How to disarm an angry and hungry nomad?!

[Xudeedi]

Thanks to Our brother Muse Yusuf who is from the heart of North West regions for penning this extensively researched study. He has put forth concrete recommendations of how to at least carry out disarmaments in the capital and all over Somalia.

 

How to disarm an angry and hungry nomad?!

By Muuse Yuusuf

January 14 2007

 

 

The Ethiopian backed “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) is pursuing its disarmament programme. So far It has “disarmed” some of the areas it controls, for example Baydhabo where rival and feuding clan militias had been disarmed and regrouped in camps. However, the task ahead is enormous and challenging, and Mogadishu residents' resistance to TFG’s order is a case in point. Mogadishu residents and in indeed many residents of other cities are fearful of surrendering their weapons for different reasons, which include, among other things: lack of personal safety and security; weapons are source of income for some (warlords, gangs, security guards etc); and powerful business communities use weapons to protect their business. In this opinion article, I will attempt to put the disarmament debate in a historical context in terms of the role that traditional and modern weapons played in Somali’s socio-political and economic status. I will argue that those in power ought to take historical perspectives into account if they want to understand the mentality of the people they are trying to disarm. Also, I will put forward some practical measures that might be useful to those constituents involved in the disarmament debate.

 

Traditionally, Somalis had always carried weapons for self-deference, hunting, protection of their herds, farms, and their families from aggressors and predators, and unfortunately for aggression purposes. Their weapons include: knives, swords, daggers, spears, shields, longbows and arrows, axes etc. In a traditional sense, weapons protected Somali’s economic sources or to put it simply a nomad’s spear and shield were his insurance policy against robbery, theft, and of course against hyenas, nomad’s most hated enemy. Without his spear, an agro-pastoralist would have been vulnerable, and would have lost his income source to predators and robbers, and his self-esteem and pride would have been low in front of his enemies. During clan conflicts, it was probably, among other things, the might, quantity and quality of clan’s weapons, which could have dictated the outcome of the conflict. To put it brutally, nomad’s economic status depended on the might of his spear.

Somalis came in contact with firearms as early as 16th century but it was the 1890s when a shipment to Ethiopia’s Menelik II through the port of Djibouti fell into Somali hands, that firearms became common among Somalis(1). Disarming Somali nomads was the most difficult task that colonial powers faced and most conflicts happened because of a fierce resistance by Somalis against colonial powers’ disarmament programme that was designed to make Somalis accept central authority and a modern state structure. A good example of this is the armed conflict between Italian colonial forces and Sheikh Hassan Barsane, a national hero, who refused to surrender his clan’s firearms.

 

Analysing colonial powers disarmament policy in the context of nomad’s socio-economic status in a traditional context, one could now see how it would have been impossible for a nomad to surrender his firearms to an alien and invading force without first the nomad getting some kind of assurance of alternative economic sources and personal safety, and above all, a surety against any attempts to eradicate his identity as an African-Somali-Muslim - his reason d’etre. In other words, to ask him surrender his weapon, it would have meant forcing the nomad, a warrior (waranle) to give up his dignity, pride, his livelihood, and indeed his entire life. We now know how - through divide and rule policies, an overwhelming power, and the so called “treaties” with clan-elders - the colonial powers managed to subdue the nomad thus making him - to some extent - accept their authority therefore the imposition of colonialism and subsequent resistance and struggle, which led to independence.

 

During the republic (1960-1990), the state provided some basic economic security, social welfare, and personal safety to some Somalis and because of this most nomad-cum-urbanites did not need to carry weapons, trusting the state to keep weapons in “safe” hands of the security forces. Unfortunately, as we all know, the state - in particular during the military regime – used its machinery to repress opponents thus killing thousands of its citizens. Perhaps it was wrong for the nomad-cum-urbanite to have trusted the state because in the end the state betrayed his trust. However, the rural majority or bare-footed nomads, who account around 71% of the Somali population, continued to carry their traditional weapons with dignity and pride, and nomad’s life continued as normal even during the colonial era. The state hardly intervened in his life, perhaps it might have intervened in some cases, for example to resolve clan conflicts over pasture and grazing rights. Perhaps the nomad was wise to have been sceptical of state’s inroads to his life and therefore was right to carry on his traditional way of life carry, the life he knows better.

