Anarchy, Terrorism, and Piracy in Somalia: New Rules of Engagement

[Jacaylbaro]

Anarchy, Terrorism, and Piracy in Somalia: New Rules of Engagement for the International Community

 

 

Somalia has long been anarchic, hitting rock bottom claiming #1 in The Fund for Peace´s most recent Failed States Index. It had no functioning central government in the past 19 years, albeit 14 attempts to reconstitute state authority had been made since 1991, when the former Cold War dictator Mohammad Siad Barre was ousted after 22 years in power. All such efforts were doomed to fail. Whether or not the latest effort is going to succeed is a matter that will remain to be seen. One thing is crystal clear at this point in time, nonetheless, that Somalia´s latest attempt at state-building has to be supported by the US and the rest of the international community, rather than fought, lest it should be a hotbed of terrorism and piracy.

 

The hitherto neglected issue of Somalia managed to be in the limelight of current international affairs as a result of the sudden surge in piracy in the waters of the coast of Somalia. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN special envoy for Somalia, said recently that "the problem of piracy has opened the eyes of those who have forgotten Somalia." The waters off the Somali coast are the most dangerous in the world - accounting for a third of the world's pirate attacks. The coast of Somalia has become the world´s worst piracy area only since 2007; though foreign fishing trawlers have been aggressively exploiting Somalia´s rich and unpatrolled waters since 1991 at the expense of coastal fishing villages. Illegal fishing has undoubtedly decreased due to the effectiveness of Somali pirates. In 2008, 40 out of 100, in 2009, so far 25 attacks succeeded. The total number of captured ships now stands at least 19 with more than 250 sailors from countries around the world being held hostage by Somali pirates and $30- $40 million paid in ransom in 2008.

 

In response to the widespread pirate attacks in the waters off the coast of Somalia, the international community launched a large naval operation to counter the problem. Naval powers from around the globe have dispatched a fleet of warships to the Gulf of Aden to fight piracy including the EU "NAVFOR Atlanta operation". Besides, at a recent conference in Brussels attended by the leadership from the UN, the EU, the AU, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the international community pledged $213 million toward strengthening Somali security forces. However, the question here is whether these measures are enough to address the piracy epidemic. The bone of contention is that the so-called antipiracy military measures are myopic and what the international community needs is a far-sighted long-term state-building agenda on shore in Somalia, promoting traditional peacemaking processes among the diverse conflicting Somali clans and sub-clans. In this regard, moderate Islam no doubt can provide a common ground for building consensus thereby easing the arduous/daunting task of entrenching a well-functioning, all-inclusive government.

 

This point was emphasized by Enough's latest strategy paper, Beyond Piracy: Next Steps in Somalia, authored by Ken Menkhaus, John Prendergast, and Colin Thomas-Jensen. The paper analyzes the current situation in Somalia and provides recommendations for how the international community in general and the United States in particular can help Somalis address multiple security threats that put their country, the region, and even far-flung countries at risk. It argues that while short-term measures to curb pirate attacks are certainly necessary, the Obama administration must not allow the politics of the piracy problem to distract it from putting in place a long-term strategy to help Somalis forge a state that, with measured external support, can fight piracy, promote peace and reconciliation, and combat terrorism.

 

The paper describes the problem of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia as "The lowest order of threat to the TFG, the Somali people, the region, and the United States is actually the security item enjoying the greatest attention right now." It goes on to say that "Even so, the continued epidemic of piracy off the Somali coast is a problem and a test of the capacity of the TFG to extend its authority." According to this strategy paper, the only viable and legitimate option for the TFG is to tackle piracy onshore, leaving no space for external actors, apart from helping strengthen the TFG and local peace-building processes.

