Somaliland and the issue of international recognition: a response

[Taleexi]

Somaliland and the issue of international recognition: a response

Ali Geeleh

January 23, 2006

 

I am responding to an article by Dustin Dehéz entitled ''Somaliland and the Issue of International Recognition''(dated 23 January 2006) which appeared in the magazine PINR and also reprinted at WardheerNews.com. The writer has rightly applauded Somaliland for its relative peace and successful elections and referendum in the country (not all by any means) which makes such a contrast to most of lawless Somalia. However, Mr. Dehéz obvious empathy for the secessionists/separatists amounts to advocating recognition for a rebel entity.

 

Judging by Mr. Dehèz's presentation, the ordinary reader unfamiliar with Somalia would be forgiven to conclude that Somaliland is a distinctive separate country that has freed itself from alien rule just as Kosovo broke away from Serbia’s tutelage. Mr. Dehéz may not concur with this interpretation but that is how most Somalis/readers will see it. As one from the area but whose regions do not subscribe to this treacherous secession, let me, for the benefit of your readers, set out the true historical perspective to the issue of Somaliland and Somalia.

 

The Somali people in the Horn of Africa were, and still are, the most homogenous people in Africa below the Sahara. They have the same religion, race, culture, language, blood ties and common homeland. Following the European scramble for Africa, the Somali homeland in the Horn of Africa was divided into five parts, creating British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland (now Djibouti), Ethiopian Somaliland, and the North Eastern region of Kenya (NFD).

 

The consequence of these colonial conquests was that artificial boundaries were imposed on the Somalis in which clans found themselves divided among the various colonial territories. In the case of British Somaliland, the ****** clans, who inhabit the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (approximating over 40 percent of the geographical area of the so-called Somaliland), were separated from their fellow clan cousins in Southern Somalia (Puntalnd). So were the ********** and ***** whose regions border Djibouti and Ethiopia. Thus, there are no particular common denominators among the clans in former British Somaliland that distinguish them from clans in other neighbouring Somali territories other than the British rule. Rather, they had less blood ties amongst themselves and more with those across the artificial borders in Italian, French, and Ethiopian Somalilands.

 

It is the artificial division of the Somali homeland in the Horn that served as the driving force for Somali nationalism and the struggle for Somali independence and unity. The five-pointed star of Somalia's national flag symbolizes the aspiration of Somalia's divided people to be free from foreign occupation or domination and that they will eventually unite as one country. The independence of former British and Italian Somalilands and their unity on July first, 1960 was the first realization of this dream. To suggest as Mr. Dehéz does that there were problems soon after independence is an exaggeration. It is true that there were initially some teething administrative problems as was to be expected given that the territories were under colonial powers with different administrative systems for nearly a century. It is also true that the ***** clan were somewhat grumpy about losing their former dominance of the North during the time of the British rule. All other clans were indeed very happy to be part of Somalia. If there were problems, they had nothing to do with the Union per se but to historically inherited difficulties or to the wrongs of Somali leaders as later happened.

 

When the Somali rebel movements succeeded in 1991 to topple the government of the late dictator Siyad Barre, with military help from Ethiopia, the ***** clan in the North Western region of Somalia declared their secession from Somalia and adopted the old name colonial name of Somaliland. They had been successful to the extent of propagating the lie that all the other clans in the territory are fully behind this secession. That is a blatant travesty of the facts.. The ****** clans in the territory remain as loyal to their membership of Somalia as they had been since July 1960 when the former British and Italian Somalilands united. So are the overwhelming majority of ******* and *****. But unlike the ******* in Sool and Sanaag who can fight off the secessionists and repulse any intrusion into their territory, the ********** have no such advantages. They had suffered atrocities in 1991 from the ****** rebel movement (Somali National Movement) and are understandably not keen for the time being to provoke any military reprisals from the ******, unless thy can count on the support of an effective and functioning Somali government in Mogadishu which can come to their aid.