 

State control over modern weapons was weakened in late 1970s and 1980s because of the defeat of the Somali National Army in ****** by the Ethiopians/Cubans/Russians, and the emergence of armed opposition groups (e.g. SSDF, SNM, USC. etc). These armed groups acquired modern and heavy weapons through misappropriation of state armoury, black markets, and of course from neighbouring frontline states – which as of today still continue to supply arms to the groups they like. Also, the armed groups’ clans played a major role to foot the bill.

 

At the collapse of the central government in 1991 and ensuing civil war meant state armoury was up for grabs, as rival armed groups and ordinary citizens joined the big loot of state property and infrastructure causing proliferation of small arms throughout the country. Marauding clans fought fiercely over the big booty, and entire military camps and equipments fell in the hands of the big ones. Some of these clans (e.g. northern regions: “Somaliland” “Puntland”) managed to remove heavy weapons from the public domain and managed to put them in centralised institutions. However, clans in the south and central Somalia find it harder to institutionalise weapons, and a large amount of that still in private hands. This remains to be the big threat. Probably, it was the six months that the Islamic Courts were in powers that weapons came closer to be institutionalised, but unfortunately that melted away with the demise of the Union of Islamic Courts.

 

Despite UN’s arms embargo on Somalia, frontline and other states and arm dealers have continued to supply arms to rivals groups through the conflict. This has created arms markets in big cities such as Mogadishu.

 

Now let me put that short historical analysis in the current situation. The big question that arises from all that is: how to disarm a hungry and angry nomad-cum-urbanite who now has access to deadly weapons? I say hungry because of the curse of an endemic poverty that is still claming thousands of lives and as the weak post-colonial state that used to provide some kind of basic public goods and services has totally disappeared from his radar. I say “angry” because of the civil war, which made Somalis, hate each other so much that even close-knit sub-clans and lineages are on each other’s throat. Maybe the nomad-cum-urbanite is angrier than the traditional nomad because in a traditional sense the latter would have known source of his income – his herd and farmland - and as he would have known how to nurture, protect, and maintain it. However, the nomad-cum-urbanite seems confused and has a misplaced identity – "galti-bax" - and is he not quite sure how to go about making his daily living and therefore might resort to “qoriga-caaradiisa” - barrel of the gun to secure that. In other words what you have throughout Somalia is a frustrated nomad-cum-urbanites and a generation of teen-agers that have been deprived of state protection and social security and welfare in the last 16 years. Those groups feel hungrier, angrier and more confused than ever. What a mess! So, in my humble opinion, in order to make sense of the disarmament debate, those involved in the disarmament debate ought to view the issue from a historical perspective, and then try to come up with some sustainable programmes aimed at reducing the proliferation of weapons.

 

Until a negotiated viable federal state structure that is acceptable to all Somalis from Seylac to Ras Kambooni is reconstituted, a state structure that could provide a decent life to its citizen, I suggest the following short term practical measures:

 

* To those authorities in “Somaliland” and “Puntland”, please keep up the good work of institutionalising weapons, rehabilitating militias, and clearing up mines etc. I urge you to strengthen and “nurture” what I call weapons collection institutions or organisations until such a time when the collected weapons are ready to be amalgamated with or transferred to a Federal Somali National Army (FSNA). I say “nurture institutions” because I am fearful of arms falling back into the hands of rival clan militias in case – hopefully NOT and God forbids – of inter-clan conflicts, which might lead to arms proliferation.

 

* To traditional clans leaders/elders/sheiks, encourage your constituencies to give up arms.

 

 

* To the Ethiopian-backed TFG, prior approaching militias to disarm them, work out a short-term sustainable plan of action that includes rehabilitation, re-training, income generation initiatives for militias. The TFG should act quickly because their political life/survival might not last long (6 months from now?) due to the unpredictability of dynamics, events and realities on the ground.

 

 

* To the weak TFG, open up political dialogue with all those opposing forces. Stubbornness will only prolong the conflict and will make your disarming programme much harder.

 

 

* Establish judicial institutions, arms collection institutions and systems – as the Islamic courts have done – in order to get gang elements of the armed groups off the streets. One problem that the TFG might face is that it does not have moral authority over some armed constituencies because (i) TFG is not a home-grown entity as the Islamic courts (ii) TFG cannot guarantee basic personal safety security to the areas it controls yet, (iii) it cannot generate income for the disbanded militias etc.

