U.S Senate Foreign Relations Hearing on Somalia Reconstruction

[NASSIR]

TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING

 

COMMITTEE: AFRICAN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE

 

SUBCOMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

 

HEADLINE: SEN. JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR. HOLDS A HEARING ON SOMALIA RECONSTRUCTION

 

SPEAKER:

SEN. JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., CHAIRMAN

 

LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

 

WITNESSES:

 

JENDAYI FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MICHAEL HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

DAVID SHINN, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

KEN MENKHAUS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE, DAVIDSON, NORTH CAROLINA

 

BODY:

 

 

U.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS HOLDS A HEARING ON SOMALIA RECONSTRUCTION

 

FEBRUARY 6, 2007

 

SPEAKERS:

SEN. RUSS FEINGOLD, D-WIS.

CHAIRMAN

SEN. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, D-CONN.

SEN. BARACK OBAMA, D-ILL.

SEN. JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., D-DEL.

EX OFFICIO

SEN. MEL MARTINEZ, R-FLA.

RANKING MEMBER

SEN. LAMAR ALEXANDER, R-TENN.

SEN. LISA MURKOWSKI, R-ALASKA

SEN. NORM COLEMAN, R-MINN.

SEN. JOHN E. SUNUNU, R-N.H.

SEN. RICHARD G. LUGAR, R-IND.

EX OFFICIO

 

 

 

*

 

 

FEINGOLD: Good morning. The hearing will come to order. On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to the hearing of this Subcommittee in the 110th Congress.

 

Before we begin, I want to offer a warm welcome to Senator Sununu in his new capacity as a ranking member of this subcommittee. I am excited to have such a dedicated and hard-working senator as a ranking member and look forward to working with him on the full range of pressing issues facing the continent of Africa.

 

Even though the senator has not been here for many, many years, I have had many good opportunities to work with him and I find him to be an excellent person to work with.

 

As members of this subcommittee know, there are few issues that we deal with here that are partisan or ideological.

 

On my recent trip to Ethiopia and Kenya where we were focusing on the Somali issue, I told everybody that this subcommittee has always been a place where there hasn't been partisan divides. It's a good example of what can be done. That was very well received by everybody who heard that in the African countries we visited.

 

We all want to end violence and promote democracy and defend human rights and reduce poverty and improve security in a continent beset with challenges, but bestowed with almost limitless potential.

 

So welcome, Senator Sununu, I look forward to working closely with you.

 

With that said, I think it is only right that we start the 110th Congress off with a hearing that addresses one of the biggest challenges we face in Africa today and that is Somalia. We've entitled today's hearing "Exploring a Comprehensive Stabilization, Reconstruction and Counter-terrorism Strategy for Somalia".

 

I look forward to today's conversation with the administration and expert witnesses about how to address the persistent, ongoing and dangerous instability in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.

 

This subcommittee, under the chairmanship of both Republicans and Democrats, has for years been pushing the executive branch to develop a comprehensive strategy to address instability in Somalia, as well as the security and humanitarian concerns that have resulted from almost two decades of instability there.

 

As I and my other colleagues have argued in the past, Somalia actually represents the new types of challenges that face our country and our friends and allies around the world. It represents the complex threats that the United States government must learn to identify, contain and combat in the post-9/11 world.

 

It is challenging the way our government is organized and it's pressing us to make decisions and changes to the way we deal with lawlessness and weak governments, corruption and humanitarian tragedy.

 

It also is forcing us to re-evaluate how our government works to eliminate terrorist safe havens and what tools we have available to not only defeat terrorists but also to defeat the conditions that allow the terrorists to plan, train, recruit and ultimately attack the United States and allied interests.

 

If we've learned anything since 9/11, it is that we can no longer ignore instability in places like Somalia. Unfortunately, after traveling to the region, extensive study, conversations with the administrations, briefings and hearings, it is clear to me that we have yet to effectively organize our government to deal with these challenges.

 

I hope that this hearing will help clarify a new strategy for going forward that will seize the current opportunity to help the Somali people dig themselves out of almost two decades of chaos.

 

To that end, I urge our witnesses and particularly those on our first panel, to focus on what we've learned as a government, what we're doing differently and what we expect to get done in the coming weeks, months and years. I know that both of our first witnesses are working hard on this very difficult issue.

 

But let me tell you why I'm so concerned about the progress our government is making on Somalia. I chaired a hearing of this subcommittee exactly five years ago, on February 6, 2002 on this exact topic. During that hearing we discussed policy options. We discussed terrorism and Al Qaida. We discussed the absence of a transitional government. We discussed the need for a more farsighted, comprehensive U.S. government policy.

 

Most importantly and most troubling to me now, in today's context, we also discussed how important Somalia was to our national security in a post 9/11 context and how we needed to do more.

 

Walter Kansteiner, then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa at that time, began his opening statement by pointing out and I quote, "That it is far easier to prevent failure than to cope with its consequences."

 

He then admitted, on the record, and I quote again, "Somalia has not been on the U.S. Government's radar screen since really about 1994."

 

Following the capture of Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts' Union last summer, this subcommittee met again on this very same issue. Under the leadership of then Chairman Martinez, we brought together most of the witnesses who sit before us again this morning to get a sense of the administration's plan for responding to that major development.

 

In her testimony, Assistant Secretary Frazer assured us and I quote, "President Bush and Secretary Rice have made it a priority to confront the ongoing turmoil in Somalia with a multilateral, coordinated strategy."

 

Now, we took this statement seriously. So seriously, in fact, that we legislated on the issue.

 

As you know, Secretary Frazer, I obtained the support of a bipartisan coalition of colleagues including my friend from Minnesota, Senator Coleman, to include an amendment in the FY07 defense authorization bill that required the administration to devise and share with Congress a comprehensive stabilization and reconstruction strategy for Somalia, as you outlined during your testimony in front of the committee last July.

 

The 90-day deadline for receipt of this report passed last month with no sign of the report and no sign of a strategy. We received no sign or call or letter suggesting that the administration was any closer to not only complying with the law, but creating a comprehensive plan for addressing the urgent, interrelated challenges we faced in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.

 

In other parts of the world, we've seen what happens when decisions are made and executed without the benefit of a long-term, comprehensive strategy backed by sufficient resources and political commitment.

 

I want our government to avoid making bad or rash decisions -- or no decisions at all -- and I want to ensure that our approach to Somalia takes into consideration the complex nature of the problem and the need to view Somalia comprehensively. Not just through a counter- terrorism lens.

 

Unfortunately, we have only a very limited amount of time to establish the conditions that will lead to political stability in Somalia and that window is closing fast.

 

Before I turn to my colleague Senator Sununu, let me note that my colleagues both Senator Coleman and Klobuchar have joined me today in introducing a bill that addresses these major challenges and authorizes significant resources to ensure that this multilateral endeavor to stabilize and secure Somalia is more successful than the last.

 

The bottom line is that unless the United States works aggressively with Somalis, regional actors and the international community to create stability in Somalia, that country will remain what it has been since the early 1990s -- a haven for terrorists and warlords and a source of instability in a critical region.

 

That is why this hearing is so critical. Whether and how we respond to the issues at hand will have a profound and long-lasting impact on the people of Somalia, on stability in the region and above all, on our national security.

 

With that said, let me also introduce our two panels before I turn to Senator Sununu.

 

On our first panel, we have two witnesses from the United States government. We have Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer and Mr. Michael Hess, the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development.

 

We've asked each of them to address current U.S. government efforts relating to Somalia and to discuss key challenges, resource requirements and the detailed components of the administration's strategy for Somalia. To the extent possible, we'd like to avoid general talking points or generic outlines and hope this can be a frank and detailed conversation.

 

We're very glad that you're both here today and we appreciate your willingness to testify. Thank you and welcome.

 

Our second panel will feature a range of individuals that are well qualified to speak on the unique challenges related to this complex country and the impact that developments there have on neighboring nations in the volatile Horn of Africa, as well as on U.S. national security.

 

We're privileged to welcome Dr. David Shinn back to the subcommittee. Ambassador Shinn was U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia between 1996 and 1999. He has testified in front of this committee a number of times and always provides a pragmatic and balanced view of the situation in the region. He currently services as an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University.

 

We look to you, Mr. Ambassador, for analysis of the regional and international dynamics relating to developments in Somalia, as well as your opinion of how the United States and international community can most effectively address the challenges we faced here.

 

After him, we will hear from Dr. Ken Menkhaus, also no stranger to the Senate. Professor Menkhaus is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Davidson College and has written extensively on the political and security dynamics in Somalia.

 

We look to you, Professor, to help paint a detailed picture of dynamics on the ground and the conditions that have emerged as a result of recent developments. We hope that your analysis will help this committee have a better sense for the complexities we need to address.

 

Finally, we welcome back Dr. Steve Morrison, who is the Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Africa Program. We've asked Dr. Morrison to speak to Somalia-related developments here in Washington and we hope that he'll lay out the challenges and requirements for developing an effective strategy to address instability in Somalia and throughout the Horn.

 

I would like to extend a special welcome to each of you this morning. I know I speak for my colleagues when I tell you how much we appreciate your coming here today. Your insights will inform and guide our discussion of immediate actions with serious, lasting implications for the Somali people, for the Horn of Africa and for the U.S. and international security. I am looking forward to hearing from you.

 

It is now my pleasure to turn to the distinguished ranking member, Senator John Sununu.

 

SUNUNU: Thank you very much, Senator Feingold and welcome to our witnesses today. I appreciate the very kind comments in your opening and look forward to working with you on this subcommittee, the importance of which I think you've outlined very effectively in your opening statement.

 

I ask consent to submit a more formal, written statement for the record. I do want to make a few points.

 

One is to underscore how complex the situation in Somalia is. That doesn't mean that those complexities are an excuse for not making more progress or not being clearer about our approach to the situation, but it means that we can learn a great deal about dealing with complex situations.

 

The economic, political, religious and civil society issues that have to be dealt with in Somalia have few parallels anywhere else in the world. We need to understand that.

 

Of course, this hearing is a small part in developing a better picture of these complexities, but if we develop better methodologies for addressing the failures and the weaknesses in these areas, then I think we'll have a framework that can be applied elsewhere in the world.

 

That brings me to the second point, which is the need to develop a better framework and organizational structure as you described for addressing fail-safes around the world, because of the natural implications that this can have for national security.

 

There's been a great deal of discussion about both organizational and policy changes within state and other organizations within the federal government to better equip those organizations for addressing these problems and the security consequences that can flow from a failed state.

 

I hope that our discussions today might help illuminate the kinds of organizations, emphasis and focus that might come from our government and other governments in order to be more effective, not just in Somalia, but in other parts of the world where we see the breakdown of economic structures and judicial structures and government structures necessary for stability.

 

A third point I want to make is how important it is to develop a regional approach. You mentioned this in your remarks.

 

But all of the players in the region have both a responsibility and an interest in addressing the situation in Somalia. They have different roles to play and, while it's true that there are competing interests in the region, I think all of the regional players are affected by a lack of security, movement of militias, weapons, financing for terrorism and the instability that results.

 

I think there's an opportunity there for the United States to take the lead in this effort, but there's also a very real opportunity for the regional players to become a more significant part of the solution.

