UN Monitoring group report!!!!!

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Letter dated … November 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council

 

 

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1676 (2006), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia (see enclosure).

 

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

 

 

(Signed) Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser

Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to

resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia

 

Enclosure

 

Letter dated 16 October 2006 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)

 

 

We have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1676 (2006).

 

 

(Signed) Bruno Schiemsky

Chairman

Monitoring Group on Somalia

 

(Signed) Melvin E. Holt, Jr.

 

(Signed) Harjit S. Kelley

 

(Signed) Joel Salek

 

Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006)

 

 

Contents

Paragraphs Page

Abbreviations 5

Summary 6

I. Introduction 8

A. Mandate 8

B. Methodology 9

II. Known arms embargo violations during the mandate period 9

A. Support from States and arms traders 10

B. The Bakaraaha Arms Market 31

C. The case of Air Tomisko………………………………………… 32

D. The case of Global Aviation and Services Group 32

III. Finances 33

A. Introduction 33

B. Local administrations: changes in the revenue-generating infrastructure 33

C. The ICU and the business community 36

D. Greater financial support from inside Somalia and abroad 39

E. Funds for the TFG 40

IV. Transport 40

V. Analysis of trends and patterns 41

A. The ICU as the pre-eminent military force in Somalia 41

B. State support and military build-up 43

C. The re-emergence of the Somali warlords – former members of the opposition alliance 45

VI. Capacity-building 46

VII. Coordination with States and Organizations 46

A. States 46

B. Organizations 46

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations 47

A. Conclusions 47

B. Recommendations 48

Annexes

I. Djibouti Airlines response to the Monitoring Group 50

II. Red Crescent Society of Djibouti response to the Monitoring Group 51

III. Government of Egypt response to the Monitoring Group 53

IV. Daallo Airlines response to the Monitoring Group 54

V. Government of Eritrea response to the Monitoring Group 56

VI. Government of Eritrea response to the Monitoring Group 57

VII. Government of Kazakhstan response to the Monitoring Group……………… 58

VIII. Aerolift response to the Monitoring Group……………… 60

IX. Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd document to the Monitoring Group……………… 61

X. Government of Ethiopia response to the Monitoring Group……………… 62

XI. Government of Iran response to the Monitoring Group……………… 65

XII. Government of Libya response to the Monitoring Group……………… 66

XIII. Government of Saudi Arabia response to the Monitoring Group……………… 67

XIV. Somali Islamic Courts Council response to the Monitoring Group……………… 68

XV. Government of Syria response to the Monitoring Group……………… 69

XVI. Government of Yemen response to the Monitoring Group……………… 70

XVII. Arms purchases and sales at the Bakaraaha Arms Market investigated during the mandate period……………… 72

XVIII. Air Tomisko response to the Monitoring Group……………………………… 78

XIX. Government of Oman response to the Monitoring Group 79

XX. Finance: Revenues from small businesses and checkpoints……………… 80

XXI. Finance: Letter with regard to Mogadishu Seaport fees……………… 81

XXII. Finance: Fees at Mogadishu International Airport……………… 83

XXIII. Letter from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission 84

XXIV. Countries visited and representatives of Governments, organizations and private entities interviewed 85

 

 

Abbreviations

 

 

APRCT Alliance for Peace Restoration and Combat against Terror

BAM Bakaraaha Arms Market

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICU Islamist Courts Union

IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IMB International Maritime Bureau

IMO International Maritime Organization

MFV Motor fishing vessel

MG Monitoring Group

MV Merchant Vessel

NVCG National Volunteer Coast Guard

OLF Oromo Liberation Front

ONLF ****** National Liberation Front

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade

TFG Transitional Federal Government

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan

UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UPDF Uganda People’s Defense Forces

WFP World Food Programme

 

 

 

Summary

It is the task of the Monitoring Group to observe and report information regarding arms embargo violations and related matters in the context of unfolding events in Somalia. To that end, the Monitoring Group has highlighted its findings for the current mandate period, noting the major factors and developments in the present summary and describing them more fully in the body of the report.

 

Since the Monitoring Group’s last report, dated, 4 May 2006, Somalia has been undergoing a period of great change and transition. The opposition alliance, with its former base in Mogadishu consisting of warlords, dissident TFG Ministers, certain businessmen and others, no longer exists. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) has become the pre-eminent force in the central and southern Regions. With a clearly visible momentum, bolstered by aggressive support from seven (7) states, they are actively strengthening and consolidating their grip on military and political power, and the economic infrastructure in the geographical areas under their control. A much weaker TFG, also backed by aggressive support from three (3) states, is attempting to hold on to its tenuously held power base in Baidoa. Anticipation of a possible military confrontation between the TFG and the ICU is an ever-present threat.

 

Accompanying and underlying these developments, are rampant arms flows to the TFG and the ICU – the two (2) principal contenders for power in central and southern Somalia. Behind the scenes, large cargo aircraft and ocean-going dhows have been clandestinely delivering arms and other forms of military support from states, arms trading networks and others, almost on a daily basis. Accordingly, both the TFG and the ICU are engaged in an aggressive, rapid and large - by Somali standards – and planned military build-up. It involves obtaining a wide variety of arms – including surface to air missiles - military materiel, motor vehicles – trucks and land cruisers used as mobile weapons platforms – the recruitment of new fighters and volunteers from foreign countries, and establishing military camps and conducting formal military training. In short, all of the essentials necessary for creating and building armies are present. Both sides, but most especially the ICU, are also busy acquiring the all-important financial capacity necessary to maintain this greatly enhanced military machinery.

 

Further adding to the military build-up in arms and materiel, both sides are actively supported inside of Somalia by the presence of combat troops, military trainers and advisors from certain states. In this sense, the ICU and the TFG are supported by Eritrea, and Ethiopia and Uganda, respectively, all members of IGAD. Also aligned with either the ICU or the TFG are other formidable organized groups of combatants inside of Somalia, adding another layer of complexity and instability to an already unpredictable security environment.

