What Is A Terror Group?

[Nur]

I've just read in the news that Australian authorities have followed the US in listing the Somali based Shabab movement in Somalia as a "terror group". The classification is political not judicial, which means the same Aussie administration or next can retract that classification. The legal and moral question that I am soliciting from the SOL audience is what constitutes "Terrorism"?

 

The following paper discusses the issue scholarly, its very long, but worth your time, please read the article and share your views on this politicized terminology.

 

Note: I found the article very interesting with the exception that I do not believe like the authors that Osama Bin Laden was responsible for 911. Overwhelming evidence shows that a shadowy governmental group may have been behind it to advance an international government policy targeted at the Islamic World in particular, nevertheless the article is educational from the economic perspective of " Terrorism" specially when one considers that the 911 architects may have been driven by economic gains in the form of control of Oil Resources.

 

 

Nur

 

 

JOURNAL OF DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE (2005)

 

On the Problematic Definition of Terrorism*

 

Zagros Madjd-Sadjadi Department of Economics

The University of the West Indies, Mona

zagros.madjdsadjadi@ uwimona.edu.jm

 

&

 

C. Daniel Vencill

Professor of Economics

Former Director, Criminal Justice Program

San Francisco State University

dvencill@sfsu.edu.

 

 

* This paper is a revised portion of a larger paper presented at the Western Economics Association 76th Annual Meeting in San Francisco in July 2001 entitled "New Security Issues and the Dark Side of Globalization: Transnational Crime, Drug Smuggling, Terrorism, Money Laundering, and the Stealth of Nations." The authors wish to thank Professors Todd Sandler, University of Southern California, and Lee Endress, University of Hawaii, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, who were the discussants on this paper when it was first presented and made valuable comments. Any errors of omission or commission lie solely with the authors.

 

ABSTRACT

 

This article explores the question of how 'terrorism' is defined in international diplomatic and military discourse, and how that definition influences responses to the issue. It traces how the term has evolved from describing a political tactic employed by states to reinforce existing regimes to a method of attacking legitimate governments and societies in an effort to bring about regime change. It explores the problem with trying to define terrorism in a systematic fashion, and potential conflicts involving the political goals of those doing the defining. Examining seven different definitions proffered by the US government for the term, it shows that, while there is considerable overlap, each also defines terrorism in such a way as to include certain acts and exclude others that are covered by the other definitions. None of the existing definitions meet the criterion of defining terrorism in a systematic fashion that is internally consistent. Some definitions attempt to criminalize certain legitimate actions of political protest or refuse to acknowledge terrorism's political protest roots. Moreover each definition fails to address the need for legitimate freedom fighting in societies. The authors propose just such a definition, by beginning with a discussion of what terrorism is, and is not, and proceeding from that discussion to devise an internally consistent and broad-based definition that acknowledges the legitimacy of civil rebellion when conducted in a proper fashion. By using economic theory to analyze the situation, it is demonstrated that without a proper definition the incentives of terrorists will be to strike at the civilian heartland, while the goal should be to get them to concentrate on solely military targets.

 

I will send my terror before you,

and will throw into confusion all the people.

--Exodus 23:27

 

This was the first time in history that war has

ever been declared on an abstract noun

--A British wit on hearing that President Bush

had declared war on terrorism in the wake of 9/11

 

Terrorism is what the bad guys do

--Brian Jenkins, one of the most respected experts on terrorism

 

 

On the Problematic Definition of Terrorism--Introduct ion and Historical Background

 

James Bovard (2003) reports that terror was used as a political tactic for the first time during the French Revolution. Certainly terror was used for thousands of years by despots to crush resistance groups, but Robespierre and the revolutionaries were the first to claim to be idealists for maximizing citizen oppression. Terrorism obviously means to terrify, and the term derives from the Latin, terrere, to cause to tremble. Thus the term was applied to the assault on civil order during the "reign of terror" in the French Revolution at the end of the Eighteenth Century. Robespierre ranted that terror is "justice prompt, severe and inflexible," "an emanation of virtue," and "a natural consequence of the general principle of democracy." For him, terror tactics were a model of "the despotism of liberty against tyranny," and justified the guillotining of thousands of the landed aristocracy.

 

Bovard informs us "by the mid-twentieth century, the term 'terrorism' was routinely used to condemn those who attack politicians, government forces, or established regimes. The Nazis denounced French Resistance saboteurs as terrorists. Terrorism has permeated Middle East conflicts since the 1940s, when Menachem Begin and his Irgun gang helped drive the British out of Palestine by blowing up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing 91 people.. In the 1950s, Algerians terrorized Paris and other French cities, eventually driving the French out of northern Africa and ending colonial rule. The U.S. revved up its military intervention in Vietnam to deal with what the Kennedy administration perceived as a 'small war of terrorism and political subversion' by a few thousand Viet Cong. In the late 1960s, Palestinians became the premier terrorists in the Western world: the kidnapping of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich heralded the era of televised political murders and media spectacles providing free publicity for terrorist groups.

 

Definitions lead to foreign policy and are not merely "semantics" or splitting hairs. The definition of terrorism allows U.S. agents to identify, track, arrest, detain (and torture) "terrorists." The beginning of the second Bush administration has brought renewed attention to the importance of a rigorous, official definition of "torture" for geopolitics. The Justice Department recently broadened its definition of torture, significantly retreating from a memorandum in August 2002 that defined torture extremely narrowly and said the President could ignore domestic and international prohibitions against torture in the name of national security. The new definition appeared in a memo posted on the department's Web site. The new definition largely dismisses the 2002 definition, especially the part that asserted that mistreatment rose to the level of torture only if it produced severe pain equivalent to that associated with organ failure or death. The issue apparently is whether the old definition led to the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Braven 2004; Lewis 2005).

