Peace has been pursuit but never attained in Somalia

[Baashi]

Why?

[Alle-ubaahne]

Originally posted by Baashi:

Why?

Are you saying after we attempted to destroy the Mogadishu Peace and Prosperity that was fought by the Islamic Courts, nothing had worked for both your uncle and the Ethiopian Mercineries?

 

Why do you think that was a genuine attempt on your side to seek peace for whatever your intentions was?

 

Are you suggesting it is our (Somali Muslims) Mujaahidiin to blame for resisting the medicine (poisinous one at best) you prescribed for us, or some other factors are working against your gullible wishes?

 

Tell us, yaa Baashi!

[Baashi]

Here we go again I won't waste my time and dignify this silly post of yours by responding to it. Kalligii Muslim use your noodless better! Waa talo!

[me]

Because we don't want it bad enough? Because we don't make good leaders? because we are a nation of ego's?

 

WHY? because we now live in Bizzaro world. Where good is bad and bad is good.

 

WHY? because we are all talk and no substance. Because we all dream of a better world or a better Somalia and never do shit and if someone tries to do something good we bring them down because he or she might make us look bad.

 

Fukkk WHY, how about HOW, HOW CAN WE BRING PEACE TO SOMALIA.

[Sky]

Amazing reply, don't ask why, ask how. Priceless.

[Baashi]

Well most of the shrewd and calculating folks I converse with would have at least made an attempt to know what makes the beast they're dealing with tik before they get into how to tame biz. For now let's leave the "how" for the second thread aight.

 

First let's define the variables so we are in a position to solve the equation or put differently let's assign variables first and come up a problem statement and from there position ourselves in an angle where we can devise a "how" approach to tackle the situation. Deal? aight!

 

Peace has tirelessly been pursuit but every time Somalis' effort toward that goal ended in vain. Now one has to note that Somalis' political disagreement, which basically is based on simple clannish platform (distrust all known political systems), is the underlying problem here. Having said that, however, let me say that it is my considered opinion that Somali political problems have farther been aggravated by constant and unceasing foreign interferences.

 

Add to that the quality of the leaders at helm there and it is no wonder that Somalia is in a such sorry state.

 

With that simple background, let's try the first method: define variables.

 

X. Deep held clan animosity that forces the contesting parties to deny their nemesis any political power both real and perceived. Nomadic philosophy of victors "exact what they can" and losers merely grant "what they must" rules the day. Kind of "winner takes all mentality".

 

Y. Interest groups both at regional level and at international stage whose interest is to shape Somalia in a way that tames the nationalistic aspirations the country has been known to harbor and denies Islamists to realize their declared objective which is to govern this geopolitically significant real estate under the dictates of Shari’ a

 

Z. Lack of wise and prudent statesmen who are clean and credible enough to lead the country through this difficult time. The current clan personalities owe their prominence to the support received - military, political representation, and what have you - from one or both of the interest groups mentioned above.

 

S. Painful history of squandering public trust to the point where secession and fragmentation is seen as a check to the central-periphery power if it ever materializes again. S = national collective history = constant.

 

f(x,y,z)* S = tragedy in monumental proportion

 

Now Mr. anniga how to modify the defined variables, so the field under which these variables get induced and act against the interest of Somalis is rip for a change, is all yours.

 

f'(x,y,z) = S + (cessation of hostilities, permanent Ethiopian withdrawal, and genuine and honest reconciliation meeting where the core Somali problem is discussed, dissected, and resolved)

 

Entertain me buddy.

[me]

A clean board strategy.

 

Set up hit squads and kill all 'qab-qable' and collaborators with the enemy anyone suspected of helping the enemy should be eliminated anyone against peace in Somalia should be eliminated. This includes warlords, media workers who are not promoting peace in Somalia, financiers of clan wars, etc etc. Foreign spies. Basically i am advocating for a reign of terror against anyone against a SOMALI PEACE.

 

 

This should create the 'conducive environment' for a real reconciliation process.

 

The Ethiopians can work freely in Somalia because of th qab-qables if the qab-qables are stopped then we can deal with the Ethio's much much better.

 

Lets compile the lists now.

 

If you are a qabiil qab-qable is ilaali. Hada iska jooji qabyaalada.

 

On top of mine is General Duke. I am not kidding General. Is ilaali.

[me]

When I wrote that I remembered this.

