The Rise and Fall of Islamism in Somalia

[NASSIR]

THE RISE AND FALL OF ISLAMISM IN SOMALIA

 

January 29 2007

 

The people of Somalia are and have remained Sunni, Shafi’ Muslims for the good part of 14 centuries. Islam is much intertwined with their culture that it takes no one to think twice of his identity as a Muslim. Thanks to the orthodox religious community, generally known as the “Ahlu Sunna wal-Jamaaca”, who have catered, over the centuries, for the faith related needs of the largely nomadic and rural society. They provided for basic literacy in the Arabic language to enable people understand and practice their faith as Muslims. In addition they continuously produced the religious leaders of the community. They were these men who have played a role in conserving the faith, despite attempts at Christianization over the last two centuries throughout the Islamic world. These orthodox religious men and their moderate interpretation of the Faith though, have suffered systematically, if tacitly, in campaigns to diminish their role by the colonial powers of old.

 

The so-called modern educational programs started by the colonial governments were designed to compete with the traditional religious schools, “malcaama” or “Dugsi Qura’n” in towns, and the “Xer” camps, mobile Qura'nic schools following the trace of the migrating nomadic camps. As the new colonial system of education became dominant; the erstwhile Somali school—traditionally available in most villages or shifting camp with the nomads through their transhumant migration—was made to look redundant and a waste of time. For example, the teachers for the formal schools were formally trained and were provided opportunities for continued education as well as study facilities and support systems. These teachers were also handsomely paid by the government compared to the conventional religious teachers who traditionally survived on community handouts.

 

These colonial systems of education paid lip service to the teaching of religion. Arabic Language and, specially “Religion”, as subjects of study, accounted for a small proportion in the curriculum notation, given that the country was predominantly Muslim. Add to this the fact that these colonial governments were also encouraging the credo of separation between the church and state. The teachers for the Arabic language were prepared by the system but the teachers for “religion” as a subject were invariably enlisted from the traditional school. Occasionally, some Arabic teachers were also enlisted from the traditional school. Those trained Arabic teachers were paid as equals to the other regular teachers. But those borrowed from the traditional pool were, however, paid as much as a third of the salary of the regular teachers, perhaps to make the point that they were uncertified and therefore inferior to those prepared by the formal system. In addition, graduates of the colonial system of education were sure to land on better paid jobs and could speak at least one foreign language, all of which was meant to intimidate the products of the old school and their traditional followers.

 

The strategy worked. It catered for the production of new elite, the majority of whom although, still considered themselves Muslims, had little regard for their tradition, including their Faith. Indeed, having had bitterly experienced the resistance staged by the religious leadership against colonization and Christianization throughout the Muslim world, the colonial masters used the new school as an instrument for social and political engineering. Without the regular funding or proper facilities, religious education was limited to the very early years of children, later to only the kindergarten stage, after which the child left for the formal school. Despites those discouraging policies to frustrate the religious community, however, these men of Faith took a greater role than most in resisting the colonial masters and eventually participated in leading the march towards independence. They were better placed for this, perhaps, by virtue of having been literate, at least in the Arabic language, and having remained largely independent, unlike the formally trained Somalis, who were almost invariably employed by the colonial administrations. A good number of the Parliament of the sixties comprised of those sheiks.

 

The postcolonial governments inherited the same system of their colonial masters as they were run by the then colonially produced new elite. They failed to make reforms in either the processes or products of the educational system. With the immigration exodus which started in the early seventies many Somalis fled the country to those oil rich conveniently adjacent Arab countries —partly to escape the oppression of Barre’s Regime and partly for those skilled enough or educated to gain greater economic returns against their formal qualifications. There, they were exposed to opportunities to learn the Arabic language and understand their faith better, as a welcome byproduct. Many made the choice to go or send their children to religious schools and institutions. They came back not only financially richer but supposedly stronger in their faith and wiser in their understanding of their religion. Adult gatherings for religious study in mosques and Qura’nic schools and institutes started to proliferate around the country. Funding from varied Islamic institutions in the Arab World flowed systemically, if covertly. In other words, the new arrangements and facilities compensated for everything missed under the colonial and neocolonial educational systems of the State.