 

* Do not deploy those disbanded militias in military or security sectors but retrain them and place them in different sectors. There are many examples in which militia members have expressed their willingness to put down their guns provided there was an alternative source of income.

 

 

* To the TFG (MTPs, minister etc) whose salaries are being paid by the international community (UN, EU), make sure you allocate (donate) a good proportion of your salaries to the needy and the poor and to those militias who you are trying to disarm. To TFG members, stop your long trips/holidays and walkabouts around the world in which you receive a daily substance allowances and spend hundreds of dollars in luxury hotels etc. Imagine a minister earning a salary of £1000 per month and allocating £200 every month to help open a kiosk and shop to those rehabilitated militias or to other needy Somalis. Legitimacy and acceptance is acquired by being down to earth and not by spending months in Nairobi hotels!

 

 

* To warlords/landlords and gangs, you must surrender your weapons, and make your available yourself to justice for any alleged crimes etc.

 

 

* To the business community, although it is hard to trust in an unpopular and weak government, you may wish to reduce your dependence on armed militias to protect your business; instead you may wish to work with the TFG to help it create a national police force for everyone sake.

 

 

In 2004, some 750,000 Somalis in the Diaspora sent US$825million - $1billion to Somalia.(2) Imagine some of that money going to arms procurement. I therefore urge those in the Diaspora, to stop sending money to your clans to help them buy weapons, instead you should get them disband and rehabilitate their militias. Please get your clans use the money for alternative income generation programmes or schemes.

 

 

* To the UN’s Security Council, tighten up the arms embargo, and impose economic sanctions on those countries which are violating the embargo.

 

 

* To the UN agencies, initiate short-term income generation projects such as getting existing and former militias and those willing to clean up Mogadishu streets. This is only one example of many income generation projects that could be initiated.

 

The majority nomad and agro-pastoral communities - the backbone of Somalia’ economy, although they might have added some modern weapons to their arsenal, still carry their traditional weapons with pride and dignity - to protect their income source in a harsh, unforgiving and poverty ridden environment. This is because, unfortunately, that majority has yet to place its faith in any state structure that existed and that majority is still continues to be sceptical of any state inroads to its lives. Also, let us all face it, the nomad-cum-urbanites and two generations who are without or with little education are more angrier and hungrier than ever, and until we, as Somalis, come together to come up with a negotiated political settlement, deadly weapons will always remain in the hands of those who should not carry guns.

 

Muuse Yuusuf

E-Mai:myuusuf3@hotmail.com

 

Sources:

 

Somalia: A country Study, Nelson Harold D, American University, Washington, 1982

Somalia: From Resilience Towards Recovery and Development, World Bank, Jan. 2006

 

(1) Somalia: A country Study, Nelson H. D, American University, Washington, 1982

 

(2) Somalia: From Resilience Towards Recovery and Development, World Bank, Jan. 2006

 

 

WARDHEER NEWS

[Taliban]

Too many theories by Muuse Yuusuf. He strikes me as an armchair analyst. The best Western field and armchair analysts failed to diagnose a cure for the Iraqi and Afghani insurgencies; it remains to be seen how Muuse's untested theories fare.

[Centurion]

Some good points, actually.

But i'm increasingly becoming of the opinion, that this TFG is more worthless than we give it credit for.

It has not implemented any proper strategy to disarm the clans and the warlords. Yes, the warlords have agreed to disarm a number of days ago.....but we have yet to see them do so.

All we've seen is sporadic street fighting, and random house checks for firearms.

 

On top of that they've now taken measures to repress press freedom, a sign of their acknowledgement of their continued incompetance.

 

The TFG has yet to produce something decisive, something to win hearts with. the UN and AU will as ever take their time, for they see (the AU anyway) futility in any mission to Somalia.

[Castro]

Originally posted by Maakhir:

Thanks to Our brother Muse Yusuf who is from the heart of North West regions

What difference does it make which region's heart he hails from?

 

These "concrete" steps seem to have be written for a western audience. Perhaps the "brother" is trying to find a job in one of the many conservative think tanks Washington, DC is littered with.

[Taleexi]

Maakhir, I met the guy in Washington DC and his piece included, among other things, some fairly analyzed recommedations but will the TFG and international community are inclined to listen. This TFG has lost our virginity and i don't see any good coming out of it. hope time proves me wrong