 

Again, I thank you for putting the hearing together. I'm thrilled to be a part of this subcommittee and I look forward to the witnesses' testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you very much, Senator Sununu.

 

I'd like to turn to Senator Coleman, who has shown a strong interest and leadership in this area, for any remarks he has.

 

COLEMAN: Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, first I want to thank you for your leadership. I am very, very grateful for the leadership that you have consistently displayed on this issue. The legislation that we talked about that was just introduced, which you championed, will hopefully help us do those things that have to be done to bring some stability to the region, including pushing for a special envoy.

 

We've got to move Somalia up on the radar screen. We talked about that with the State Department, but this is a way to do that. I simply want to say thank you. Thank you for this hearing. Thank you for your strong voice. Thank you for your consistent efforts. I'm pleased to join with you.

 

We estimate there may be 70,000 Somalis in Minnesota. This is personal for me. This impacts a lot of folks in my community.

 

Just one bit of optimism with the challenges we face, understanding that Somalia is on the front line in the war on international terrorism today, what happens there does have an impact.

 

With the recognition you've talked about, we need to approach this with a broad range plan. It's not an isolated piece, we have to have a strategy and a comprehensive plan to deal with Somalia.

 

There's great diversity in the Somali community back in Minnesota. I have seen folks come together on this, and so if a diverse community back home can come together with the goal, the commitment, being greater stability and peace in the region, then we should figure out a way to work with them to make that happen.

 

Again, I ask unanimous consent to submit a more detailed formal statement, but I do want to thank you for your leadership on this issue.

 

FEINGOLD: Without objection. I thank the senator from Minnesota. I would just point out that some of the Somalis that lived in Minnesota had the wisdom to move to Wisconsin.

 

(LA.U.GHTER)

 

COLEMAN: It must be a warmer climate over there.

 

(LA.U.GHTER)

 

FEINGOLD: Anyway, thanks to both of you. Now we'll turn to the first panel.

 

Secretary Frazer?

 

FRAZER: Good morning and thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Sununu, Senator Coleman.

 

At this first hearing of the Africa Subcommittee, I would like to congratulate both Senator Feingold and Senator Sununu on their new positions. I look forward to working closely with you and other members of this subcommittee during the 110th Congress.

 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling the hearing on this timely and important issue and for your focus on Africa more generally. With your permission, I would like to submit my written testimony for the record.

 

FEINGOLD: Without objection.

 

FRAZER: Thank you. I am pleased to have this opportunity to publicly discuss U.S. policy and engagement with Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

 

Somalia occupies a unique space both geographically and strategically. The country sits at the crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East. The region's overall security is directly affected by Somalia's internal situation and for the first time in 16 years, Somalis have a real opportunity to rebuild their nation.

 

We will assist Somalia to realize this opportunity by restoring effective governance, governance that is representative of the full spectrum of Somali society. A lot has happened and significant diplomacy has been undertaken since I last appeared before this subcommittee in July 2006.

 

At the time, the United States was encouraged by the June 22, 2006 agreement between the Somali Transitional Federal Institution and the then Union of Islamic Courts.

 

The United States supported this agreement, which came to be know as the Khartoum Declaration, including the points of mutual recognition and cessation of hostilities. While negotiations initially offered great promise, by late July the actions of the Islamic courts were beginning to run counter to the spirit and the reality of dialogueue.

 

Immediately after the Khartoum Declaration, the Union of Islamic Courts was renamed the Council of Islamic Courts and Hassan Dahir Aweys, designated by both the United States and the United Nations as a terrorist, was elected to be the chairman of the CIC Consultative Council.

 

During the following months, extremist elements within the CIC, particularly the radical al Shabaab organization, hijacked the broader Courts movement, driving the CIC toward an agenda of military expansion and aggression.

 

Despite international efforts to encourage dialogueue between the CIC and the TFIs, the CIC chose to repeatedly violate the terms of the Khartoum Declaration through the December 18, 2006 terrorist bombing attack on the parliament building in Baidoa; the takeover of Kismaayo on September 25th and military build ups around Baidoa and Puntland.

 

These were decisive moments. Ultimately, the CIC miscalculated in its decision to pursue a military agenda and to refuse to join the governance process and the TFIs through peaceful dialogueue.

 

When the transitional federal government and Ethiopia launched a counter offensive against the CIC in December, the CIC's structure disappeared rapidly, driven in large part by the withdrawal of support from the Somali population.

 

The extremists within the CIC very clearly did not reflect the will of the Somalis as represented by civil society and their government. In the last two months, I have traveled to the region twice, conveying the strong commitment of President Bush and Secretary Rice to the people of Somalia.

 

The most striking lesson I took away from my first trip to the region in early January is this: The Somali people are ready.

 

The Somali people are ready for peace; they are tired of war. While the TFIs are not yet ready to stand entirely on their own, they offer a promising vehicle for Somalia.

 

At this moment of opportunity, we are proceeding purposefully. We pursuing a strategy to establish stability, move forward with the process of inclusive dialogueue and reconciliation and begin reconstruction in Somalia.

 

Under my leadership and that of President Bush's special assistant for Africa, Mr. Bobby Pittman, there is a growing inter- agency team working together to advance United States policy objectives in Somalia.

 

That inter-agency policy team is part of our broader strategy, working with the international contact group on Somalia multilaterally and very much coordinating with our regional partners, especially Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, but also Ghana, Yemen and Tanzania.

 

While the overall U.S. policy goals remain consistent to eliminate the threat of terrorism and improve regional stabilities by supporting the reestablishment of effective governance and response to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people, the changing dynamics inside Somalia require us to constantly adapt to ensure that our engagement remains effective.

 

To take advantage of the current window of opportunity available in Somalia, there are four immediate policy priorities: encourage inclusive dialogue amongst Somali stakeholders; mobilize support to build the governance capacity of the TFIs; provide development humanitarian assistance to the Somali people; achieve deployment of an African stabilization force; continue to track the terrorists to prevent Somalia remaining a safe haven for terrorism.

 

These goals are also shared by our partners in the international community. The United States believes that the key to long-term stability in Somalia now lies in a process of inclusive dialogueue and reconciliation within the framework of the transitional federal charter.

 

The United States has encouraged the leaderships of the TFIs to make clear, through statements and actions, that they are committed to an inclusive process of dialogue and reconciliation.

 

We have been clear. We see a role in the future of Somalia for all those who renounce violence and extremism and we strongly believe that the TFG must reach out to groups that have previously been marginalized from the political process.

 

In addition, we remain deeply troubled that foreign terrorists, affiliated with Al Qaida, have succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Somalia.

 

Somalia's continued exploitation by terrorist elements threatens the stability of the entire Horn of Africa region. We will therefore continue to take measures to deny terrorists safe haven in Somalia, as well as the ability to plan and operate from Somalia.

 

The United States government remains committed to neutralizing the threat that Al Qaida poses to all Americans, Somalis and citizens in the neighboring Horn of Africa countries. The administration will continue working with Somalis regardless of clan, religious or secular affiliation to eliminate this common threat.

 

As we look ahead to the next two years, Somalia's assistance needs may look overwhelming. To support our policy objectives and help achieve a lasting solution for Somalia, the United States has identified three priority areas for U.S. and foreign assistance.

 

Security and stabilization, number one; second, political dialogueue and reconciliation; third, service delivery and governance capacity.

 

Sufficient funding is required to enable the United States to successfully and adequately pursue these three important policy goals.

 

Under the first objective of security and stabilizations, funds would be used to support the deployment of the African Union mission in Somalia, AMISOM, longer term security sector reform and post- conflict stabilization activities.

 

Under the second objective of political dialogue and reconciliation, funds would be used to support reconciliation and dialogue through support for conflict mitigation, civil society and media freedom.

 

Lastly, under our third form of assistance priority, funding would be used to improve the ability of the Transitional Federal Institutions to provide social services and build the governance capacity of other TFIs at the local, regional and national level.

 

To help achieve these objectives, the administration has included a request for $60 million for Somalia in the president's supplemental funding request for FY 2007. That $60 million figure includes $20 million in humanitarian assistance and $40 million to support a peacekeeping operation.

 

We are working to identify additional resources for these efforts, which includes the $40 million that Secretary Rice announced in January, bringing our totally FY 2007 to $100 million for Somalia.

 

However, post-conflict institution building is ultimately a locally led enterprise. If international donor support is to be effective, these resources must be linked to the progress made by Somalis in achieving broad base political dialogueue and reconciliation on the part of clans, religious leaders, business people, civil society activists, women's leaders and other political groups.

 

Along with our African and international partners, the United States will remain engaged in supporting this much-needed process of inclusive dialogue while also attending to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.

 

The situation inside Somalia has changed a great deal since July. When I last testified before this body about Somalia, the United States along with our African regional partners and international partners had made significant progress toward supporting the TFIs and moving toward the rapid deployment of a peacekeeping force since last July. Work remains to be done but the political process is going to be inclusive and successful.

 

One important factor continues to work strongly in our collective favor: the Somali people are tired of war and yearn for what the TFIs offer, namely stability, security and governance. Our comprehensive strategy for Somalia is already showing promise and we are likely to see more progress in the coming months.

 

Thank you and I would be happy to take your questions.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your remarks. Now we turn to Mr. Hess.

 

HESS: Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Sununu and Senator Coleman. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss U.S. government assistance and the way forward in Somalia. With your permission, sir, I will submit my written statement for the record.

 

Having just returned from a trip to the Horn of Africa, where we have a disaster assistance response team monitoring needs in Somalia and the Somali region of Ethiopia and the Kenya-Somalia border, I plan to give you a picture today of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and a sense of how our humanitarian and development partners on the ground regard the situation.

 

I will also discuss what we see as a way forward and what USAID is doing to assure that the way forward brings peace and stability to a population that has suffered more in one year than most do in a lifetime.

 

In July, when I addressed the subcommittee, I spoke about the disastrous toll that the drought had taken on central and southern Somalia and that 1.7 million agro-pastoralists and pastoralists whose lives and livelihoods have benefited from the robust U.S. government humanitarian response and the generosity of the American people.

 

Since July, these same Somalis have experienced some of the worst flooding they can remember. Although the death toll has been minimal, 255,000 people were displaced, crops were destroyed and livestock were lost. Flooding has seriously hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly food, to the region.

 

During my trip to the region, I had the opportunity to visit Dadaab camp -- it's a refugee camp 80 kilometers inside the Kenya- Somalia border -- where I heard first hand from Somalis about the situation in their home country. The camp hosts some 170,000 refugees, 98 percent of whom are Somalis who have fled the country.

 

However in the last year, when the Islamic courts were making advances in Somalia, nearly 35,000 additional people crossed over from Somalia and now reside in that camp.

 

There are two points I would like you to remember about this camp.

 

First, it has been there for 16 years and has a global acute malnutrition rate of 22 percent, which is 7 percent over the emergency level, even though the people in these camps receive a full ration.

 

I point out the challenges that we face and what Fred Cooney (ph) taught us a long time ago -- that it's more than just food that prevents malnutrition.

 

Secondly, the families with whom I spoke, particularly the women, were not willing to return to Somalia when peace returned. That is a striking comment and one on which we'll have to work in the future.

