September 22 that if it sent forces into Somalia, "we will have no choice but to fight them. We will see it as an invasion." Washington and European donor states are aware of the danger that a peacekeeping mission would excite a wave of xenophobic nationalism in Somalia that would play into the hands of the I.C.C. and particularly into the hands of its hard line factions. With the deep south now coming under Courts control, the I.C.C.'s threats gain enhanced credibility.

 

Conclusion

 

During late September, the I.C.C. resumed its role as the protagonist in Somalia's conflicts. By gaining a strategic foothold in the country's deep south, appearing to moderate its Islamization program (although the signs are mixed) and taking advantage of a shift in its favor in Washington's policy, the I.C.C. has positioned itself as a potential peacemaker and has launched a charm offensive.

 

With its position substantially improved, the I.C.C. still faces the presence of Ethiopian forces in Somalia; the problem of if, when and how to move north into the sub-states of Puntland and Somaliland; pressures for accelerated Islamization from its hard line factions; and localized clan and popular opposition. Thus far, the I.C.C. has refrained from confrontation with Ethiopian and Puntland forces, and has used the Ethiopian presence effectively to fan nationalism among Somalis. The I.C.C. has also kept a public face of unity and has been able to suppress outbursts of opposition or cut deals with potential antagonists.

 

Most importantly, the I.C.C.'s model of establishing local courts administered by local officials and clerics who pledge loyalty to the Courts has proven successful as a formula for reconciling localism with nationalism.

 

On balance, the I.C.C. was politically astute and played its cards well in late September. It is likely that its recent successes will reinforce its skills and make it more confident in applying its political formula.

 

Report Drafted By:

Dr. Michael A. Weinstein