Somali- Ethiopian Relations are One-sided Relationships (Not mutual)

[SOO MAAL]

At this regrettable era in Somali history is very disgraceful to all Somalis; we all know that Ethiopia is Somalia’s historic and notorious enemy, all Somalis both in the republic and Western Somalia suffering Ethiopia’s conspiracies for more than century. About 30 years ago if ordinary Somali citizen show bit support to Ethiopia, let alone going to Ethiopia. Shockingly, currently we finding all Somali politicians without exception (from newly elected president Abdulaahi Yusuf, the self-declared Somaliland president Daahir Riyaale, the new president of Puntland Haashi, Somalia’s former president- Arta- Abduqaasim, to countless warlords based in southern Somalia such as Aideed, Muuse Suudi, Qan yare Afrax, Ato, Mohamed Dheera, Mowlid Ma'ani, Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigudud, Mohammed Said Hirsi Morgan, etc) going to Ethiopia periodically meeting with Ethiopian officials without a bit of embarrassment, more amazingly all these self-appointed politician (I mean warlords) have great animosity and hostility between themselves, at the same time they have friendly relationships with Ethiopia and in fierce competition to become Ethiopia’s favorite ally, Ethiopia gladly sends generous shipments of ammunition to ignite more bloody wars in Somalia.

 

 

It became reality in Somalia, that no man can win Somali leadership without Ethiopia’s support (forget Egypt, or any regional country), we know the Ethiopia opposed vigorously Somali transitional government I (Arta) led by President Abduqaasim Salad Hassan, despite Abduqaasim sought Ethiopia support but rejected by Ethiopian officials. Even the secessionists in the north tried very hard to get the sympathy of Ethiopia, so may Ethiopia recognize them. Also, after Puntland elders elected Jama abdi Jama as president of Puntland, Ethiapia re-instilled Abdulaahi Yusuf by force. It is reality that countless Mogadishu warlords all receive daily arms from Ethiopia; until Somalia’s national capital became ghost towns. As well, Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigudud, the leader of RRA, and a longtime Ethiapian backed warlord said “Ethiopia only willing to provide bombs and wheat for militia†when Ethiopia supported his deputies against him.

 

 

Can we blame Abdulaahi Yusuf for being Ethiopian backed (Of course no), when all Somali politicians are Ethiopian backed including Members of parliament- the national assembly, Somali regional administrations (Somaliland, Puntland, Hiiraanland, Jubaland – all are Ethiopian inventions).

 

We can say most so-called Somali politicians (Somali power brokers) are suffering from illness called “Ethiopian worship†it a national curse and problem.

 

Following are Ethiopian backed so-called Somali politicians:

 

 

 

The newly elected president of Somalia (Former Somali Clonel in Siyaad Regime)

 

Self-declered Somaliland President Daahir Riyaale (Former senior spy NSS of Siyaad regime in northwest Somalia)

 

 

Current Somali MP and warlord Hussein Aideed

(The son of Fomer somali colonel and warlors Faarax Aideed)

 

Current Somali MP and warlord Muuse Suudi

 

Current Somali MP and Warlord Cusmaan Ato

 

Somali MP and Warlord Shaatiguduud

 

Somali Warlord Maxamed Siciid Xirsi Morgan

[SOO MAAL]

Interview with the President of Somaliland

 

 

 

The following is the full text of an exclusive interview conducted by Walta Information Center with Mr. Dahir Rayaleh Kahin, the President of Somaliland on Tuesday 30th March 2004.

 

Question: Somaliland is not an internationally recognized country. Yet you have recently traveled to Belgium and England. How were you received there? Whom did you meet? What were the outcomes of your encounter?

 

Answer: Well, I met several ministers in the United Kingdom, and I have addressed the House of Commons in Britain. I was mainly talking about our case, because we have taken independence from Great Britain in 1960. And we were mainly asking for the renewal of their trust on us. That was the main theme of our visit in England. And they were very assertive. Although we didn't take the full answer at that time, we hope things will change in the future.

 

Question: Are you asking for recognition or any other thing?

 

Answer: Recognition and how to establish bilateral agreement. Because everybody who wants to come to our country says that we are not recognized. So we have asked the support of the British Government in this respect.

 

Question: What about in Belgium?

 

Answer: We met the officials of Inter-parliamentary Union, EU Commission, the House of Senate and Parliament of Belgium. We were talking the same issue.

 

Question: What was the response of the European Union?

 

Answer: They were very receptive. We will be waiting for the answer. They have listened to us cautiously and understandably.

 

Question: Were you satisfied?

 

Answer: Yes. I was satisfied; because this was the first time the international community heard our voice.

 

Question: Was this your first travel to Europe?

 

Answer: Yes.

 

Question: We have also gathered that you have met Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. What issues did you raise and was the discussion fruitful?

 

Answer: This is not the first time that I met Meles. We are always received warmly when we come to Ethiopia, because this is a brotherly country. This time we shared issues that concern our area. Although we are not recognized by Ethiopia we share security, border and many other things. So we talk about these and new developments in our area. We just correspond on that and we have good understanding when we come here.

 

Question: Did you discuss anything particular this time?

 

Answer: We always discuss about our destiny as one of our major issues.

 

Question: So you're still looking for recognition?

 

Answer: Yes, we still hope that it will come to a conclusion with time.

 

Question: When?

 

Answer: In the near future.

 

Question: How do you rate your relationship with Ethiopia?

 

Answer: It's good. We have no better friend than Ethiopia.

 

Question: Is your friendship mutual?

 

Answer: Yes.

 

Question: In what ways?

 

Answer: Security, trade.... And now we want to strengthen the trade relations between the two countries. We are building the corridor between Berbera and Ethiopia. So we have a lot of business that we can do together.

 

Question: What benefits do you get from Ethiopia?

 

Answer: They always treat us as brothers, as young brothers. They help us better than any other country in the area.

 

Question: What is the picture of your trade relationship? Can you elaborate on that?

 

Answer: It is growing. Ethiopians come to Berbera and send their goods through Berbera and bring their goods from Berbera. It is open for them.

Question: What is your role in the fight against terrorism?

 

Answer: You have heard that we have captured a lot of people that tried to infiltrate Ethiopia. They are now in our custody. They are members of the ONLF.

 

Question: How many are they?

 

Answer: About thirty. They have been trained in Eritrea. Luckily we have captured them. And they are now in court; because we don't accept anyone to attack our neighbours.

 

Question: What about other terrorists?

 

Answer: Terrorism is a global issue and every nation has the right to fight against terrorists; because they are against the interest of all people, every community and all nations. So we are committed to fight terrorists.

 

Question: Are you trying to control Islamic terrorists as well?

 

Answer: Whether Islamic or not, we will fight them. They are all the same. Terrorism has no religion. A terrorist is a terrorist.

 

Question: Do you have any form of cooperation to stop terrorism?

 

Answer: Yes. I think we can work with Djibouti and Ethiopia. We will jointly work with Djibouti and Ethiopia, because these are the two neighbors we have now. On the other side there is no country, no government that functions. Although they are members of the UN and EU, there is no government there.

 

Question: So do you intend to assist the political evolution in Somalia?

 

Answer: It is their problem. We were united in 1960 but we have with drawn from that union. We will not go back to the union. This is their problem. They have to solve their problem, as we have solved our problem.

 

Question: Do you consider any form of integration if peace prevails in Somalia?

 

Answer: No, it is the will of the people. I cannot judge the will of the people. In 1960, the Somaliland people decided to form the union. And now the people have rejected the union.

 

Question: How did you gauge the interest of the people?

 

Answer: It was the will of the people. They held referendum in May 2001, and 97% of the population of Somaliland voted not to go with the union. Somaliland is not the first African country to withdraw from union. We are not the first Africans. There are many African countries that withdrew from union. Gambia and Senegal, Egypt and Syria, and there are many examples. So what we are doing is not new to Africa.