 

Franz Fanon

 

If this suppressed fury fails to find an outlet, it turns in a vacuum and devastates the oppressed creatures themselves. In order to free themselves they even massacre each other. The different tribes fight between themselves since they cannot face the real enemy — and you can count on colonial policy to keep up their rivalries; the man who raises his knife against his brother thinks that he has destroyed once and for all the detested image of their common degradation, even though these expiatory victims don’t quench their thirst for blood. They can only stop themselves from marching against the machine-guns by doing our work for us; of their own accord they will speed up the dehumanisation that they reject.

[me]

The question I have fr you is are the qab-qables are our brothers, will taking them out have any effect? I know I am thinking too simplistic if I think, taking them out will change everything all of the sudden. But think with me here, since we have not tried to take the qab-qables out what effect will it have if we do that.

[Baashi]

There you are Mr. Oodweyne. How life has been treating you lately buddy?

 

Yeah awoowe, long time no see. Gotta feed the young ones, ya know!

 

This is an attempt to induce a meaningful discussion. And yes you are right power hungry lords have hijacked the proceedings of the said conferences in order to realize a selfish interest but make no mistake these men have always had their constituents who were ready to do their bidding for the sake of their clannish interest.

 

Nevertheless Somalis desire to end this long national nightmare was and still is real. My question is simple. How come Somalis are both with and against these tyrants of theirs? I smell complacency on one hand and real, honest, and genuine call for peace on the other.

 

I just probed the forum on the subject of peace and the time and the blood we invested in its attainment and we have nothing to show the effort we put in this fleeting goal.

 

I am not fluent in Arabic but I still remember a qoute I heard from my Egyptian teacher back in my days in Sakhawdin School and it goes like this: Wa minal cajaa'ibu cajaa'ib, qurbu dawaa' wamaa ileyhaa wasuul. I'm parapharsing him but in a nutshel it means the solution is within reach yet it is unreachable!!

 

My question is why? I fully understand the role power hungry politicians have played in disrupting peace whenever they thought they are not getting the top seat they were after.

 

I'm fuming with frustration sxb. Look what has happened to us. Xabasha is in a position to dictate what kind of government Somalia should have and who should and should not attend this important gatherings (Islamist and nationalist are out) and her fav personalities are in under the cloak of civil servants, Diaspora, and Suufiis sect of Islam.

 

Let me throw lil spicy nuts there while I'm at it. What you make of the argument that from the get-go the Ethiopian hand in Somali politics has been the real and only effective force that's been doing the real steering in the pot.

 

From the proxy war in conjuction with the rebels of the military regime in power back then waged in the name of the grieving clans to the clannish contest that followed the fall of that regime, Ethiopia was the enabler, supplier of weapons, and the real king maker behind the Somali tragedy.

 

This argument is a refutation to the view that Somalis alone bear the responsibility of ruining the country and rendering the life in Somalia unbearable.

 

I happended to hold the view that this problem goes deeper than few lunatic personalities. Ethiopia is clearly part of the problem but still it is just a one variable. There is more to this than I thought.

 

Negative tribalism alone can not explain this either. I listed what I thought is the underlying forces that kept Somalia at the bottom of the pit for two decades and counting. I assumed the negative tribalism is the blood that runs through the vains of the beast...

[Alle-ubaahne]

Originally posted by Baashi:

Here we go again

I won't waste my time and dignify this silly post of yours by responding to it. Kalligii Muslim use your noodless better! Waa talo!

lol, it bothers you, I understand, but the history that is in store for you, is much worser than the little discomfort in which my questions had created in your amxaaro-aching-brain!

 

Live long with humiliations, yaa Amxaaro-raac! lol

[Xudeedi]

Somalia: Traitors’ Paradise

 

Muhsin Mahad

 

Feb. 11, 2007

 

No one should be surprised if I call our nation as one not only infested with traitors but also run by traitors for their own benefit, their cronies and clans, but above all for the service of their foreign masters. Where in other societies, leaders look to the democratic will of their people for their political sustenance and legitimacy, for our unelected, foreign-imposed lot, it is Ethiopia’s support and patronage that underpins their survival.