 

The new breed of religious men clandestinely catered for the needs of the elite, who were willing to review their attitudes to Islam as sort of new borne Muslims. Tolerance to fundamentalism began to take root, but Barre’s government, threatened by the advent of the new trend, resisted by persecuting the Islamists and, indeed, co-opting the traditional religious school as its allies. They began to certify them in greater numbers as religious teachers, Mosque Imams and court judges. At the same time, the Regime openly ostracized the new Islamists. Still, the advent of the new school of fundamentalism was considered positive by many people. For example, I was of the opinion that, while the old school had still catered for the largely nomadic and the rural community, who have not had equal access to the formal system, the new Islamist school has been catering for the elite and the urban community in the major cities, who had, in the past, drifted further away from their faith, and many of whom were now willing to revisit it. Hence, the logic that it was a good thing for the two schools to co-exist, not without tension between them even then, mainly because of the Regime’s policies deliberately playing the one group against the other in its divide-and-rule tactics.

 

However, with the collapse of the government in 1991, each of the two camps had to shift for themselves to seek a new role in the disintegrating social and political milieu. History has it that a faction of the Islamists—namely, al-Itihad al-Islami—sought power in the vacuum that followed, by starting a premature uprising, led in part by Hassan Dahir Awes, the current leader of the defeated UIC, in 1992. The skirmishes in some north eastern towns of Somalia lasted for a matter of months, in which the resistance staged by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, the current President of the TFG, and others defeated and emasculated the Islamists. Little was heard of them since then, except in relation to their affiliation with Alqaeda, as per the US assertion, or their accusation of subversion and attack by Ethiopia in places along its border with Somalia, in the mid nineties.

 

By comparison, members of the orthodox school responded to the lawlessness and insecurity prevailing in the Capital, and established clan-based Islamic courts, initially, in north Mogadishu. The courts helped a lot in the north, so that the courts were also adopted in the South of the capital by individual subclans. Neither the Islamists on their own right, nor the courts, had openly shown ambitions for central power until they married into an alliance with the Transitional National Government (TNG), in whose Parliament they had a sizable number of members and with whose President they had a rare influence. Hence, Political Islamism, in earnest, started with Abdiqassim Salad Hassan’s short-lived Transitional National Government (TNG), which was single-handedly crafted by the Djibouti Government in the year 2000. With the dissolution of that government came the advent of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which took two years to contrive, only with the patience of the international community, as an outcome of the Embagathi Conference held in Kenya, 2002-2004.

 

With the new government headed by an arch enemy of the Islamists, President Abdullahi Yusuf, to replace their earlier found bedfellow, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, neither the latter nor his fellow Islamist allies were ready or willing for the new government to take its seat in the Capital to become an effective government in any way, shape or form. Even better for them, they had an unexpected ally in the warlords of Mogadishu who, although were not friends of the Islamists, happened to become a blessing in disguise for them in their resistance to the TFG. In other words, they were the enemies of their enemy, until the US unleashed its clandestine operations in support of the warlords, sidelining the rightful TFG, to do its dirty laundry of hunting down for it the foreign operatives, it alleged, were harbored by the Islamists in Mogadishu. The Islamists who were gradually solidifying their alliance with the Islamic courts exploited the opportunity to produce a popular anti-warlord and anti-US uprising, initially in the Capital, immediately spreading it to much of the South of Somalia, as they gradually realized they could.

 

But, the UIC was never as militarily powerful as people thought. They had a number of factors to their advantage though. The Mogadishu populace was sick and tired of the tyranny and division perpetuated by the warlords and needed a way out of the prevailing quagmire. Hence, the UIC militia succeeded with little resistance as the clans swiftly transferred their loyalty from the warlords to the UIC. The Islamists have also been in control of trade, foreign exchange companies and some of them were shareholders in all major business and infrastructure enterprises and schemes. Experience in other parts of Somalia, with the onslaught of the Islamists, also indicates an even more important factor which works immediately to the success of the Islamists in the short-term, but which backfires in the longer term.