 

Question: Is that the reason why you don't help in the peace process of Somalia?

 

Answer: If we were recognized, we will invite them and solve their problem. That is the hope we have.

 

Question: In what way can you solve their problem?

 

Answer: We will call them. We know each other. We will tell them the truth. They cannot cheat us as they cheat the other people.

 

Question: Are you in any way trying to help them?

 

Answer: How can we help them? There are about 50 warlords. Everyone has his area. Who do we reconcile? To whom do we talk? We don't know.

 

Question: Why does your country still remain unrecognized?

 

Answer: Africans should answer this question. We have made a success story in our country, because under the rules, we have built a country, a free country, and a democratic country, which is governed by a rule of law. Africans should give credit to this success story made by their own people; because in Africa, there are conflicts everywhere. We believe that we are the only people who solved their problem in an African way, by their own tradition. So our brothers Africans should give us credit for that.

 

Question: How long do you think this will last?

 

Answer: I think our brothers will come to the right conclusion and accept the reality on the ground.

 

Question: Do you mean the African Union?

 

Answer: Our African brothers, the African countries.

Question: Have you appealed to the African Union?

 

Answer: Yes. We will appeal to each country, and we have met with the AU Chairman. We have stated our case and everything. We hope they will answer.

 

Question: Did they give you any promise?

 

Answer: Some countries have promised, but we will see this in the future.

 

Question: So you're still in the dark.

 

Answer: We are still in the dark for any reason that we don't know. We are only hostage for a country that doesn't exist. We, however exist, we exist.

 

Question: So you think, Somali is a hindrance?

 

Answer: It doesn't exist. But I exist as a country. I am a hostage for a country that does not exist.

 

Question: Is your country faring well despite the prevailing condition?

 

Answer: Yes.

 

Question: How are you faring economically?

 

Answer: We are trying our best. We have held two elections without any help from the international community. So you can imagine how we are trying our best, although we have meager resources. We try our best to do whatever business we can in our country, as regards security, running the offices, making elections for our people, taking referendum for our country. We have achieved this. We have demobilized our forces. It's a greater achievement that is never practiced by many African countries.

 

Question: Is your country contributing to the efforts being exerted to stop the movement of the smugglers to and out of Ethiopia?

 

Answer: Smugglers, travel everywhere. They come from Ethiopia; they come from our country. We are trying our best. But to fight smugglers, we have to make entry points for the two countries, so that we can take custom fees from the people. We will close all the walls and they cannot penetrate through the walls. So we are preparing to overcome this problem with Ethiopia, with the Ministries of Finance of Somaliland and Ethiopia. We are making arrangements so that the people can trade freely on both sides; they can go through the customs and custom free. Some technicians have come to Ethiopia from Somaliland to make arrangements with their counterparts here.

 

Question: There have been reports of UN Agencies operating in your country. What have they been doing there?

 

Answer: These are NGOs.

 

Question: What do they do?

 

Answer: Small projects, rehabilitation of schools and just some small things.

 

Question: Which UN agencies are operating in Somaliland?

 

Answer: Many international organizations; UNDP, UNHCR, EU, UNICEF, WHO.

 

Question: Can they move freely?

 

Answer: They can. They even travel during the night.

 

Question: According to media reports, there have been reports of insurgency in your country.

 

Answer: Yes. Those people killed the expatriates. Luckily, we have captured them.

 

Question: What was it all about?

 

Answer: We don't know. They are terrorists. They want to destabilize our country, because we are practicing the rule of law in our country. They want to make our country the same as those in Mogadishu. They have been sent from Mogadishu.

 

Question: Who supported them?

 

Answer: Al-Quaeda and all that.

 

Question: Are they now fully controlled?

 

Answer: To certain extent, yes . We have captured the main organs operating in our country.

 

Question: When was that?

 

Answer: While I was away from the country. Another four were captured while I was in the country.

 

Question: Do you have anything to tell me?

 

Answer: No, thank you for the interview. I would like to thank the Ethiopian people, the Ethiopian government. That's what I want say. ;

 

 

Source:

Walta Information Center

[SOO MAAL]

SOMALIA: IRIN Interview with Hasan Muhammad Nur "Shatigudud", military leader of the Rahanwein Resistance Army

 

ARTA, Djibouti, 31 August (IRIN) - Hasan Muhammad Nur "Shatigudud" (Red Shirt), the military leader of the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), joined the Djibouti-hosted peace talks as one of Somalia's main "warlords". "Shatigudud" - a former colonel who served in the National Security Service in northwestern Somalia - was one of the few military leaders who attended the talks, despite the fact there was no special invitation or status given to "warlords".

 

He managed to persuade Digil-Mirifle clan elders to accept his favoured list of candidates for parliament, thereby creating rivalry with his fellow RRA Secretary-General, Abdullah Derow Isaak. The rivalry of the two became an underlying theme at the conference, with "Shatigudud" seen as representing "warlord" demands and Derow as taking on more the role of a peace-maker.

 

Derow was eventually elected Speaker of Parliament in the first successful cross-clan election held by the conference on 21 August, despite last-minute manoeuvring by "Shatigudud" to sabotage the vote. "Shatigudud" then stood for president, but unexpectedly withdrew from the race and reconciled with Derow. Both men come from Baidoa.

 

QUESTION: Why did you decide to withdraw from the presidential elections?

 

ANSWER: Because the Digil-Mirifle were lucky enough to get the Speaker of Parliament. This is one of the main posts in the new government, so I decided I should withdraw my bid for the presidency.

 

Q: Do you really support the process?

 

A: I fully support it.

 

Q: But previously you had some reservations, and walked out. What was the problem?

 

A: My major concern was the number of parliamentary seats [given to the sub-clans and the military groups], but that has now been resolved.

 

Q: What role do you hope to play in the new government?

 

A: I would like to play a very important role. I would like to play a crucial part and would like to be considered for an important position in the formation of the new government.

 

Q: You've been seen as a potential spoiler of the process all the way through.

 

A: No, it's not true. I am a grown man and would not have come here if I had wanted to spoil anthing. I would have said no to what I don't want and yes to what I do. But I would not have been here at all if I had not supported the process.

 

Q: And what do you think should be the next step for an elected president? Should he set up in Baidoa, or Mogadishu?

 

A: The next step should be to form a government. Once that government is formed - well, everyone is talking about Baidoa, but it is also possible to take the government somewhere else, if that is what the government wishes.

 

Q: Do you think some of the regional governments have reservations about this process?

 

A: I believe there are no reservations. I believe that up to now they have supported the process. They have said as much, and have said they are ready to help us. I don't know what will happen later, but as of now I believe they will give that support.

 

Q: You have a very close relationship with Ethiopia. Through that relationship, do you have any insight into the position of Puntland leader Abdullahi Yusuf [who refused to take part, despite attempts by Ethiopia to bring him on board].

 

A: Yes, I do have a good relationship with Ethiopia - like many Somalis - and I do have a good relationship with Abdullahi Yusuf. And hopefully I will be able to convince him to come into the process. I urge the new government to make contact with Puntland and Somaliland, and to succeed - without any war or fighting - in winning them over.

 

Q: And as a military leader, what future do you see for your forces? Are they to be co-opted, or disarmed?

 

A: My men are Somalis, and I don't think they will oppose anything that is in the interests of Somalia. We will do what we think is in the best interests of Somalia. I think they will support the Somali government, and - unless something new develops - I don't think they will stand in the way. There are many militias in Somalia. I don't think any new government will be able to absorb all of them into a new security force. What will have to happen is, of course, that we will have to disarm them.