 

As a result of this overburdened and overstressed military environment, tensions between the TFG and the ICU are exceedingly high, and volatile, and are accompanied by all of the ingredients for the increasing possibility of the occurrence of a violent, widespread, and protracted military conflict in most of Somalia. Adding to this momentum toward a military solution is the publicly stated intention by the ICU to violently oppose any IGAD or African Union (AU) military force foisted on this volatile military mix – an environment highly vulnerable to a plausible catalyst for a grand fight. Moreover, there is the distinct possibility that this momentum toward a military solution inside of Somalia may spill over into a direct state-to-state conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as occurrences in other vulnerable Regional states of acts of terrorism.

 

In an effort to seek responses from the multitude of actors involved in arms embargo violations, a total of 54 letters have been sent by the MG to a combination of states, businesses, and entities. It has received 26 replies, as of the writing of this report, mid-October 2006. Some of the respondents avoided answering questions by providing information that was not relevant to the questions asked, and others gave conflicting responses to questions concerning the same information. In the final analysis, all respondents denied any involvement in violating the arms embargo. The foregoing effort aside, the unbridled military build-up in Somalia continues.

 

In view of the unprecedented and highly exacerbated security situation in Somalia, the MG proposes new inter-related recommendations that, if implemented, are intended to reduce the level of tension and offset the continuous momentum toward a military catastrophe in Somalia. The new recommendations call for the following actions: (1) increasing the strength of the arms embargo through an all-border surveillance and interdiction effort that is intended to severely curtail or cut-off the flow of arms, military materiel and other forms of military support to Somalia, (2) the application of financial sanctions on significant Somali owned and operated businesses intended to reduce monies and other financial resources available for purchasing arms and military materiel, and (3) a high level, international diplomatic effort intended to disengage states from contributing to the military build-up in Somalia, while at the same time trying to move political dialogue between all relevant Somali actors toward a political solution for Somalia.

 

 

 

I. Introduction

 

A. Mandate

In paragraph 3 of its resolution 1676 (2006) of 10 May 2006, the Security Council conferred the following mandate on the Monitoring Group on Somalia:

(a) To continue the tasks outlined in paragraphs 3 (a) to © of resolution 1587 (2005);

 

(b) To continue to investigate, in coordination with relevant international agencies, all activities, including in the financial, maritime and other sectors, which generate revenues used to commit arms embargo violations;

 

© To continue to investigate any means of transport, routes, seaports, airports and other facilities used in connection with arms embargo violations;

 

(d) To continue refining and updating information on the draft list of those individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733 (1992), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for possible future measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee as and when the Committee deems appropriate;

 

(e) To continue making recommendations based on its investigations, on the previous reports of the Panel of Experts (S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) appointed pursuant to resolutions 1425 (2002) of 22 July 2002 and 1474 (2003) of 8 April 2003 and on the previous reports of the Monitoring Group (S/2004/604 and S/2005/153, S/2005/625 and S/2006/229) appointed pursuant to resolutions 1519 (2003) of 16 December 2003, 1558 (2004) of 17 August 2004, 1587 (2005) of 15 March 2005 and 1630 (2005) of 14 October 2005;

 

(f) To work closely with the Committee on specific recommendations for additional measures to improve overall compliance with the arms embargo;

 

(g) To assist in identifying areas where the capacities of States in the region can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo;

 

(h) To provide to the Council, through the Committee, a midterm briefing within 90 days from its establishment;

 

(i) To submit, for the Security Council’s consideration, through the Committee, a final report covering all the tasks set out above, no later than 15 days prior to the termination of the Monitoring Group’s mandate.

 

The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following experts: Bruno Schiemsky (Belgium), arms expert and Chairman; Melvin E. Holt, Jr. (United States of America), arms expert; Harjit Kelley (Kenya), maritime expert; and Joel Salek (Colombia), finance expert.

 

The Monitoring Group travelled to Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Yemen.

 

Throughout the period of its mandate, the Monitoring Group kept the Security Council and its Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) informed of its activities by submitting bi-weekly progress reports through the United Nations Secretariat and by providing a midterm briefing to the Committee on 6 September 2006.

 

The Monitoring Group received much-appreciated support and assistance from the United Nations Secretariat and other United Nations agencies, in New York and the Region.

 

B. Methodology

The Monitoring Group interviewed government officials in the region, including members of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and, where relevant, representatives of diplomatic missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. The Monitoring Group also contacted numerous key, knowledgeable individuals from Somali civil society and the business community.

 

The two reports of the Panel of Experts (see S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) and the previous reports of the Monitoring Group (see S/2004/604, S/2005/153, S/2005/625 and S/2006/229) were also taken into consideration during the investigations. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the Monitoring Group’s first and second reports also apply to the present mandate.

 

 

II. Known arms embargo violations during the mandate period

Rampant arms flows

Information gathered during the current reporting period indicates that arms flows into Somalia, most especially to the two (2) principal antagonists - the TFG and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) – has dramatically increased in terms of numbers of arms, frequency of delivery and weapons’ sophistication. Arms flows have been aggressively fed by a growing number of individual states, and to a lesser degree, arms trading networks. This has been taking place in the greater context of a broad-based military build up by both sides.

 

The majority of arms provided to the ICU by states - seven (7) - and arms traders include the types that are typically used in Somalia. But, ominously, new and more sophisticated types of weapons are also coming into Somalia including man portable surface to air missiles such as the Strela-2 and 2M, also known as the SA-7a and 7b ‘Grail’, and the SA-6 ‘Gainful’ Low to Medium Altitude surface to air missile. Other new types of arms include multiple rocket launchers, and second generation, infrared-guided anti-tank weapons.

 

On the other hand, arms provided to the TFG by states - three (3) - and arms traders overwhelmingly include the types that are historically typical for the Somali environment including assault rifles, a variety of machine guns and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, and large quantities of ammunition.