 

A related concern is the use of the tactic "renditions" in dealing with those defined as terrorists. This approach, commonly used by the CIA, is to transfer captives and terrorist suspects apprehended outside the U.S. to third countries that have agreed to hold them indefinitely and without public proceedings or transparency. The transfers, called "renditions," depend on arrangements between the US and other countries, such as Egypt, Jordan and Afghanistan, that agree to have local security services hold certain terror suspects in their facilities for interrogation by CIA and foreign liaison officers. Some have alleged that these renditions, under definitions and legal bureaucratic guidelines, have become essentially kidnapping. Former CIA director George Tenet in his testimony before Congress, has concluded that renditions are an effective method of disrupting terrorist cells and "persuading" detainees to reveal vital information on terrorist plans (Priest 2005)

 

It has been argued that President Reagan was determined to elevate antiterrorism to a major driving force of U.S. geopolitical policy. Reagan initiated this campaign by redefining a "terrorist attack" to include any threat of a terrorist attack. This data manipulation more than doubled the statistics on international terrorist incidents over the previous decade from 3,336 to 7000. The Reagan administration pestered the CIA to redefine terrorism to include "all acts of violence intended to impact a wider audience than the victims of violence" (Mohr 1981). Bovard (2003, p. 10) states that this expansive definition would have placed the American icons Robert E. Lee and George Washington onto the terrorist watch list.

 

Philosophical Question: Can there be a true and correct definition of terrorism - an abstract concept with no real presence?

 

Furthermore, typology presents problems: there are as many typologies of terrorism as there are definitions. We may be able below to build a model as an alternative to definitions. Terrorism is comprised of a variety of activities, not a singly defined action. A typology can capture a range of terrorist activities better than most definitions.

 

Alex Schmid (1983, p. 70-110) was able to synthesis various definitions. A unique definition cannot possibly account for all the potential uses of "terrorism." Yet, a number of elements are common to leading definitions, and most definitions of terrorism have two characteristics: someone is terrorized, and the meaning of the term is derived from terrorists' targets and victims. In a conglomerated definition and empirical analysis finds 22 elements common to most definitions, and he forms a definition containing 13 of those elements. Terrorism is a method of combat in which the victims serve as symbolic targets, and violent actors are able to produce a chronic state of fear by employing violence outside the realm of normative behavior. Their goal is to reach in an audience beyond the immediate victim pool and bring about a change of public attitudes and actions.

 

In the academic literature, Jenkins (1984) defines terrorism as the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about a political change. Laqueur (1987, p. 72) defines terrorism as an act that constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective by targeting innocent people. In a more recent work, Laqueur (1999) settles on a simple definition, only arguing that meanings and definitions fluctuate with history. He says terrorism is a form of political or criminal violence using military tactics to change behavior through fear. Legal definitions may also contain internal contradictions. Under the legal guidelines of the U.S., some groups can be labeled as terrorists, while other groups engaged in the exact same behavior may be described as legitimate revolutionaries. It is possible that terrorism cannot be defined unless the act, target, and possibility of success are all analyzed and specified. With this definition, freedom fighters use legitimate military methods to attack legitimate political targets. The actions can be legitimized when they have some possibility of winning the conflict. Terrorists fail to meet this legitimacy test in one of three ways: military methods, military targets, and some chance of victory.

 

Diplomatic Implications of the Definition

 

Definitions pose a major problem because of the U.S. policy of not negotiating with terrorists. Making concessions to terrorists raises the problem of empowering them or even inspiring other potential terrorists (creating an "appeasement cycle"). However, we have a history of negotiating with Khadafy, often cited as a terrorist with a long history of promoting terrorism. Some analysts allege that we can negotiate with a nation, even a rogue state, but not with a terrorist network, which is not state sponsored. Networks lack embassies or formal legal status and therefore present a practical problem for diplomats, even assuming willingness to negotiate.

 

Nevertheless, policy discussions about terrorism focus on the fact that terrorist cells and networks are key to the dangers confronting us. Negotiations with terrorist networks may be necessary because these networks are elusive and difficult to fight. Engaging in battle with terrorist networks requires inventing new tactics that radically differ from those we have traditionally employed against national armies or even against states that "harbor" terrorists and their training sites. Negotiating with terrorist networks necessitates an increased level of innovation and flexibility. We must accept the fact that there might never be a "treaty" signed. But, negotiations may result in a tacit agreement among the combatants, after which terrorist attacks almost entirely cease, and our forces begin a genuine exodus from affected countries. At the very least, we need to consider and debate a theory and policy of network diplomacy to augment nation-state diplomacy.

 

Currently, the most prominent thinker in this area is John Arquilla, professor of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His position is, the fight against terrorism could go on indefinitely unless the U.S. adopts imaginative new strategies. He has stated, "…we do have a chance of winning outright before terrorists can acquire weapons of mass destruction. If we ever decided to wage 'netwar' (i.e., network-style conflict) against the terrorists with smaller, more nimble units of action, more flexible forces, we would have a real capability to rip al Qaeda apart, cell by cell." Arquilla also stated, "President Bush has also shown a surprisingly deft diplomatic touch on occasion. He reeled in Moammar Khadafy with the promise of restoring normal relations in return for Libya's renunciation of all illicit weapons development activities. In his recent videotapes, Osama bin Laden has used a fair amount of conciliatory language. In one he promised not to attack European countries as long as they stayed out of or withdrew from the U.S.- led coalition. In his October message he went further, taking the position that al Qaeda would not strike again if attacks on Muslims ceased." (San Francisco Chronicle 2005)

 

The U.S. diplomatic approach can be revealed clearly from evidence that our representatives to the United Nations have, for decades, been adamant that "state terrorism" is impossible as a practical matter.