 

The onslaught of Islamism almost invariably creates a confusion of the predominantly Muslim community, where people are assaulted to make a sudden choice between their loyalty to their Faith, in a new flask, and their allegiance to their clan system. It is during these early stages of confusion and divided loyalty that the Islamists were making inroads into the corridors of power in those communities. The UIC has also had a similar opportunity. By the end of six months, however, people were ready for an alternative leadership, mainly because of the rigid shari’a application. Thus, by all indications, it was not so much that the Ethiopian and the TFG forces invaded with an overwhelming force, as it may have been that the honeymoon was over by the time they invaded. Hence, the victory of the TFG can also be considered a popular choice made by the people to get rid of the Islamists after a short lived trial.

 

Islamism, therefore, is neither a popular political ideology nor is it an alternative interpretation of Islam. At best, it has been a radicalizing the old school of thought—largely, out of a literal interpretation of the text of the Qura’n and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace and Prayers be on him). Islamism encourages extreme Puritanism. This brand of interpretation popped up here and there over the centuries, throughout the Islamic world. The ideas almost invariably originated with scholars and thinkers who felt there was more to Islam than just the name and there was need for the purification, by revisiting the fundamentals of the Islam in order to realign the faithful to the interpretations of the Shari’a as per the works of the original four jurors and scholars—Shafi’, Hanfi, Malik and Hambal. It has also been often the case that those new ideas for purification, which were intended for social discipline through re-education and social revival by instilling new blood into the faith, also became prey to some with political ambitions, or who were simply disillusioned with the social and political order of the day. More often than not, these pseudo-Islamic political movements disappeared into oblivion as speedily as they emerged out of nowhere. By all indications, the recent UIC movement in Somalia has not been any different, by my estimates, at least.

 

While that is so, most people forget that the orthodox Islamic leadership remains well and alive in Somalia. They exist as they have done for the centuries past, always supportive of the wishes and choices of the community in collaboration with the other forms of social and political authority in the land, while specifically remaining responsive to the needs of the community in learning about their Faith and playing their role to the full in all faith-based social services, which literally accounts for most everything the society lives, breaths and thinks in the predominantly Islamic community. Indeed, those orthodox religious leaders can be called the “moderates”. However, individuals like Sheikh Sharif, who crossed the line of orthodoxy into the oblivion of Islamism are no longer salvageable. The Islamists are neither “moderates” in anyway, nor would they ever accept to share anything out of the realm of their prism of reasoning with anything, which is, in turn, very difficult for others to accept. Therefore, those calls for reconciliation between the TFG and the emasculated Islamists by the international community are only questionable even by the standards of the most moderate secularists. These Islamists can only be accommodated and given the opportunity to participate if and when they renounce violence and announce a ceasefire with the TFG, because they have not as yet.

 

On the other hand, the traditional religious leadership has, as always, remained neutral, if silent of the new developments, while the Islamist leadership coerced people into a Taliban-like stile of religious practice. As always, the majority of them have avoided confrontation with the Islamists during those six months in which they ruled. Hence, one can safely assume that the victory of the TFG over the UIC has been liberation for them too. They have created an umbrella organization the leaders of which met with the leadership of the TFG upon its arrival in Mogadishu and have promised support and cooperation. The international community must appreciate the presence of these orthodox religious leadership not only because they are non violent in their approach and reasonable in their interpretation of the text of the Shari’a; but they also represent a majority of the religious community in Somalia and they are agreeable to a majority of the population.