 

Once we do that we will have to find a way of finding them something to do. We have to find them alternative work to do. I think that to do this, it is very important for the international community to fully support the government that comes out of here, to give it moral and material support so it can stand on its own feet as quickly as possible so as to be able to participate in international forums and to restore the sovereign integrity of the Somali nation.

 

SOURCE:

IRIN

[SOO MAAL]

Yusuf Wins Somali Presidential Election

 

Reuters News

 

NAIROBI, 11 October 2004 — Ethiopian-backed warlord Abdullahi Yusuf was elected Somali president by lawmakers yesterday, according to an unofficial tally, in the 14th attempt in a decade to restore government to the lawless African country. Yusuf won 185 votes cast by parliamentarians meeting as an electoral college in neighboring Kenya, against 76 for opponent Abdullahi Addou, in a third and final round of voting, according to a Reuters tally of results that were read out one by one by officials.

 

If the result is confirmed Yusuf will head a transitional federal government (TFG) that will attempt to shepherd the broken country of up to 10 million to elections under a new constitution in five years’ time.

 

Somali lawmakers voted for the new president for their anarchic Horn of Africa state in an election held in Nairobi.

 

Three of six Somali presidential candidates who qualified for the second round in yesterday’s election pulled out of the race moments before the start of the ballot.

 

“I am pulling out of the race and I will support anyone who is elected. That is democracy,†Salat, who won just 15 votes in the first round, told the packed stadium.

 

Salat’s administration never managed to exert authority beyond a few pockets of the Somali capital, Mogadishu. “All my life I have worked for a united Somalia and it is for that reason that I am withdrawing,†Barre, half brother to Somalia’s last president, the late Mohammed Siad Barre, toppled in 1991, said on announcing his withdrawal. “For the sake of the Somali nation I give up my desire to be president,†was Hussein Ado’s valediction.

[SOO MAAL]

Somalia: IRIN interview with Hussein Aideed, 5/4/99

 

 

U N I T E D N A T I O N S Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa

 

Tel: +254 2 622147 Fax: +254 2 622129 e-mail: irin@ocha.unon.org

 

IRIN interview: Somali National Alliance leader Hussein Aideed

 

Hussein Aideed took over the leadership of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) on 2 August 1996 after the death of his father, General Mohamed Aideed. He controls South Mogadishu, and is co-chairman - along with Ali Mahdi Mohamed in North Mogadishu - of the Benadir Administration.

 

The following is an interview with Hussein Aideed at the former presidential palace, Villa Somalia, in Mogadishu - April 1999.

 

QUESTION: You have just sent a joint letter to the UN Security Council about Ethiopian incursions on the border. Is there any other action you plan to take?

 

ANSWER: I will call the chief of intelligence and foreign minister in Ethiopia and pressure them not to interfere in Somalia's affairs. Ethiopian troops went into Bula How and Dolo because Ali Noor, the vice chairman of the Somali National Front [a Mujerteen faction, led by General Omar Haji Masale, currently in South Mogadishu and part of the Benadir Administration] was killed. Ethiopia was working with Ali Noor and thought it was a political assassination - but they can't solve it. For two years I refused to go to Ethiopia because I wanted them to get out of Somalia. SNA is trying to strengthen the regions, and we don't violate borders. We have a problem in Dolo because the bridge there is half Somalia's and half Ethiopia's, but we want to remove Ethiopia from inside our territory.

 

Q: Ethiopia has justified incursions on the basis that Islamic fundamentalists operate from the border, and a general lack of border security.

 

A: Yes, we should have a joint force against Al-Ittihad. But Ethiopia has had a military training school in Bula How for almost a year, and they occupy the town as if it were their own. When I visited Ethiopia in August-September 1998 I met with [Ethiopian Prime Minister] Meles Zenawi and others, and we established a nine point agreement on security, politics and cooperation. Yet they seem to oppose the interim government that was first established with my father, General Aideed, in 1995. My father was in charge of that government for one year, then I took over after his death. I don't know why Ethiopia will not recognise it - we have managed to establish some unity and bring together society, control some of the airports and set up an administration. One of the problems is that Ethiopia is suspicious of Cairo, because there is a Nile problem between Egypt and Ethiopia. Ethiopia also has a strong suspicion of Arab countries - they have said it too me - whereas Somalis are both African and Arab and I have to join the conflicting sides.

 

Q: Eritrea is said to be supporting and supplying you, and through you, Ethiopian opposition groups in Somalia.

 

A: I think this is a problem of misinterpretation by Ethiopia. There are over 50,000 Oromos, Tigrayans and Eritreans here - we have an open border. And there are some four million Somalis in Ethiopia. They talk about the Oromos here, the political refugees. In fact, they have been here since 1977 [the ****** war]. The SNA has provided a safe haven for Oromos and allows them to express their political views. Only about 700 are organised politically. This is very small - and we do not allow a weapons supply. Now we have a problem of Ethiopia trying to hire local Somalis and Ethiopians to capture the Oromo leaders in Mogadishu, and we had to kill three hired Somalis this month.

 

We have a good relationship with Eritrea and Kenya. I also talk often to Ethiopia - Ethiopia called me recently to talk about Eritrea. They expect me to mediate, because this war [Ethiopia-Eritrea] is a family war, it is egos between leaders, and should be discussed inside as personal differences. Both leaders trained in Somalia [under the previous regime] and we have a special relationship with both of them.

 

Q: And what about speculation that Somalia is being used by international terrorists? There have been rumours that Osama bin Laden may be in Somalia.

 

A: There is a rumour that he is in Gedo region, but we have sent our own intelligence out and to this point we are treating it as a rumour. Bin Laden has never been in Mogadishu but we believe he passed through El Wak region and the border area in 1992-93. The absence of border controls means it is possible he could pass through, but we need intelligence from the international community to help us investigate. Bin Laden has a huge construction company in Saudia Arabia. He is very rich, and funds Al-Ittihad: he can fund them in Sudan, here, and in Ethiopia. We have to share intelligence on this matter. It is something the US State Department has called me about. Al-Ittihad was a problem during UNOSOM, and still operates in Kismayo, along the Indian Ocean coastline, on the Kenyan border area, and in Bosasso. There are also pockets in Mogadishu, but they are not active. We need a unified government to tackle this, and it is difficult when there are no international representatives here - we need US, EU and UN representatives. Al-Ittihad uses religion to control society, which we, as Somalis, do not allow; it is against Somali beliefs, because we are Sunna.

 

Q: The Benadir Administration seems to have been compromised by renewed fighting in Mogadishu. What damage has Musa Sude Yallahow inflicted on this new agreement?

 

A: The Cairo mediated agreement was the culmination of the last nine years of talks. We talked on how to make a unified government with an executive and how to have laws to safeguard the system. We will eventually have elections. But first, we had to unite Mogadishu, then we need to get international recognition of the Mogadishu administration. We need to control and open the airport and ports. So far, we have done more than anything before, and we hope to continue this progress by having a meeting in Baidoa, including representatives from other parts of Somalia. There are details of power sharing on paper - each area will have delegates in view of having a council and a prime minister.

 

Q: And what about Musa Sude, who is technically part of the Benadir Administration, but is now opposed to it?

 

A: Musa Sude was the former vice chairman to Ali Mahdi Mohamed, and he controls maybe 70 to 80 gangs in Mogadishu. He was able to take advantage of the openness of the city since the administration was set up in August. Elders are talking to him, and he is obliged to rebuild the governor's house [destroyed by Musa Sude] and rectify his mistakes. If not, we will take military and police action. Musa Sude and Osman Ato [former vice chairman to General Aideed, now working with Musa Sude in opposition] actions make it difficult to control weapons.

 

Q: Is the police force able to take any action?