 

The impression created by Mr. Dehèz that there is a “dispute†over Sool and Sanaag between Puntland and Somaliland is ludicrous. Puntland (including Sool and Sanaag) is part and parcel of Somalia just as the rest of Somaliland is. To suggest that there is a dispute between Somalia and Somaliland is to imply that Somaliland is itself not part of Somalia. It also implies that the people in the area under “dispute†do not exist or else that their voice/wishes do not count. Most likely this writer may be a victim of the secessionist’s disinformation that Puntland had grabbed regions belonging to Somaliland. This interpretation is possible since writers or journalists visiting Hargeisa rarely ever go to the regions in question; Sool and Sanaag and ascertain for themselves what the true facts are: that it is the people in Sool and Sanaag regions who took the initiative to join the Puntalnd administration rather than the other way round.

 

A rebel entity, based on one clan, has no legal basis to claim regions belonging to other clans, whose inhabitants had repeatedly made clear that they have nothing to do with the secession. Sool, Sanaag and Cayn regions had never participated in the elections and referendums organized by the secessionists which Mr. Dehéz wrongly describes as having been nationwide. How “wide†is the question?

 

Mr Dehéz makes contradictory observations regarding support for Somalia's unity. On the one hand, he points out that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), comprising of the East African countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya and Sudan, as being collectively “committed to Somalia’s unityâ€. On the other hand, he states in his conclusion that "neighbouring countries [supposedly IGAD] are deeply divided on the issueâ€. The fact of the matter is that IGAD, the African Union, the European Union, the UN, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference have all reaffirmed Somalia's unity.

 

Mr. Dehéz misrepresents the British position when he suggests that the former colonial powers, Britain and Italy, do not see eye to eye about the Somalia’s problem and its solution. Nothing Britain has said or done can be interpreted that way. On the contrary, Britain has always joined other UN security members and its EU members to support Somalia unity. So has Italy. Britain had never given any false hopes to the secessionists regarding possible recognition. On the contrary, it has repeatedly advised them to settle their problems with their fellow brothers in Somalia.

 

Finally, Mr. Dehéz says that a “resolution of Somaliland's status is a prerequisite for success of the peace process in overall Somaliaâ€. There is no dispute or question about Somaliland’s status. It has no other status other than being a region of Somalia. That is the status that the international community recognizes as of now. If Mr. Dehéz is suggesting otherwise, meaning that the area be recognized as an independent country separate from Somalia, that is not the way to peace. It is a sure prescription for fanning the flames of the Somali civil war. Inevitably, there will be war between the ******* and the ******* over Sool and Sanaag. One can also envisage intervention by the Somali government – assuming it overcomes its present difficulties That augurs ill for the stability of the Horn and Africa as a whole. It is in the interest of peace that the clan-based secession be discouraged.

 

In today’s Federal democratic Somalia, regions have more or less self autonomy. The ***** -dominated secessionists in the North have everything to gain by playing their full part in Somalia. To refuse unity is to unite the rest of the Somali people against them. Sooner or later, there is bound to be action from a future more effective and powerful government in Somalia. This time, the secessionists will not be facing Siyad Barre and its dreaded regime but the rest of the Somali people. It is a pity that Mr. Dehéz who appears to have empathy for the secessionists did not venture to give them such simple home truths.

 

By Ali Geeleh

Email:Aligeeleh@yahoo.co.uk

_______________

 

No explicit qabiil terms, baliis

 

[ January 25, 2006, 01:17: Message edited by: Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar ]

[Taleexi]

''Somaliland and the Issue of International Recognition''

Dustin Dehéz ,PINR,23 January 2006=

 

When the regime of Siad Barre was ousted from power in Mogadishu in 1991, it left a power vacuum that could not be filled by the many varying and still belligerent Somali factions. Somalia in its modern boundaries was formed by a unification of the two former colonies Italian Somaliland -- the southern part of present-day Somalia -- and British Somaliland in the north. The different forms of colonial rule adopted by the British and the Italians left Somalia with very diverse colonial legacies.