 

 

 

A. Support from states and arms traders

As was the case during the previous mandate, ending in May 2006, the Monitoring Group notes the continuation of an expanding number of states – ten (10) at the writing of this report - providing different types of support to either the TFG or the ICU in violation of the arms embargo. State contributions to the TFG and ICU are either clandestinely delivered directly to the intended recipient using State owned means of transport, or, indirectly using an intermediary in the form of a private commercial maritime vessel - usually dhow - or aircraft in an effort to disguise the contributor’s true identity. Contributions include large quantities of a wide variety of arms including assault rifles and small caliber machine guns, large caliber anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and mines, among others. They also include military materiel, motor vehicles – trucks and land cruisers used as mobile weapons platforms - military troops, trainers and advisors, and funding. The MG has identified the following arms embargo violations:

 

Djibouti

The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Djibouti has provided military uniforms and medicines in support of the ICU, as follows:

 

(a) On 30 July 2006, an aircraft from Djibouti Airlines landed at an airfield in Mogadishu, Somalia, with medicines and military uniforms intended for the ICU. The true nature of the cargo was disguised and was represented to be from the Djibouti Red Crescent Society in order to further conceal its origins. After unloading the cargo, the same aircraft departed the airfield and proceeded to Mogadishu’s main airport.

 

The Monitoring Group sent letters on 18 August 2006 to the Government of Djibouti, Djibouti Airlines and the Red Crescent Society of Djibouti notifying them of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring received a reply from the Government of Djibouti, dated 21 September 2006, Djibouti Airlines (Annex I), dated 20 August 2006, and from Djibouti Red Crescent (Annex II), dated 8 September 2006. All respondents denied having violated the arms embargo, as described above.

 

Egypt

The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Egypt has provided training in support of the ICU, Somalia, as follows:

 

(a) On 26 July 2006, a meeting took place in Mogadishu between officials from the ICU and visiting Libyan, Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the residence of ICU Finance Chief, Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. The meeting resulted in the following decisions: military training would be provided to about 3800 fighters at the Hilweyne military barracks located near Bal’ad town, north of Mogadishu; Egypt and Eritrea would provide instructors; facility upgrades, training costs and incentives were to be paid for by the Libyan Government; Libyan, Eritrean and Egyptian military officers with support from Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, Adan Hashi “Eyrow”, Abdullahi Ali Nuur and Mukhtar Roboow “Abu Mansuur” were to evaluate the condition and needs of the proposed training site the day following the meeting.

 

On 23 August 2006, the ICU opened the military training camp at Hilweyne and welcomed their first contingent of about 600 recruits who are expected to undergo a period of intensive military and ideological training.

 

On 19 September 2006, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Egypt notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. On 2 October 2006, the Monitoring Group received a reply from the Government of Egypt (Annex III) denying their involvement in the above described activity.

 

Eritrea

During the current mandate period, the Government of Eritrea provided at least 28 separate consignments of arms, ammunition and military equipment. They also provided troops and training to the ICU in Somalia, as follows:

 

Eritrean support to the ICU

(a) On 26 April 2006, a shipment of arms consisting of AK 47 assault rifles, PKM machine guns, RPG 7s and a variety of ammunition arrived on a dhow at the seaport of El Ma’an. The arms were from the Government of Eritrea and were destined for the ICU.

 

(b) On 6 May 2006, at about 0500 hours, an Eritrean military aircraft – Antonov – landed at Dhusamareeb, Galgaduud Region, Somalia. Awaiting the landing of the aircraft were about 75 people, five lorries and two land cruisers. The vehicles headlamps had been turned on to facilitate the landing of the aircraft. The aircraft transported a shipment of anti-aircraft guns. The arms were offloaded from the aircraft and loaded onto the lorries. The lorries, accompanied by the land cruisers, travelled by road to a natural seaport near Hobyo on the Somali coast.

 

On 9 May 2006, a dhow arrived at El Ahmed seaport located south of Marka, Lower Shabelle Region. On board the dhow were fighters from Pakistan and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The fighters remained on the dhow. Five (5) out of the 75 people associated with the 6 May receipt of the anti-aircraft guns boarded the dhow along with part of the shipment of the anti-aircraft guns. The dhow then departed the port of El Ahmed travelling south along the coast with a destination Raskiambooni located in south Somalia. The Monitoring Group has previously reported that the Raskiambooni area serves as a training and support center for militant fundamentalists. In charge of the Raskiambooni center is Sheikh Hassan Abdulle Hersi “Sheikh Hassan Turki”, a known militant and leader of the Munathamul Jihad wa Dawa (Organisation for Jihad & Propagation).

 

© On 15 June 2006 and continuing over a short period of time, about one (1) week, four (4) Eritrean military aircraft landed at Dhusamareeb, Galgaduud Region. Included onboard the aircrafts were various types of arms including AK 47 assault rifles, PKM (machine guns), RPG launchers, a variety of ammunition and military uniforms.

 

ICU member Aden Hashi Farah “Eyrow”, one of the leaders of the Hizbul Shabaab (Youth Movement), took possession of the arms and military uniforms. The shipment was loaded onto lorries and transported under the protection of 12 technicals to Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, the shipment was separated into four (4) consignments and variously distributed to militant forces in Mogadishu, Marka, Barawe and Kongo (former TFG military training camp near Jowhar), where the Eritreans intend to set up a military base in support of the ICU.

 

(d) On 19 June 2006, a dhow arrived at El Ade seaport (Mogadishu area) containing 24 LAWs (M72-series lightweight anti-armour weapon), 1200 anti-tank mines, 4000 F1 hand grenades, an unspecified number of small arm ammunition boxes, 2000 uniforms, 1500 military style, individual water bottles, and medicines. The arms and other items were transported from the Port of Assab, Eritrea.

 

(e) On 30 June 2006 a vessel using the name SELAM travelled from the Eritrean seaport of Massawa to Somalia carrying food and arms, as follows: 2000 tones of food, around 50 DShK, 50 82mm mortars, 3000 AK-47 and 1000 boxes of ammunitions.