 

A: We have funding problems with the police. We keep them as professionals and they run much of the districts. Courts are being established. I also have a contingent of about 10,000 militia ready to strike at any special problem. The key now is to reinforce the police and open the ports. We need the equipment back that the UN took - the cranes, the computers - and we need funding for the port. Diplomats and international representatives, including the UN, have seen and approved the administration here, and seen how we are reconstructing the hospital and opening roads. We need social services. But we also need the shipping lines to open, we need administration of ports, and expert skills to help run and train personnel.

 

Q: With your training as an American marine, do you find the chaos of the Somali militia frustrating?

 

A: Yes, sometimes it is very frustrating to see the chaos of the militia here, that's why I brought in uniforms. I bought 20,000 uniforms from China, where they are very cheap, and I was also given some from African countries, like Eritrea and Uganda. I also invested US $4 million in renovating the presidential offices in Villa Somalia. The militia have to learn. One of the most difficult things is re-training the militia and a large part of my efforts go on this. Many things are frustrating - like the fact we can't use national troops to protect our borders. It is difficult for me to use force and achieve reconciliation. If there is fighting in Mogadishu, I can't use force, because it would look bad. What we need is a constitutional government.

 

I am democratically oriented because of living in the US and because of my father's ideals. I am trying to close the gap now between the international community and Somalia. After the failure of UNOSOM, the US and the West became shy about coming here, but there is a moral obligation to Somalia. For example 800 million dollars of EU aid, which is our share, is blocked because we have no government. We need to engage the international community in a more positive way now that things have improved.

 

[ENDS]

 

Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 13:57:22 +0300 (EAT) From: IRIN - Central and Eastern Africa Subject: SOMALIA: IRIN interview with Hussein Aideed [19990504]

[SOO MAAL]

ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA: an Uneasy Relationship

 

UN Integrated Regional Information Network

 

EDITORIAL

January 2, 2001

 

Nairobi

 

Hopes are fading for a fresh chapter in the often stormy relationship between Horn of Africa rivals, Ethiopia and Somalia. Despite a visit by newly elected Somali interim President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan to the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, in November, relations have deteriorated rapidly, with reports of Ethiopia arming and hosting opposing faction leaders and back-pedalling on gestures of recognition for the new Somali government. The new interim Somali government, for its part, made an unsuccessful show of force in December to prevent weapons - which it said came from Ethiopia - from arriving in Mogadishu, accusing Ethiopia of interfering in Somalia's internal affairs and stationing troops on Somali territory.

 

Tensions between the two countries add another dimension to the protracted Horn of Africa conflict and drought crisis. The ****** war between Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1970s, the collapse of the Somali state in the 1990s, and the Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict in 1998, have created some of the largest refugee movements in recent history prior to the Great Lakes disaster. Political developments between Ethiopia and Somalia have direct humanitarian implications for migration, displacement, economies and regional stability.

 

The visit

 

The November visit was the first by a Somali president - albeit still unrecognised by Ethiopia - to Addis Ababa for nearly two decades. The last visit of a Somali head of state to Ethiopia was in early 1974 when former president Muhammad Siyad Barre went to persuade Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie to attend an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit being held that year in the Somali capital, Mogadishu. The emperor attended, but afterwards the relationship between the two countries deteriorated to the point of war.

 

When President Abdiqassim arrived, the Ethiopian government fell short of announcing his visit as one by a "head of state", but the red-carpet treatment was given in most other respects, including the presidential suite at the Sheraton Hotel and a welcoming delegation of ministers at the airport. Ethiopia has not yet recognised the new government, which has otherwise received widespread international acceptance.

 

Talks were duly held between Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Abdiqassim. They focused on contentious issues of domestic and regional security. Later, the talks were declared "successful" and "cordial" by both sides. Somali Foreign Minister Isma'il Buba told reporters that "very clear understandings were reached on basic issues discussed". The Ethiopian government said in a press release that "the establishment of the transitional government constitutes a major achievement in the Somali peace process".

 

Yet, since the talks, the Ethiopian government has rapidly back-pedalled - even on its "symbolic" gestures to the new government. In December, Ethiopian officials told IRIN that when Meles attended Abdiqassim's inauguration in August, it was only "symbolic, to encourage the peace process", and that there were now serious misgivings over his links with "Islamic fundamentalists". Ethiopian troops remain on Somali territory, and the Somali leader has made no progress in negotiating with critical opposition faction leaders, who are supported by Ethiopia. "If things don't get better soon, they are likely to get much worse," a regional diplomat told IRIN. The two countries stand at a vital crossroads, observers agree.

 

The recent past

 

"The history of Somalia and Ethiopia is littered with distrust, animosity and war," said one regional analyst. Suspicion of neighbouring expansionism and political extremism is deeply rooted in both states. However, Somalia's disappearance into a political abyss over the last 10 years opened a new chapter.

 

Meles Zenawi came to power with the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPDRF) in 1991, in the same year the Somali government collapsed. Initially, the events in the two countries seemed to break the mould. Meles knew Somalia very well, as he lived in Mogadishu when he was a liberation leader in the 1980s. Meles and Eritrean leader Isayas Afewerki "lived together in a villa behind Tawfiq Hotel, north Mogadishu, and were handled by the National Security Service, provided with travel documents and Somali passports, trained and given a Tigrayan radio frequency", a former senior Somali government official told IRIN.

 

Once in power, Meles was genuinely disturbed by Somalia's descent into factional anarchy, and its regional consequences. Competing Somali militia leaders were, for their part, initially willing to use Meles to broker peace talks, as he had links to the old, military dictatorship, while at the same time was perceived as a successful revolutionary and a leading figure in the "new generation" of African leaders. Ethiopia got international commendation when it managed to bring the main Somali factions together for the first time in Addis Ababa in 1992 for peace talks.

 

But the honeymoon was not to last for long. Ethiopia's pivotal role in Somali peace talks was over by 1993, with many of the faction leaders claiming it was forcibly pursuing its own agenda. The new Ethiopian government, moreover, was increasingly influenced by events in its own Somali region - which has a large ethnic Somali population and close economic and political links with neighbouring Somalia. The activities of Somali irredentist movements in this part of Ethiopia, particularly the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which were seeking to establish a "Greater Somalia" to incorporate all territories containing Somali populations, led to the Ethiopian-Somali ****** war in 1977. "Some Somalis do retain a lingering desire for a greater Somalia, but it's more an emotional dream for the indefinite future... There are few in the ****** who would want to join Somalia now, though they might want an independent ******ia," regional expert Patrick Gilkes told IRIN. Although the threat of irredentism had generally receded by the time Meles came to power, the ethnic Somali population continued to feel alienated and marginalised from the centre of power, which has always been dominated by northern Christian Amhara and Tigrayan groups. Central governments have, for their part, viewed the migratory pastoralist Muslim Somalis as resenting government structures and having an ambiguous national identity. "Intense clan loyalties make it difficult to superimpose transcending political structures," one observer said.

 

The EPRDF found it difficult to establish itself in the Somali region, which remains one of the most unstable areas in the country. A strong military presence has remained in the Ethiopian ****** area, and has provoked accusations of repression and abuse, documented by international and local human rights organisations. In Kebri Dehar, an ******i stronghold, local and international sources told IRIN in November that the bodies of suspected rebels caught and killed by government soldiers were sometimes left outside the garrison until they rotted. Relatives were too scared to collect or identify the bodies, said the sources, who included witnesses.

 

Having introduced a form of democracy based on ethnic regionalism, the Ethiopian central government found itself struggling to establish an "obedient" Somali party. In the areas contiguous with Somalia, the ******i National Liberation Front (ONLF) agitated for regional independence, while armed opposition groups included cells of the Islamic extremist movement, Al-Ittihad. Ethiopia's population is generally believed to comprise about 50 percent Muslim and 50 percent Christian, but Ethiopian officials told IRIN the ratio was roughly 60 percent Christian to 40 percent Muslim.