 

For Italy, colonies were a question of national pride and status, its colonial policy aimed at the total assimilation of the colonial territories. British Somaliland, on the other hand, was only of marginal importance to the British Empire and was used as a logistical supply outpost for British ships sailing to India or the Gulf of Aden. The British colonial praxis there could best be described as indirect rule and, as a result of this soft approach to indigenous political systems, the traditional order stayed largely intact.

 

Additionally, the relationship between north and south Somalia has always been difficult. Only days after gaining independence in 1960, the two countries unified and Somalia has since been dominated by the southern part of the country. After the bloody 1977-78 ****** war between Ethiopia and Somalia, the government of Siad Barre became more repressive, and more Somalis from the former British Somaliland protectorate called for national sovereignty free from Barre's rule.

 

Due to the Barre regime's violent repression, Somalilanders, encouraged by Ethiopia, took up arms and formed the Somaliland National Movement (S.N.M.) in 1981 to resist Barre. In the late 1980s, Barre virtually lost control of the province and ordered the air force to bomb Hargeisa, today's capital of Somaliland. The bombing and subsequent raids of government troops claimed tens of thousands of casualties. However, by the end of the 1980s, what has become the unrecognized Republic of Somaliland was nearly totally under the control of the S.N.M. The vacuum left by the collapse of the central government in Mogadishu in 1991 had, therefore, less effect on Somaliland than it did for the rest of the country.

 

Somalis, although belonging to one nation, are organized along clan lineages; traditionally, conflicts are solved by local clan elders. After state collapse in 1991, clan leaders and elders in Somaliland gathered in a traditional meeting, a so-called Guurti, and proclaimed Somaliland's independence in May 1991.

 

Since then, Somaliland can be regarded as a relatively stable region. With little foreign help, it has managed considerable progress in consolidation of statehood: in a nationwide referendum held in 2001, the country introduced a new constitution with overwhelming support from voters. In April 2003, voters were again called to the polling stations for the election of a new president. The ballots in which Dahir Riyale Kahin was elected president were comparatively open and fair.

 

The consolidation reached a climax at the end of September 2005 when the country held parliamentary elections. Although far from being perfect, international observers from the Catholic Institute for International Relations called the elections free and fair. Furthermore, more voters in recent elections turned out to vote for candidates from different clans, a clear signal that Somalilanders are beginning to trust their political system. But the consolidation of statehood has so far not been followed by international recognition from the international community.

 

Somaliland in the International Arena

 

Although Somaliland managed stability and continuity in domestic policy, its foreign policy has been less successful. Part of the problem is that the new president of the Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) in Somalia, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, is a former warlord from Puntland, the northeastern part of Somalia. Puntland and Somaliland were already at war in early 2004 over the provinces Sool and Sanaag. While Somaliland claims that on the basis of the colonial boundaries these provinces belong to Hargeisa, Puntland is determined to take hold of all areas in which its fellow clansmen live (Somaliland is predominantly inhabited by the ***** clan, while Puntland is inhabited by the ****** ).

 

A success in the peace process in southern Somalia between Yusuf and Speaker of Parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan would inevitably lead into another conflict between Somaliland and Somalia in which Puntland undoubtedly would hold a dominant position. Thus, the resolution of Somaliland's status is a prerequisite for success of the peace process in overall Somalia. [see: Somalia's Uncertain Future]

 

On a local level, Somalia's strategically key position in the Horn of Africa between the Arab peninsula and the African continent is adding its part to the ongoing struggle. Many Somalis believed that efforts for the resolution of continuing state failure in their country would come from the Arab countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa. But for the time being, the countries keenest to bring stability back to Somalia are the East African countries that have formed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (I.G.A.D.). These members consist of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya and Sudan.