 

The beaten track to Addis Ababa and regular endorsements from Meles Zenewi is now an absolute imperative for all those holding power in Mogadishu, Garawe, and Hargeisa or those aspiring to it. For Meles’ Somali lapdogs, trooping to his capital for “consultations”, at his behest and at the drop of a hat, has higher priority for them than attending to pressing domestic matters crying for their attention. Beleaguered as they are in their foreign-protected residences, they rarely venture out to meet the public in the capital or to see the rest of the country for all the time they had been “power”. For all practical purposes, Nairobi and Addis Ababa are their preferred domiciles and are only quartered in Mogadishu purely for political necessity.

 

Competition for Meles Zenewi’s eyes and ears is so fierce that the standing of any Somali leader is measured not by how much support

he earned from his people but how many times he visited Meles in a given period. Those at the lower end of the collaborators’ league table will have to make the necessary extra sacrifices in order to enhance their standing with the new superman in the Horn. Since the top rank of the table is reserved for the super collaborator whose long-standing track record s is unbeatable, the rest of the pack can only scramble over the leftovers. These behavioural manifestations are indisputably the hallmarks of traitors.

 

Ethiopia’s only gift to Somalia, apart from spreading AIDS, is breeding traitors in our midst. There are so many of them around these days, their treasons so common, that it is becoming increasingly internalised in our collective psyche as part of the normal daily reality. Such is the change that not everyone will see these collaborators as less honourable than any one else in our society. It has not always been like this, and one has to go back to our history to trace the genesis of the act of national betrayal and its proliferation to its current level.

 

The year 1967 is a special one in the Somali political history calendar. It would be remembered for the year when the second government since independence, headed by President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, .was formed. But it will also be remembered as the year when the first Somali espionage case in our history as a nation was uncovered. The person concerned was Ahmed Yussuf Dualeh, who at the time was serving as foreign minister in that government. He (together with another government official) was found to have committed the ultimate, unthinkable and unpardonable crime: any Somali could have engaged in, not least by the very person in charge of the nation’s foreign affairs. Needless to say, he was found out to have been spying all along for the country’s arch enemy- Ethiopia.

The shockwaves that the event generated rocked the young nation to its foundations and its tremors were felt further a field wherever Somalis lived. In the newly independent country, this reaction was to be expected among a people who were until then nationalists and morally uncorrupted. If that episode was to be the only case of its kind, it would have remained a mere solitary story in our history books and the nation would have recovered from its psychological trauma. Unfortunately, that was only the beginning of worse things to follow. The story of Ahmed Yussuf Dualeh is instructive in how far we have changed in our perception of traitors.

 

Today we live in times where barefaced treasons committed by holders of the highest offices of the state are so commonplace and where serving Ethiopia’s interests is second nature to them. But no matter how bad Somalia has gone down the road of a failed state, nothing has prepared us for the shock of 2007, another year which will also enter our political history calendar. Yet, by all accounts, there was a far greater shock in 1967 when Foreign Minister Ahmed Yussuf Dualeh was accused of passing state information to Ethiopia than 40 years later in 2007 when President Abdullahi Yussuf invited them to invade the country and, worst of all, let them occupy the Somali capital. Nothing could better portray the sea change in our national values and sentiments than our different reactions to these two epoch-making events.

 

Unlike the country-wide shock to Ahmed Yussuf Dualeh’s espionage case of 1967, the reaction to Ethiopia’s occupation of Somalia, and particularly its capital, is at best one of localised, transitory and muted indignation and at worst one of indifference if not outright undisguised approval. For the pro Ethiopian invasion camp, the irreparable damage to our sovereignty and national esteem is of little concern, swayed as they are by crude clan sentiments and the primitive urge to score points against the other “side”. This permissive accommodating mindset towards Ethiopia may have now reached its pinnacle but has been long in the making ever since the overthrow Siyad Barre’s government in 1991.

 

The sweeping transformation in the perception of Ethiopia, among certain circles of our population, from a foe to a “friend”, is a process that began decades ago and pioneered by no other person than Abdullahi Yussuf himself. It was him, in his insatiable quest to wrest power from Siyad Barre, who went over to Ethiopia in the 1970s, where he established bases for his SSDF rebel movement and from where he subsequently launched attacks against Somalia in collusion with Ethiopia. While most Somalis saw him as a traitor, others, clan related supporters, considered him otherwise.