 

Creating a "buffer zone"

 

Although the Somali population in Ethiopia is relatively small - about 3.5 million - the territory it occupies is significant in that it borders on Somalia and is used by armed opposition groups, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the ONLF. The Oromos, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, are linguistically and culturally related to Somalis and comprise both Christians and Muslims. According to the Ethiopian government, many elements of the armed opposition in the Ethiopian Somali region are "Islamic fundamentalists".

 

The new Ethiopian government of 1991 pursued an increasingly militaristic option in the Somali region - much like previous regimes. By 1993, the Ethiopian defence minister, Siye Abraha, announced to journalists in Addis Ababa that Ethiopian troops had fought and defeated Islamic fundamentalists in the ******. A heavy military presence has since remained in the Somali region, particularly in the ******, and is used to control domestic insurrection, as well as launch military operations along the common border and into southern Somalia.

 

Problems in the Ethiopian Somali region were exacerbated by the collapse of the Somali government. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and returnees crossed the common border because of the civil war in Somalia. Extremists and armed groups took advantage of the anarchy and lack of controls at the border. At the same time, Ethiopia's relations with its western neighbour, Sudan, had begun to deteriorate, with behind-the-scenes accusations by Ethiopia that Sudan was "exporting" Islamic extremism, and providing support for armed Al-Ittihad units based in the ****** and southern Somalia.

 

Ethiopian public foreign policy became increasingly defined by the threat of "Islamic fundamentalism". Meles Zenawi said in an interview in December 2000: "What concerns us first and last is what the government [of Somalia] and the different parties and organisations do inside Ethiopia. Some of the extremist organisations did not limit their activities inside Somalia and went to destabilise Ethiopia." In the interview, published in the Arabic London-based 'Al-Hayat' newspaper, Meles said of the situation in Somalia: "What worries us is the presence of well-trained terrorists, and that is enough to destabilise the security and stability of Ethiopia."

 

Interventionism unbound

 

By the mid-1990s, Ethiopia, the US, and the UN had failed to facilitate effective peace talks in Somalia, and international intervention brought disastrous consequences, with the deaths of UN and US peacekeepers, as well as hundreds of Somalis. There was increasing bitterness in Somalia towards what was perceived as external opportunism and negligence. "Somalia became a free-for-all... States and organisations could interfere in any way they liked," said one Somali political source.

 

It seemed that the distrustful relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia had changed very little. While in the past, Ethiopian governments had felt threatened by a strong, united Somalia, the absence of any state at all was just as bad. In the name of national defence, Ethiopia went ahead and pursued a policy of backing and creating "friendly forces" in Somalia.

 

Ethiopia in Somalia

 

By the time a new government was elected during the Djibouti-hosted peace talks in August 2000, Ethiopia was firmly committed to certain Somali leaders and territories. "Ethiopia would deny it but would much prefer to see a Somalia composed of several 'building blocks' - a loose grouping of Mijerteen (Puntland), ********* , ****** and trans-Juba states, kept relatively weak, with Somaliland as a separate state," one Somalia expert told IRIN. With a constitution which "encourages ethnic regionalism, but expects political obedience", the Ethiopian government found no difficulty in relating to and manipulating these semi-independent regional blocs, one regional diplomat asserted.

 

Critical to Ethiopian interests was the self-declared state of Somaliland in northwestern Somalia. Ethiopia became landlocked when the former Ethiopian coastal province of Eritrea became independent in 1993. Agreed access by Ethiopia to Eritrean ports collapsed in 1997, after which war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, and Ethiopia turned to Djibouti.

 

Ethiopia-Djibouti port arrangements and infrastructure meant the Djibouti port took the lion's share of Ethiopian traffic, but ultimately proved unsatisfactory to Ethiopia. A Djibouti journalist told IRIN that there had been frequent complaints from port handlers and middlemen over "demanding" and "difficult" Ethiopian traders and truck drivers. More pertinent was the decision by President Ismael Guelleh, elected in 1998, to contract a Saudi Arabian company to take over the poorly run port by August 2000. Guelleh made a clear foreign policy move by turning more decisively to the Arab states for support and financial assistance, which held little appeal for the Ethiopian government. By December 2000, the Djibouti Port Authority had released plans to raise port tariffs by up to 150 percent from 15 January, which was met with anger in Ethiopian government and business circles. Official figures quoted by Reuters news agency said the volume of traffic at Djibouti port had nearly tripled to four million tonnes since Ethiopia began relying on the port - including the huge volumes of relief food which passed through the port because of a drought-related food crisis in Ethiopia. Uneasy with its dependence on Djibouti, Ethiopia from 1999 placed increasing importance on securing access to the port of Berbera, Somaliland.

 

The president of Somaliland, Muhammad Ibrahim Egal - ­former Somali prime minister and an elder statesman - has made a number of visits to Ethiopia since he was elected at Borama in 1993. Somaliland has never received official recognition as an independent state by Ethiopia, but Egal is afforded sufficient status and facilitation to satisfy the political relationship. Diplomatic sources say Ethiopia also supplied ammunition to Egal. Economic and trade agreements have been signed with Ethiopia, with Egal eager to encourage Ethiopia's appetite for securing "friendly" ports and developing trade routes. In an interview with 'Al-Hayat' in December 2000, Meles Zenawi said "We do not recognise Somaliland as an independent state... We have a de facto relationship with all [independent states]... It is on our border. Do we pretend that it does not exist?"

 

Ethiopia's relationship with Somaliland is deeply rooted. [The previous government provided external bases to the Somali National Movement (SNM), which fought in the 1980s for the liberation - and ultimately independence - of northwestern Somalia. Many Somalilanders and SNM fighters have lived for long periods in Ethiopia.] With the present Ethiopian search for "friendly ports" frustrated by the Eritrean border conflict, high tariffs in Djibouti, and extreme distances involved in neighbouring Kenya and Sudan, Somaliland's importance to Ethiopia is disproportionate to the present capacity of the port of Berbera. But the Ethiopian government counts opposition by the self-declared state to the new interim government as a primary reason for withholding official recognition of Abdiqassim.

 

The Ethiopian government has also consistently supported the leader of the Puntland administration, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf. Ethiopian officials told IRIN that Abdullahi Yusuf was "of a different calibre" from other faction leaders - one who could be trusted to deliver on promises. Abdullahi Yusuf served in the Somali army before he was involved in a military coup in 1978, led by Mijerteen officers. He fled to Ethiopia, where he formed the opposition group which became the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). The colonel was detained by former Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Hailemariam, reportedly because he was using Libyan money to buy the services of senior Ethiopian officers to help assassinate his opponents within the SSDF. He served seven years until released as a result of the EPRDF takeover in 1991. In 1998, he took the initiative, as leader of SSDF, to declare Puntland an autonomous region.

 

The relationship between the Ethiopian government and Abdullahi Yusuf is widely known, though both sides continue to go through rituals of secrecy. When the Djibouti-hosted peace talks attempted to get the Puntland leader on board, the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) looked to Ethiopia to effect persuasion. A senior military officer flew to Bosaaso, and Abdullahi Yusuf paid a number of visits to Addis Ababa. The failure of Ethiopia to bring Abdullahi Yusuf to the talks was seen as much as Ethiopian ambiguity towards the Djibouti-led peace process, as the intransigence of the Puntland leader. Abdullahi Yusuf has made frequent trips abroad for medical treatment, including for liver problems, over the last two years, mainly to Kenya and Britain.

 

Southern Somalia - crossing the line

 

Compared to the disastrous infighting in the south, Somaliland and Puntland achieved relative success in establishing stability and functioning administrations. However, Ethiopia did not limit its interests to "existing building blocks", point out regional analysts: it was also eager to create one in southern Somalia.