 

Across the border in Somalia, our partners estimate that the most recent round of conflict has displaced 40,000 people in south and central Somalia. Almost all of those have returned to their homes, but a number of people estimate that the acute food crisis has dropped by more than half.

 

However, as the rains and flooding begin to ease, our partners are preparing for an increase in water and mosquito borne diseases such as cholera, dysentery and malaria, which pose a particularly serious threat to children under the age of five, the elderly and the population already compromised by under-nourishment.

 

Livelihoods are also at risk. In addition to human disease, animal disease is a threat. Rift Valley Fever is suspected in hundreds of recent animal deaths and several human deaths in southern Somalia, where conflict has made it difficult to collect and transport samples for confirmation. Rift Valley Fever can decimate herds of cattle and sheep and it poses a serious health threat to the weakened human population.

 

It also has a disastrous potential economic impact on Somalia and its neighbors. Our U.N. partners and NGO partners are working together with the Transitional Federal Government to identify the fever and treat humans and animals.

 

So far in fiscal year 2007, the U.S. government has provided nearly $16 million to mitigate the impact of drought, floods and conflict, resulting in the displacements in Somalia and across its borders.

 

This assistance builds on the carryover resources from $92 million in 2006. The availability of these resources permitted our partners to respond immediately and robustly to the flood emergency in the fall and ensured a strong food pipeline through the first quarter of this fiscal year.

 

USAID's ongoing humanitarian programs are targeted in the drought and flood affected areas of southern and central Somalia and addresses food insecurity, nutrition, health, water, sanitation and hygiene. Our partners have well-established programs and a thorough knowledge of the local and regional issues affecting the populations they serve.

 

It is this experience that has enabled them to continue to serve beneficiaries and implement programs throughout the political turmoil of the past year.

 

While in Nairobi, I met with our partners. I was uniformly impressed with their dedication and the knowledge each one brings to their work. None of groups felt that the conflict occurring around the withdrawal of the Courts had dramatically increased humanitarian needs. But they all stressed the needs to continue support of drought and flood victims.

 

Access appears to be improving in many parts of Somalia. The government of Kenya has pledged to soon reopen its borders for humanitarian deliveries into Somalia and most of our NGO partners are back in Somalia.

 

I also met with the United Nations country team for Somalia. They have an impressive team. The head of the UNDP had just returned from Mogadishu, where he led a U.N. delegation to assess the possibility of the return of U.N. personnel.

 

It is clear that the U.N. regards the next few months as a window of opportunity to support Somalis to achieve peace and security in their country. The U.N. country team outlined a set of priorities for the next six months, which bridge humanitarian, stabilization and initial reconstruction efforts.

 

These priorities also include building the capacity of key Transitional Federal Institutions, strengthening the security sector and assisting the Transitional Federal Institutions in jump-starting urgent, basic social services, particularly in education and health.

 

In addition, they will ensure that the livelihood and job creation launched earlier in this year will be community-based activities.

 

Our own priorities are much the same as these, since we helped them draft the plan. Last year we programmed $7.9 million in FY06 development assistance to strengthen the capacity of civil society, support conflict mitigation, address basic education needs, including distance learning and teacher training, to increased access to water and rehabilitation of urban water systems and development of rural water services.

 

Also, while I was in Nairobi, I met with Admiral Hunt, the commander of the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, with whom we have been working very closely through the entire Horn.

 

I am optimistic that the coordination established between the State Department, USAID and CJTF-HOA and the Somali working group in Nairobi, we are creating a coordination model capable of serving both our national security interests and the interests of the people of Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

 

I would like to outline for you our priorities over the next 90 days.

 

First, we will continue to respond to humanitarian contingencies, which may arise in this volatile area.

 

Secondly, we will identify opportunities to increase training and capacity building in our current emergency programs, particularly in nutrition, health and water services, jump-starting long-term efforts addressing the delivery of critical public services.

 

Third, we will develop a post-conflict Somalia livelihood recovery strategy, similar to the lessons learned in the pastoralist recovery and alternative livelihood programming we have been doing in Ethiopia and Kenya and other parts of Africa.

 

Fourth, support the efforts made on the part of the U.N. and our non-governmental partners to ensure that the ongoing emergency response provides a foundation for recovery and reconstruction.

 

Fifth, ensure that the protection of humanitarian space becomes part of the diplomatic dialogueue with the Transitional Federal Government.

 

In closing, I want to remind the committee that the dire situation on which I reported last July and that for the people of Somalia, the situation has only gotten worse. We are here today talking about a window of opportunity when it may be possible to help Somalia find a pathway out of political chaos, hunger and suffering.

 

Seizing this opportunity will increase the chances that the region as a whole finds its way to a stable, peaceful and productive future. The approaches that I have outlined today are our best efforts at maximizing this opportunity and we look forward to working with you and the Interagency, to make sure that these opportunities are not lost.

 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for having me back to talk about Somalia and what we hope to accomplish there. I look forward to responding to any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr. Hess, and thank you to the panel for your testimony.

 

I'll begin the questioning in a minute, but first I want to say how pleased I am that Senator Webb has joined us, not only today but has asked and has become a member of this subcommittee. He's already made the effort to meet with me and talk about the work of the subcommittee and I'm extremely pleased to have his expertise.

 

WEBB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be a member of the subcommittee and I look forward to working with you on all the issues under its jurisdiction.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you, Senator.

 

I'll start up with a 10-minute round. Secretary Frazer, can you tell us why the administration has failed to comply with the requirement in law that it provides a report on Somalia including a strategy for dealing with instability in Somalia?

 

FRAZER: Should I just take that question or are you going to ask a number of questions?

 

FEINGOLD: I'm going to ask you a lot of questions, but first I'm asking you why you haven't complied with the law. I thought I'd start off with that one.

 

FRAZER: I'm used to getting five or six questions at once.

 

FEINGOLD: You'll get some of that. But I just want to hear what you have to say right away.

 

FRAZER: Let me just say, sir, that we haven't failed to comply with the law. What we're trying to do is to develop -- as you have asked and the Congress has asked -- a comprehensive strategy.

 

Let me just state that part of developing a comprehensive strategy is actually responding to the events on the ground and actually implementing the strategy we have in place.

 

I know that we spent quite a lot of time dealing with very fast moving events in the Horn of Africa, building the multilateral approach that you and in our consultations, private and public, have called for and building a coalition with our region of partners.

 

I think that the spirit of the request from the Hill is to have effective impact on the Horn of Africa, and I think that we've demonstrated that over the past year.

 

So we certainly are working on trying to get that strategy paper to you, but we're also very much focused on implementing an effective strategy, which I think that we have seen in the results that are taking place in Somalia today, which -- when you requested that, the Transitional Federal Government was isolated and sitting in Baidoa. Today it's in Mogadishu.

 

So I think we've got to do both things, and we're trying to manage both things.

 

FEINGOLD: You know, I understand that. I am concerned, though, about the essential lack of communication about not following the law. I, kind of, look at it as putting the cart before the horse.

 

Without the benefit of a shared and coordinated vision, I think it's difficult to make tactical or daily decisions and respond to the changing environment.

 

This report, which should have been in by now, would hopefully provide the general goal, the objectives, the tasks and the contingencies involved in pursuing our interests in the region. It should take into account the changes on the ground and the fluid nature of the situation.

 

Look, Secretary, the Congress passed a law and expressed its desire to understand how the administration was going to deal with instability in Somalia, about how it would address the terrorist safe havens there.

 

And it just troubles me, obviously, as a senator and somebody that was involved in passing a law, that the administration would, sort of, put this to the side without any real communication.

 

I will urge you, Madam Secretary, to take immediate action to comply with the law that was passed and signed by the president.

 

Now, let me turn to the current situation on the ground. You and I have talked about this before and I'd like an update.

 

What is the status of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops on the ground?

 

FRAZER: Ethiopian troops have started their withdrawal, Senator. They started in January withdrawing forces.

 

As you know, in your discussions having traveled to Ethiopia and met yourself with Prime Minister Meles and in my discussions with him as well and in the secretary's discussions -- Secretary Rice's discussions -- Prime Minister Meles said that he wanted to be out of Somalia within two weeks.

 

More than two weeks have passed. Many in the international community have urged him to slow down that timeline because of fear that there would be a vacuum created by the too-rapid withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, so the withdrawal has started but it hasn't been completed. We would expect it to be a phased process as we phase in the African peacekeeping forces.

 

FEINGOLD: What percentage of the Ethiopian troops have been withdrawn?

 

FRAZER: You'd have to have a concrete number of how many were there in the first place to decide on that percentage and that number has varied. Some people have said 2,000, some people have said up to 8,000 on forces. I don't know what the...

 

FEINGOLD: Is it your sense that most of the troops have been withdrawn, or just a small percentage?

 

FRAZER: It's not my sense that most of the troops have withdrawn at this point.

 

FEINGOLD: Will the A.U. peacekeeping force be deployed before the last Ethiopian troops are withdrawn from Somalia?

 

FRAZER: That is the idea. We would hope to have -- we've been working with the Ugandan battalion in particular. President Museveni has promised to put in 1,500 troops. We've been working with them.

 

Right now, their parliament -- the Minister of Defense has put a motion before parliament on January 31st. They take three working days to decide. Their opposition was out so they're trying to give opposition time to actually consider the deployment of those Ugandan forces.

 

As soon as that parliament approves the decision, we will be prepared to help them deploy.

 

FEINGOLD: I know it's your strategy to support the TFG, but what happens if the TFG is unable to create the political agreements and the consensus needed to govern the country effectively. I know it's hard to discuss this because that's not what we want to happen. But given this country's history, I think we need to be prepared for the possibilities.

 

Will you talk a little bit about what that strategy might be?

 

FRAZER: Well, we're planning for the TFG to be able to build the consensus necessary and we think that they've made good progress in that regard in a very short period. We continue to see the prime minister reaching out to the various clans.

 

The president, at the African Union Summit, has announced having a reconciliation conference that would include all stakeholders. They've made appointments for the mayor of Mogadishu and the deputy mayor that have been broadly accepted and supported.

 

We will continue to work with them to actually accomplish inclusive governance. That's going to be...

 

FEINGOLD: I'm pleased to hear that, but what's the back-up plan if they can't?

 

FRAZER: That's not going to be easy, as you said, because they actually are going against the trends of the last 16 years.

 

FEINGOLD: What's the back up plan if they can't?

 

FRAZER: I'm getting to that, Senator, because I think that the back-up plan is based in the effort to actually try to achieve the inclusive dialogue.

 

We would expect that, if that's not going to happen, the analysis is that it would probably be a very narrow community -- two communities that would create a counter to this inclusive dialogue. That's a particular sub-sub-clan, which needs to be brought into the dialogue and that's remnants of the Islamic Court and foreign terrorists.

 

So, what would happen?

 

We expect to be able to reach out to that sub-sub-clan and deny those foreign terrorists that support of the community.

 

If it doesn't work, it's very likely going to be because of outside influence. It's going to be because of outside support for terrorists and we would hope to have, you know, a peacekeeping force there that would help to provide some of the stability while they create the space to drain the swamp essentially of that foreign terrorist element.

 

FEINGOLD: I'm at the point of draining the swamp. In December, shortly before the Ethiopian incursion, you stated that the Council of Islamic Courts was, quote, "controlled," unquote by Al Qaida in East Africa. This characterization implicitly compared the CIC to the Taliban, the last regime to be under the control of Al Qaida.

