The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware

[Gabbal]

This is an old, but interesting piece. Enjoy

 

The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware

 

 

Submitted to

Rudoph V. Wiggins, PhD

In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements

for Written Communications

The Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Quantico, Virginia

 

 

Major Tom L. Wanambisi

Kenya

April 6, 1984

 

 

The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware

 

On June 26, 1960, hardly four days after the British Government granted

 

the former British Somaliland her independence to become the Somalia

 

Republic, the new government declared her desires to unite all the Somali

 

speaking people in the Horn of Africa.

 

As the Somalis see it, writes Mr. John Drysdale:

 

"Their frontier dispute is not essentially about land alone

but the people."1

 

The nomadic Somali speaking people who by colonial boundary "arrange-

 

ments" found themselves dismembered. About two-thirds of them live under

 

the national flag of the Somalia Republic and the remainder are divided

 

between Djibouti (former French Somaliland), Ethiopia and Kenya. This

 

historical error prompted the first Somalis President, Dr. Abdirashid Ali

 

Sharmarky to say this:

 

"No! Our misfortune is that our neighboring countries, with

whom we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations

are not our neighbors but our Somali kinsmen whose citizen-

ship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary "arrangements".

They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasture

lands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same

pastoral economy as overselves. We speak the same language.

We sare the same God, the same culture and the same traditions.

How can we regard our brothers as foreigners?"2

 

On the other hand, both the Ethopian and the Kenyan Governments consider

 

their Somali population as just one of the minority communities living

 

within our borders and are, therefore, bonafide citizens. The governments

 

regard any external pressure as infringement in internal matters of a

 

sovereign state. They further consider any desire by the Somali people to

 

break away and possibly unite with Somalia as seditious. The support,

 

material or moral given to the Somalis to enable them to fight by the Somalia

 

Government is viewed as infringement of territorial integrity. And, in the

 

words of President Kenyatta: "Kenya will never surrender any inch of her

 

territory to anyone.3

 

The Portion Under Dispute

 

One, Robert Paul Jordan, an American journalist once wrote:

 

"The Horn of Africa is a most inhospitable place. A harsh

land this is. Not a desert, but close. High arid country

mostly--a Savannah of acacias, patches of grass, thorny

shrubs, tall ant-hills and rocks. When the scanty rains

fall, it runs cruel. Then, sheep and goats slowly die.

The barrens are strewn with their carcasses."4

 

This portion of land is, no doubt, desolate but strategically located. The

 

area consists of a large triangular land mass which juts eastwards into the

 

Indian Ocean to the south of the Arabian peninsula. One side of the

 

triangle extends westward from the "Horn" along the Gulf of Aden to

 

Djibouti. The second leg runs in a southerly direction from Djibouti over

 

the Eastern Highlands of the Great Rift Valley (Ogaden Province of Ethiopia)

 

to the mouth of the River Tana on the Kenyan East Coast. See Map.

 

By way of comparison, this vast land is about three times the size of

 

New Mexico. It is virtually isolated from the rest of Africa by the high

 

mountains in the west of the Great Rift Vally. These inland mountains are

 

similar to California's Sierra Nevada range in that they obstruct the

 

prevailing westerly winds. Precipitation occurs as the moisture-ladden air

 

mass rises over the mountains but very little rain falls on the eastern

 

slopes including the Ogaden plains. Consequently, most of the region is

 

nearly as dry as the Great Amerian Desert. The only two rivers, the

 

Shebele and Juba,flow from the high mountains southeastward into the Indian

 

Ocean near the Port of Kismayu. They are perennial rivers. Although part

 

of the River Juba is navigable, Shebele is not. It terminates in marshland

 

near the town of Jowhari before reaching the ocean.

 

The portion between the two rivers is the best farmland in the area

 

producing sugar cane, vegetables, bananas, sorgum and millet. However,

 

sometimes the rains do not come, such was the case--a prolonged drought in

 

1980 in which both the rivers ran dry for the first time in memory.5 Drought

 

is even more prevalent to the north along the coast. It averages only two

 

inches of rain a year.

 

Although similar dry weather prevails throughout the area resulting in a

 

parched landscape, the few ancient wells and occasional rains do provide

 

some relief. This brings life to the hardy patches of grass which support

 

the herds of sheep, goats, and camels.