 

Once Abdullahi Yussuf braved the taboo attached to collaborating with Ethiopia, and weathered the inevitable stigma he incurred as the first former Somali military officer to betray his country, it was only a matter of time before other power-seeking individuals or rebel movements would follow in his foot steps. And so did the SNM and USC. Doing Ethiopia’s bidding, these three rebel militias succeeded in their different ways in toppling Siyad Barre. But they also brought down the Somali State in the process. What they gained may be a moot question but for the Somali people as a whole, the collapse of their State has engendered incalculable dire consequences whose fallouts will continue to blight them for the foreseeable future.

 

Just as the political careers of Abdullahi Yussuf and his SSDF comrades blossomed despite their treacherous connections with Ethiopia, likewise none of the leaders of the other equally clan-based rebel movements have met with any opprobrium from their clan constituencies. On the contrary, they have been received as liberators in the aftermath of the collapse of the Somali State. Against this background, it was not surprising to see the amazing turnaround in Ahmed Yussuf Dualeh’s political fortunes from a former a pariah to the Honourable Minister of Education in “President” Egal’s secessionist government in Hargeisa. His past crimes, far from being held against him, are now seen in Hargeisa as heroic actions against a Somali State that all secessionists are working or praying for its irredeemable disintegration.

 

The high-water mark of Ethiopia’s creeping colonisation of Somalia since the fall of Siyad Barre’s government must be the capture and occupation of Mogadishu with hardly a shot fired in anger. Hitherto, they contended themselves with launching occasional incursions into small border towns but occupying Mogadishu unopposed is something beyond their wildest dreams. No less incredible for the Ethiopians is the low ebb of Somali nationalism, graphically symbolised by the burning of the Somali national flag in Hargeisa by mindless secessionist mobs, and the proposal by Hussein Aided calling for the border between the two countries to be abolished and one common passport be adopted.

 

Much as Hussein Aideed’a proposal sounds like a daft outburst by an unthinking former USA mariner, it should not be dismissed as idle talk. He could well be airing Meles Zenewi’s agenda. Having lost Eritrea, Ethiopia is desperate for access to the sea. Swallowing defenceless Somalia with the connivance of its unelected and unaccountable leaders would serve Ethiopia the dual purposes of shuttering the dream of Greater Somalia and at the same time ensuring it access to 3000 km coastline. In any other country in the world, a minister committing such a gaff would have resigned and, if not, sacked. But not by one headed by Abdullahi Yussuf and Gedi whose views on our relations with Ethiopia very much conflate with those of Hussein Aideed.

 

No less an Ethiopian “man” is Prof Gedi. Here is a man with no previous history in Somali politics or in the struggle against Siyad Barre and yet was sprung out of no where and made Prime Minister on Meles’ orders. Gedi’s only claim for the post is his unquestioning loyalty to Ethiopia. It did not take much time before his show his true colours when he expressed, not in so many words, his indifference to the secession of Somaliland. That amounts to supporting it. Throughout the first week of Mogadishu’s occupation, when most Somalis were in shock and morning, this man was shamelessly going around stridently justifying the legibility of the Ethiopian invasion. At least President Abdullahi Yussuf had the sense to keep a low profile for a while until the dust settles even if he approves of this invasion as much as Gedi.

 

The incomprehensible and humiliating submission to the enemy and the support it received from Somalis is a knockout blow to our national honour. It will continue to haunt us for generations to come just as the French have not come to terms to this present day with their own humiliations when their enemy, Germany, occupied Paris during the Second World War. Considering the crimes committed against the country, Abdullahi Yussuf deserves to be tried for treason one day, just as Norway and France did to their own Quislings and collaborators with the enemy and as Somalia once did to Ahmed Yussuf Dualeh. For the time being, he remains crowned for what it is worth as Somalia’s president, albeit presiding over the graveyard of a country he did his best to destroy. That will be his everlasting epitaph when he departs, physically or politically. Not that he cares about his place in history so long as he remains president, regardless of what happens to this country in the process. Siyad Barre is often quoted as saying while in power, perhaps unfairly, that there will be no country after him. It may well come to that after Abudllah Yussuf

 

The UIC, their rise and fall

 

Somalia’s deepening political malaise has for over a decade defied all attempts by the international community to resolve it and revive the defunct Somali State. But like providence from heaven, it took the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) only a matter of mere weeks to achieve what the international community and their umpteenths reconciliation conferences have failed to accomplish: they brought peace and order throughout the territory under their control. The UIC succeeded where others failed because their words and actions have struck a deep chord with the long-suffering public.