 

However, DIA head Negroponte was quoted in the Washington Post, saying, quote, "I don't think there are hard and fast views," unquote on the question.

 

Asked whether the CIC was the next Taliban, he stated, I don't think I've seen a good answer.

 

In January, DIA director General Maples testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee that, quote, "Al Qaida is assessed to be assisting the radical Islamist elements of the CIC with leadership and training with hopes of establishing a future Taliban-like state," unquote.

 

That testimony would seem to contradict your assertion that Al Qaida had already asserted control of the CIC. Would you like to take this opportunity to revisit your earlier statement?

 

FRAZER: Thank you for the opportunity to clarify my earlier statement and to say that quotes from the newspapers are hardly quotes at all. Because certainly people change what one has actually said to them when they write it in newspapers.

 

But what I specifically said was that the Council of Islamic Courts was a heterogeneous group which had been hijacked by terrorist elements. People like Hassan Abdullah al-Turki, designated under U.S. Executive Order 13224 of the United Nations Security Council 1267.

 

What I said was it's led by Dahir Aweys, a designator under U.S. Executive Order 13224 and under the United Nations Security Council resolution 1267.

 

What I said was that the Al-Shabaab militia specifically was of the extremist order and was led by individuals like Adan Hashi Ayro, who was trained by Al Qaida in Afghanistan prior to 2001. Those individuals had hijacked what was a heterogeneous Islamic Court. So I was much more specific than what was quoted in The Washington Post.

 

FEINGOLD: I hope to get back to this in another round, but thank you for that. And since I've run out of time here, I do want to at least ask a question of Mr. Hess. Thank you for your patience.

 

After your recent travel to the region, can you give us a sense for what impact the ongoing humanitarian challenges will have on the political efforts in Mogadishu?

 

HESS: Yes, sir. We feel that the humanitarian community is pulling together -- and the U.N. as well -- to take this opportunity to work with the TFIs and the TFG to build capacity in service delivery.

 

So this humanitarian assistance that's being provided will assist in building that capacity in delivering the services to the people who need it the most. Especially in the terms of education, health and water and sanitation.

 

FEINGOLD: OK, Mr. Hess, I hope to return to you but now I'll turn to the ranking member, Senator Sununu.

 

SUNUNU: Thank you very much. Let me pick up the questioning.

 

Mr. Hess, could you speak with a little bit more detail about the activities of the disaster recovery team, the DART team, that is operating?

 

What's the size of the group?

 

You know, what activities have they prioritized at the highest level?

 

What are the weaknesses of a DART group like this?

 

What areas are they not ideally suited to address and obviously therefore these are areas that we should find other ways to complement their efforts.

 

HESS: Yes, sir. We don't take the formation of a Disaster Assistance Response Team lightly. When you create one of these, as you know it sends a signal and a message, which was exactly what we were trying to do.

 

We were concerned about the humanitarian situation starting in December and the fact that it might deteriorate as people were on the move during the bad time.

 

SUNUNU: When was the response team first put together?

 

HESS: In the end of December.

 

(CROSSTALK)

 

SUNUNU: So, December of 2006 -- so it's only been in place for a couple of months?

 

HESS: Absolutely.

 

SUNUNU: And the size?

 

HESS: Right now, it's about eight members, but it varies. One of the members is sitting behind me now, so they rotate occasionally. In terms of what they're focusing on, we look at the primary basic humanitarian needs.

 

We are concerned about the global acute malnutrition rates in south central Somalia where we've seen rates of 22, 23, in some places as high as 30 percent global acute malnutrition rate in the Gega region.

 

Again, we can't address that specifically with food, but food and security is a large part of that. Certainly we look at food as a big component of that. Our partners World Food Program and CARE are doing a good job of distributing food.

 

But we also have to look at water, sanitation. And they are focused and working -- the team is focused very closely on working with our partners who are rehabilitating wells, digging new bore holes.

 

And the flooding, unfortunately, especially in the lower Juba region disrupted a lot of the work we had been doing on water and sanitation, so that was a problem.

 

We're also worried about the health situation from the Rift Valley Fever, malaria, mosquito borne diseases, diarrhea and cholera which we saw a minor outbreak of.

 

Again, working with the Disaster Assistance Response Team we had the ability to respond quickly to cordon off the area where the cholera initially broke out.

 

The areas where we'd like to see some more work, where we are looking at, is how we can facilitate more directly the capacity building of the government. We have our office of transition initiatives, has a member on that Disaster Assistance Response Team looking for the opportunity to get in and directly facilitate the building of that capacity along with UNDP.

 

SUNUNU: Do any of the response team personnel work directly in Somalia, or are they primarily located in Kenya?

 

HESS: They are all in Kenya. They have not been able to get in yet.

 

SUNUNU: You said that most of our NGO partners are back operating again in Somalia.

 

What level of effectiveness have they reached, and is there more capacity that they can build or that we can help them build within a country?

 

HESS: The points that we tried to make with our NGO partners is building local capacity at the same time as they try to deliver the assistance.

 

As you can imagine, most of what they do is through local partners. We're trying to build up that capacity so that they can carry on through the challenging period, if you will.

 

We want to make sure that they have that capacity specifically on the monitoring side, because we're concerned about this global acute malnutrition rate, we're concerned about the spread of Rift Valley Fever and other mosquito borne diseases. If we can build that monitoring capacity on the local side, we'll be a lot further ahead.

 

SUNUNU: How is the team's relationship with the government of Kenya and/or government of Ethiopia?

 

Either intentionally or not, do those governments have anything in place that acts as a restriction on our ability to have a positive impact?

 

HESS: That's a good point We have a good working relationship with both governments, because we've had teams and we've had missions in the area for a long time.

 

One of the areas which we are working very closely with the Kenyan government on now is the Dadaab Camp. As I pointed out, the global acute malnutrition rate is pretty high. One of the things we're looking at is using areas around the camps to increase alternative livelihood development there.

 

What we're looking at is the planting of alternate crops so that we can vary the diet of the people in the camps and also to drill some more wells in the region, but as you know, when you're talking about a water table that is vulnerable to begin with, that's a problem. The government of Kenya worked very closely with us during the flooding of the Dadaab camp, as you remember one of the sub-camps, Ifo, was wiped out.

 

The Kenyan government worked very closely with us to help alleviate that situation, so they have a good working relationship with the government.

 

SUNUNU: Thank you.

 

Assistant Secretary Frazer, you mentioned the negotiations that are excepted to take place at the end of February and some of the out reach or the contact participation that needed to take place at the sub clan level.

 

What other participants are important to the success of those negotiations?

 

Are there any parties that have been reluctant to participate?

 

FRAZER: Yes, thank you, senator. Inclusive dialogue is already taking place with the prime minister and the president reaching out to various stakeholders.

 

The key stakeholders would be, I believe, the Somali business community, the business leaders which provided financing for the ports in the past and will be an important part of providing the assistance and support for the Transitional Federal Government.

 

Also, it's very clear that the Ayer sub-sub clan in the past had been a base of support for the Islamic Courts. There are some concerns about trying to make sure that they feel that they are adequately represented or represented, that they have their own representatives as part of the Transitional Federal Government and part of the inclusive dialogue. I think that those are two key sectors.

 

Somali women are extremely strong. And I think very much reaching out to the women's groups and civil society groups would be key to building that inclusive dialogue.

 

SUNUNU: But you expect each of these groups to be effectively represented in the February discussions?

 

FRAZER: Yes. I think you're talking about the National Reconciliation Conference. I would expect them to be represented most certainly as well as Somali Diaspora.

 

SUNUNU: You spoke a little bit about the troops committed by Uganda, 1,500 troops under the A.U.

 

What other commitments have been made for troop participation and what can the United States do, what have we offered to do, to support the logistics and deployment of those troops?

 

FRAZER: For the Ugandan troops, we have military planners working in Uganda with the Ugandan chief of defense forces and chief of general staff. We will do a contract airlift for the Ugandan forces. We also have planners at the African Union working at headquarters on command and control systems.

 

The Nigerians have also offered a battalion. The Burundians have offered a battalion of about 1,000 troops as well.

 

Malawi originally was reported to have offered them, but I think that they need to go through their parliamentary system as well to get the final approval.

 

Other countries, like Rwanda and Tanzania, have offered to train the Transitional Federal Government's national army and we are hoping that South Africa will provide some type of assistance.

 

Algeria has also offered to provide airlifts to AMISOM and so they're still in the process of finalizing the troop contributors and the way in which they will contribute. We can provide planners.

 

The Ghanaians have offered a few hundred troops as well. They've asked us for planners to go to Ghana to Accra and to work with their military to prepare them for deployment.

 

We will provide some equipment, contract airlift some sustainment support.

 

SUNUNU: When do you expect deployment to take place and what numbers do you expect will be achieved?

 

FRAZER: The first deployment that we're hoping for is of the Ugandan forces. We're on standby waiting for their parliament to decide. We can deploy them a day after their parliament decides.

 

We also know that they have teams right now in Mogadishu and in Addis, coordinating their planning within the A.U. structure. So we're ready to assist, it's the timing. I'm keep hoping in the next week or two.

 

SUNUNU: And the total number that you hope to attain?

 

FRAZER: For that first deployment we're talking about...

 

SUNUNU: But in the aggregate, including the other commitments that you've referenced?

 

FRAZER: The A.U. has said that they want a force of about 8,000. They feel that they have commitments right now for actual forces of about 4,000.

 

SUNUNU: OK, thank you.

 

Last question, Assistant Secretary Frazer, what should the status of Somaliland be and what is the official interaction between the U.S. government and the governing organizations in Somaliland?

 

FRAZER: I think that we in the administration agree with the sense of Congress that the status of Somaliland should be held off right now.

 

We have always said that we will follow the lead of the African Union and I think that the African Union also feels that now is not the time to push for decisions on Somaliland.

 

They have been invited to be part of the National Reconciliation Conference that President Yusuf announced. I don't know whether they'll take up that offer.

 

We meet with representatives of the Somaliland government and they have a representative here. We met with them when I was at the African Union summit, I met on the margins of the African Union summit with the foreign minister of Somaliland and have done so in my travels through the region in the past.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you, Senator Sununu.

 

I'm also pleased to see Senator Cardin here, who's a new member of the subcommittee and the Senate but obviously no stranger to these issues, as a long-time distinguished member of the House.

 

Welcome. And normally, we would rotate and go to Senator Cardin now, but out of courtesy he has deferred to Senator Coleman who has been here for some time.

 

Senator Coleman?

 

COLEMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, Senator Cardin.

 

Let me first talk a little bit about the resources we have focused on dealing with this issue.

 

How many State Department folks do we have in Nairobi who are focused on Somalia. Just Somalia -- what kind of compliment do we have there?

 

FRAZER: There are currently six people full time working on Somalia in Nairobi, including a Somalia coordinator, a senior foreign service officer and Ambassador John Yates, who's part of leading that Somali working group under the leadership of obviously our Ambassador Ranneberger, who I'm not including among the statistics.

