Meles Zenawi taking too many chances

[Fabregas]

US bombers began pounding away at Somali positions as battles escalated between the Somali resistance and the combined forces of the invading Zenawi's army and the Somali interim government. Hardly a day passes without a bombing or assassination in Baidoa, capital of the interim government. The Americans are using their usual excuse: they are trying to kill Al-Qaeda leaders.

 

Somalia's Islamic resistance seems to have mastered the art of guerrilla warfare, taking control of small towns then abandoning them and disappearing into the population. It is a tactic designed to baffle and frustrate a regular army trying to fight a symmetric war. Where exactly is the enemy? Meanwhile, the ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Eritreans are waiting for the right moment to assault the Zenawi's troops.

 

What should the Ethiopians do?

 

The simplest solution would be to withdraw and live to fight another day. But this is not what Zenawi really wants to do right now. He is still hoping to get the US and Europe to back an African contingent, along the lines of the one formed for Darfur, in Somalia. That would give the Ethiopians a chance to pull out of the country without losing face.

 

Alternatively, Ethiopian politicians may escalate the situation on the Eritrean front, which would give them an excuse to pull out troops from Somalia without looking as if they were running away. Or, learning from American tactics in Iraq, Ethiopia may stir up factional strife in Somalia, which would give it a breathing space and make it look more of a peacemaker than an invader. The Ethiopians may be tempted to finance and arm warlords and have them fight a proxy war against the resistance. That would create a real problem for the Somali resistance.

 

The worst possible situation for any resistance movement is one in which it finds itself distanced from the general population. Without firm public backing, it is hard to maintain the momentum of resistance. Let's take Hamas for example. Hamas started out as a popular group, with a large network of public institutions engaged in social endeavours. This is why it managed to survive once armed struggle started. In Iraq, this wasn't the case, for the Baath Party had extinguished all autonomous social or political activities in the country prior to the invasion. This is why the Iraqi resistance is so divided right now.

 

The Taliban is another case in point. In power before the occupation, the Taliban had the grassroots it needed to resume the fight once it was deposed by the invasion. Even while in power, the Taliban was locked in battle with the Northern Alliance. Later on, after Taliban leaders fled to remote mountain areas, they could count on their local supporters.

 

In Somalia, the situation is similar in some ways. Prior to the occupation, the militia of the Islamic Courts was in control of most of Somalia, but it hadn't yet had the chance to forge strong links with the general public. Still, even before the occupation began, the Islamic Courts had gained some military experience through its battles with the Baidoa interim government and other northern factions.

 

The Islamic Courts have something in common with both the Palestinian and the Iraqi resistance movements: religious zeal. But they are more clannish than the Palestinians and less sectarian than the Iraqis. So far, the Somali resistance has managed to put so much pressure on the Ethiopian occupation forces that current battles are likely to develop into a full- fledged war.

 

Factor in the Eritrean-Ethiopian border rivalries, the resurgence of the ONLF, and Ethiopia's efforts to stir up inter- tribal conflicts in Somalia, and the future seems to be rather dim for the Ethiopians. First of all, Eritrea is likely to escalate things on the borders with Ethiopia. Second, Ethiopia will have to deploy more troops against the ONLF. And third, the scale of resistance in various parts of Somalia may prove too much for the Ethiopians. So why is Ethiopia refusing to withdraw from Somalia?

 

For starters, Ethiopia wants an access to the sea. Since Eritrean independence, Ethiopia has been landlocked. Should Ethiopia pull out of Somalia and recognise the independence of both Eritrea and Somalia, it would have to learn to live without sea access or regional clout. It is not only money or trade Ethiopia is worried about, but influence and power.

 

Still, if Ethiopia decides to stay in Somalia while being challenged on other fronts, it may be risking utter defeat. At one point, the Somalis may start demanding the ****** region back. A protracted war in Somalia may therefore lead to profound changes in Ethiopia's politics and geography. Ethiopia, let's keep in mind, is not exactly an ethnically or religiously homogeneous nation. And some local clans may just be tempted to secede or grab power from the central government.

 

Eritrea is biding its time now, waiting for the Ethiopians to get a bloody nose in Somalia before moving in for the kill. The Ethiopians are for now banking on US support, but that may not last forever, not with Europe steadily manoeuvring to replace the US as the dominant power in Africa.

 

Everything is possible now, from a devastating war in Somalia to extensive confrontation in ****** or an Eritrean- Ethiopian showdown. One thing is sure. Meles Zenawi is taking too many chances

[Fabregas]

http://www.hamarey.com/news/meles-zenawi-taking-too-many-chances-r95

 

A bit of the mark on many things, but still interesting.....