 

During the Reagan Administration, 1981-1989, it was popular to define terrorism in terms of national policy and point to terrorist states-those that used terrorism to attack American interests. It is more likely that terrorist groups are not and never were controlled by "sponsor states."

 

Diplomacy Strategies and Existing Policy

 

In December 2004, the Report of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel for Threats, Challenges and Change was released. It stated (United Nations 2004, p. 51, emphasis added):

 

The United Nations ability to develop a comprehensive strategy has been constrained by the inability of Member States to agree on an anti-terrorism convention including a definition of terrorism. This prevents the United Nations from exerting its moral authority and from sending an unequivocal message that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, even for the most defensible of causes.

 

The same document states that various elements need to be incorporated into a definition of terrorism, but it stops short of providing a blanket definition.

 

Another definition given by Rear Admiral Yedidia Groll-Yaari (1998), Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for the Israeli Navy is that "Terrorism is the unlawful potentially or intended lethal attack against non-combatant and innocent persons at random, or a selective such attack on specific individuals in their public capacity, intended to prevent or promote the pursuit of a public cause or causes."

 

An Islamic scholar, Ayatullah Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali Taskhiri (1987), defined terrorism as "an act carried out to achieve an inhuman and corrupt (mufsid) objective, and involving threat to security of any kind, and violation of rights acknowledged by religion and mankind."

 

The United Kingdom defines terrorism in its Terrorism Act of 2000 as:

 

(1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where-

 

(a) the action falls within subsection (2),

(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

© the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

 

 

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it-

 

(a) involves serious violence against a person,

(b) involves serious damage to property,

© endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,

(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

 

 

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

 

In each of these cases, terrorism would encompass different things. Groll-Yaari would require that the action be illegal while the other two definitions do not require that to be the case (although the British definition might be construed as intending to cover only crimes, it does not explicitly have such a requirement). The British definition explicitly allows for actions taken against computer systems whereas this appears to be beyond the scope of the definitions given by the other two respondents. Taskhiri's definition requires that the act violate rights acknowledged both by mankind and by religion whereas neither of the other two definitions make such a requirement. Indeed, it could be argued under one or more of these definitions that the African National Congress engaged in terrorism under Nelson Mandela and that Mahatma Gandhi also practiced terrorism.

 

In fact, Mandela was a terrorist under virtually all definitions given by various States. He was a policy-level member of Umkhonto we Sizwe, and a document found at Rivonia on 11 July 1963 (http://www.anc.org. za/ancdocs/history/m k/mayibuye.html) details the goals of the organization, making it clear that the future Nobel Prize winner was a member of a terrorist organization and, therefore, a terrorist himself: "The white state has thrown overboard every pretence of rule by democratic process. Armed to the teeth it has presented the people with only one choice and that is its overthrow by force and violence."

 

Gandhi can also be considered a terrorist under the British definition because violence is not a prerequisite of terrorism. A case could be made that his march to the sea to make salt involved "serious damage to property" in that it attempted to bring down the salt monopoly in India. That his actions were political is a stated fact and it certainly was designed to influence the government.

 

One Country Struggles to Define Terrorism

 

Defining terrorism is problematic even within a country. The United States government operates with at least seven different, and somewhat conflicting, definitions. In addition, there are several subcategories of terrorism that merit their own definitions.

 

The US State Department, in its Patterns of Global Terrorism Report uses Section 2656f of Title 22 of the United States Code (22 U.S.C. § 2656f), which defines terrorism as:

 

Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

 

This section further defines a terrorist group as "any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism."

 

A second definition is given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Terrorism is the "unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1996, p. 3).

 

A third definition is proffered by the Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism (Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism 1986, p. 1) which, although noting, "neither the United States nor the United Nations has adopted official definitions of terrorism", nevertheless used the following definition:

 

Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups, or to modify their behavior or politics.

 

The fourth definition comes from the Department of Defense Technical Information Center's Dictionary of Military Terms (2004):

 

The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

 

A fifth definition is found in the Immigration and Naturalization Act 212 (a)(3)(B) calling terrorism:

 

any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following:

 

(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).

(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained.

(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of such a person.

(IV) An assassination.

(V) The use of any-

(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or

(b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.

(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.

 

A sixth definition is found in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Terrorism is: any activity that--

 

(A) involves an act that--

(i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and

(ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and

(B) appears to be intended--

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

 

A seventh definition, slightly different that above, is found in Executive Order on Terrorist Financing, September 24, 2001, promulgated by President George W. Bush: (d) the term "terrorism" means an activity that -

 

(i) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and

(ii) appears to be intended -

(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

© to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking

 

Examining each of these definitions, one can see that virtually any action can be defined as terrorism, or can be excluded from the definition, depending on the desired result. For example, while five of the seven definitions specify that the action must be "unlawful", the first definition used by the State Department contains no such distinction. Although most of the definitions speak to motives of the participants, the Homeland Security Act merely requires that the action appear to be motivated to alter policy or intimidate a population. Most definitions deal with actions that are directed at society or the government but the Immigration and Nationality Act's definition would include all forms of murder that are not financially motivated and involve use of a firearm or explosive. Most definitions discuss the use of violence, but the Homeland Security Act of 2002 could include under the label of terrorism the releasing of a computer virus that included a message in it arguing for world peace.