 

COLEMAN: In addition, we've talked about the global nature of the war on terrorism and the concerns about Somalia being a base for expanded terrorist activity. The Bureau of Near East Affairs -- how globally are we looking at dealing with the situation in Somalia?

 

FRAZER: Yes, they are involved. We work closely with them. I sometimes feel that a lot of it is them suggesting that I travel to countries in their region, but certainly Assistant Secretary David Welch raises the Somalia issue. Our ambassadors in the region are constantly reporting meeting with officials in their countries and sending in those reports. We have reports of significant interaction with Yemen, but also from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, from the Arab League. We're engaging all of them.

 

COLEMAN: Senator Feingold, the chairman, talked about legislation that was introduced today which I myself and Senator Klobuchar co-sponsor. One of the parts of that legislation talks about a special envoy to Somalia and lays out very specific duties and direct United States government efforts to establish a credible, capable government and national unity, provide detailed assessments of challenges and progress on the ground in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, to a truly comprehensive and sustainable peace in Somalia.

 

What is the administration's position with regard to the appointment of a special envoy to Somalia?

 

FRAZER: As I said, we have Ambassador Yates as our Somali coordinator. He was appointed, took up his position based in Nairobi in January 2007 and we would expect him to play the role of the special envoy as outlined to work in the region to develop that diplomatic engagement in the region itself.

 

COLEMAN: Does he have the recognized authority to do what a special envoy does?

 

Does he have the leeway, the independence to be able to do what a special envoy would be called upon to do?

 

FRAZER: Yes, senator, in the context of the lead on our foreign policy as you very well know is Secretary Rice and she's very much in the lead on our Somalia policy. She convenes her team, she has been part of this development of the strategy with the national security adviser within the context of the inner agency, so yes indeed, like our other ambassadors who have authority in their countries as chief of missions, he is empowered with helping us to develop that strategy and to implement the strategy.

 

COLEMAN: My concern would not be necessarily from above, I just want to know that folks on the ground -- I want to know that folks in the embassy, folks in other areas would recognize that he has the ability to pull things together, to get information and to help put in place a plan. That's my concern.

 

Is it recognized that he's going to have those abilities that we would expect a special envoy to have?

 

FRAZER: Senator Coleman, I'm having -- yes indeed. You know, Ambassador Ranneberger is our chief of mission with responsibility in the region overall to coordinate our policy in the region and he does so by convening conference calls with the regional ambassadors. Their chief of mission, Ambassador John Yates works very closely with Ambassador Ranneberger to help us implement that strategy. Yes, he has the authority.

 

Line authority belongs in the region to our chiefs of mission and we hold that and guard that very closely and obviously in Washington the Secretary of State leads our foreign policy.

 

COLEMAN: I recognize that. I mean my concern is that the bureaucracy recognizes that we're focusing resources or we're putting somebody in position to pull things together. It's tough working within a system that people don't recognize. It's my concern -- we talk about a special envoy, rather than say respectfully just a bureaucrat.

 

We want somebody out there who's able to say this is important. Both witnesses talked about this window of opportunity. There's a window of opportunity now, but if we don't seize it and we don't direct the resources, if we don't say that this is important, then I don't know if we'll seize that window of opportunity. That's really where I'm getting to on this line of questioning.

 

FRAZER: I understand it, senator and I appreciate it and I've said that I think that the ambassador has all of the authority necessary to do that. The reason why I'm hesitating and you're hearing me hesitate, is because I don't understand why we would want to take or suggest that the Secretary of State who is actively engaging and involved on a daily basis on Somalia and is a senior diplomat for our government -- why we would suggest that she not stay in that lead role.

 

Why would we devolve in some ways the authority away from the line responsibility for it if it's being carried out?

 

If it's not being carried out, a special envoy I think can help to manage but when the line authorities are managing the policy, I'm left puzzled, frankly, by the desire to put another person into that line command.

 

COLEMAN: In part we're talking about the Secretary of State because the Secretary of State is involved in trying to get support in the region for efforts in Iraq. The Secretary of State is involved with trying to deal with the situation of preventing the rearmament of Hezbollah in the Lebanon.

 

The Secretary of State is involved with the very delicate negotiations dealing in six party talks with North Korea because the Secretary of State -- and I could go on and on. In Venezuela, the Secretary of State in the Sudan and Darfur and so my concern is...

 

FRAZER: And Somalia.

 

COLEMAN: And that's my concern, that there are all these critical areas and issues that we face today and I just want to make sure that we are putting the focus, the attention, the resources with the kind of independence that allows people to do what has to be done, knowing that the Secretary of State's attention is going to be diverted by a whole range of other critical issues.

 

This is also important and I don't want to minimize that importance in recognizing that there are other things going on in the world today that are going to take her attention and her focus.

 

FRAZER: The Secretary of State has prioritized Somalia on her range of issues that she's dealing with. Any time we need to go to see the Secretary of State, she leads our policy on Somalia, she is the decider that gave us the $40 million in January when we went to the international contact group. She's the one who blessed and decided on the regional strategy. It's a priority for her.

 

COLEMAN: And I appreciate that.

 

Mr. Hess, I would like to look at little bit at the resources. I think the president's budget request talked about -- was it $9 million was the figure for development assistance for Somalia in 2008?

 

Does this represent all the assistance that we're providing Somalia to accomplish all the objectives that you mentioned?

 

HESS: No, sir, we have more money than that. As you know in the supplemental there was an increase of $20 million that was asked for. We have additional food aid resources that will be available as needed. We have 41,000 metric tons on the ground right now. We did a call forward for another 18,500 tons in January so the pipeline is in good shape there. But we have funds available if we need more food resources.

 

We're looking at non-food items, particularly on the water sanitation side, rehabilitation of wells. We have asked our partners to look particularly at those areas and also on education.

 

COLEMAN: Do we have a figure as to what the total costs will be? What do we need to make a difference in Somalia, understanding that we have a whole range of humanitarian crises in flooding, malnutrition et cetera et cetera?

 

HESS: It's hard to estimate exactly what that number is right now, but we're looking at anywhere from $20 million to $60 million. We need our partners on the ground to come back to us after they've done a thorough assessment because you don't want to attach a number to that right now without an accurate assessment. We need to look primarily at the damage that was done by the flooding on the wells that we had dug during the drought last year.

 

COLEMAN: Are you satisfied with the level of international cooperation that we're getting to deal with the situation in Somalia?

 

HESS: Yes, sir. I met with the donors when we were out there, that's a very good question. I met with all the donors. They're very seized with the issue. ECHO and the E.U. have done a very good job of coordinating the effort. DIFID, our U.K. partners, are very much engaged in the area and they meet on a weekly basis to ensure -- because what we're talking about here are gaps and where the gaps exist and we want to make sure that those gaps are covered and we work very closely with them to ensure that we don't have those gaps.

 

That's also the role of that U.N. team. OCHA, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance has done a very good job on the coordination role. They've got a good team player out there and he's doing a great job as well.

 

COLEMAN: Thank you.

 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, Senator Cardin.

 

FEINGOLD: Let me turn to Senator Cardin, but just before I do I want to thank Senator Coleman for the remarks he just made in the context of the special envoy. I know the secretary indicated she's puzzled by our request for a special envoy but I'm puzzled that you would be puzzled.

 

Let's face it, in Sudan we had a special envoy in John Danforth to try to resolve the dispute between the north and the south. We currently have a special envoy with regard to Darfur, Ambassador Natsios. So presumably Secretary Rice has engaged in those matters. I know she is. I know she cares about them. It's just a question of how much can one person do with such an incredible range of problems which Senator Coleman just identified post 9/11. It's essentially impossible.

 

So you know, I'm loathe to just call for a bunch of special envoys but we're in a very unusual situation. Ambassador Ranneberger is an excellent ambassador who I had a chance to work with in Kenya. He's obviously doing Somalia part time because Kenya is a very important country and it requires an enormous amount of his attention.

 

John Yates is a retired temporary appointment, so this is about authorities in part, you're correct about that, but it's also about capacity. Just how much can people do given the resources. We had Newt Gingrich of all people come before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and say that it had been a mistake to cut back on our State Department people and advocate a significant increase in state department staff.

 

This is the symbol of the contract with America admitting that he was wrong to do that. So we are in a different era and it is not necessarily an attack on your authority or Secretary Rice's authority to say in this particular situation, it may be necessary to have a special envoy. I hope we can continue discussion of this special envoy issue in that context and in that spirit.

 

Senator Cardin?

 

CARDIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me concur in your comments, Somalia is very important to U.S. interests and I think a special envoy is appropriate and certainly we need the resources if we're going to be able to be effective.

 

Administrator Hess, thank you for being here.

 

Secretary Frazer, I appreciate both of your testimonies. As I understand your testimony, Secretary Frazer, the mission or our priorities in Somalia I think are without dispute, to encourage political dialogue between leadership, with the stakeholders, to mobilize international support to build a government's capacity clearly for credibility.

 

We need the international community working with us and deployment of an African stabilization force in order to deal with the humanitarian circumstances. I think all those are goals that we agree with. I want to concentrate if I might on the issue of terrorism within Somalia and the mission, the air strikes, that the U.S. participated in at the beginning of January.

 

Can you just give us the status of those air strikes, the targets and how successful we were?

 

FRAZER: Yes, senator, I can try my very best. There were two air strikes, A130s as you said. They were targeting convoys. There were in a remote area in Somalia, near the border between Somalia and Kenya. I don't have full information at this point on the results. I think that probably my colleagues from DOD might be able to help but I think there's also an issue of the fog of war and we need greater clarity.

 

We think that and we're fairly certain that some of the terrorists that were targeted have been captured or killed, but I think that probably time will tell. We will have a better opportunity to know exactly who has been killed in those attacks and who has escaped.

 

CARDIN: I'm certainly interested in that and perhaps we'll follow up with DOD. I'm also interested in what impact it has on the other goals. It's been reported that Europeans were not very pleased with these air strikes. Maybe you could give us a little more information about how the stakeholders have responded to American air strikes?

 

FRAZER: Senator, the key stakeholders that we've been focusing our strategy on are the Africans themselves, particularly those in the region who have some leverage and whose interests are most threatened by these terrorists who are operating in Somalia. We've worked very closely as I said with Ethiopian, Kenya and Djibouti. We've shared intelligence with them to try to track these terrorists. We will continue to work with them.

 

I think that everyone wants to work in coordination and cooperation and so we have to maximize that but I think that we have a shared goal to try to track these guys and our cooperation with the key partners, being those countries in the neighborhood, has not been undermined by the two air strikes.

 

CARDIN: I certainly agree with us doing what is necessary against terrorism. My question is a little bit broader, as to what impact that is having on our overall strategies in Somalia as it relates to our diplomatic efforts?

 

FRAZER: Our diplomatic efforts continue strong. The International Contact Group on Somalia is a focal point for our diplomatic, multilateral efforts. We continue to have key institutions and member countries. Key institutions being the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League, the intergovernmental authority on development that are involved as well as key countries like Norway, the U.S., Tanzania and others.

 

There has been no diminishing of that multilateral effort. In fact, more countries have asked to join the International Contact Group on Somalia.

 

CARDIN: But do you anticipate that additional air strikes will be necessary?

 

FRAZER: That's really an operational question, sir. It's clearly tracking these terrorists who continue to threaten American lives, the Somalis themselves and the neighbors is a key priority for the United States, but that is really an operational question for the combatant commanders in the field.