 

Before I take the reader to a historical background, let me focus a

 

little on the specific contested portions. As I mentioned earlier, the

 

Somalia Government considers the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia and the North-

 

eastern Province of Kenya as forming part of the "Greater Somalia" domain.6

 

The idea of "Greater Somalia" was conceived in the mind of Mr. Bevin, then

 

Britain's Foreign Secretary after World War II, who in 1946 proposed to the

 

House of Commons in London to consider lumping together the British

 

Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and adjacent parts of Ethiopia into a trust

 

territory.7 So that, in Mr. Bevin's won words:

 

"The nomads should live their frugal existence with the least

possible hinderance. They could have a chance to live a decent

economic life."8

 

Ten days after Mr. Bevin introduced this proposal in the House of Commons,

 

the British administrators in Somaliland organized meetings to inform the

 

people the "good news" about their future.9 As it will be learned later,

 

this pre-emptive move would embarrass the British Government and create a

 

living but volatile problem in the Horn of Africa.

 

An Ancient Heritage

 

The Somalis are a Hamitic people whose ancestors are believed to have

 

immigrated from the Arabian peninsula long age. They came to settle on the

 

biblical land of "Punt", the ancient "Aromatic Kingdom" renowned for its

 

frankincense and myrrh.10 Their traditional geneologies trace the ancestry to

 

Arab forebears who belonged to the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Mohamed, and

 

ultimately they claim belong to a common ancestor.11 The Somali Prime

 

Minister, Dr. Abdirashid Sharmarky once said:

 

"Our misfortunes do not stem from the unproductiveness of the

soil, nor from a lack of mineral wealth. These limitations

on our material well-being were accepted and compensated for

by our forefathers from whom we inherited, among other things,

a spiritual and cultural prosperity of inestimable value. The

teaching of Islam on the one hand and lyric poetry on the

other..."12

 

At least 65% of the population live a nomadic life style. Moving from place

 

to place within their homeland in search of water and grazing areas for

 

their livestock is their way of life. Professor Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Head

 

of the Geography Department of Ehtiopia's Haile Selassie I University,

 

described the Somalis as exhibiting:

 

"External individualism and utter lack of discipline. The

acute struggle for existence in this harsh environment often

expresses itself in group conflicts over wells or grazing

land."13

 

Although largely illiterate and poor, Somalis regard themselves as

 

superior to adjacent groups. This arrogance stems from the ethnic

 

homogeneity shared by all Muslims in the Horn.14 Although dispersed in the

 

four different countries (the Somalia Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya

 

and Djibout) the Somalis common language, religion, and cultural heritage

 

provide a strong sense of unity which is truly rare and, therefore, gives

 

them an advantage.

 

The Colonial Legacy

 

Prior to the European colonization of the Horn in the second half of

 

the nineteenth century, the region had been ruled by indigenous tribal

 

chiefs. The Sheiks and Sultans whose relatively small, semi-autonomons

 

dominions paid grudging difference to Ethiopian hegemony. For over three

 

centuries, despite periods of neglect and frequent uprisings, Ehthiopia had

 

maintained its independence and authority over most parts of the Horn.15 The

 

Ethiopian influence, however, varied over years as the Somalis resented

 

their domination. This resentment was consequently exploited by several

 

European nations to gain their initial control in the Horn.

 

The initial British interest in the Horn was on the Somalia Coast for

 

strategic and logistical reasons. After the British had annexed Aden in

 

1840, treaties were signed with local chiefs to guarantee the continuous

 

supply of cattle from inland to feed the garrisons. The opening of the Suez

 

Canal in 1869 increased the strategic importance of the area and;

 

consequently, the British entered other long term agreements which gave them

 

possession of the port of Berbera and several other offshore inlands.

 

Britain immediately assigned consuls at Berbera, Seylec and Bulhar to

 

protect her interests.16 She gaines automatic control of the area and

 

especially the sea links between India and the Suez. These accomplishments

 

were achieved by exploiting local grievances such as one described in 1892

 

confidential British diplomatic dispatch to London which read:

 

"Sheikh Sufi states - The Abysinians read, "Ethiopians" are

always on one side of us, the English on the other. We

(Ogaden tribes) are with the English, and we wish for

English rule. We are your children.

 

I say that, as a sheep quivers under the blow of a knife,

we, the Ogaden, are quivering under the oppressions of the

Abysinians, who have every year, for the last nine years,

visited us and levied large numbers of sheep, goats, horse,

camels and taken what they liked from us. We have no guns

and are not powerful enough to fight and must submit.

 

Last season the Abysinians (drove) off all livestock; 990

men, women and children perished. We are Mullahs and we like

to tell the truth."17

 

The British made use of similar circumstances to gain influence in the area,

 

including the colonization of the region to the south into the present day

 

Kenya and Uganda. This expansion had been sanctioned by the Berlin

 

Conference of 1884/85.18

 

By the same token, the French and Italians had also established

 

colonies. The French acquired a colonial foothold in the northwest along

 

the coast of Aden in 1885 (present day Djibout) which they initially called

 

French Somaliland. This colony was strategically placed. Its port City of

 

Djibout was the terminus of Ethiopia's only rail link to the sea. Thus, the

 

French could easily cut off this access if the need arose and Ethiopia would

 

be paralyzed.