 

Southern Somalia - Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions - was the real Achilles heel as far as Ethiopia was concerned. There, fighting and insecurity continued in the absence of any real leadership, and because of the lack of a secure administration. There was also widespread recognition, both inside and outside Somalia, that Al-Ittihad was operating in these areas. By 1993, Ethiopia had persuaded the US to help in efforts to police the ****** and border against Islamic extremist groups. The Ethiopian Ministry of Defence confirmed to journalists in 1993 that the US government had given "non-lethal aid", including trucks, to help create a "buffer zone" against the threat of Islamic "fundamentalists".

 

"I think the US is now basically embarrassed about its policy in Ethiopia," said one diplomat who deals with Somalia. Eager to establish a foothold in a region it had been locked out of during the Cold War, the US gave "seemingly unconditional blessing" to Meles Zenawi's regime, said the source. Ethiopian foreign policy rhetoric about "Islamic fundamentalists" sat comfortably with the US, which similarly defined its policy in the region. When Ethiopia attacked communities it accused of harbouring "fundamentalists" inside southern Somalia with helicopter gunships and ground troops in 1998, there was no protest made on behalf of the stateless country. This US "special relationship" with Ethiopia took a blow in the later stages of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict of 1998-2000, with the US withholding aid after Ethiopia went ahead and launched an attack on Eritrea despite intense US-led shuttle diplomacy efforts to avert the fighting. By December, however, the US proposed that the UN Security Council lift an arms embargo imposed on Ethiopia and Eritrea, due to lapse in May, on the grounds that they had signed a comprehensive peace agreement on 12 December in Algiers.

 

Arms from Ethiopia also go to faction leaders in southern Somalia, agree diplomats, humanitarian sources, Somali political sources, and residents of Gode in the Ethiopian Somali region. Muhammad Siyad Hirsi Morgan, onetime bodyguard and a son-in-law of former dictator Muhammad Siyad Barre, leads a small group of militia in Waajid, a ********* Resistance Army (RRA) controlled territory in Bakool Region, and receives support from Ethiopia. Since September, Morgan has been seen receiving weapons on two separate visits to Gode, while accommodated by Ethiopian military and government officials, say local residents and regional diplomats. Morgan, a former sub-lieutenant in the army, rose rapidly through the ranks to head the Ministry of Defence in the last days of Siyad Barre's rule. As a Mijerteen, he has unsuccessfully laid claim to the southern port of Kismaayo.

 

The other main recipient of Ethiopian support is Mogadishu-based faction leader Muse Sude Yalahow, who represented a challenge to the younger Aydid in areas of south Mogadishu from 1997. Yalahow was formerly a driver for the Somali ambassador to Iraq, and supported faction leader Ali Mahdi Muhammad in northern Mogadishu when the civil war broke out. Now considered one of the most effective obstacles to the new government in Mogadishu, he draws support from the Abgal, one of the largest ****** sub-clans, and controls the Medina area of southern Mogadishu. Among the various Mogadishu faction leaders, Yalahow's area of control "had a semblance of order, established an Islamic court, instituted a system of taxation, and maintained decent security", Somali political sources told IRIN. Ethiopia initially showed interest in him because of his opposition to Husayn Aydid, but has recently been blatant in its use of the faction leader against the new interim government. Local and international media reports documented the arrival of weapons trucked into Mogadishu from Ethiopia for Yalahow in mid-December.

 

Ethiopia took advantage of unsanctioned freedom to support "friendly forces" in a stateless country, pointed out one regional diplomat. Its relationship with the RRA became "an open secret", with senior Ethiopian military officers moving visibly in southern Somalia, and weapons moving from the Ethiopian border into Somalia. By 2000, there were numerous reports of faction leaders visiting the Ethiopian Somali region - particularly Gode, the capital of the ****** area - to receive weapons and meet Ethiopian military and government representatives.

 

Part II: The proxy war

 

Ethiopian policy in southern Somalia was also influenced by Mogadishu faction leaders, particularly Husayn Muhammad Aydid in south Mogadishu. Although the Ethiopian government enjoyed a period of good relations with his father, General Muhammad Farah Aydid, there was a significant rift by the time the general died, in 1996. While Meles recognised Aydid as a strong military man and a tough negotiator, his young US-marine trained son was considered a dangerous light-weight, who had inherited his father's mantle through his clan only by force of circumstance, rather than by traditional legitimacy or qualification. Husayn Aydid turned to Libya and Egypt for support, and openly allowed Ethiopian opposition leaders from the armed OLF to live in Mogadishu. Former Oromo refugee camps in Qoryooley, southern Somalia, were turned into training camps for the OLF, international and local news agencies reported. By the late 1990s, the Ethiopian-backed RRA had become not just a force to deal with "Islamic extremists" in Gedo Region but also as a buffer force to contain Husayn Aydid and deal with factions and militia allied to him. As well as facilitating Ethiopian opposition, Aydid for his part provided Al-Ittihad with arms in an attempt to limit Ethiopian policy in southern Somalia, a western intelligence source told IRIN.

 

In 1998, a full-scale border war flared up between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The flow of arms to competing factions in Somalia significantly increased as the two countries became embroiled in proxy war. In May 1999 a large consignment of heavy arms was reported in the international and local Somali press as arriving in Marka, southern Somalia. The shipment, reported to have originated in Eritrea, was destined for Husayn Aydid. Local reports said Eritrean officials, soldiers and members of the OLF arrived with the arms shipment. Somalia was "rapidly becoming a new theatre in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict," one regional analyst told IRIN at the time.

 

In April 1999, Husayn Aydid sent a joint letter with other Ethiopia-opposed faction leaders to the UN Security Council, protesting against Ethiopian incursions into the Somalia border region. He told IRIN, in an interview in Mogadishu at the time, that Ethiopian troops had invaded Bulo Hauwen and Dolo on the common border. He also claimed that Ethiopia had established military training facilities in Bulo Hauwen. Aydid denied supporting and arming Oromo fighters, but admitted that he provided "a safe haven" for political refugees from Ethiopia - of which "only about 700 are organised". Ethiopia was hiring local Somalis and Ethiopians to capture and assassinate Oromos living in Somalia, accused Aydid. In the same interview, Aydid said his relationship with Eritrea was "good" and admitted to receiving uniforms from the Eritrean government.

 

Ethiopia was accused of "occupying" the south-central Somali town of Baidoa in June 1999, and denied it strenuously. But well-placed security and political sources told IRIN at the time that Ethiopia was concentrating its forces in Baidoa, while the RRA went in pursuit of the remnants of Husayn Aydid's rapidly weakening militia force and the OLF. An intelligence source told IRIN at the time that Ethiopian troops were present in Baidoa, and had moved troops into Gedo Region through the border town of Dolo. Ethiopia had also established a presence at Ceel Berde near Beled Weyne, said the source. It completed the creation by Addis Ababa of a "buffer zone" between Luuq and Beled Weyne, and extended it to Baidoa said the source. "The exercise represents a double success for Ethiopia, in blocking Eritrean efforts to open a second front and sending a clear message to Islamic fundamentalists in southern Somalia to be very careful about incursions into Ethiopia," the source added.

 

Ethiopia has always strongly denied invading Somalia or creating "friendly forces". When giving an interview to 'Al-Hayat' in December 2000, Meles Zenawi said Ethiopia had put a lot of effort into Somali peace processes, including the recent one hosted by Djibouti. "We have put a lot of effort with all the other Somali groups in the border regions to participate... Some of these groups participated and others refused, and it is not possible for us or others to impose on them by force," he said.

 

What next?