 

CARDIN: I'm trying to get from you, but I'm not succeeding, as to whether this is having any significant impact in our discussions with our international partners on the goals that you have articulated in Somalia.

 

FRAZER: Clearly the issue of what actions the United States takes in terms of tracking these terrorists -- all of our actions -- sharing information, air strikes, putting forces on the ground if we should do that -- are part of the dialogue that we have, especially with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda, our regional partners. Especially with them, but also more broadly. My focus on the diplomatic effort is to ensure that whatever we do is coordinated with those key countries around Somalia that have the greatest leverage over it.

 

Secondary is working and making sure that we remain coordinated with countries throughout Africa. We do that most effectively through the African Union. I had dialogueue with Chairman Konare at the A.U. It was good dialogue. I think we're still latched up. Then from there, obviously, the international partners, working with the European Union and especially with Norway who co-chairs the International Contact Group on Somalia, so what I'm saying...

 

CARDIN: It would seem to me though that part of the diplomatic effort is to work with our European friends and have a greater understanding on the use of our air support to deal with terrorism. Was that done?

 

FRAZER: Frankly there just wasn't in my interaction with the Europeans -- that issue wasn't high on the agenda. It came up in one of my conversations with one European country. All the others were focused on the question of conditioning aid specifically to the AMISON force and its deployment and whether the E.U. position that until the TFG did more on dialogue would hold up funding for AMISON.

 

That was really the focus of attention and the major diplomatic issue that we were addressing on Somalia at the African Union summit in which I had consultations broadly with the European countries. It didn't have a chance -- maybe it'll come up at the International Contact Group on Somalia, which will meet on February 9th. It didn't come up at the last one because in December or January when we had that meeting, the air strikes took place after the meeting was over.

 

CARDIN: It just seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we would be in a stronger position in carrying out the goals that, Madam Secretary, you have announced, if there was a broader involvement in decisions made in regards to the terrorist activities in Somalia and what we need to do in order to bring that under control.

 

I thank the chairman for the time.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you very much, Senator Cardin, for your participation. We do need to get to the next panel soon, but I do want to take a little more time to ask some questions.

 

Secretary Frazer, thank you for your patience here. Thinking more broadly, can you explain how the U.S. government is working to eliminate the conditions that would allow the terrorists to use Somalia as a safe haven for so long. As you've indicated, we've known that Al Qaida affiliated individuals have been in Somalia for years.

 

So what are we doing differently now?

 

FRAZER: Well, what we're trying to do is as I said of course working very closely with the regions to share information about the movement of these terrorists. We're not going to completely eliminate terrorists in the Horn of Africa or anywhere else around the globe unless we work in close partnership with countries themselves, strong, capable countries that can monitor their own borders.

 

We will continue to work with the U.N. and we're doing so in the Security Council to try to track terrorist financing. Very much working in partnership with the neighboring countries. Obviously also building a capable, inclusive government in Somalia will be a large part of trying to prevent terrorists from maintaining a safe haven there.

 

I think that we saw that most dramatically with the CIC and how the Somali people withdrawing their support from the CIC helped it to collapse. Building those strong governance institutions on a crucial basis I think is part of a longer-term strategy, even a medium term strategy of preventing terrorists from taking hold in Somalia.

 

FEINGOLD: Then what is the state of play with the Islamic Courts right now?

 

Do they actually pose any security risk to the TFG?

 

Are you confident the TFG with international support will be able to change the very conditions that led to the rise of the warlords and the Islamic Courts in the first place?

 

FRAZER: I think the situation is still very dynamic. We're clearly working to try to make sure that they don't. I've heard in my consultations two different analyses of the continued insecurity of Somalia.

 

One is that it's coming from certain sub-sub-clans that feel that they are not sufficiently part of inclusive dialogue. They're attacking to indicate bring us in.

 

Secondly I've heard the analysis that it's remnants of the Council of Islamic Courts. As the leadership withdrew they left behind certain fighters. They handed out weapons and it made those remnants that are trying to start an insurgency and reconnect with the reconstituted leadership of the CIC.

 

FEINGOLD: This relates to one of the really tough questions, which is obviously we want this TFG to be as inclusive as possible for it to work, but are there any specific redlines or specific groups or individuals that should not be part of the process and how do you determine that?

 

FRAZER: We stated very broadly that those who renounced the violence and terrorism should be part of the process. The Transitional Federal Government has drawn the lines a bit more narrowly. They have said that those who have invited terrorists into their country should not be part of an inclusive dialogue.

 

FEINGOLD: We do not share that narrow of a view, apparently.

 

FRAZER: It's a foreign country and so we work with them and we advise and consult but they have to make the decisions for their own government and how they're going to govern. Our statement has been fairly broad, which is that those who renounced violence and extremism, having said that I must say that many of our partners have advised us to be careful and that people say things but they tend to do something very different. So we're trying not to micromanage the process of inclusiveness but to state broadly what is necessary for that longer term stability.

 

FEINGOLD: I can see this is one of the hardest questions here and in other places. Who can we actually deal with. Who is irreparably an enemy of the United States and who is sort of in between. This is one of the toughest parts of this job and I recognize that.

 

A couple of quick questions on the African Union stabilization force. We're all optimistic and hopeful about the deployment of the A.U.-led stabilization force, but let me ask you to be as frank as you can. Is this force going to be deployed in a timely manner and more specifically, as you and the international community plan to support this deployment, what are the major challenges and shortfalls and gaps that have to be considered?

 

FRAZER: I think that we're hopeful that it'll be in a timely manner. Frankly, I think we're a little bit behind the timetable that we, the U.S. government, had hoped for. We had hoped that that deployment would take place in early January. But people have to go through their own national process.

 

We expect that the AMISOM force will eventually transition into a U.N. operation and that say within six months, that transition would be UNDPKO would be prepared to take over to sustain this force over time and to build it. So the A.U. force would be an immediate insertion into Mogadishu to prevent that security vacuum from occurring as the Ethiopians withdraw, but that it would then get the broader international support of the U.N. Security Council and they're working on a resolution to that effect now.

 

FEINGOLD: Have any of the nations that have pledged forces suggested that they'll only be involved for a certain period of time?

 

FRAZER: No.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you both for your patience. We'll now move to the second panel. Let us being with the second panel.

 

Dr. Shinn, would you begin please?

 

SHINN: Thank you very much, Chairman Feingold, for inviting me again to speak to this committee about Somalia. If I may submit a longer statement for the record?

 

FEINGOLD: Without objection.

 

SHINN: I want to look briefly at first the issue of the neighbors of Somalia. Basically there are three now, if you include Somaliland, which declared its independence unilaterally from Somalia in 1991. Fortunately the TFG wisely has avoided a confrontation with the authorities in Hargeisa as it tries to consolidate power in the former Italian Somalia.

 

The other two neighbors with very long borders are Kenya and Ethiopia. There's a long problem here involving irredentist claims by Somalia against the resident Somali populations in Ethiopia and Kenya, which in the case of Ethiopia includes about one quarter of its land area.

 

Unfortunately this issue was revived during the period of the Islamic Courts, when at least one senior member of the Islamic Courts, Hassan Dahir Aweis, who was Chairman of the Shura of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts, on more than one occasion claimed Ethiopia's ****** as part of Somalia. Although others in the Courts did not subscribe to this view.

 

Ethiopia appears almost from the beginning of its recent military operation to have planned a brief campaign, one because of the high cost of the operation and two I think the fact that even it understood that a continuing presence in Somalia would simply incite Somali nationalism against Ethiopia and lead to further problems.

 

The dilemma today for the Transitional Federal Government as we have already heard this morning is that the early departure of the Ethiopians leaves a potential power vacuum in Somalia. The TFG has not yet shown a capacity to maintain control on its own in the country. Although there have been numerous press reports about various warlords and others turning over their arms and weapons to the TFG, frankly I would take those with a grain of salt.

 

Somalia remains awash in hand carried weapons and even though there may be some control over the larger weapons you can be assured there are plenty of hand carried weapons to go around for years to come. They're not going to be turned over.

 

Ethiopia clearly prefers to have a moderate, national, friendly government in Mogadishu. On the other hand, I think Ethiopia could live with a return to numerous fiefdoms ruled by individual warlords if that were the other possibility. Obviously they do not want a return to extremist rule coming from any element of the Islamic Courts.

 

As the Islamic Courts gained power last year, Kenya joined Ethiopia in strong support of the TFG but Kenya has now more recently turned to somewhat of a more neutral role on this question. Kenya remains the chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD. During the past year, IGAD members have been deeply divided on the best way to deal with Somalia. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda strongly supported the TFG.

 

Eritrea strongly supported the Islamic Courts. Djibouti began 2006 as a supporter of the TFG but shifted its sympathy to the Islamic Courts after they took control of Mogadishu. Sudan almost certainly sympathized with the Islamic Courts in its role in IGAD and because of these past and continuing divisions in IGAD over Somalia, there is little prospect the organization can play a leading role in resolving ongoing differences over the short-term. Over the medium to longer term, perhaps they can return to a useful role.

 

Looking at the Wider Region beyond IGAD, Yemen has legitimate interests in Somalia because of the large number of Somali boat people who continue to make their way to Yemen's shores. Egypt has long- standing historical interests along the Somali coast and is always concerned about developments involving Ethiopia, which is the source of 86 percent of the Nile water, which reaches the Aswan Dam.

 

Dubai in the UAE serves as the financial center for both Somalia and Somaliland. There has been a history of money from Saudi sources and the government supported Islamic charities finding its way to both legitimate and illegitimate Islamic causes in Somalia. Then you have Libya and Iran who just seem to meddle because it's an opportunity.

 

Looking at the African Union and the Arab League, the primary role of the African Union has been an effort to deploy an African Union Mission in Somalia, which has been referred to this morning as AMISOM, for a period of six months. The A.U. envisages that AMISOM will consist of nine infantry battalions of 850 personnel each supported by maritime coastal and air components, appropriate civilian personnel and a police training team.

 

This mission is expected to evolve into a U.N. operation after six months that will support the long-term stabilization of post- conflict reconstruction in Somalia. Most of the contributing countries seem to have attached conditions such as approval only after ratification of its legislative body. So far I'm not aware that any country's legislative body has yet approved participation.

 

Estimates suggest that AMISOM will cost $34 million each month. The U.S. has promised $14 million to support the force and the airlift of African troops to Somalia. As we heard this morning from Assistant Secretary Frazer, the United States is prepared to pledge another $40 million for this purpose. The European Union has already released 15 million Euros or about $20 million for the same purpose.

 

There is still no date for the arrival of the first troops and it is apparent most potential African troop contributing countries are concerned about the situation on the ground and whether they will be entering a friendly or a hostile environment. The Arab League had an opportunity to make a real contribution to the establishment of peace in Somalia, which is an Arab League member. With the defeat of the Islamic Courts, the Arab League seems to have largely abdicated responsibility for Somalia.

 

Let me just conclude with a couple of comments about the United Nations and the International Community. U.N. resolution 1725 on Somalia adopted by the Security Council on 6 December 2006 has been largely overtaken by events as a result of the Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government military victory.