 

The Italians would have appreciated that kind of leverage in their own

 

dealings with Ethiopians. Italian efforts to subdue Ethiopians were

 

frustrated when Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II dealt a humiliating blow at the

 

Italian Army at Odawa in 1896.19 However, the Italians contented with

 

establishing colonies in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.

 

It took many years before the European colonial powers finally gave up

 

their influence on the Horn. The French agreed to grant Djibout

 

independence in 1977 (although they still garrison troops there). The

 

former British and Italian Somaliland joined to form the present day Somalia

 

Republic in July 1960.

 

As it stood, the government was not happy. It had inherited

 

colonial boundaries which were not compatible with the ethnic Somali

 

peoples' ideals for "Greater Somalia". That is probably the most important

 

legacy of the colonial era. An era that has created the present day tension

 

and conflict in the Horn. This situation regretably may continue as long as

 

the Somali people seek to unite at the expense of their neighbors.

 

Arms Build Up

 

 

At her independence, Somalia had a weak Army of 5,000 men. This force

 

was inferior to meet her political objectives. She approached the Soviet

 

Government in 1963 for assistance. The Soviet Government responded by

 

lending her equivalent to the United States dollars 32 million. By 1969

 

Somalia had trained about 800 officers in the Soviet military schools. She

 

had recruited, trained and equipped 23,000 regular men.20 By 1976 she had

 

acquired the following equipment in her military inventory.

 

Click here to view image

 

With a total force of 23,000 men in the Army, 1,000 in the Air Force

 

(Aeronautical) about 550 in the Navy, 8,000 in the Police and 10,000 Victory

 

Pioneers of popularly known as Peoples' Militia, Somalia declared a silent

 

war against Ethiopia in June 1977.22 Why? To annex "Ogaden" as part of her

 

expansion program.

 

The Ogaden War

 

 

As the new military government in Ethiopia (after the overthrow of

 

Emperor Haile Selassie) was sorting out the mess at home, including

 

suppression of Eritreans who wanted to breakaway to the north, the Western

 

Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) also stepped up its attacks to the south

 

against the overstretched Ethiopian Army outpost in the Ogaden Province. In

 

July 1977 these guerrilla forces were joined by the Soviet equipped and

 

trained Regular Somalia Army. This surprise attack was highly successful in

 

the initial stages. The highly taxed Ethiopian Army had been pushed back to

 

Dire Dawa within three months.

 

It was at this point in time that the desperate Ethiopians requested

 

help from the Soviet Union to counter both the Samalis and Eritrean rebal

 

forces. The Soviets responded quickly by airlifting in a huge amount of

 

supplies and Cuban troops. In March 1978 with the assistance of East

 

Germany, Soviet advisors and Cuban troop, the besieged Ethiopians regained

 

the offensive and drove the Somalia forces all the way back to their border.

 

Somalia losses were significant. It is estimated that Somalia lost about

 

8,000 troops--at least one-third of the prewar army strength, 75% of its

 

tank force and nearly half of its combat aircrafts.23

 

Although the Somalia National Army was defeated decisively in the Ogaden

 

War, recent events have indicated a stepped up guerrilla activity by the

 

Western Somalia Liberation Front with the backing of the military

 

government. Thus, the fighting still goes on. What would have happened if

 

Somalia decided to attack Kenya first?

 

 

The Shifta War in Kenya

 

The British Government on realizing that the would-be Kenya Government

 

would not accept the terms set by some British officials in the 1960's,

 

decided to take a different approach. Series of meetings were organized

 

including one in August 1963 in Rome to resolve the issue. The British

 

Government stand was spelled out by Mr. Peter Thomas as follows:

 

"Since the British Government would be responsible for Kenya

only a few more months (before her independence in December

1963), the British Government considers that it would be

wrong to take a unilateral decision about the frontiers of

Kenya without reference to the wishes of the government of

that country; and that agreement should be sought by the

African governments concerned working and negotiating within

an African framework."24

 

The Somalia delegation led by then, Prime Minister Dr. Abdirashid Sharmarky

 

were disappointed to learn at their first meeting that the British

 

Government had no intention of making any constructive proposals. He

 

charged:

 

"The British had only convened the meeting to explore the

position of the Somalia Republic, which was in any case well

known to them."25

 

In conclusion, the Somalia Government states:

 

"It was evident that the British Government has not only

deliberately misled the Somalia Government during the course

of the last eighteen months, but has also deceitfully

encouraged the people of North Eastern Province to believe

that their right to self-determination could be granted by

the British Government through peaceful and legal means. The

responsibility for the consequences that may follow this

suppression of a fundamental human right lies squarely on

the British Government."26

 

Shortly after this, the Somalia Government recalled her Ambassador from

 

Britain and severed diplomatic relations. The Somali people residing in the

 

North Eastern Province boycotted the elections, took arms, and demanded

 

self-automony.