 

Ethiopian officials told IRIN that the reluctance to extend official recognition to Abdiqassim's government was concern over extremism. "There is serious concern that this transitional government is supported by and involved with Islamic fundamentalists," said one highly placed Ethiopian official. "We are also concerned about the lack of engagement with the established administrations, like Somaliland and Puntland, and about the lack of engagement with other faction leaders." He said Ethiopia had not yet officially recognised the interim government - "that will depend on how the transitional government addresses these concerns". Meles Zenawi said in the interview with 'Al-Hayat' in December that Ethiopia had supported all the resolutions regarding the new interim government taken by IGAD. He said he wished to stress "that we had role in reaching an agreement that allowed the president of the current government in Mogadishu to take up the Somali seat on condition that he must have some specific qualifications". He said the qualifications would be determined by "whether this government will use the cover of international legitimacy to take the rest of the country by force or whether it will resolve the problem by peaceful means". He also said he had discussed the issue of Islamic fundamentalism with Abdiqassim "and he assured us that he is not one of them and that he will fight any organisation that destabilises the regions. We have no problem if he keeps his promise in these regards".

 

After pronouncing its war strategy against Eritrea "successful" in May 2000, the Ethiopian government has portrayed itself as a "regional superpower" with a "responsibility" to keep regional peace. It was during the border war that the Ethiopian army was increased to its present size of about 400,000, international diplomats in Addis Ababa told IRIN - the same size as under former communist-style dictator Mengistu Hailemariam. Massive rearmament was carried out in the build-up and onset of the war, until the UN Security Council slapped an arms ban on the two countries. Security sources in Addis Ababa said the Ethiopian army consists mainly of infantry, who were motivated by the national crisis during the border war. In one of the poorest countries in the world, joining the army on a small but regular salary is attractive. However, the militarisation of Ethiopia brought its own dilemmas, one diplomat told IRIN. Regional training camps taught thousands of young men how to handle weapons, and stirred up strong political sentiments. Then, after a relatively short time on active service, the soldiers returned to their homes. "Many were seduced by the tales of a 'high-tech' war - they thought they would be pushing buttons but found themselves as cannon fodder on the front lines," said the source. Political sources in Ethiopia told IRIN that the government was "almost Marxist" in its approach to the war with Eritrea, with the "massive concentration on morale-boosting political messages and propaganda".

 

Many soldiers have been transferred south since the cessation of hostilities with Eritrea in June, charge opposition groups. The OLF and the ONLF have both issued statements accusing the government of increasing its military presence in eastern Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Somali region and along the Ethiopian-Somali border. Diplomats and humanitarian sources in Ethiopia confirm a recent new concentration of troops along the common border.

 

Having built an extremely militarised regime, where aggressive nationalism temporarily mollified some of the fiercest domestic opponents, the dilemma of the Ethiopian government is to maintain its internal image as a regional superpower, said one diplomat.

 

Making choices

 

Abdiqassim faced criticism during his election and after his inauguration that he was linked to Islamic fundamentalists - not only from Ethiopia, but also from a nervous international community, which had disengaged itself from Somalia for almost a decade. In an interview with IRIN, he said "Islamic fundamentalism" was a reference to extremism, and he had nothing to do with extremists. "I am a Muslim by faith; I have respect for other faiths... As for fundamentalism, I never support extremists. That is what fundamentalism means. I am against extremism, whether it is religious or ideological," he told IRIN. But Ethiopian officials point to the fact the Islamic courts, as a security force, support the government, and members of the courts are included in the transitional national parliament. The head of the Islamic courts - which is one of the most powerful and efficient militia forces in Mogadishu - is headed by Shaykh Hasan Diriye Aweys, who was the military commander of Al-Ittihad in the southern Gedo Region from 1993 to 1994. But supporters of the new government say accusations of fundamentalism are being deliberately exaggerated, or are based on misunderstanding of the composition and role of the Islamic courts.

 

"The connotation is one of extremism, but the Islamic courts are overwhelmingly dominated by traditionalist mainstream groups, which are much less conservative than "fundamentalists," said one Somali political source. Shaykh Hasan heads the courts, a clan-based organisation, but he is controlled by a council of elders, who provide him with money and militia, said the source. "Fundamentalism along the lines of Algeria cannot take hold in Somalia, where religion is basically not really adhered to in a predominantly nomadic culture," said the source.

 

However, there is agreement between supporters and critics of the new government that Somalia's situation creates extreme vulnerability. Ethiopia is not the only neighbouring country that has expressed concern about extremist groups using Somalia. In an interview with IRIN in April 1999, Kenyan Foreign Minister Bonaya Godana said there were fears that terrorists had used Somalia territory in planning the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. A US intelligence source told IRIN that a communications system had been established by a cell of Islamic extremists linked to international Saudi-born terrorist Usamah bin Ladin, in the southern coastal town of Ras Komboni. There were reports in the international press - never confirmed - that Bin Ladin had visited southern Somalia prior to the embassy bombings.

 

"A drowning man will grab a straw - if there is no alternative, you take what is provided by whoever provides it," one Mogadishu resident told IRIN. Money from Arab states and fundamentalist organisations provides resources, including to schools and institutions, in the absence of any other assistance, Somali political sources said. But if Ethiopia further isolates the new interim government and arms its opponents, the likelihood of Abdiqassim turning to Arab states and Islamic resources only increases, point out regional experts and diplomats.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source -- Allafrica.com

 

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[SOO MAAL]

Will always support Ethiopia

Independent Somaliland a non-negotiable

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

By Ali Mohamed Nour (Ali Toosane) Hargies/Somliland Email: toosane@lycos.com

 

 

 

 

Since we proclaimed the rebirth of our country as an independent State in May 1991 at Buroa 13 years ago, Somaliland has achieved a great deal by way of putting in place its own Constitution, established democratic institutions, its own currency with out external provisions and so on.

Yet, the international community still reluctant to recognize Somaliland although it has fulfilled all the requirements for Statehood. Namely:

Article (1) of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, singed on 26December, 1933, provides that the State should possess the following qualifications: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into a relation with the other states.

There is no doubt that Somaliland possesses all the qualifications for statehood. It has security, commercial, and diplomatic agreements with her neighbour Ethiopia.

Similarly, its has similar links though to a small degree with the Republic of Djibouti. Interestingly enough, its people occupy the territory of the former British Protectorate.

We are worried about Somaliland’s statehood as being ignored for too long, because terrorism take root and grow when people don’t have the means to control their own government.

Today’s terrorism in the world has been linked not only with religious or ethnic extremism, but also with problems of poor governance, inter-state conflicts, suppression of freedoms and human rights as well as criminality etc.

On several occasions, the United Nations warned that Somalia was becoming a heaven for terrorists and for the smuggling of weapons including surface - to - air missiles. In addition to, the assistance of Islamic Fundamentalist Groups, strongly influenced by Egypt and Saudi Arab’s hard - line Wahabisim.

Really, all these things happened as the result of, recent killings of innocent humanitarian aid workers in Somaliland were organized in Mogadishu. So if a State like Somaliland is ignored for too long, the insecurity in Somalia could spread into Somaliland and in fact this will undermine the stability of the whole region , particularly neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Today Egypt wants the African Union and Arab League not to recognize Somaliland’s Statehood and let Eritrea to remain hostile with their brothers in Ethiopia. However the African Union and the Arab league can’t overlook the fact that Somaliland has a strong case to back its independence since the Statehood of Somaliland does not contravene the charter of the newly-formed organization of Africa AU, particularly the inviolability of colonial borders.

Somaliland has the right of backing of the former African Organization OAU Cairo Resolution of 1964, which has ratified the sanctity of inherited colonial boundaries in Africa.

Definitely, the weaknesses of the former African Organization OAU permit Egypt, Saudi Arabia and probably Libya to commit impoverishing and destabilization programmes against the states of the region particularly Somaliland and Ethiopia.

Both Somaliland’s political livestock exports ban and Eritrea‘s hosting and training camps for several opposition groups such as ONLF, OLF are typical examples of impoverishing and destabilization programs in the region. So that if the newly formed organization of Africa AU is realistic their mandate they should have to find a political solution this violence.