 

Towards a Conclusion:

 

Fellow Somalis and concerned friends of Somalia, I have staged the preceding argument not to blindly support the TFG, which I agree, may not necessarily constitute the right or the best material of men and women to represent Somalia. They are not necessarily endowed with the right skills or the propensity to rescue Somalia from its abyss, like many of you, who I am sure could have played the role better. But, I am concerned that Somalia cannot go on without a government far too long into the future. The international community is almost fatigued of respecting our statehood by virtue of suspended animation. Soon enough we face the awkward, if dangerous, likelihood of letting us loose to become prey to even greater division, dismemberment and annexation, which would make our Somalia a thing of the past.

 

I admit that I have succumbed to the flimsy, if demagogic, argument of the Somali elite that “a bad government is better than no government”, which I have, up to now, resisted to accept and rejected as a ploy by the elite to re-impose the same old form of government from the top. Two decades later, I realize that we deserve non but our elite, for we could not produce an alternative breed of leaders—not yet any way. The thirteenth Reconciliation Conference held in Djibouti produced the Transitional National Government (TNG) preceding the current TFG. If the current TFG is a government of warlords, as some prefer to call it, the previous one entirely comprised of their arch rivals, the alliance of the civilian clan elite—an equally corrupt and power hungry civilian politicians commonly known as the "Manifesto".

 

All Somali clans were equally represented in the Embagathi process as were all of those feuding factions and personalities. The fact that the warlords dominate the current TFG is but the fault of those who tried and failed to stop them. Hence, all we need to say to them is: tough luck. The 14th Reconciliation Conference produced the TFG as the government de jure, recognized by the international community. For the rest of us, what is important is not so much who won in the last political encounter between the political groups. It should be what are they doing about the mandate given to them? But, first, they have to be given the opportunity to try. The TFG has only just been given the opportunity to even arrive in Mogadishu for the first time since its inception. It has already lost half of the mandated term—5 years. Our concern should be: can they do anything about their mandate in the short time left?

 

If only one of the two major groups of the political elite contending for power could give the opportunity to the other (The TNG, the last time, and the TFG, this time around) to try, we would have a solid system of government by now. It is not too late for the opposition to afford this opportunity for this government to succeed, so that they can participate in the elections to be held at the end of this mandated term and perhaps peacefully replace the current TFG. In the meantime, we now have none better, or even worse, than this TFG to call a government—our government. Perhaps, we deserve non better, I am inclined to accept. At least, it made it to Mogadishu despite the odds; no matter how, and on that point alone it deserves a chance, as was the intention of most of us, upon its formation—that chance which it missed because of the greed and opportunism of some of its own. But above all, I fear that there will be no next time for reconciliation for Somalia after the last one—the Embagathi Process.

 

Surely, we are temporarily stuck with this government which is represented, by all Somalis, carbon copies of the rest us, as far as clans go, and recognized by the international community. We cannot produce another one faster than we can give it the opportunity to try. And that would be the shortest cut for making it to a better future for our unity, stability and prosperity. It is a matter of choice between a futile and an endless search for the ideally perfect government and making do with what we have to work from there towards better governance in the future.

 

Abdalla Hirad

E-Mail:MHirad@aol.com

 

 

Source

[Fabregas]

The author doesn't offer any real arguments to support the title of the article "the rise and fall of islamism in somalia".

 

He makes a distinction between the "orthodox religious movement(good)" and the "Islamist movement(bad)".

 

If this is to prove "the rise and fall of islamism" in somalia.Then it is very simplistic and misleading.

 

The Islamic Courts union, included a diverse RANGE of groups including, Takfiri wal hijra, Al islax, Qutbist, Salafis, Ikhanwil Muslimeen, Al itixaad, Warlords and even some Sufi adherents.Probably the reason for their lack of unity, co-ordination and bizzare policies during their time in power.Some of these groups could easily be placed into his two chosen markers, however some groups such as Al Islax could easily be placed bang in the middle.

 

The overall feeling i got from the article was that the author was basically promoting the government.Maybe the title should have been "The rise and fall of the "Islamic Courts Union"?

 

The rest of the article was just a repetitive history lesson as to who did what, when and where.