 

For us Kenyans, the Somalis demand that we give up approximately 45,000

 

square miles of our territory (approximately a fifth of the land mass), not

 

only is it unacceptable but also violates our Constitution and the OAU

 

Charter. The Kenyan view was and continues to be similar to that expressed

 

by the majority of the Organization of African Unit member countries:

 

"Thus, in almost every country in Africa, there are minority

groups having racial, religious or tribal affinities with

neighboring countries."27

 

The conference that met in Addis Ababa Ethiopia in 1963 to resolve the

 

boundary issue resloved:

 

"Countries with widely diverse populations would be quickly

dismembered if each ethnic group was allowed to go its own

way under the banner of self-determination. The resulting

partitioning would create a chaotic potpourri of tiny,

nonviable"Nations" toally incapable of providing even the

barest of government services."28

 

At the conclusion of the conference, the Somali President Osman had the

 

following to say:

 

"By becoming united, the Somali people feel that not only

would their welfare be secured, but that as a single entity

they would be able to contribute effectively to the ideals

of African unity. The people of the Republic cannot be

expected to remain indifferent to the appeal of its brethren.

If the Somalis in those areas are given the opportunity to

express their will freely, the government pledges itself to

accept the verdict."29

 

The Somalia Government was, to speak the least, "very dissastisfied" with the

 

result of the meeting. The North Eastern Region therefore became the site

 

for small but intensive skirmishes between the Somalia supported guerrillas

 

and the (independent)Kenyan Army. For four years the war continued with

 

neither side being able to gain political advantage. Diplomatic efforts to

 

end the fighting were unsuccessful as the Somalia Government ignored the

 

organization of African Unit (OAU) call to withdraw her support from the

 

guerrillas. This prompted the Kenyatta Government to sign a "Mutual Defense

 

Treaty" (MDT) with the Emperor Haile Selassie's Government in 1964. The

 

treaty still had little impact on the war as the Kenyan Army could not

 

effectiviely control the materiel supply routes from Somalia to the

 

guerrillas.

 

Finally in 1967, the Kenyan Government decided to control the movement

 

of local inhabitants by constructing fourteen "Manyattas"--villages which

 

were guarded by troops. Fortunately, this action had tremendous effect on

 

the guerrilla activities and in October 1967 the Kenyan Government signed a

 

"Memorandum of Understanding" with the Somalia Government ending the Shifta

 

War. The ceasefire to me was not totally due to the "Manyatta" scheme but

 

rather to the high costs of the protracted conflict. The new Somalia

 

Government decided to terminate what had become a futile and expensive

 

national burden which they could not afford anymore.

 

Although the fighting had stopped, Somalia did not renounce its

 

territorial claims. Instead a low intensity campagin still continues and

 

the future may well see a resumption of a major conflit. Kenya beware.

 

Even after Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden War, she still retains one of

 

the largest armed forces in the Horn; comprising of about 50,000 men in the

 

National Army, 1,000 in the Air Force (Aeronautical Corps) and 550 in the

 

Navy. She restructured her major commands in 1981 into three regionally

 

defined corps: seven infantry divisions each composed of three

 

armored/mechanized brigades, sixteen infantry brigades, three comando

 

brigades and twenty-three artillery battalions. As Air Force (Aeronautical

 

Corps) of four tactical strike squadrons and one transport squadron. A Navy

 

of twenty vessels including ten fast attack crafts (FAC).30

 

Although most of the Soviet supplied and serviced equipment is claimed

 

to be in poor serviceable state, Somalia still husbands a formidable force

 

in the Horn capable of being reactivated upon receipt of resources.

 

 

External Influence

 

Supposing Somalia decided to go offensive once more, who are likely to

 

support her or who are likely to be her allies?

 

Somalia still has a number of wealthy friendly nations who would

 

come to her aid. Egypt has had long historical ties with Somalia dating

 

back into the 18th century. During the Ogaden War and precisely the North

 

Eastern Region skirmishes, Egypt supplied certain combat items to sustain

 

the war. Even after Somalia cut diplomatic relations with Russia, Egypt

 

undertook to supply some spare parts from her own Soviet stockpiles.