 

(f) On 4 July 2006, four (4) flights of Eritrean military aircraft landed at Esaley Airport located in the northeastern area of Mogadishu; two (2) of the flights contained arms for the ICU and two (2) of the flights transported a total of approximately 500 military personnel consisting of Eritrean military and fighters from the Ethiopian insurgent groups ONLF and OLF.

 

Subsequent to their arrival at Esaley, all of the military personnel were transported to El Ma’an seaport. At El Ma’an, militant fundamentalist businessman and financier Abukar Omar Adani made arrangements for the troops to be transported by dhow to the vicinity of Marka, Lower Shabelle. The three-fold purpose of the troop deployment to the Lower Shabelle is to create an alternative headquarters in addition to Mogadishu and establish both a new military base and a training camp for foreigners – both military trainers and fighters. The location of the new facility is located near both the seaport and airport of El Ahmed.

 

(g) On 15 July 2006, Colonel Yusuf Negash Warque, an Eritrean military officer, arrived in Mogadishu on a chartered aircraft. The Colonel, who speaks Somali, conducted a meeting with leaders of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts including from both the Executive Committee and the Majlis Al Shura (Consultative Committee). The following day, 16 July, Colonel Warque departed Mogadishu in a Toyota pick-up truck and, escorted by four (4) technicals, travelled to Mareer-Gur for a meeting with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys.

 

(h) On 17 July 2006, a vessel using the name MV YOHANA travelled from Eritrea to Somalia carrying food and arms, as follows: 3000 tons of food, 50 DShK, 30 82mm mortars, 2000 AK-47 and 100 RPG-7. It should be additionally noted that in a report by UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2003/223, paragraphs 71-73, a vessel using the name MV YOHANA was also identified as being associated with the Government of Eritrea’s involvement in Somalia arms embargo violations, which, among other things, included delivering arms and transporting troops of the OLF.

 

(i) On 20 July 2006, an Airbus A-310-300, operated by Daallo Airlines, departed from Assab, Eritrea, destined for Somalia. Onboard the aircraft were a variety of arms, as follows: B-10 anti-tank guns; heavy (large calibre) machine guns; PKM machine guns, with magazines and telescopic sighting devices; AK47 assault rifles; G3A3 assault rifles; Browning .30 calibre machine guns; 120mm mortars; rifle fired grenades. And, on or about 21 July 2006, a second arms shipment, consisting primarily of a variety of ammunition, arrived in Somalia onboard an Airbus A310-300 - also operated by Daallo Airlines.

 

The Daallo Airlines flights picked up the arms shipments in the Eritrean seaport city of Assab, where the shipments had originally been delivered by dhow. Monitoring Group sources clearly indicate that Eritrea is being used both as a conduit and platform for, and coordinator of, support for the Somali ICU. States using Eritrea for this purpose include Djibouti, Libya, Egypt and certain middle-east countries.

 

The Monitoring Group sent letters on 18 August 2006 to Daallo Airlines and the Government of Eritrea notifying them of the above information and seeking their responses. All parties replied, as follows: on 22 August 2006, Daallo Airlines (Annex IV) denied participation in the above described events; and on 22 August 2006, the Government of Eritrea (Annex V) denied participation in the above described events.

 

(j) On 23 July 2006, late in the afternoon, a commercial aircraft arrived at Dhusamareeb (Galgaduud Region) with a shipment of arms for the ICU. The arms shipment consisted of the following: shoulder fired surface to air missiles and second generation, infrared-guided anti-tank weapons – 50 units; RPG’s - 100 units; AK 47 assault rifles – 540 units; FAL assault rifles – 94 units; PKM machine guns – 106 units; ZU-23 and DShK anti-aircraft ammunition – unknown number of units; and foodstuffs, water supplies and medicines. The aircraft that delivered the arms had reportedly departed from the UAE empty, and flew to Eritrea where it picked up the arms shipment.

 

The arms were loaded onto five (5) trucks and, under escort by seven (7) technicals, were transported to Mareer-Gur (Galgaduud Region) which was then the local headquarters of the militants. At a later date, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys relocated the headquarters to Bula’ley, an area approximately 40 kilometres southeast of Dhusamareeb.

 

(k) On 24 July 2006, an aircraft containing an arms shipment and senior Eritrean military officers arrived in Mogadishu’s Esaley Airport. The arms consisted of unknown numbers of rockets and other anti-tank weapons.

 

(l) On 26 July 2006, a meeting took place between officials from the ICU and visiting Libyan, Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the house of ICU Finance Chief, Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. The meeting resulted in the following decisions: provide military training would be provided to about 3800 fighters at the Hilweyne military barracks located near Bal’ad town, north of Mogadishu; Egypt and Eritrea would provide instructors; facility upgrades, training costs and incentives were to be paid for by the Libyan Government; Libyan, Eritrean and Egyptian military officers with support from Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, Adan Hashi “Eyrow”, Abdullahi Ali Nuur and Mukhtar Roboow “Abu Mansuur” were to evaluate the condition and needs of the proposed training site the day following the meeting.

 

On 23 August 2006, the Islamic military forces opened the military training camp at Hilweyne and welcomed their first contingent of about 600 recruits who are expected to undergo a period of intensive military and ideological training. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys indicated in comments concerning the new recruits that they would be trained, among other purposes, to participate in the defence of Somalia from both internal and external - foreign – aggression.

 

(m) On 26 July 2006, a dhow originating from Saudi Arabia carrying food items stopped in Eritrea and picked up a shipment of arms. The dhow then continued to Somalia. Onboard the dhow was a retired senior military officer of the Egyptian army who is also a member of the al-ikhwān al-muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood), using the name Ahmed Abu-Masri. The Egyptian posed as the dhow pilot. Also onboard the dhow was a Somali businessman, using the name Omar *****, who had coordinated acquisition of the food items and arms. The dhow arrived in Somalia at Raage Eele, approximately 40 kilometres north of El-Ma’an. The consignments of food and arms were loaded onto waiting trucks and covered to conceal their true identity. The convoy containing the consignments and the Egyptian travelled to Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys’ stronghold in the Galgaduud region.