 

I.G.A.D. is committed to Somalia's unity since it fears that a successful secession of Somaliland could be quoted as a precedent by other secessionist movements in East Africa. At the same time, Somalia and subsequently Somaliland have become theaters for proxy wars. Arab countries are trying to balance Ethiopia's influence in the Horn. Yemen, for instance, supported Jama Ali Jama, a rival of Yusuf in Puntland, as Yusuf is regarded by many Somalis and Arabs as being overly tied to Addis Ababa.

 

Furthermore, Yemen serves as an important transport hub for small arms to Somalia and Somaliland despite a United Nations arms embargo and despite a maritime presence of U.S.-led military forces engaged in the "war on terrorism." During the 1998-2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Somalia became the theater for a proxy war between the two countries. Eritrea channeled weapons to Somali warlords in the Ethiopian ****** region in an attempt to open a second front in the war. A unified Somalia is the only country in the Horn that, potentially, could become a rival to Ethiopia's dominant role. Therefore, Eritrea rejects the recognition of Somaliland since it still hopes that a single, unified government for all of Somalia could emerge which would not be under the influence of Ethiopia.

 

Ethiopia, on the other hand, maintains good relations with Somaliland as well as with Yusuf and the T.F.G. With Eritrean independence in 1993, Ethiopia lost access to the Red Sea and is since dependent on the port of Djibouti for crucial imports and exports. Somaliland's port at Berbera might very well offer an alternative trade route if officially recognized and Ethiopia repeatedly showed a willingness to establish diplomatic links to the government in Hargeisa. Djibouti, on the contrary, feels uneasy; on the one hand it doesn't want to promote a competitor for its main source of revenues -- its port facilities -- but on the other hand it is relieved that the commonly shared border is relatively safe.

 

Meanwhile, the question of Somaliland's independence has created a row between the two former colonial powers of Somalia, Italy and Great Britain. Italy has strongly emphasized the importance of Somalia's unity and is subsequently supporting the T.F.G. headed by Yusuf.

 

American sources mentioned in the Economist in December 2005 recently indicate that Italy is even funneling weapons to the provisional government despite a United Nations arms embargo. Britain, as the former colonial power of Somaliland, is said to develop a much more open approach to Somaliland and has repeatedly encouraged Hargeisa's process of democratization.

 

The United States also pursues this more open approach. The U.S. State Department announced that it "welcomes the September 29 parliamentary elections in Somaliland." Furthermore, a report published by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a number of recommendations for strengthening U.S.-African policy, in which it called Somaliland's capital Hargeisa a strategic location in the global war on terror and criticized the lack of a U.S. presence there.

 

At the same time, the conflict about Somaliland's secession between the former colonial powers is making it difficult for the European Union to develop a common stance towards Hargeisa.

 

Conclusion

 

While Somalilanders voted for their right of self-determination, the subject of state secession is still a matter of ongoing conflict. With a transitional government in southern Somalia reluctant of accepting Somaliland's independence, neighboring countries deeply divided on the issue, the regional organization I.G.A.D. unable to endorse any solution, and a European Union paralyzed by the quarrel between the U.K. and Italy, Somaliland's future remains to be seen.

 

 

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The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader

[Taleexi]

Sorry the order of the posts, ideally the latter would have been first, but guess what we aint living in a perfect world, or are we?

[Paragon]

The Somali people in the Horn of Africa were, and still are, the most homogenous people in Africa below the Sahara. They have the same religion, race, culture, language, blood ties and common homeland. Following the European scramble for Africa, the Somali homeland in the Horn of Africa was divided into five parts, creating British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland (now Djibouti), Ethiopian Somaliland (Og-a-den), and the North Eastern region of Kenya (NFD).