 

Cyberterrorism, Ecoterrorism, and Narcoterrorism

 

In addition to the main concept of terrorism, there are at least three major subcategories defined by law enforcement in the United States. These subcategories are Cyber-terrorism, Eco-terrorism, and Narco-terrorism. Each is an attempt to widen the definition of terrorism in such a way as to encompass events that are not normally characterized as terrorist. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has given not one, but three, different definitions of Cyber-terrorism:

 

A criminal act perpetrated by the use of computers and telecommunications capabilities, resulting in violence, destruction and/or disruption of services to create fear by causing confusion and uncertainty within a given population, with the goal of influencing a government or population to conform to particular political, social or ideological agenda. (Lourdeau 2004)

 

The use of Cyber tools to shut down critical national infrastructures (such as energy, telecommunications, transportation, or government operations) for the purpose of coercing or intimidating a government or civilian population. (Kerr 2000)

 

Terrorism that initiates, or threatens to initiate, the exploitation of or attack on information systems. (Lewis 1999)

 

Another definition has been offered by a member of the FBI laboratory, Mark M. Pollitt, in a unpublished and undated paper entitled "Cyberterrorism: Fact or Fantasy." In that paper Pollitt (undated, p. 10-11) argues: "Cyberterrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents." His definition is almost universally and erroneously given as the FBI definition despite the following advisory warning that appears on the first page of the document: "It does not represent the policy, opinions, or conclusions of the United States Government or of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

 

The FBI has defined eco-terrorism as

 

The use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally-orie nted, subnational group for environmental-politi cal reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature" (Jarboe 2002)

 

The Drug Enforcement Administration has adopted the following definition for narco-terrorism:

 

DEA defines narco-terrorism as a subset of terrorism, in which terrorist groups, or associated individuals, participate directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or distribution of controlled substances and the monies derived from these activities. Further, narco-terrorism may be characterized by the participation of groups or associated individuals in taxing, providing security for, or otherwise aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavors in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist activities (Hutchinson 2002).

 

The Practical Problem of the Definition

 

A proper definition is critical not only to prosecute individuals responsible for terrorism but also to properly inform the public as to their obligations. Even if an individual does not conduct a terrorist action, the United States has stated that providing material assistance to a "terrorist organization" is also a crime. Title 22 of the United States Code requires the State Department to publish an annual report on terrorism, including a list of terrorism countries. The State Department's most recent annual report is entitled Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. For an online version of the Report, see the State Department's web site at http://www.state.gov /s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/200 3/. Reports typically classify terrorism as either domestic (common in countries such as Algeria, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan) or international (defined in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country."

 

On October 8, 1997, Secretary of State Madeline Albright designated 30 foreign organizations as terrorist groups. Interestingly, the IRA and the PLO were not included in this list, perhaps because of their roles in then-pending peace talks in Northern Ireland and Israel, respectively. However, they are now back on the list. The list includes more than 20 Islamic organizations and one far-right Israeli group that was previously considered two separate entities.

 

With the end of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic and social upheavals in Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and other "sponsor states," traditional terrorist organizations have found themselves without state sponsorship (with the exception of the continuing support from Iran), and in need of alternative sources of financial resources. Hence, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, kidnapping, extortion, and other illegal activities, have become the primary alternative support sources for transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). As a result of the end of the cold war, certain strategic economic warfare moves and sanctions, and international cooperation between western powers, rogue state terrorist budgeting has likely declined. In order for the aggregate production of terrorist acts to stay constant or even to increase, budget substitution must occur, which in this context implies much higher levels of entrepreneurial crime, philanthropic terrorism (bin Laden), or new alliances between transnational criminal groups, organized crime, former military hierarchies, and terrorists to share and acquire targets, labor and capital, information, networks, and weapons.

 

At any rate, the distinction between terrorist groups pursuing long run political objectives and the TCOs pursuing short-run economic objectives has blurred, and both groups are increasingly forming strategic coalitions to further their own joint income or utility maximization.

 

This merger of terrorism and criminal organizations is particularly troubling for those interested in civil liberties. If terrorism is a criminal act, the use of military force to combat it is an unprecedented trampling on the very fabric of democratic institutions. If it is instead an act of war, then the use of police forces to prosecute it is equally problematic. Military forces who are captured and commit war crimes are tried by military tribunals. Civilian courts try civilians engaged in criminal action. Crucial differences include the presumption of innocence, rights of the accused, and the prohibition of torture. The ability to decide, on an ex post facto basis, how and where to try terrorists implies jurisdictional "shopping" and a decline in the impartiality of the state. Indeed, the US has signed and ratified the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the US Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Brown v. Mississippi (1936) that evidence provided under torture is inadmissible at trial. Though ratification was carried out with several reservations and declarations, most of these were carried out to ensure compliance with the US Constitution as opposed to attempting to circumvent it. In addition, the US specifically stated that the carrying out of the death penalty per se was not subject to the Convention. Article 15 of that Convention specifies "(e)ach State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made." Yet, the US government argues that it can use torture to determine whether to detain individuals indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and, by extension, whether to punish them (Sniffen 2004).

 

The question of whether terrorism is a crime or not has implications for American policy using the military. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the Army (and, by extension, the Air Force as that branch of the military service was spun off from the Army) in the enforcement of civilian law. This is enshrined in 18 U.S.C. § 1385.