Many Somalilanders including me can’t understand why Arab league particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabi and probably Libya ignores Somaliland’s right to exist. Are they saying the recognition issue of Somaliland may undermine or affect the newly formed Southern - Somali State in Kenya? I would argue that the opposite is true. The sooner Somaliland is recognized the better chance to restore peace, law and order in the South.

Truly the Arab league is running to find what they called a counter-balance of Ethiopia in the region in order to arm against us our brother Ethiopia again and destabilize the Horn of Africa.

Equally significant is that the Arab league is not so happy the bilateral relations we have to day our brothers Ethiopia as well as the use of Ethiopia our port Barbra. So that it is clear the Arab league is firmly, politically, and emotionally committed to the survival of the unity of Somalia. Let me say my words.

Our children’s children will look back through their history books with admiration and thanks for the Ethiopian people. In fact, an Ethiopia in danger is our danger. Any person, state, organization that fights against Ethiopia will never have our support. We shall give whatever help we can to our brothers Ethiopia as they did for us. On the other hand, unstable Ethiopia is not good for Somaliland, Djibouti, Kenya and even the stability o f the whole region; Ethiopia is the heart land of the Horn of Africa.

Finally, we Somalilanders know our goal and we are determined to reach it. The independence of our country is nonnegotiable.

 

source

[SOO MAAL]

SOMALIA: Interview with Somaliland Foreign Minister Edna Adan Ismail

 

 

ADDIS ABABA, 24 Jun 2003 (IRIN) - Edna Adan Ismail is the foreign minister of the self-declared republic of Somaliland which is seeking international recognition as a separate independent state. On an official visit to Ethiopia - 12 days into her new job after being appointed Somaliland's first female minister - she tells IRIN about the quest for recognition.

 

 

QUESTION: Is Ethiopia ready to recognise Somaliland following your talks with the foreign minister Seyoum Mesfin?

 

ANSWER: Recognition is something that will take its natural course, but what we talked about were the bilateral relations of the two countries, the trade relations, and the common concern about security in the region. We discussed food aid coming in from the European Union through the port of Berbera, flowing freely without being looted, without military escort across Somaliland.

 

Q: But as your most important ally did he say in a year’s time we will recognise Somaliland?

 

A: That he did not say, but it has been said before that Ethiopia will not be the first to recognise us. But they certainly will not be the third.

 

Q: Who is going to be the first?

 

A: We think the smartest country will, because recognition of Somaliland is something that is bound to happen. The independence of Somaliland, in the fifties, came about as a result of mutual agreement and treaties, with pomp and pageantry, with signatures of documents. At that time when Somaliland gained its independence from Britain, 34 nations recognised Somaliland including the Security Council members of that time. We have never severed relations with any of those

countries so technically we are still recognised by 34 countries of the world. The problem now is our former partners, our Somali brothers, are in such disarray, such confusion that there is no way we can part like we did with Britain. Somaliland is not self-declared unless somebody is brave enough to tell me Britain does not exist.

 

Q: Why then won’t Britain recognise Somaliland?

 

A: I think probably I would attribute it to humility, stiff upper lip. I don’t know. Britain has not been as forceful as Italy has been to defend Somalia. And I think it may be because they are afraid it may be seen as nepotism. A former territory, supporting it blindly - whereas it may be seen as more credible if it is a country that has no links with Somaliland recognising it on its merits.

 

Q: Who in Africa are you targeting as the key countries?

 

A: We are looking at South Africa, Mozambique, Senegal, Uganda, Ethiopia, and many African countries. Most of them are very understanding, but many misinformed about how the emotional union of Somaliland and Somalia came about. It was never a domination of one country over the other; it was the union that came about because people wished to share a destiny.

 

Somaliland is the most senior of the two partners, the first born of two twins. It should have been triplets because Djibouti in 1977 opted not to join that union wisely. When the union, an emotional union that was never ratified, which never had benefited from legal documents being signed, between Somaliland and Somalia got into trouble and ended in a very long and hard civil war of 11 years, we closed our borders and got down to the hard task of rebuilding our country. On the other hand in Somalia regretfully they had destroyed their own country, their own cities, and it continues to disintegrate. It is very sad. We hope one day our brothers in Somalia will understand the wisdom of peace and stability so we can sit across the table and have a dialogue.

 

Q: Will you try and get those countries to pressure the African Union to recognise Somaliland?

 

A: I don’t think pressure - convince perhaps, inform perhaps. Somaliland is a bright example of what Africans can do with their own resources, determination and self-help. Somaliland held a referendum in May 2001 when 97 percent of our people opted for separation from Somalia. Now we have managed to build ourselves up, we can look for a headway because at the beginning we were very preoccupied with clearing our country of landmines, bringing our people home from refugee camps in Ethiopia.

 

Q: But the fear is that recognition will lead to the further disintegration of Somalia?

 

A: How much more disintegration can happen in Somalia? How many factions are there - 17? ... I don’t think Somaliland can be blamed for the disintegration of Somalia. They didn’t need Somaliland to help with their disintegration. I think the disintegration of Somalia has been caused by the funds pouring in from international taxpayers. Money has poured in and much has been looted to buy more guns and create more warlords. It has been a comedy. The world expects us to produce a divorce document when there has never been a marriage. It cannot be done. If Somaliland is recognised we will play a very major role in the reconciliation of the clans in Somalia. We know them better than anybody else.

 

Q: What is it like being the foreign minister of a country that is not recognised?

 

A: For me a sense of pride, a duty that gives me great honour to perform.

 

Q: But it must be very frustrating being a foreign minister that no-one recognises?

 

A: No way. I am proud of the achievements of my country, and I am proud to be the foreign minister of that great country that is Somaliland. We have achieved far more than other countries have. Look at Liberia, look at Zaire, look at Sierra Leone, and look at Ivory Coast. I would rather be the minister of foreign affairs of Somaliland than the minister of foreign affairs of some countries. I am proud of Somaliland.

 

Q: When will Somaliland be recognised?

 

A: I think 2003 is a good year. So many good things have happened in Somaliland. Recognition would be the icing on the cake. We are paying a heavy price for being peaceful. There is nothing sensational happening, there are no bodies of dead marines being dragged through the streets of Somaliland like there were in Mogadishu. There are no international troops to keep peace in Somaliland. We maintain our demobilisation and our peace ourselves. There are no foreigners kidnapped or no hijacks. Nothing sensational happens. It is just a very dull country that is getting on with its daily life, rebuilding.

[Qudhac]

somaal

 

it seems you are bit obsessed with somaliland aint you boy, listen the fact that you have savages running your country is not the fault of ethopia so stop the calaacal, what our relationship with ethopia is non of your damn bussiness if you hate them well thats your problem do it on your own we went past those fake cries of crodile tears that weve seen so many times. To be honest you just same to us two neighbouring countries the only difference is the only thing that comes from your side is caos, murders, and terrorist, dont think inaan idin kala jecelnahay.

[Jumatatu]

Originally posted by Qudhac:

dont think inaan idin kala jecelnahay.

relieve yourself mate with the fact it is mutual..

[General Duke]

SOOMAAL, good topic bro.

Qudac :rolleyes:

 

Juma lol

[SOO MAAL]

Qudac, I am from northwest Somalia, I just cannot comprehend the fact that we crowned Riyaale as president, Riyaale was working for Siyad regime in northwest Somalia during 1988 rebellious, assenior spy in NSS Siyad’s secret agency to last of siyaad regime in Jan 27,1991. In 1988, it was inconceivable and unbelievable to imagine that Riyaale could become Somaliland president.

[Saxardiid]

To be honest you just same to us two neighbouring countries the only difference is the only thing that comes from your side is caos, murders, and terrorist, dont think inaan idin kala jecelnahay.

relieve yourself mate with the fact

it is mutual..