 

The piracy epidemic in the Gulf of Aden waters is merely a reflection of the anarchy onshore. Piracy, like terrorism, is reflected by a deeper malaise. The root causes behind the increased piracy off the coast of Somalia are state collapse, humanitarian crisis, abject poverty, and the ongoing exploitation of the waters by global factory fishing vessels. As a result, there are not many viable livelihoods for anyone in Somalia these days. In order to capture the essence of this problem, let´s try to consider the Somali narrative on the ongoing piracy as told by Ken Menkhaus. The narrative "sees it is justifiable protection of Somali shores from illegal fishing, and … sees the piracy as a minor problem we are overreacting to. For instance -- they say at present there is a massive humanitarian crisis in Somalia, 3.5 million people at risk, and the UN is calling for $950 million in aid. We have only provided a fraction of that aid. Yet we're willing to mobilize the world's navies at considerable cost to stop a $20-40 million piracy problem. That's how (not all) Somalis see it."

 

The paper contends that given the significant national security interests that the United States has in Somalia with respect to counterterrorism, and the international political and commercial pressure generated due to piracy, the Obama administration should more deeply engage in Somalia´s state reconstruction. In a much similar paper entitled "7 Ways to Stop Piracy", Ken Menkhaus contends that "the United States and the international community have overstated the threat of Somali piracy. Somali hijackers earned between $30 and $40 million in ransom in 2008, a handsome sum of cash in one of the world´s most impoverished countries, but a paltry sum for international shipping -- not even enough to appreciably raise insurance premiums for ships passing through the Gulf of Aden."

 

In an attempt to explain away naval military operation as the dominant normative mode of engagement, Menkhaus says "Most shipping companies prefer to live with the current piracy modus vivendi. The risk of any one ship being pirated is still low; their crews, ships, and cargo are returned safely; and the ransom fees are manageable. A military rescue, by comparison, is much riskier to the crew and will raise insurance costs considerably, as insurance companies will have to factor in the possibility of injuries and loss of life to crew and ensuing lawsuits."

 

For Menkhaus, what would seem to justify a military response to the problem of piracy in Somali waters are fear of copycat piracy elsewhere, fear of al Qaeda adopting the practice to capture Western hostages, and commitment to the principle of open seas, rather than the ransom amounts themselves. For him, another reason why a military response is not warranted is owing to the practical impossibility to patrol a zone of 2.5 million square miles.

 

In the words of Sadia Ali Aden, "Like the Iraq war, the military solution is a failed solution. The military solution will only discredit if not altogether alienate the moderate elements, radicalize insurgents, and perpetuate bloodshed and chaos. Therefore, it seems that the only way toward a win-win solution is through diplomacy and by adopting an alternative, constructive policy toward Somalia." Comparing the situation with the war in Iraq, Donald Levine has also suggested that "Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia, with US concurrence if not active backing, is likely to have a similar effect. Our goal should be to strengthen the moderate Somalis there, not undermine them through arousing anti-Ethiopia and anti-US hysteria."

 

 

In a recent piece, Johan Galtung, my own professor and who is considered widely and deservedly to be the Father of Peace Studies, claims that Ethiopia received payment from the US in exchange for its incursion in to Somalia. While I concur with Johan Galtung´s proposal that "the piracy issue can be solved but only if treated as part of the whole Somalia complex", but I dismiss his opinion that Ethiopia was paid by the US to attack Somalia as unsubstantiated, if not untrue. As Terrence Lyons aptly put it, "It´s important to note that Ethiopia moved into Somalia not as the puppet or proxy for the United States. Ethiopia had its own very specific national security interest relating to Somalia. Ethiopia saw stepped-up attacks on Ethiopia as originating in Somalia, aided by Eritrea. Ethiopia saw this as a real threat to the Ethiopian state and region. That´s why Ethiopia invaded, I believe, rather than just because the United States said ´Go get al-Qaeda.´" Galtung was not alone in entertaining the idea that Ethiopia obtained a pecuniary gain from the US for its incursion in to Somalia. A certain Eric Margolis also wrote in the Huffington Post that "Ethiopia received generous cash rewards from Washington for its invasion." This, however, is by no means a defense of Ethiopian invasion. For me, the decision to invade shall always remain to be Ethiopia´s biggest foreign policy blunder, though I don´t deny its legitimate national security interests. There were other ways and means of safeguarding its interests short of aggression, not to mention the timing.