 

Towards a New Definition

 

So how does one define terrorism? It often appears as though the term is used almost casually, as though any foreign or major attack on the United States is a terrorist action. Indeed, the Oklahoma City Bombing, the attack on the USS Cole, the 1993 and 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut all have one common element: before any claim of responsibility was made-each of these was derided as a terrorist action. Even the actions at Columbine have been described as terrorist. However, the attack on Columbine while calculated and acting against civilian targets was not a terrorist action, it was a common crime. Thus, we need to establish clear guidelines as to what is terrorism and what is not. This is not merely an academic exercise. It is, instead, an activity that is best performed prior to engaging the terrorist. If terrorism is not a war crime, the military should not be involved in its elimination and terrorists should be accorded all legal rights and privileges associated with their constitutional protections. On the other hand, if it is a war crime, the police should not be involved and terrorists should be treated as either prisoners of war or war criminals depending on the circumstances. Yet many governments-the United States in particular-persist in attempting to do both, and this activity diminishes the rights of all Americans and reduces the ability of the United States to combat terrorism effectively.

 

While many would argue that terrorism ought to be concerned only with violence against the person, we, as economists, argue that large-scale actions against infrastructure may carry with them costs to society and terror within a population that are far greater than that felt by the death of any single individual (Landsburg 2004). Thus, we argue that a terrorist definition should include activities such as large-scale disruption of telecommunications or computer networks. The definition should deal with the characteristics of terrorist organizations to encourage them to act more like military ones, allowing the use of military action against them. It should deliberately not include the military on active duty. Otherwise, the attack on Pearl Harbor would end up being classified as "terrorist" instead of an "act of war" because it was initiated prior to a formal declaration of war. However, this is what the US policy now states (United States Department of State 2004, p. 12):

 

"We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere."

 

In addition, actions taken by Iraqi forces loyal to Saddam Hussein could be classified as terrorist following US declarations of victory even if they otherwise met the definitions of acting as military forces within the scope of the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, any proper definition of terrorism should allow for the expansion of the Geneva Conventions to account for these organizations. It should hold governments responsible as well for acts that would be considered terrorist in nature. Indeed, if it were not for definitions that omit State culpability, actions taken by the United States government in overthrowing the democratically-elect ed Chilean government of Salvador Allende in 1973 and the 1984 mining of Sandino harbor in Nicaragua would be considered terrorist.

 

At the same time, it should not allow a government to essentially define away the rights of another government to legitimate self-defense when attempting to occupy another's territory nor should it allow a government to argue that countries that it does not recognize have no legitimate right of self-defense. The case of Taiwan comes to mind immediately. Not recognized by most countries as an independent nation, the fact that the government of Taiwan in furtherance of its political goals constitutes a clear and present threat of violence to the Chinese mainland, even if only in self-defense, places its actions in the realm of terrorism by most definitions. This is clearly nonsensical.

 

It should not specify that acts need to be "unlawful" because that will allow for the definition of terrorism to be whatever a government chooses it to be. Any attack becomes unlawful if it is perpetrated against the government but no action taken by a government could therefore considered terrorist. Finally, if one adopts the concept of terrorism as crime, there is no reason to deal with terrorists as a separate entity. As the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (2000/2001, p. iii) states, "In accordance with U.S. counterterrorism policy, the FBI considers terrorists to be criminals."

 

However, terrorists do not consider themselves to be accountable under the law. They regard the United States government as an illegitimate force and, therefore, would view attacks by that government as terrorist under this definition. What is needed is a common definition so that all will play by the same rules.

 

Thus, we adopt the following definition:

 

Terrorism is a war crime involving:

 

(a) the use of any weapon of mass destruction outlawed by international law or.

 

(b) an attempted or successful attack deliberately directed against civilian persons or property or military personnel who are

 

(1) either out of uniform and acting in their civilian capacities or

 

(2) who have surrendered, which is undertaken in a manner unauthorized by either international law or by the laws of the country in which the attack occurs by another country's forces or by members of an organization previously known to the government as promoting the use of such attacks and having as their central objective the prevention or causation of social or political change for the purposes of halting or affecting such change. Actions by members of an organization previously known to the government as promoting the use of such attacks and having as their central objective the prevention or causation of social or political change for the purposes of halting or affecting such change are considered legitimate military actions when they are directed solely against military targets and do not involve the use of weapons of mass destruction. Such legitimate military actions are considered acts of war and are not war crimes. Members of such organizations shall be covered by the Geneva Conventions and will be considered prisoners of war provided they are commanded by a person responsible for his or her subordinates and otherwise conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war even if they fail to have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance and fail to carry their arms openly.

 

Let's take apart this definition. Terrorism may show itself in any form of attack. It could be the introduction of "supermoney," a counterfeit currency designed to destroy the financial system in a country. It could be an attack on the computer network of a country or it could be bombing a school bus or government building. However, it is not an attack against any military force or personnel unless those military personnel are out of uniform and acting in their civilian capacities or the activity would ordinarily break international law, such as the use of chemical weapons or killing those who have surrendered. Thus, the definition covers the taking of hostages. The definition covers only organizations that are defined as potentially terrorist in advance of the action taking place or by the forces of another country. It also covers the actions of any State acting within its borders that uses a weapon of mass destruction. The important thing is that someone cannot claim to be a terrorist organization after the fact. The action must be deliberately directed towards the civilian persons or property and not merely kill civilians due to collateral damage. It allows a field of operations for the terrorist organization that is considered a legitimate act of war and renders this activity immune from criminal prosecution, although not from military retribution. At the same time, terrorists who refuse to operate within the sphere of operations will be considered to be war criminals and will be subject to trial by military tribunal or at the World Criminal Court in The Hague.