 

The 19 January 2007 A.U. communique has effectively replaced the U.N. resolution. The U.N. Security Council on 2 February 2007 urged the A.U. to send peacekeepers to Somalia quickly so that Ethiopia could withdraw its forces.

 

The enormous amount of energy being devoted by the A.U. and the international community to the raising of a peacekeeping force for Somalia would be better spent in convincing, maybe demanding, that the TFG and other parties begin immediately a serious process that leads to power sharing. This should be the highest priority of the international community, including the U.N., A.U., Arab League, E.U. and U.S.

 

If meaningful talks -- and I underscore meaningful -- get underway soon, it will reduce the likelihood of conflict or violence and increase the possibility that African troops can enter the country peacefully. Yesterday there was the beginning of a precursor effort to move forward with this reconciliation conference in Mogadishu. It is not clear who all attended that, but it does appear as though the moderate elements of the Islamic Courts were not invited.

 

The outcome of this reconciliation effort may well result in a restructuring of the Somali parliament and ministries, which are far too numerous, somewhere in the vicinity of 50 and will certainly involve sharing power with some elements of Somali society who are poorly represented in the TFG. The alternative to this may well be a phantom peacekeeping force that arrives too late to achieve any real purpose in Somalia. In any event, the TFG probably envisages AMISOM as tantamount to a praetorian guard to keep it in power.

 

The TFG must prove to the Somali people that it is prepared to win their respect and support. Only then will there be a meaningful role for AMISOM and only then will the TFG be in a position to create a national government that has long-term prospects for survival.

 

The beginning of meaningful reconciliation process should serve as a signal to the international community to increase substantially its humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia.

 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you, Doctor, for a very clear and helpful presentation.

 

Dr. Menkhaus?

 

MENKHA.U.S: I would to thank the subcommittee members and Chairman Feingold for the opportunity to participate in this timely hearing on Somalia and with your permission I'd like to submit my written...

 

FEINGOLD: Without objection.

 

MENKHA.U.S: Also with your indulgence I'd like to speak loosely off my notes, rather than read them, in the interests of avoiding duplication of what other speakers have had to say.

 

I've been asked to provide a brief analysis of Somalia's recent political development as a point of departure for discussions of development of U.S. strategy toward Somalia. I'd like to begin by discussing the dramatic events of 2006. Many of those events have been touched on, but just to refresh our memory, after 15 years of complete political paralysis and state collapse in Somalia, we had quite an eventful year.

 

Starting with the TFG parliament reconvening unexpectedly after being moribund for over a year, followed by or at the same time an alliance for the restoration of peace and counter-terrorism. A group of U.S.-backed militia leaders and business men formed a coalition. That alarmed the ascendant Islamist movement in Mogadishu. A four month war ensued in Mogadishu which culminated in a dramatic victory on the part of the Islamists.

 

They consolidated control, not only over all of Mogadishu, but quickly expanded their authority through most of south central Somalia, leaving the TFG at that point in time precariously perched in a transitional capital in Baidoa and holding a few other hinterland areas.

 

Really, looking like they were on the verge of collapse. It's important to remind ourselves too that the Union of Islamic Courts or the CIC later provided Mogadishu with a level of rule of law, public order and governance that the city had not seen in 15 years. That earned the CIC a fairly strong measure of public support in Mogadishu.

 

We also know that over time, the CIC as Assistant Secretary Frazer pointed out, became increasingly radicalized. Its most reckless policies were those directed toward Ethiopia. To put that set of policies in perspective, I think it's worth pointing out that hardliners in this broad umbrella saw fit to mobilize for Jihad against Ethiopia as a way of inflating their Islamist ideology with pan-Somali nationalism and anti-Ethiopianism to increase their base of support, marginalize the moderates.

 

In the short term, this is highly effective. In the long term what it did is it bought them a disastrous war with the largest standing army in sub-Saharan Africa.

 

dialogue during that time between the Union of Islamic Courts and the TFG was attempted. The United States and other governments sought to bring them together to negotiate a government of national unity. All agreed that that was the best window of opportunity at the time. All were disappointed with the lack of progress. I think as we look back we'll see that intransigence on both sides was very much to blame.

 

The TFG feared negotiating from a position of weakness, feared losing key positions. Ethiopia was not entirely sure it wanted to support a process that could lead to Islamists essentially taking over the TFG as a Trojan horse and many of the hardliners in the Islamist movement saw no reason to revive the TFG that they thought they were about to defeat from within, within weeks or months.

 

Finally in late 2006 we had the war. The Ethiopian offensive occurred. Again the details of that have been provided already, but just to reinforce what Assistant Secretary Frazer said, one of the things that was remarkable about that is the extent to which the CIC was not defeated but was dissolved internally. The loss of support from inside Mogadishu signaled to many of us that the hardliners had gone too far.

 

It's not entirely sure that they actually sought a war with Ethiopia. They may have just sought mobilization for war and were playing brinksmanship and lost. A broad section of the Mogadishu population was very angry at them. That included clan elders. It included the business community. It included moderate Islamists, for drawing them into an unnecessary war, forcing them to flee southward toward the Kenyan border or melt back into Mogadishu.

 

That culminated with Ethiopia occupying Mogadishu, another very unexpected development and the TFG's arrival as a fledgling administration in the capital.

 

Where do we stand today?

 

The situation in Mogadishu is tense. It's fragile and it's deteriorating. Ethiopia is partially withdrawing its troops to avoid a quagmire. The good news with that is that by withdrawing their forces, they are eliminating the main targets that an insurgency would attack. The downside as has been pointed out is that runs the risk of leaving a vacuum if the African Union forces are not able to deploy in a timely manner.

 

The TFG itself still remains very, very weak. It is not providing basic administration in the capital. The population there compares now the kind of public security that they earned under the Union of Islamic Courts to the TGF and the comparison is not flattering.

 

The public response to the TFG inside Mogadishu ranges from tepid and opportunistic support to outright hostility and rejectionism. Criminal lawlessness is up dramatically in the city. Warlords have returned and reassumed their place in their fiefdoms. There is a rise in sporadic violence targeting both Ethiopian troops and transitional federal government insulations and officials, including the beginnings of what looks like another dirty war such as we had in 2004/2005 -- a rise of political assassinations.

 

It's important to point out I think that that is not at present an insurgency as we would normally define it. The violence is a combination for the moment of criminal violence, of clan-based resistance, of warlord opportunism and some Islamist violence directed at Ethiopia and the TFG as well.

 

In the midst of this deteriorating situation in Mogadishu, we have an international response that's based on three pillars that have already been described. That is first mustering and deploying an African Union peacekeeping force to replace the departing Ethiopians.

 

Second, generating revenue, funding and support to build the governance capacity of the TFG.

 

Third, the promotion of political dialogue to make the transitional federal institutions more inclusive, to make Mogadishu populations stakeholders in the TFG as opposed to opponents.

 

Political dialogue is not going particularly well. The fact is when you take the temperature in Mogadishu, the sense is that the TFG leadership is seeking a victor's peace. It is engaged in a variety of policies that seem designed to alienate, designed to marginalize its key opponents rather than bring them into the government.

 

Even the reconciliation conference that's been called for by the president appears designed more to bring people in who already support the TFG rather than the key opponents to the transitional government. Both sides are responsible for the impasse at this point. The TFG has certainly done its part in seeking this victor's peace, but on the other side the Mogadishu opponents seem committed at this point to rendering Mogadishu ungovernable.

 

They don't have to defeat the TFG, all they have to do is play for a draw and then run the clock out while the TFG has only two and a half years left on its mandate and they appear perfectly capable of doing this. They don't need outside help to foil the TFG's progress. All they need is a base of support in Mogadishu from the population and from some political leaks and they have that in abundance at this point.

 

To the three pillars. In my view, the deployment of African...

 

FEINGOLD: I am going to have to ask you to conclude pretty soon so we can hear from Dr. Morrison.

 

MENKHA.U.S: OK. I would say that of the three pillars that we are pursuing in support of peace and reconciliation in Somalia, dialogue has to be privileged. If African Union peacekeepers are sent in the absence of dialogue toward a more inclusive government they will be viewed as enemies in Mogadishu and they are likely to be targeted. If they aren't targeted they are likely to have to pay for their own protection.

 

Likewise state building funds if they're provided to the TFG in the absence of dialogue are going to be perceived by opponents of the TFG as having taken sides. Just as a final point, what happens if we get to that worst case scenario if the TFG in fact is not able to bring together a large consensus and a government of national unity, the question that you asked earlier this morning.

 

I think one of the scenarios that we have to start looking at is can we assist the transitional federal institutions to move forward on the key aspects and functions of the transition, which is to say deliberating over a constitution, setting up a referendum and setting up elections to end the transitional process and bring in a full fledged government in Somalia even if it has not been able to govern most of the country.

 

That may sound like an absurd scenario, but in fact we've seen that already in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the government was essentially paralyzed throughout the entire time and yet it muddled through thanks to a strong national electoral commission and robust external support.

 

That's important, because what that does it would send a signal to the potential spoilers that you can block the government's capacity to govern in Mogadishu but if you don't join the transitional institutions and they're the only game in town, you lose out on a voice in the final dispensation of the country.

 

Thank you.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you very much, Doctor, for that excellent if troubling report.

 

Dr. Morrison, thank you for your tremendous patience and for your work in this area. You may proceed.

 

MORRISON: Thank you very much, Senator. I would request that my full statement be admitted...

 

FEINGOLD: Without objection.

 

MORRISON: ...into the record. I'm going to speak briefly drawing on the January 17th conference that we organized with the U.S. Institute of Peace and with the Council on Foreign Relations, at which you, senator, honored us by kicking that off.

 

The most fundamental challenge it seems to me for U.S. policy right now is how to proceed with realism, caution and patience and how to blend or integrate the hard counter terrorism equities that we have there with the softer equities that we have in getting a broadened compact negotiated for governance in Somalia, for meeting the dire humanitarian needs and beginning of reconstruction.

 

Right now, there is no clear vision and there's no strong interagency process that brings those two pieces of the hard and soft together. There's quite a bit of imbalance in the approach and there's quite a bit of confusion and suspicion within the region and beyond around U.S. intentions. So in terms of defining a strategy and a policy, this is I believe the core challenge before us.

 

There are a couple of other key dimensions that I think need highlighting. One is not only is establishing a viable governing system the sine qua non of progress and has to be the top priority, but we need to consciously and systematically prepare for at least an interim failure in the near term. The probabilities are so strong in that regard.

 

Second is we should not allow ourselves to become obsessed with chasing after an 8,000 person A.U. force when the signs are all there that at best we're going to see a modest deployment that will probably be concentrated in and around Mogadishu.

 

Third, we need to move quickly to strengthen U.S. diplomatic capacities and to enlarge the leadership that we can exercise, particularly in the security council.

 

On the key findings that we have identified that I think should guide policy, one is that there is great uncertainty surrounding what is happening on the ground and within the region with respect to the Islamist movement. That means we need to intensify our analysis and engagement.

 

Second the TFG continues to lack capacity and legitimacy and has a high probability of folding.

 

Third, the TFG has thus far failed to enlarge its governing coalition and is moving in that direction and our leverage on that score we need to reexamine and be much more creative in how we can move the TFG.