 

The dhow had a load capacity of 88 metric tons with the markings XL8.5x10 on its hull. The arms shipment consisted of the following: 3600 anti-tank mines and 500 hand grenades. On 18 August 2006, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Saudi Arabia notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

 

(n) On 26 August 2006, three (3) dhows transporting 2000 fully equipped combat troops from Ertirea arrived at Warsheikh, located north of Mogadishu, along the coast. On arrival at Warsheikh, the troops were re-located to an area in north Mogadishu for ultimate re-deployment to different ICU held areas. They were re-deployed as follows: 500 of the Eritrean troops went to Baledogle, 500 to Hilweyne training camp, 500 to Lower Shabelle, and 500 remained in Mogadishu and were stationed at Villa Baidoa and the former Police Academy, Bolisiya.

 

(o) At the end of August 2006, at about 0645 hours, a large military transport aircraft arrived in Mogadishu International Airport with a shipment of arms from Eritrea. The shipment consisted of the following: M-46 130mm towed field gun, D-30 122 towed howitzer, M-30 122mm towed howitzer, D-30 152mm , ZU 57-2-57mm , Zu-23-2, Shilka-4-23mm, Zu-23-4, different calibers of mortars, SA-6 ‘Gainful’ Low to Medium Altitude surface to air missile, surface to air missiles PZRK Strela 2M aka SA-7 ‘Grail’, RPG-7.

 

 

Eritrean support to the ONLF via the ICU

(p) On 8 July 2006, a shipment of arms transported by camels and donkeys, and under the escort of 70 members of the ICU along with 160 ONLF fighters, entered Ethiopia through the Abudwaq District, Galgaduud Region, Somalia. The shipment consisted of the following: explosives – 06 boxes, shoulder fired, anti tank weapons – 06 units, PKM machine guns – 22 units, AK47 assault rifles – 120 Units, FAL assault rifles – 40 Units and hand grenades – 06 boxes.

 

Training of ICU militia in Eritrea

(q) On 27 July 2006, upwards of 500 fighters from the military forces of the ICU were flown from Easley Airport, Mogadishu, to Eritrea. They were sent for training on the use of the new types of rockets and surface to air missiles shipped by Eritrea to the ICU. Of the approximate 500 fighters, 200 were also to receive training in Eritrea in guerrilla warfare. The others were sent to Libya (100) and Syria (200) [more details included under Libya and Syria, this report].

 

® On 8 August 2006, 300 fighters of the ICU were also flown from Baledogle Airport (north west of Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle Region, to Eritrea for the purpose of attending military training on the use of rockets and surface to air missiles that Eritrea had recently delivered to the ICU. Earlier the same day, the same aircraft that transported the fighters also offloaded shipments of AK47 assault rifles and PKM machine gun ammunition at Baledogle Airport.

 

The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 18 September 2006 to the Government of Eritrea notifying it of all of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

 

The case of ERIKO Enterprise, Asmara, Eritrea

(s) On 26 July 2006, at 07.45 AM, an Ilyushin aircraft (IL-76) containing an arms shipment for the ICU arrived at Mogadishu International airport. Also on board the aircraft were 10 senior Eritrean military officers. The Eritrean officers were lodged in the Ramadaan Hotel, owned by Abukar Omar Adani, who is a financier of the ICU.

 

The IL-76 departed from Assab, Eritrea, indicating a flight plan designating a destination of Hargeisa (Somaliland), but the aircraft went to Mogadishu. The IL-76 used the call sign or LFT-1221. The IL-76 has the Kazakhstan flag painted on the tail. The registration number on the fuselage of the aircraft starts with the following pre-fix: UN - which is the code for Kazakhstan.

 

Before landing, all road routes in the proximity of the airport were closed and vehicle traffic was redirected elsewhere. Security of the area and offloading of the arms shipment were coordinated by the leader of the Hizbul Shabaab, Sheikh Mukhtar Roboow “Abu-Mansuur”. The arms were offloaded onto seven (7) trucks that were covered to conceal the identity of the cargo. Another truck, carrying barrels of fuel, was left uncovered. The arms shipments consisted of a wide variety of weapons, spare parts, and ammunition including, among others, the following: assault rifles, hand grenades, mines, PKM machine guns, LAWs, surface to air missiles, multiple rocket launchers, different calibres anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns. Also on board the aircraft were military uniforms, machine gun belts (feeder belts) and medicines.

 

(t) On 28 July 2006, two (2) IL-76 cargo aircraft landed - the first aircraft at 0700 hours - at Mogadishu International airport. Both aircraft contained arms shipments for the ICU. Again, before the aircraft landed, all road routes in the proximity of the airport were closed to vehicle traffic. The arms shipments consisted of the following: anti-tank weapons; ZP-39 anti-aircraft guns with seats; 80 extra barrels for the ZP-39; boxes of ammunition for ZP-39; DShK heavy machine guns and boxes of ammunition; PKM and boxes of ammunition; AK 47 and boxes of ammunition; grenade launchers for the AK 47; mines; FAL assault rifles and boxes of ammunition; grenade launchers for the FAL assault rifle; SAR-80 assault rifles; anti-personnel mines; B-10 anti-tank guns and boxes of ammunition; and 60mm mortars and boxes of ammunition.

 

The arms were offloaded onto lorries and, escorted by a security detail consisting of 25 technicals, transported and distributed to three (3) arms storage facilities in Mogadishu - Villa Baidoa, Villa Somalia and the former Police Academy Bolisiya (between the international airport and the main seaport). The majority of the arms were divided between Villa Somalia and the former Police Academy.

 

Subsequently, arms from the three (3) shipments of 26 and 28 July were further distributed to militias belonging to the ICU in Mogadishu, Jowhar, Buur Hakaba (located along the road between Mogadishu and Baidoa) and Guriel (Dhusamareeb area).