 

In so defining terrorism, we can now deal with it without infringing on the rights and liberties of our civilian population. It provides for a means to legitimize activity against a government organization only to the extent that it places boundaries on permissible targets. Without having such boundaries, an attack on a military installation and an attack on a school carry the same penalties. As such, since the attack on the school will cause more terror in the civilian population at less potential cost to the terrorist organization, attacks on civilian targets can be expected to be undertaken with greater frequency than if one were to legitimize the attack against the military target. As the ability to defend a military target is far greater than a civilian one, one would hope that directing terrorists towards "hard" targets would be preferable to directing them towards the "soft" ones.

 

From Car Bombs to Truck Bombs to the Terrorist Financial Multiplier of Trophy Targeting.

 

It may be that the IRA invented and perfected the car bomb. One clear feature of modern terrorism is the ability to achieve fantastically large benefit/cost ratios utilizing asymmetrical warfare, suicide attacks and unprecedented "force multipliers." Douglas Farah (2004) states, it was the truck bombs as a terrorist strategy that most impressed bin Laden, because they led to the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon. We had no short-run counter-strategy. The 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut killed 63 people, and the truck bombing six months later that destroyed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killed 190 American soldiers. Bin Laden was hoping similar attacks could drive the U.S. from Saudi Arabia.

 

This strategic tool remains a major threat today. The Naval Research Laboratory warned that if a 90-ton tanker car carrying chlorine crashed during a Fourth of July celebration at the National Mall, it could kill 100,000 people in 30 minutes (New York Times 2005, p. 8).

 

Osama bin Laden, the arch terrorist, has shown the importance of diplomacy between terrorist movements and groups. OBL engineered the Hezbollah-al Qaeda alliance-"a strategic partnership, indicative of a major shift in terrorist thinking." This move was designed to increase terrorist leveraging of economic resources and human capital, and increased the potential of the force multiplier. Farah (2004, p. 126-132) states, "It was also during his time in Sudan (1994) that bin Laden made a historic but much overlooked decision with far-reaching implications. As part of his emerging strategy, he set aside the deep historical religious rift between his own Sunni Muslim group, which dominates Saudi Arabia, and those of the Shi'ite Muslim, who dominate Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. For centuries the two groups have remained hostile to and warred with each other. Hezbollah would provide explosives, training, and other military expertise to the newly minted al Qaeda organization, while al Qaeda provided money and foot soldiers for Hezbollah operations."

 

Alliances increase bargaining power in future strategic negotiations. Alliances furnish an exchange of technology, communications infrastructure, cross-recruiting sources, intelligence, weapons access, and network power. Fundamentalist, jihadist groups will continue to form alliances to alter the payoff matrix in a way that moves our dominant strategy to a position where withdrawal of military presence from Arab countries becomes the Nash equilibrium.

 

The OBL organization is fully aware of the benefits of imposing a "terrorist tax" on all U.S. capitalist business enterprise activities at home and abroad. Both taxes to support homeland defense and the implicit taxes of private expenditures for system redundancy, dispersal of office staff, backup computers at remote sites, and risk-analysis based security systems, all combine to raise production costs, lower worker productivity, shift our aggregate production function downward, raise consumer prices, and slow the process of globalization. Increasing "panic costs" also imposes lost profits to several economic sectors, and may lead to "no confidence" waves affecting federal governance.

 

Osama bin Laden himself remarked at the huge terrorist multiplier and impact on financial markets, of the 9/11 attack (especially on New York City). The direct impact of nearly 3,000 killed outright, and destruction of the World Trade Center, the impact on our airline industry and the New York economy (and perhaps lengthening the recession), produced in excess of $200 billion in damages. Thus, with a bin Laden investment of $500,000, the multiplier ($200,000,000,000/$5 00,000) = 400,000 to one. One could also think of this as the benefit/cost ratio of a single well-coordinated and successfully planned attack. Apparently, not all the funds allocated by bin Laden were used: Farah reports that some of the 19 terrorists wired excess funds earmarked for the attack-which would could be reinvested or used as cell seed money for future attacks-back to the source country, Sudan, in the hours before the 9/11 attack. The investment cycle and planning phase for such "trophy attacks" can apparently be up to 8 years. This is the time between the original 1993 attack on the WTC and the ultimate attack on 9/11. Long gestation periods such as this tend to make the U.S. feel relatively safe and complacent that homeland defense is working. But, for fundamentalist jihadist strategy, time is not measured the same way as in the West. For these groups, the Crusades and their injustice happened only yesterday.

 

As highly cost-effective as terrorists attacks prove to be, they still require substantial aggregate funding. If al Qaeda cells are operating in 80 different countries, this integrated, global operation requires extensive financing and ongoing money laundering. Usually, laundering involves steps of transforming, layering, and reintegration of illegal-source dollars. In the case of terrorism, it is the reverse: legal source money may be transformed into funding of criminal activities. Or illegal funds from "conflict diamonds," or taxes on illegal drug production, may be transmitted in secret form to terrorist cells. According to Farah (2004, p. 141), U.S. officials now estimate that Islamic extremist groups operating in the U.S. have raised hundreds of millions of dollars-and perhaps more than a billion-since the mid-1980s. Diplomatic cooperation among many countries, and their central banks, is essential to detect and staunch terrorist financing. Since the U.S. has been unable to disrupt money movements in support of illegal drugs, it is doubtful we can trace and detect terrorist cell financing on any international scale. Some states refuse to cooperate diplomatically. One of bin Laden's biggest investments in Sudan was to jointly capitalize, with the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) officials, the al-Shamal Islamic Bank. Bin Laden's investment in this bank was $50 million. The bank continues to operate today. Its owners deny any connection to terrorists. (Farah 2004, p. 126-7.)