 

The military defeat of the UIC was partly of their own making. Intoxicated with their initial blitz against the warlords and their unopposed expansion into other towns and regions, they came to overestimate their military prowess. But above all, it was their reckless creeping onslaught on the TFG base, and their bravado and irresponsible brinkmanship to threaten Ethiopia with a Jihad all the way to Addis Ababa, often mouthed by the wild-eyed self-appointed Sheikh, Yussuf Indhacade, that did their final undoing.

 

Sheik Yussuf Indha Cadde’s provocative threat to attack Addis Ababa was as credible as President Ahmadinejad of Iran’s call for Israel to be wiped off the map. Such empty threats only serve to play into the hands of Ethiopia and Israel and provide them on a plate the pretext they need for pre-emptive action against their antagonists in the name of self defence. Ironically, when the Ethiopian invasion came, Indhacade was the first to take to heels and seek shelter abroad deserting the young men and boys he misled to be slaughtered in the marshes and mangroves of the lower Juba.

 

The UIC were of no direct immediate threat to Ethiopia but only remotely so, to the extent that the movement supports the Somali aspiration of Greater Somalia. Ethiopia’s backing for the TFG is for strategic reasons. An important pillar of that strategy is to keep in place a pliant government it created in the first place that would allow it access to Somali’s sea and at the same time to forestall Somali irredentism ever again rearing its head in the Horn. If the TFG were to collapse under pressure and replaced by one dominated by the UIC, Ethiopia’s worst fears would have materialised. It was the need to save the puppet TFG rather than any immediate threat to Ethiopia that prompted its invasion of Somalia. Like other anti-Muslim governments fighting Muslim militants, Ethiopia has invoked the war on terror ad nauseam as a handy cover-up to keep Somalia under its tutelage. In this, it has been aided by overt and covert USA support and an international community preferring to look the other way.

 

The UIC allowed itself to be high jacked by some disreputable criminals, masquerading as Islamists who brought them nothing other than to alienate many potential Somali followers as well as to draw the hostile attention of all those in the West dogged by Islamophobia notably the American government. With friends like Sheikh Indhacade who needs enemies. The blame, though, squarely lies on the shoulders of the leader of the UIC, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Awais. This is the second time he led a militant Islamic movement against Abbdullahi Yussuf and Ethiopia and lost both times mainly because of his misguided tactics and poor leadership. When there are repeated defeats of such disastrous proportions, there should be accountability. In this regard, Sheikh Dahir Awais is now a liability to what is left of the movement and the sooner he steps down and retires for good, the better for all concerned.

 

The UIC as a coherent functioning body has been defeated militarily- at least for now -but their fundamental appeal, based on Somali nationalism and Islamic values, has not been destroyed but remains alive. To replace that appeal, it will require the emergence of a Somali government that would embrace those core values of the UIC that endeared them to the Somali people of every clan and region throughout the country, north and south. The TFG represents the very antithesis of what the UIC stood for and therefore has no appeal for the wider Somali people except for those motivated by myopic clan loyalties to one leader or another in the TFG. As such, the need for a better structured and led UIC has not diminished by any means. Despite their mistakes and shortcomings, what they stood for is beyond reproach. With time and with help from within Somalia and from the Diaspora, those mistakes could have been corrected, Ethiopia permitting, which they never did for obvious reasons.

 

By Mohsin Mahad

E-mail: mohsinmahad@yahoo.co.uk

[Xudeedi]

Another documented article, "Reconciliation in Somalia in the wake of Col. Yusuf's Return to Power in Puntland"(2002) I would like to share with the participants, answers the question raised in the thread, in my view. It clearly elucidates the political orientation and personality features of individuals from two camps/groups that have held the country in hostage for the last 16 years.

