Saalax Posted November 10, 2010 November 10, 2010 On October 13, 2010, the president of Somalia’s Internationally–recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad, announced his selection of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmajo) to replace the T.F.G.’s former prime minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, who had resigned his post on September 21 after he had spent the preceding summer locked in a power struggle with Sh. Sharif. The nomination of Farmajo came as a surprise to politicians and observers. In the weeks succeeding Sharmarke’s resignation, the Somali media reported lists of contenders for the position representing factions within the Somali political class; on none of those lists, among them those published by Garoweonlin. Shabelle Media, and Suna Times, did Farmajo’s name appear. He was not brought up in the reports of the discussions between Sh. Sharif and sub-clan leaders, parliamentary groups, and stakeholders such as Ethiopia, Uganda, the United States, and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), all of which had their own favorite candidates. Farmajo, indeed, appeared to come out of nowhere. A political unknown, he had worked as a young man at the Somali embassy in Washington between 1985 and 1988 under the regime of dictator Siad Barre, and, after Barre was overthrown, became part of the Somali Diaspora in the United States, pursuing a career as a municipal official in the Buffalo region of New York State. He had no experience with Somali politics on the ground and no base of his own from which to lead. Commentators politely said that he had “no political baggage.” Closed sources in the Horn of Africa region have shed light on the selection of Farmajo and the subsequent conflict over his approval by Somalia’s Transitional Federal Parliament, which was consummated on October 31. The sources’ intelligence reveals a continued evolving fractionalization in the Transitional Federal Institutions that has been exacerbated. The Story Behind the Story According to one source, a member of the transitional parliament confirmed that the nomination of Farmajo had come without any forewarning to the Somali political class; on October 12, Sh. Sharif arrived in Mogadishu from Nairobi with Farmajo – “an individual whom we do not know and whom he wants to name as prime minister.” On further inspection, however, the unknown Farmajo is not entirely innocent of connection to the intrigues of current T.F.G. politics. According to a source, Farmajo was chosen from within the presidential palace by Sh. Sharif’s chief of staff Abdikarin Jama, who according to public reports had grown up with Sh. Sharif in the town of Jowhar in the Middle Shabelle region, had been an associate of his in the Islamic Courts Union, and had been his favorite choice for prime minister (he had been prominent on every list of candidates published by the media). According to the source, Farmajo is related through his mother to Jama, and both are affiliated with the Ahlu Sheikh sect, Sh. Sharif’s religious group. Farmajo, says the source, is a supporter of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.), the organization through which Sh. Sharif entered the T.F.G. in the Djibouti agreement of 2009. Farmajo, then, is a factional candidate, representing a small group within the presidential palace that is, in particular, determined to reduce the power of erstwhile Sh. Sharif ally and A.R.S. associate, transitional parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan Sh. Adan, who was not consulted in the selection of Farmajo and had his own favored candidate, Said Farah Garad, who was backed by Ethiopia and also did not appear on lists of candidates published by the media. The source adds that the bid of the Ahlu Sheikh faction to insert Farmajo could not have been successful had Washington not become exasperated with the delay in naming the candidate for prime minister and sided with the Jama group against Sharif Hassan, while at the same time urging compromise between the disputants. Taking Sharif Hassan out of the loop in the selection of the nominee for prime minister insured that the speaker would fight back when Farmajo faced parliament for a vote of confidence. The ostensible disagreement between the president and speaker came over the president’s claim that voting was legally required to be conducted by an open show of hands, and the speaker’s counter-position that voting was required to be by secret ballot. According to a source, the legal issue, which caused the vote to be delayed three times, was a based on Sharif Hassan’s attempt to bribe parliamentarians in his favor, and Sh. Sharif’s blocking move to insist on an open vote that he believed would not allow parliamentarians to make secret deals with the speaker. According to the source, both sides had funds to influence the vote, with Sharif Hassan having received $(U.S.)1.5 million from Ethiopia and Sh. Sharif $(U.S.)7.5 million from Arab countries in addition to $(U.S.)1.5 million more that had been used to buy off Sharmarke. The machinations of both sides and the delays led to a visit to the airport in Mogadishu by a delegation of regional actors led by United Nations special representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, that met with the two Sharifs and warned them to reach an agreement immediately. The adversaries reportedly met privately directly afterwards and the deadlock was broken, with an open vote being held approving Farmajo 297-92-3 on October 31. According to the source, the next moment of the intrigue will be revealed in Farmajo’s list of proposed cabinet ministers that must be submitted for approval to parliament within a month after the vote of confidence. The source reports that some politicians believe that Sharif Hassan has capitulated and has even lost support among his Bay&Bakool clan backers, whereas others believe that a deal was struck, partly at the behest of Washington, between Sh. Sharif and Sharif Hassan, giving the latter the right to stack the cabinet in favor of the old corrupt political elite. Indicative of the power of Sharif Hassan is the fact that, breaking with precedent, he was the one, as speaker, swore in Farmajo as prime minister on November 1. In any case, says the source, the power struggle will continue with the Ahlu Sheikh faction making a bid to have the transitional institutions extend beyond August, 2011 in order to preserve A.R.S. power in the T.F.G., and Sharif Hassan attempting to unseat Sh. Sharif. New splits are also possible when parliament convenes to approve Farmajo’s cabinet list; some members of parliament have warned that they will not endorse a list that includes figures from the old corrupt political elite. Within this maelstrom of intrigue, Farmajo appears as an inexperienced player who represents a narrow faction and cannot even serve that base fully because he is checked by Washington’s desire for a compromise with Sharif Hassan. Bottom Line Reports from closed sources make Farmajo’s selection intelligible. Farmajo is an indicator of an ever more narrow hyper-factionalization within the T.F.G. aided and abetted by default by Washington. By: Dr. Michael A. 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