 

We also know that terrorist cells can be "self-financing" via in-country crime such as identity theft, credit card fraud, robbery, and other scams. This means that one mode of cutting off funding is akin to squeezing a balloon. It displaces the financing to another arena, but has no long-run impact on terrorist funding.

 

It may be necessary to define terrorism in a fashion that describes a production function that includes various inputs of materials, human capital, labor, fixed capital, communications infrastructure, financial market access and continuous funding of secret money. The production function is combined with a strategy to maximize gains, combined with optimal counter-moves of target state's agents. Both the U.S. and terrorists groups continually attempt to alter the payoff matrix drastically; the result could likely be a stalemate in the game's solution-an endless war on terrorism with escalating stakes. This often happens in repetitive games with multiple agents.

 

Suppose terrorist groups are not and never were controlled by state sponsors. Nevertheless, without tacit rogue state support and financial secrecy, their efficiency would be quite diminished, and their production function quite impaired. Theocratic state government backing of anti-American views is certainly a factor in ensuring a very elastic supply function of terrorist recruits. Different counter-strategies imply different resource combinations or input substitutions.

 

A Game-Theory Model

 

Game theory is the study of how people behave then they are placed in situations that require them to interact with others. It presupposes that each person "must first know the decision of the other agents before knowing which decision is best for herself." (Jehle and Reny 2001, p. 267) Since such information is inherently unknown in most cases each person must adopt a policy of examining the potential actions of each of the other participants in the situation in order to determine the best course of action for herself. Several game-theoretic and rational choice models of terrorism exist and Sandler and Hartley (1995, p. 305-335) provide a good survey of the literature.

 

The essential feature of a game-theoretic model is the assumption that both parties are rational and, therefore, seek to maximize the difference between their individual benefits and costs when considering an action.

 

A terrorist organization has as its central purpose to cause damage to the country that it attacks. This damage can take many forms. First, any action undertaken by the country to "harden" its targets against terrorist activity generates benefits for the terrorist because it imposes costs on the country. Second, any action undertaken by the terrorist that causes damage to the country increases benefits for the terrorist. On the other hand, actions taken against the terrorist by the country increases costs for the terrorist. A country will respond to a terrorist action in one of three ways: negotiation, retaliation (offensive), or conciliation. Ironically, a conciliatory gesture can increase costs for the terrorist by reducing the number of people willing to join the terrorist organization because the country has accepted some of the demand if the government is able to make it appear that the conciliation was not the result of the terrorist activity. As the terrorist organization becomes more successful in its endeavors, it is forced to abandon terrorism because the political will of the populace has turned. For example, in Northern Ireland, when Sinn Fein, the Irish Republican Army's political wing, has had political success, it has usually corresponded with a reduction in the use of the paramilitary forces.

 

Negotiation, on the other hand, causes an increase in benefits for the terrorist (e.g., payment for hostages) even when that payoff is in terms of advancement of the terrorist goals (as it appears as though the goals are being met as a result of the terrorist activity).

 

Retaliation increases costs for both sides because it expends resources.

 

The terrorist, on the other hand, has five choices: (1) attack a civilian non-hardened target; (2) attack a civilian hardened target; (3) attack a military non-hardened target; (4) attack a military hardened target; (5) do nothing.

 

Obviously, the nation would prefer to do nothing and have the terrorist do nothing.

 

We will assume the following conditions exist.

 

1) Terrorists receive more benefit from attacking military targets than non-military targets but the cost is also higher, so the net gain is ambiguous.

2) There are an infinite number of possible civilian targets but a finite number of military ones.

 

Games are played sequentially. The first move is from the government, which must decide whether to harden a target or do nothing. Assuming that the decision is to harden a target, the result is a cost to the government, designated as a. The terrorist organization thereby receives a certain amount of benefit, designated as b. The reason the terrorist organization receives benefits is because hardening a target is tantamount to acknowledging the terrorist organization can inflict damage on the target. Therefore, the terrorist organization achieves at least some of the terror it is seeking.

 

After hardening the target, the terrorist will move. If the terrorists attack a non-hardened civilian target, they will receive an expected benefit of c at a cost of d. Similarly if the terrorist attacks a non-hardened military target, they will receive an expected benefit of e at a cost of f. Hardened targets result in the same expected benefit but at a higher cost, h (which is more than the cost to the government of hardening them). The costs and benefits for each type of activity are described below:

 

.................... ............ Benefit Cost

Attack civilian hardened target c d+h

Attack military hardened target e f+h

Attack civilian non-hardened target c d

Attack military non-hardened target e f

 

We know that the following is true based on our assumptions: e > c, f > d. Under these circumstances the terrorist will never attack a hardened civilian target because there are an infinite number of non-hardened civilian targets, each of which costs less to attack. The difference between the cost of attacking a hardened versus a non-hardened target is h (assuming an equally likely response from the government no matter if the target is hardened or non-hardened). What is critical to learn, however, is that unless the government announces stiffer penalties for one type of attack than another, the government is powerless to determine which target (civilian or military) will be attacked. It is for this reason that we suggest that the government impose greater costs on terrorists when civilian targets are attacked than when military ones are.