 

Fourth, the Mogadishu security has deteriorated since the removal of the security network provided by the Islamist Courts and we have to assume that that trend line will continue.

 

Fifth, the Ethiopians are withdrawing. They are a lightning rod within Mogadishu and their withdrawal will create gaps and will stimulate a spike in violence within Mogadishu.

 

Sixth, Islamism remains popular and legitimate. It has a strong hand. It is fundamental to whatever governing coalition is going to emerge and it can wait out the failures of current leadership.

 

Seventh our counter-terrorism strikes have put us into a strong strategic embrace with Ethiopia and the TFG. If we're going to counteract and distance ourselves from that, we need a diplomatic strategy that consciously seeks to do that.

 

Our recommendations are that first of all we -- and this is consistent with what David and Ken have said -- intensify the pressures upon the TFG to enlarge the governing coalition. Make use of our access in Yemen and in Kenya and elsewhere to the Islamist Court remnants. Be very realistic about what we can achieve from an A.U. peacekeeping operation. Intensify the security council engagement -- and I would add there the Chinese were very helpful in the earlier days of putting through 1725 and can be I believe helpful in that regard.

 

If we were to turn to the Security Council to intensify its involvement, we should ensure that we have a robust and sustainable funding flow. You've put forward, Senator, the idea of a trust fund. I think that's a laudable idea. I hope that can be moved forward but key to our leverage and our ability to really move forward is getting much higher and more sustainable and predictable forces, flows of resources.

 

The fifth point that we have institutional capacities that we are expanding, the humanitarian operations we've heard a lot about today and those are very laudable. We can add to those expanded work in health and education in making greater use of the combined joint task force for the Horn of Africa, for a number of constructive operations and by intensifying our analytic capacities.

 

I agree that we have a need for a senior level figure to manage the interagency and ride the circuit at a senior level with the region and in Europe. This person can complement and greatly augment our capacities. I would add also that Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte can play a very important role here in making Somalia a part of his portfolio as he begins his work.

 

The last point is that we can encourage within the U.S. greater unity among the Somali Diaspora community. That community has been very exuberant but remains divided. It is seeking to unify itself this month. It is making a significant play in that regard. Remittances are estimated at as high as $1 billion per year to Somalia from the Diaspora. This is an influential, highly gifted and talented community which is moving toward unity and we should be very strategic on how we make use of that.

 

Thank you very much.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you, Dr. Morrison. I've attended a lot of hearings of this subcommittee in 15 years and this is one of the most useful and best panels I have heard and I thank you.

 

Let me ask a couple of questions, although the hour is late. Dr. Morrison, you basically anticipated my first question that I want all three of you to answer. I take you as having just essentially endorsed the idea of a special envoy for Somalia. Let me ask Dr. Shin and Dr. Menkhaus their response on that in light of Secretary Frazer's comments today.

 

SHINN: Thank you, Senator. I strongly support the idea. I know John Yates personally, he's a good personal friend of mine, we went in the foreign service together. He's a very fine officer. The fact is though that he is not a special envoy and as I understand it and listening to Assistant Secretary Frazer this morning, he reports to Ambassador Ranneberger, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, who is preoccupied with Kenyan affairs.

 

So you do not in fact have someone who is independently or semi- independently engaged full time on Somalia affairs. I think this is an ideal location to do just that. I traditionally am not enthusiastic about special envoys, because they tend to conflict with ambassadors on the ground, but in this case you have no State Department personnel in Somalia and there is no conflict.

 

FEINGOLD: Excellent.

 

Dr. Menkhaus?

 

MENKHA.U.S: I agree.

 

FEINGOLD: OK. Dr. Shinn, where do U.S. and E.U. objectives and priorities in Somalia overlap and what are the most significant areas of divergence?

 

SHINN: I think in a general sense they pretty much overlap. I think where the divergence comes is if the European Union as Assistant Secretary Frazer implied has been much stronger on pushing the idea on the Transitional Federal Government that they must be more all encompassing in terms of whom they bring inside that government. At one point, the European Union said it would not provide any funding to the TFG unless the TFG did engage in a reconciliation process.

 

President Abdullah Yusuf said that he would start a reconciliation effort. He has done that, but it remains to be seen whether it's meaningful or not. That's the key. It's one thing to have to go through the motions. It's quite another to be serious about power sharing, about revamping if necessary a parliament, reducing the number of ministries from some 50 to what probably ought to be about a dozen for Somalia and making sure that you have technically competent people in the jobs, not do it just on plan lines alone.

 

FEINGOLD: Dr. Shinn, you implied that the African Union peacekeeping force that is currently envisioned and authorized is unrealistic. What do you see as sort of the minimum level of resources, mandate and climate timetable necessary to stabilize Somalia in the short and medium term and do you think this minimum can be achieved?

 

By when and what needs to happen?

 

SHINN: Short of creating a broad based Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, I frankly don't see it working. I think that's the bottom line. The first step is to have a government that is more all encompassing. Once you have that then the rest I think will flow naturally.

 

I think you will have much less resistance from the heir sub-clan of the Hawiya (ph) clan. I'm posing this. I think you will have less resistance from the warlords, who still have a power role in Mogadishu.

 

I think you will have more enthusiasm from the businessmen in Mogadishu to support such a government. But I'm not sure that there is any number of AMISOM troops that is going to be able to secure all of Somalia. At the height, the American-led UNITAF operation had 25,000 troops there.

 

Some of them admittedly were offshore. Even UNISOM had far more than 8,000 and we all know the difficulties that they had and they had all the most highly sophisticated equipment known to military enterprises around the world.

 

We're asking African units with fairly lightly armed weapons to go in and do something that both UNITAF and UNISOM had great difficulty doing.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you very much, Doctor.

 

Doctor Menkhaus, you've written that the United States must not allow support for counter terrorism efforts abroad to become -- and I appreciate your blunt language -- a meal ticket for leaders in failed states. How can we prevent this in Somalia and the larger Horn of Africa region where corruption and the lack of transparency are obviously common?

 

MENKHA.U.S: Well, for starters, again by pushing for more accountable, transparent good governance in these governments, including the TFG. There has been a tendency to use the counter terrorism card to try to solicit our unconditional support and I think one of the messages in the panel today is that support to the TFG does very much have to be conditional.

 

Beyond that, there is an interesting and important problem that we haven't spoken about directly related to counter terrorism and our partners in counter terrorism monitoring in the Horn of Africa. That is to say that we all agree that a strong, robust state as a partner in counter terrorism is essential as a long-term goal. We also know that that state building capacity will take a long time to build up.

 

In the mean time, we'll have a transitional phase in which this government is weak, in which it will be easily penetrated. In which, ironically, foreign terrorists will probably be able to better exploit Somalia rather than less able to exploit Somalia. The fact is that Somalia today as a more or less de facto collapsed state is not a very conducive environment for many terrorist activities. They actually prefer Mumbasa or other places in the region.

 

We have to have a strategy that will simultaneously allow us to build up that state capacity to monitor criminal and terrorist activities in the country while preventing terrorists from exploiting that transitional period. I think the answer in Somalia is community policing. Somalis at the community level know what's going on in their neighborhoods, they know what's going on in their districts. They often know before we do where we're driving because our driver knows.

 

It's difficult to keep secrets there, but that presumes that the community feels that it's a stakeholder in counter terrorism monitoring and that it has a functional relationship with the state and that's been what's been missing for a long time.

 

FEINGOLD: Thank you. What was your reaction to Secretary Frazer's answers to my questions about how to define the Islamic Courts and about who should or should not be part of the political reconciliation process?

 

MENKHA.U.S: Political Islam is ascendant in Somalia and if we demonize or criminalize all of them, if we imply that they're all linked to Al Qaida, as some members in the TFG have tried to do, we run this very strong risk of eliminating a very important and potentially constructive force in Somalia.

 

We've really been talking in terms of the foreign Al Qaida suspects that we have been worrying about, this high value target, we're talking about a very small number of people. Three is the number that most often comes to mind. The handful of Somalis that we designated as terrorists are also very small. We have to be careful about the lack of proportionality in our policies in pursuit of that small number of people.

 

A lot of pottery was broken in the pottery barn in Mogadishu over the past few months. A very effective government was overturned in Mogadishu and we are, rightly or wrongly, held responsible by the Mogadishu community for that. I would argue that we need to first of all allow Somalis to make that determination of who represents them in their political forum. We have to recognize that will take on more of an Islamist flavor and again as long as they renounce violence and terrorism I see no reason not to allow them to participate.

 

FEINGOLD: I think that's a thoughtful answer and clearly if anybody is Al Qaida, we have to pursue them and have to pursue them vigorously but let us not over-define the characteristics of somebody in a way that would prevent us from reaching out to people who may not be committed to that course at all. I think this is one of the most important questions internationally. Somalia is a great example.

 

Dr. Morrison, how has the security threat or the threat that Somalia poses to the United States changed since your last testimony in July? Has the situation improved, worsened or just changed?

 

MORRISON: Well, the advent of the Courts when we were last together in July -- it was at the front end and it wasn't clear which direction they were moving.

 

The formation and dominance of the Shabaab in the intervening period and the escalation of this rhetoric vis a vis the surrounding region and the threats towards the Ethiopians -- the provocations and the like -- and the reports that came forward in the fall around the amalgam of seven or eight sovereign countries along with Hezbollah that were professing their support materially and financially and diplomatically of the hard core Jihadi elements within the Islamist Courts.

 

These developments were very serious ones and I think they accounted for the response of the Ethiopians and drove much of the response to the United States in the strategic partnership. The Shabaab it would seem to me has been detonated and scattered. The threat within the boundaries on the soil of Somalia is uncertain but I do not see it as grave and resurgent. I think it bears careful watching. I emphasized in my comments that there's considerable uncertainty around the nature of an Islamist insurgency and the possibility of a resurgent Jihadi element also within the region -- in Yemen, in Saudi Arabia, in Eritrea and elsewhere. There are elements there which have every incentive to seek to strike new deals with Al Qaida or Al Qaida affiliated organizations.

 

That is a serious consideration and one that bears very close watch here.

 

FEINGOLD: Finally, could you go into further detail about the impact that the AC130 attacks in Somalia could have on the broader political efforts in Mogadishu. Does it impact our credibility and our work throughout the region?

 

MORRISON: It creates a very strong hostility. It has had the impact of broadening the suspicion and hostility towards the United States. Whether this was fully warranted or not, that has been one of the impacts. In some ways, that was predictable. The legacy of the United States engagement in the early '90s and the abrupt withdrawal after the debacle of October '93, there was a sense of abandonment.

 

There is a sense now within the general population that the overwhelming interest in counter terrorism, in arms strikes by air and on land dominate the U.S. set of concerns at the expense of concerns with reconstruction, political accommodation and with the humanitarian response. That's what I mean about the need for a counter balance or a recalibration of the approach that would integrate the hard and soft.

 

Our counter terrorism equities are real in this part of the world and are going to continue to be real and are going to continue to require a response and a systematic strategy, but we also have to much better manage what the fallout is and protect the softer side of the agenda which remains integral to getting Somalia out of its current mess.

 

FEINGOLD: I thank all of you for your expertise and your patience. This has been a long but I think very worthwhile hearing and that concludes the hearing.

 

END