 

(u) On 7 August 2006, an Ilyushin 76 (IL-76) aircraft operated by ERIKO Enterprises, using flight call sign LFT-3756, departed Assab, Eritrea, with a destination of Mogadishu International Airport, Somalia.

 

The Monitoring Group sent letters to the Government of Eritrea on 9 August 2006 and 1 September 2006, and the Government of Kazakhstan on 15 August 2006, requesting their responses concerning four (4) IL-76 flights reported to have variously taken place on 26 and 28 July, and 7 August 2006. The Monitoring Group also sent letters on 19 September 2006 to Aerolift Company, based in South Africa, and to the Government of South Africa requesting their responses to the above information. As of the submission of this report, the Monitoring Group had not received a reply from the Government of South Africa.

 

The Government of Eritrea did not reply to the 9 August 2006 letter. They replied to the 1 September 2006 letter in a letter dated 6 September 2006 (Annex VI) informing the Monitoring Group, as follows: “The Government of Eritrea does not have any information on the arrival or departure of the said aircraft. The Government of Eritrea is gravely concerned about the continued spread of misinformation on Eritrea’s alleged violations of Security Council resolution 733 (1992)” In the same letter, the Government of Eritrea also stated the Monitoring Group’s information “…is totally wrong and lacks credibility.”

 

However, subsequently, the Monitoring Group received the following information: (1) ICAO and the Air Traffic Control Authority from a neighbouring country confirmed the flights, (2) on 19 September 2006, the Government of Kazakhstan (Annex VII) provided ownership information for the IL-76 in question that indicated the aircraft belonged to Aerolift, and (3) on 29 September 2006, Aerolift (Annex VIII) provided information that indicated that the same IL-76 had been sold to ERIKO ENTERPRISE, an Eritrean company, before the flights to Mogadishu took place. Accordingly, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group made several attempts to establish contact with ERIKO, during the first two (2) weeks of October 2006. Eriko could not be reached for comment.

 

Seeking additional information and clarification, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group placed a follow up telephone call on 3 October 2006 to the same Aerolift representative who had provided the above indicated assistance and asked for additional information. The representative told the Chairman that he would provide documentation that would show that the aircraft in question was operated by ERIKO. However, as of the submission of this report, the Monitoring Group had not received the promised documentation.

 

The case of the B-707 of Euro Oceanic Air Transport Ltd

The Monitoring Group received information that on 8 and 10 October 2006, a B-707 aircraft -the same aircraft used on both days - flew from Massawa, Eritrea to Mogadishu International Airport. The B-707 aircraft bore a Ugandan registration number 5X-EOT and used the call sign MHU of Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd, formerly Air Memphis. Cargo transported on the 8 October flight consisted of generators, medicines, 2500 single person tents and 30 larger tents, 400 pieces of telecommunication equipment for vehicles, 1500 communications handsets and 10 sealed containers. The intended recipients of the cargo were the ICU military forces based in Raskiambooni, Guriel, Mogadishu and Kismaayo. Cargo transported on the 10 October flight included an unknown quantity of arms and representatives of an ICU military force who were being returned to Somalia from a state that has been providing support to the ICU following completion of military training.

 

Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd is based in Kampala, Uganda. The Chairman of the Monitoring Group placed a telephone call to the Chairman of Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd, who furnished the following information: the B-707 (referenced in the foregoing paragraph) was smuggled out of Egypt on 5 July 2006 and was at the time of its flights from Massawa, Ertirea to Mogadishu, Somalia on 8 and 10 October operated by Euro Oceanic Air Transport, a company based in Bahrain. This company used the registration number, Air Operator Certificate and call sign without authorization from Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd. The Chairman of Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd further informed the MG that they sent letters to the authorities of Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Yemen and the UAE after they learned that the aircraft was transporting arms shipments from Eritrea to Somalia (Annex IX).

 

Ethiopia

The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Ethiopia has provided arms, training and/or contingents of military units to the TFG, warlords, Somali clans and the Puntland administration in Somalia, as follows:

 

Ethiopian support to the TFG

(a) On 28 June 2006, at 0400 hours, four (4) trucks containing 10 metric tons of ammunition left Dollow, Ethiopia, en route to Baidoa. The trucks are reported to belong to a businessman and had been specifically contracted to deliver the cargo to TFG President Yusuf in Baidoa.

 

(b) On 29 June 2006, Khalif Isse Mudan, owner/operator of Mudan Airlines signed a contract with TFG, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi in a hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, granting Mudan Airlines the right to transport weapons and ammunition from Ethiopia to Baidoa for the TFG.

 

© On 3 and 4 July 2006, a total of two (2) flights of Mudan Airlines aircraft transported Ethiopian troops and arms to Baidoa. The aircraft transported both the troops and arms from the Ethiopian military installation located in eastern Ethiopia at Goday (aka: Gode). The senior Ethiopian military officer (General) in charge of the operation on behalf of his Government and who accompanied the flights to Baidoa is named GABRE. TFG President Yusuf requested the troops and arms as a response to learning that Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys had been appointed head of the Majlis Al Shura (Consultative Committee) of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts.

 

Upon arrival at Baidoa, the Ethiopian troops went immediately to President Yusuf’s compound. The troops are part of a four-fold plan to support the TFG. The soldiers charged with the responsibility of providing security to President’s Yusuf residence are from Zone 5 in Ethiopia and have Somali physical features. Their other responsibilities include personal protection of President Yusuf, assisting in the overall defense of Baidoa, offensive manoeuvres against any militant assault and support of Yusuf’s militia.

 

(d) On or about 20 July 2006, late in the night, Ethiopian military forces, in a convoy estimated to consist of 93 vehicles, crossed the border from Dollow, Ethiopia, into the Gedo Region of Somalia. The troops were deployed to several locations within Gedo, Bakool and Bay Regions, as well as in the vicinity of Baidoa. Also, among the vehicles in the convoy were 40 armoured vehicles, or technicals, some of which were mounted with multiple rocket launchers. The armoured vehicles/technicals supported by TFG units, deployed to a location about 25kms east of Buur-Heybe (Buur-Eyle).