 

Finally, we have the government's response. Retaliation imposes costs on both the terrorist organization and the government. Conciliation costs the government while providing the terrorist organization with ambiguous benefits, while negotiation (often done in secret or, if done in open, almost always coupled with a cease-fire or truce agreement) usually has a lower cost to the government than conciliation but clearly provides the terrorist organization with benefits. Doing nothing may not cost as much as retaliation but it is often more costly to the government than negotiation because of the public perception that nothing is being accomplished. Thus, we can set up the payoffs and costs as follows:

 

Cost to Government Cost to Terrorist Benefit to Terrorist Retaliation j k Negotiation l m Conciliation n p Do Nothing o

 

In this case, j > o > l > n, while k > p (if p is a net cost) and m > p (if p is a net benefit).

 

In each of these games, the terrorist and the government are relative gains maximizers but there are information asymmetries. First, the government does not know what the payoff matrix for the terrorist looks like. Although the government would like the payoff to the terrorist to be low, it must estimate what the payoff looks like and use that as its best guess. On the other hand, the terrorist typically has better knowledge of the government cost than the government has of the terrorist cost and benefit structure. This gap in knowledge can be expected to decrease over time as the government acquires information about the terrorists goals and costs through inferences based on its actions (Lapin and Sandler 1993). As such, we come up with several random numbers to cover the expected payoffs for each side and generate a game.

 

We are now ready to define the payoffs from the game. In doing so, we will assume that the government is an unbiased estimator of the terrorist threat. This may not be entirely accurate because governments may find it in their interest to overemphasize or underemphasize terrorist activity depending on how the political winds are blowing. However, given the difficulty of determining the exact amount of bias in predictions of terrorist activity, it is a better assumption to take the unbiased perspective.

 

Scenario 1: Government hardens target (resulting in a cost of A and an expected utility to the terrorist of b, where b is a random number with mean B and variance ß). It should be obvious that the government will not harden a target when b > A. The terrorist receives utility B.

 

Terrorist decides to attack non-hardened civilian target, resulting in utility C and cost D, provided C>D and C-D > net utility provided from attacking non-hardened military target (or hardened military target if all military targets have been hardened). Government calculates net terrorist utility as c, where c is a random number with mean C-D and variance ?.

 

Government retaliates against terrorist, inflicting damage K on the terrorist (estimated by the government as k, where k is a random number with mean K and variance d) at a cost of J to the government.

 

Scenario 2: Government hardens target.

 

Terrorist decides to attack non-hardened civilian target.

 

Government negotiates with terrorist. This costs the government L, while bringing the terrorist a benefit of M. Thus, total government net benefit is the difference between the perceived cost to the terrorist and the cost to the government.

 

Scenario 3: Government hardens target.

 

Terrorist decides to attack non-hardened civilian target.

 

Government does nothing. Scenario 4: Conciliation. This costs the government n and the government perceives the terrorist will receive a benefit of p.

 

In this particular game, the response is completely based upon perceived losses and gains in this one step. The government may announce that it will always retaliate against terrorist but that threat is only credible if k - J > m - L and k - J > p - N and k - J > O. In other words, if the government can undertake a retaliation at relatively low cost, it will undertake it but, as cost to retaliate rises, the government is likely to turn to one of the other strategies. Since the only strategy that unambiguously results in a reduction in the terrorist's net benefit (after costs) is retaliation, it is the only strategy that can forestall an attack. However, since the government does not know what the terrorist's costs and benefits are, at the margin where the terrorist's costs and benefits are such that the terrorist would anticipate a response, the government may not respond. Alternatively even when the terrorist is certain that the government will not respond, the government may still respond with retaliation. This uncertainty will raise the likelihood of terrorist action. Thus, the better the government can understand the terrorist, the less ambiguous will be the response and the greater the likelihood of forestalling a threat in the first place.

 

Now we can look at the other side of the game, the hardening of targets. Since the terrorist receives some benefit from target hardening and it costs the government without reducing the chances of a civilian target being sought, the hardening of civilian targets is never a viable option unless the expected value to the terrorist of a particular civilian target from attack is far greater than the expected value of another target when both targets cost the same amount to harden. Otherwise, it is unwise to harden civilian targets. At the same time, it is unwise to harden military targets because this will only make civilian targets more attractive. In the single case where different civilian targets have different expected terrorist values associated with then, the government will again likely overharden or underharden targets because of the uncertainty involved. In either case, terrorist net benefit after costs will be raised. Indeed, the single best response is to provide a uniformly greater cost to civilian targets over military ones by altering the definition of terrorism to reduce costs to terrorists in attacking military targets and raise them when they attack civilian ones. For example, if we treat attacks on military targets as legitimate wartime measures but civilian targets as unacceptable criminal actions, the proper incentive structure will be generated. This does not mean that we are ceding anything to terrorists because individuals captured during time of war may be held until a ceasefire is negotiated as prisoners of war.

 

Conclusion

 

Economic theory suggests that rational individuals think at the margin. Assuming that terrorists are rational in that they deliberately choose policies that maximize their own utility (no matter how warped others may find those goals that generate utility), economic theory would suggest that a modification of the definition of terrorism is warranted so as to allow attacks on military installations at a lower juridical cost than that imposed when terrorists attack civilian targets. If we make the penalties the same, only the civilians will suffer and the cost to defend the homeland will invariably rise.

 

Furthermore, if a clear delineation is not made between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" terrorist actions, the line between terrorism and common criminality will become increasingly blurred and it may become impossible to successfully disentangle the military function from the police function of the State.

 

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