The cliche' quote above might hold some truth, but to use such ethnic similarity to justify objection to the aspiration of a people is neither logical nor is it sustainable. Somalis may share all cultural and physical attributes, but for sure their consensus does vary. To say the least, 'some' of the people of Somaliland have made the decission to take control of their destiny, for which they have a God-given right. All other talk is futile and non-objective I am affraid. The day we start respecting each other's independent choice (either with regards to intra-Somaliland matters and inter-South and North), will be the day when we have mastered the art of civility and thus prosperity.

[Taleexi]

Paragon, what about the rights of the people who reside in the plains, valleys, mountainous areas in between from Buhoodle to Bosaso , from Erigavo to Garowe, in your dictionary they've no right whatsoever but by default reer Hargeisa and Berbera have the divine right to claim other's territories and what therein, I must say that you are implying implicitly that God is not just based on your argument put forth, you endorsed the secessionists' agenda while you denied others' political aspirations, what a hypocrisy!.

 

I personally could care less, had they (the secessionist) limited their experimental administration within their triangle cities (Buroa, Hargeisa and Berbera) rather than attempting executing their detrimental land expansion policies and power hungriness.

[Paragon]

Originally posted by Mansa Munsa:

Paragon, what about the rights of the people who reside in the plains, valleys, mountainous areas in between from Buhoodle to Bosaso , from Erigavo to Garowe, in your dictionary they've no right whatsoever but by default reer Shiikh ***** has the divine right to claim other's territories and what therein, I must say that you are implying implicitly that God is not just based on your argument put forth, you endorsed the secessionists' agenda while you denied others' political aspirations, what a hypocrisy!.

Mansa Munsa, please re-read what I wrote, before you accuse me of hypocrisy. I think you've jumped the gun of judgement too soon.

[Xargaga]

[quoteI personally could care less, had they (the secessionist) limited their experimental administration within their triangle cities (Buroa, Hargeisa and Berbera) rather than attempting executing their detrimental land expansion policies and power hungriness.

Same old rhetarects. The names of the three Towns and the golden triangle. Horta waa suaal where are the following towns located Mr Mansa? Ceeri-gaabo, Caiynabo. Gar Adag, the famous safe haven for cadde muuse Ceel-afweyn, Not to mention xiis and maydh . are they within this triangle or?

 

To Admin: take note of this the Golden Rule # 1 has been broken here hope the man from timbuktu will be reprimanded

[Taleexi]

Paragon, xaal qaado cimaamadii ba iga dhacdaye, I was in an interval of what have you. I re-read your post, and missed seeing 'some' somaliland people, 'some' is the keyword here that I should have read it from the first place

[Jaylaani]

Mansa,

 

Whuz up with all the hate? So you don't think Somaliland should e recognized, big deal. Joint the millions of Somalis who believe the same thing. Somaliland political issues are for Somalilanders. You can cry all you want but the will of the people will prevail. See you at the crossroad.

 

If you guys would spend half of that energy to better your self instead of discrediting Somaliland from left to right, the current situation of “SOMALIA†wouldn’t be as hopeless as it was 14 yrs ago. I love to see all Somalis doing well but people like you make me sick.

[LANDER]

Jay,

Let these folks spend their precious time dwelling over every article put forth by foreign intellectuals. It really bothers them to see third parties who don't apparently any direct interest in Somaliland,to be continuously writing about it and spreading awareness of the issues facing it. Typical response is the one put forth by this author, instead of applauding this foreigner for understanding the complex geo-politics of a third-world region that is bordering on insignificance on the global stage, he tries to lecture him in his own warped, fallacious, self-righteous and typically fascist views. Yes it is a pity the likes of him don’t spend more time doin real ish for his beloved Somalia.

[Taleexi]

Jeylaani, God willing I may be around for awhile therefore it is advisable that you develop some ways of handling me on due course.

[Taleexi]

Lander, remember we are in an information age, an outsider who knows so little about somalia's history and its people and yet wants to take a position regarding somali affairs, must lacks the skills of argument making.

 

First, know who you and your subjects are, and then let us delve into the discussion in a civil way..

[Jaylaani]

Lander,

 

I heard you bro....