 

Sources reported that the Ethiopian units exchanged gunfire with two reconnaissance technicals belonging to Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde in Bullafulay, located northwest of Baledogle, resulting in three (3) militiamen killed and the two technicals with the crew members captured. Ethiopian reconnaissance units were spotted in Kabahirig ex-Commando training camp approximately 10 kms northeast of Baledogle, as well as the perimeters of Jowhar and Baledogle on 23 July 2006.

 

The ICU also deployed some of their units during the same time frame in the areas of Baledogle and Leego. The Monitoring Group learned that over 200 technicals had been assigned to positions entailing all routes leading to Mogadishu.

 

(e) On 25 September 2006, several hundred of Ethiopian combat troops arrived in Baidoa from Ethiopia.

 

(f) The Ethiopian military has set up several training sites in the greater Baidoa area including, as follows: 1) Labatan Jirow, former prison site about 60 kilometres north of Baidoa, is jointly operated by the Ethiopians and the TFG as a training camp and also serves as a weapons storage location; 2) Daynuunay, former military base about 28 kilometres southeast of Baidoa, is a training camp, where the Ethiopians have about 30 technicals, 10 of which are mounted with ZU 23-4 or ZP 39 anti-aircraft guns; 3) Manas, former military base 30 kilometres south of Baidoa and the largest camp with Ethiopian presence.

 

Ethiopian recruitment of new militia

(g) During July and August 2006, in the Gedo Region, Somalia, Ethiopian military personnel including a security and intelligence officer named Colonel Atto Abraha Getchew were actively involved in recruiting new militia members for the TFG. The Colonel is based in Geedweyne, Dolow District, Gedo Regioin, Somalia. The Ethiopians provided incentives to the elders in the forms of vehicles and money to promote the recruitment process. Once recruited, new recruits were sent to military training facilities in the vicinity of Dolow, Ethiopia/Somalia border town.

 

(h) During mid-July 2006, about 400 new Somali recruits were undergoing military training at the Dolow facility. At the training facility, the new recruits received the necessary individual combat equipment and uniforms. Following their training, the recruits using 4x4 vehicles and under the command of the Ethiopian military, were tasked to conduct patrolling activities in the Gedo Region.

 

Ethiopian support to Puntland

(i) On 8 August 2006, a delegation from Puntland led by Puntland’s Minister of Interior – Mohamed Ahmed Warsame “Seefta Banaanka” – travelled to Werder town, Zone 5, Ethiopia, for meetings with an Ethiopian military, General officer. The delegation that included the commander of Puntland Darawiish forces briefed the Ethiopian General on the threats anticipated from the Islamic military forces in their advance toward Puntland. The General responded by ordering arms shipments to be given to the Puntland forces. It consisted of 800 AK47 assault rifles, 120 PKM machine guns, 24 boxes of ammunitions and an unknown number of boxes of landmines and hand grenades.

 

In Zone 5, Ethiopia, the arms were transferred from two (2) Ethiopian military trucks to two (2) trucks belonging to the Puntland delegation. The trucks traveled through Zone 5 to the border with Somalia where they were joined by 80 armed escorts for the overland journey to Galkayo, Mudug Region (central Somalia).

 

A team of three (3) senior Ethiopian Military officers, under the leadership of a colonel, accompanied the Puntland delegation back to Somalia. The team’s mission was to conduct fact-finding relative to the threat posed to Puntland by the Islamic military forces.

 

(j) On 7 August 2006, a commercial aircraft containing an arms shipment from Ethiopia arrived in Garowe (capital of Puntland). The shipment consisted, among other arms, primarily of LAW’s and ammunition. The transport cost for the aircraft was shared by the Ethiopian government and President Yusuf (TFG).

 

(k) On 10 August 2006, an aircraft from Ethiopia containing a shipment of arms arrived in Galkayo. The shipment consisted of LAW’s and ammunition for the AK-47, PKM and RPG’s.

 

(m) On 3 September 2006, Puntland President Mohamud Muse Hersi (Adde-Muse) confirmed that troops of the Ethiopian Armed Forces – numbering 300 - are staying in Galkayo, and further stated that they would be training Puntland militia forces.

 

President Muse, Ethiopian officials and Qeybdiid had earlier held a meeting in Garowe, Puntland, to discuss the specifics of mutual defence assistance for the purpose of halting the advance of the ICU on Galkayo and Puntland. Ethiopia agreed to provide weapons and ammunition, uniforms, medicines, food, transport, military training, troops, command and control, and planning assistance.

 

Following the meeting of 3 September 2006, Ethiopia provided the following support: training for a total of 1500 personnel representing a combination of militias from Puntland and Qeybdiid; 3000 fully equipped Ethiopian combat troops; eight (8) troop transport trucks; twelve (12) 4x4 pickup trucks; five (5) land cruisers; four (4) tanker trucks; and arms: AK 47 assault rifles – 400 units and 15 boxes of ammunition, RPG 2 and 7s – 60 units and 140 pieces of ammunition, PKM machine guns – 90 units and 20 boxes of ammunition, land mines – 340 units, anti-personnel mines – 180 units.

 

Further, on 2 October 2006, President Muse told the Chairman of the MG during a telephone conversation that Ethiopian military personnel were present in Puntland. He specifically mentioned that 32 military (advisors) were, at the time of the conversation, located in Galkayo (Mudug Region), and providing training to President Muse’s militias. He added that the Ethiopian training, which he acknowledged would end in two (2) weeks, was being provided to his militias to strengthen their capacity to halt the infiltration of Ethiopian rebels from Somalia into Ethiopia.

 

[Note: The MG has learned that Somaliland authorities expressed serious concern over Ethiopian military support to Puntland, fearing that Puntland my use it against them in their longstanding border dispute.]

 

Ethiopian support to Somali clans

(n) On 17 July 2006, Ethiopian military units under the command of Captain Hassey Aliow crossed the border with Somalia in the Beletweyne District, Hiraan Region. The Ethiopians conducted meetings with Somali Elders and militia chiefs of the Baadi’ade and Ujejeen clans for the purpose of intelligence gathering regarding the activities of the ICU in the Hiraan Region.