 

Besides, Galtung´s characterization of Ethiopia as Christian and Somalia as Islamic, which gives the impression that the problem with Ethiopia and Somalia is religious, is a reductio ad absurdum. First, FDR Ethiopia, unlike Imperial Ethiopia, is not a Christian state, as secularism is one of the pillars of its political system. Second, Ethiopia, in terms of its religious composition, is a country where a significant portion of its populace is Muslim. In the words of Terrence Lyons, "While many portray Ethiopia as a Christian nation, the country in fact has roughly equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. Ethnic and national identity rather than religion has proven to be the most important social cleavage. It is possible, of course, that religious divisions will grow as an additional spillover from Ethiopia´s incursion into Somalia. This is another reason why settling this conflict is imperative."

 

What is so disturbing is also the unfounded allegation that Ethiopia tips Somali pirates about the vessels, their cargo, and lane. Menkhaus in his online appearance on the Washington Post dismissed such allegations saying "Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has better things to do." There are also reports that Britain-based private companies tip the pirates. According to Press TV´s last week edition, "Well-placed informers constantly update control centers in Somalia, which ultimately give the pirates information about ships, their cargo and their routes, the Guardian reported citing a European military intelligence document obtained by a Spanish radio station, Cadena SER."

 

The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on its part claims, in its May 8 2009 edition of A Week in the Horn, that the external spoilers have been busy in the last two weeks with destructive activities in Somalia. To quote, "There is a real danger of further violent confrontation, and to make matters worse external forces, including the Government of Eritrea, foreign extremists and various government and non-government actors in the Middle East, have been increasing their flow of finance, weapons and ideological guidance to extremist elements. In the last two weeks, since Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys´ return to Mogadishu from Asmara, Eritrea has sent four plane loads of weapons, two to the airstrip at K50 and two to Ballidogle airfield. Last weekend further fighting broke out in Mogadishu between Al-Shabaab and Government forces with AMISOM also being targeted." This I am afraid is no good news inasmuch as it is indicative of a probable return to its long-standing 'securitization agenda' by Ethiopia. It is common knowledge that both Ethiopia and the U.S. justified their military actions in Somalia at least in part as a response to the threat of terrorism. However, for Ethiopia there is more to its national security interests than mere threat of terrorism and the major threat has been that Somalia can become a site where attacks against Ethiopia could be launched, and indeed was the site of a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

 

Ken Menkhaus emphasizes that "the Somali piracy epidemic is unquestionably an on-shore crisis demanding an on-shore solution. Naval operations to interdict and apprehend pirates will help, but cannot possibly halt the daily quest of over a thousand gunmen in such vast waters when the risks are so low, rewards so high and alternatives so bleak in desolate Somalia."As Michael Shank proposes, we must find stability on land first, then order will return to the seas. Like Shank, Menkhaus argues that "The solution will ultimately have to be on-shore, with more effective government in Somalia." Thus, the key to solving the seas is to promote a negative peace agenda buttressed by vision and continue with a positive peace agenda on land while ensuring inclusiveness and good governance within Somalia's transitional federal government. On the former, the West must rally. It has resources; all it needs is the will. It is also in the best interest of the sub-region in general to work out a con/federative arrangement among member states of the Horn, because Somalis are also to be found in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

 

Having pointed out the following four areas of immediate priorities (1) Enhanced security, (2) Halting impunity (3) Inclusive governance, and (4) Managing external spoilers such as Eritrea, Libya, Qatar, and Iran, Enough´s latest strategy paper put forth recommendations for the United States: (1) supporting local security and order efforts and (2) supporting indigenous criminal justice systems (like Xeer).

 

The most pressing choice facing the international community at the moment is between total engagement and total disengagement. While the only viable option is engagement, the kind of engagement that the situation in Somalia warrants is positive engagement": supporting an inclusive process of state-building or reconstruction, bolstered by traditional peacemaking processes, based on moderate Islam. Enough´s strategy paper concludes that "In fighting terrorism on land and piracy at sea, U.S. national security interests will be better secured if we aligned ourselves more with the interest of most Somalis in better security and effective governance. Helping to build the house and using the back door will be much more effective than barging into the front door of a house that has yet to be built." This is a good call on the US, but won't be a good enough call until it is also addressed to Ethiopia, which is the region's pillar of peace by its own right.

 

 

Alemayehu Fentaw