 

Somalia joined the Arab League nations in 1974. Being a predominantly

 

Moslem state, she attracts sympthy from wealthy Arab countries. Saudi

 

Arabia has become increasingly interested in the Somalia's affair not only

 

for political reasons but also strategic and economic. Kuwait has invested

 

heavily in power stations in Mogadishu and Iraq has been supplying her with

 

crude oil.31 Somalia also maintains cordial relationship with the Sudan.

 

Although Somalia broke relations with Russia, she still maintains good

 

relations with Rumania for ecomomic aid.32 China has maintained cordial

 

relations with Somalia since 1961. She receives both economic aid and

 

military. For instance in 1978, after severing diplomatic relations with

 

Moscow and suffering defeat in the Ogaden War, Siad Barre desperately

 

visited China to seek emergency military and economic help. China responded

 

with a token shipment of light arms, spare parts and materiel equivalent to

 

American dollars 18 million.33 Accordingly, she supplied her with thirty

 

Chinese F-6 fighter bombers in 1981.34 North Korea has also remainded on good

 

terms with Somalia providing a cement plant, iron foundry, vegetable oil

 

factory and a technical college.35 Although Italy discontinued assisting

 

Somalia, she resumed economic and military aid in 1977. Perhaps, one single

 

but major supplier of the needed economic and military aid now is the United

 

States. With the increased tension in the Persian Gulf area and the Soviet

 

presence in both Alghanistan and Ethiopia, the United States was compelled

 

to reinforce its presence in the Indian Ocean to safeguard her strategic

 

national interests. To do so, she sought access to military facilities at

 

Berbera and adjacent airfields. Agreement was reached in 1980 covering the

 

use of the facilities, refurbishing of the port and in exchange the United

 

States agreed to provide economic aid and military credits over two years

 

for the purchase of twelve M-167 (towed) Vulcan 20mm AD gunds, three TPS-43

 

long range AD radars and associated communication equipment. These were

 

supplied in 1981.36 For Kenyans, who is likely to come to our aid when we

 

face aggression?

 

 

Potential for Conflict

 

Although the large scale fighting in the Horn has gone down, guerrilla

 

(can not read word)continue unabated. The underlying cause of conflict remain

 

unsolved and are most likely to provoke further fighting in the future.

 

Recently, the two Heads of State pleaded for mutual cooperation and

 

understanding to enhance development for the good of all the people in the

 

area. But, nothing was said about Somalia's expansion ambitions. Somalia

 

has not renounced her territorial aggression. Who knows the exact answer?

 

It is my opinion that the Somalia officials are buying time. Time to

 

rebuilt their shattered economy, restructure, retrain, rearm their huge

 

armed forces and obtain economic support from whatever source, and as soon

 

as they are ready, they may declare war, this time probably against Kenya.

 

 

Conclusion

 

 

In conclusion, I would like to make two fitting quotations from the

 

recent speech of President Ronald Reagan in November 1983 when he visited

 

the Republic of South Korea and addressed members of the United States Army

 

Second Division:

 

"For the United States, the military strength will never

be an end in itself; nor will military strength alone

give us the means to achieve our ends. The freedom and

prosperity we seek for ourselves...cannot be created or

imposed by force. If we lack sufficient force to deter

or counter the hostile use of force, then we would have no

chance of preserving the peace. And without peace we

cannot have freedom or prosperity. It is the paradox of

peace that to preserve it, we must be prepared to use force

and use it successfully. Only if we can convince any

potential adversary that the cost of aggression would be

far higher than any possible benefit can we be certain that

aggression will be deterred and the peace be preserved."37

 

The Kenya Defense Force Mission is defensive and the government

 

articulates it thus. Accordingly, may I quote President Reagan's address:

 

 

"Our policy is defensive. United States uses its military

force only in response to clear threats to stability and

peace. We pursue this policy knowing fully that our

defensive posture grants several military advantages to a

potential aggressor. He can choose when, where and how to

attack. He can formulate a detailed plan for his operations

to take maximum advantage of his strengths and exploit our

vulnerabilities. He can also mask his pre-attack mobiliza-

tion efforts under the guise of training exercise or

diplomatic crises so that any advance warning we might get

could be cloaked to ambiguity."38

 

I conclude that the Somalia border dispute requires a deliberate

 

solution and urgently. It cannot in my view be achieved by mere expressions

 

of brotherhood. Rather, it could be achieved by a more genuine and honest

 

approach by both governments without external influence. Kenya beware.