They, in technical terms, are known as “assemblists” and “militarists”. Each group has received financial and intellectual backing from a number of countries. The former group a.k.a the “manifesto” is dominated by civilian politicians of the 60s, whereas, the "assemblists" group is and has been dominated by former officers, colonels, and generals of the old Somali army. They do however shift alliances between the two groups, “shifting alliances have remained a constant feature of their personality composition.”(par.4) The "assemblists” were initially disappearing from the political landscape of Somalia by failing, on several occasions, to wrest regional control from the “militarist”, with the exception of Somaliland---the late Egal was able to defeat Abdirahman Tur and Ismail Hurre (Bubba). Then, the Arta Conference hosted by Djibouti and which had the IGAD’s mandate's of national reconciliation, (under the cloak of assisting Somalis reconstitute a unitary government and the development or empowerment of ’Civil Society’) restored the “assemblists”¨ whom it has supported since 1991, but it did so to the exclusion of the militarist and accusing them of “everything that went wrong in Somalia,” in front of the UN General Assembly in 1999. Djibouti also sought to undermine Abdillahi Yusuf’s authority in Puntland and by extension the whole militarist camp. This led to the formation of SRRC --the “militarist”¨ and Ethiopia, alienated as to how it could play a political role at the Arta conference under the auspices of Djibouti and with the support of the Arab league, Egypt being at its helm, saw the SRRC as an opportunity to counteract the TNG. As a forgone conclusion, the author shows, “Col. Yusuf may have concerns beyond Puntland,” which indeed happened, but the TFG and Ethiopia may now taking the footsteps of TNG and Djibouti, each to the exclusion of the other and both, as now appears, having no solution to Somalia’s mosaic fiefdoms and anarchy.

_______________________________________

 

 

The "militarists" and the "assemblists" have been the only two political forces contending for

power ever since the start of the ongoing political debacle in 1991, in earnest. The Islamists have been the only other form of political force of any significant influence in Somalia during the decade. Col. Jama's loss of power may signify a downhill trend for the assemblists, who essentially draw their support from a segment of the population loyal to the civilian politicians of the sixties-roughly speaking. the core of the so-called "Manifesto". In addition, the result of the Arta Conference has also indicated that the group has forged an alliance with two other groups of politicians in as far as the TNG's composition can indicate. These include the Islamists and the technocrats in Barre's rule; even some military personalities who happen to be of little political significance of their own right, as politicians. This hotchpotch of political groupings makes up the TNG. By

comparison, the militarists draw their support from that segment of the population which still remain loyal to their clan origins and most of whom have been organized around the armed fronts in their struggle against the former regime. The RRA, founded under Col. Shatigaduud, is the exception here, in that their front was founded later to free themselves from another front, long after the former regime had collapsed.

 

There seems to be not much difference between the two groups in either their solutions for the Somali question or in their political methods. Both groups appeal to clan sentiment for revenge and vengeance. Both groups resort to military power when the situation demands it. Both groups have indicated a

tendency to impose government from the top and have shown little respect for public accountability and participation in government. Neither of the two groups have a political solution for the Somali crisis beyond their own

motivation to seek political control.

 

But, in general, the militarists often fare better with military methods for gaining power and the assemblists fare better at exploiting the bid for power by the clan elite, by promising governmental posts as an incentive for their support. Hence, they are 'assemblists' in the sense that they assemble the clans' traditional, civil and political leadership by buying support in exchange for money and governmental posts. Although, even the militarists have resorted to this option, when they tried to establish government under,

for example, Aideed's dictatorship-perhaps, knowing no better-Ali Mahdi's governments of the early 90s and, more recently, those of the TNG provide a vivid example of this tendency. Each of these governments had a cabinet of over eighty members.

 

........But most immediately, countries like Djibouti, Egypt and Ethiopia must change their approach to intervention for peace in Somalia and must come out clean in their support for the people of Somalia in its entirety, if at all, rather than taking sides with individuals or groups of factions. They should never use the camouflage of assisting Somalia in the pursuit of their own selfish interests. Alternatively, these countries can wash their dirty laundries

elsewhere and must, indeed, conduct their wars within their respective boundaries. The people of Somalia are sick and tired of fighting proxy wars.

 

AN OLD CASE EXAMPLE BUT RECURRENT

 

Pending the settlement of the dust of the latest battles between the two groups in Puntland, the Southwest of Somalia remains a troubled zone. Here, the competition for control is felt most intensely on the eve of the ever dragging-on preparations for the IGAD-sponsored Reconciliation efforts in Nairobi. The region is slowly bleeding to death and the exodus is at its

highest into Kenya while the government of that country is struggling very hard to host a meeting between the men who are causing the havoc in the same region from which the refugees are fleeing. It is note-worthy to mention in

passing, that, for a while-that is, until the installation of the TNG-all the regions of Somalia have been experiencing a lull towards stability, which was gradually giving way to a cooling off period. No sooner than the installation of the TNG, who immediately saw itself as the government de jure, did the

World see an escalated degree of fighting and political instability in all parts of Somalia.

 

 

Source of the referenced article