 

The Ethiopian military also distributed an arms shipment to the clans that consisted of landmines (anti-tank) – 100 units and AK 47 assault rifles – 400 units. Adan Jimaale Garas, aka: Adan Geri, of the Ujejeen clan accepted the weapons on behalf of both clans.

 

(o) On 24 August 2006, Ethiopian units arrived in Jawiil of the Hiraan region and met community elders and security officials from Ujejeen and Galje’el clan of the ******. They discussed security cooperation and in particular monitoring of the activities of the ICU gave them the following weapons: AK 47 assault rifles – 200 units.

 

(p) On 29 August 2006, 607 (AK47 rifles – 400 units, PKM – 200 units and RPG – 07 units) assorted units of weapons and communication equipments from Ethiopia were delivered in Galkayo by road and distributed as follows: ******/*****/*********** subclan – 427 units; ******/Habargedir/Sa’ad subclan – 100 units; ******/******** – 80 units. The allocation to the *********** was driven on truck to Lasanood on 30 August 2006.

 

(q) On 30 August 2006, Ethiopian military units with Mr. Donyaale of Reer-Dalal subclan of the ******* arrived in the border town of Balanbale in the Galgaduud region. They met few selected individuals and later on handed over the following weapons to the ******* in order to establish security forces and cooperate with them: PKM – 05 units; RPG – 05 units; AK47 assault rifles – 230 units; hand grenades (F1) – 1000 units.

 

Ethiopian support to Somali warlords – former members of the opposition alliance

(q) On 24 May 2006, the Ethiopian military sent a large consignment of ammunition, including small arms ammunition, to former Jowhar warlord Mohamed Dheere, via the then Governor of Hiraan Region, Yusuf Dabageed. The shipment was transported on five (5) trucks and once received by Mohamed Dheere, was, in part, distributed to some former members of the opposition alliance/counter terrorism alliance in Mogadishu.

 

® On 24 May 2006, part of a consignment of ammunition sent to Mohamed Dheere by the Ethiopians and forwarded through Yusuf Dabageed had been bought with funding by the ICU through former warlord Musse Suudi’s men in Bal’ad: Maalim Farah and Gudbaaye. Both of these men were paid for their services to the ICU, $20,000 and $40,000, respectively.

 

The shipment of ammunition had been transported on five (5) trucks and distributed to former members of the opposition alliance/counter terrorism alliance including Mohamed Dheere. Maalim Farah and Gudbaaye persuaded Dheere’s militia commander to sell them 12 metric tons of light weapons ammunitions. Dheere’s militia commander later disappeared and switched sides.

 

(s) Beginning from approximately July 2006 and continuing to mid-October 2006 (time of completion of the writing of this report), the Ethiopian Government provided certain former Somali warlords, members of the Mogadishu based opposition alliance, with the following military assistance:

 

Mohamed Dheere, former Governor of Middle Shabelle, with its capital in Jowhar, received a quantity of AK 47 assault rifles and ammunition and eight (8) 4x4 vehicles to be used for technicals;

 

Mohamed Qanyare, warlord and former TFG Minister, received AK 47 assault rifles – 90 units and 20 boxes of ammunition, PKM machine guns – 30 units and 35 boxes of ammunition, RPG 2 – total of 140 units of ammunition for RPG 2 and RPG 7, and rifle fired grenades – 80 units, and land mines – 200 units;

 

Abdi Qeybdiid, former warlord and police boss of Mogadishu, held talks with Ethiopian military in Goday (Zone 5), Ethiopia, and following the talks received arms, uniforms, trucks and Ethiopian troops to accompany him back to the Galkayo area, Mudug Region, central Somalia. The specific items consisted of AK 47 assault rifles, pistols, PKM machine guns, RPG 2 and 7, a variety of ammunition, hand grenades, military tents and radio communication equipment. These items were transported in two (2) trucks, while five (5) trucks were used to transport Ethiopian troops.

 

The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 15 September 2006 to the Government of Ethiopia and a letter, dated 18 September 2006, to Mudan Airlines notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The MG received a reply from the Government of Ethiopia (Annex X), dated 9 October 2006. The Government of Ethiopia indicated, effectively, that the allegations contained in the MG’s letter were “without basis” and that the letter contained “manifestly erroneous information”. However, on the other hand, the Government of Ethiopia acknowledged in their letter that “the CCIC (Consultative Council of Islamic Courts) has continued to import all types of sophisticated arms from outside the region, and also has been receiving fighters from areas proximate to our region in great numbers.” It is interesting to note that this latter information is fundamentally consistent with information contained in this current report of the MG.

 

The Monitoring Group had not received a reply from Mudan Airlines by the time of the submission of the present report.

 

Iran

The Monitoring Group received information that the Government of Iran has provided at least three (3) separate consignments of arms and ammunition, and medical supplies and the services of three (3) medical doctors to the ICU, as follows:

 

(a) The Monitoring Group received information that on 25 July 2006, an aircraft containing a shipment of arms from Iran arrived at Baledogle airport and was met by the Courts Union head of Security Affairs, Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siyaad “Indohaadde” and the Chairman of the Dayniile Islamic Court, Sheikh Hussein Janaqow. The arms shipment consisted of the following: PKM machine guns and M-79 grenade launchers – 1000 units; shoulder fired surface to air missiles – 45 units; an unknown quantity of mines; 200 boxes of ammunition for the PKM; military uniforms, water-cans; first aid boxes – 2500 units; and packed food – 600 boxes. Also on board were 3 Iranian doctors to provide first aid training and other emergency medical support services to the ICU. On 9 August 2006, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Iran notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. In its reply, dated 26 September 2006, the Government of Iran informed the Monitoring Group that “according to the information received from the relevant authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there has been no transfer or shipment of any kind of weapons or military equipments from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Somalia”. The Government of Iran further informed the Monitoring Group that “no flight has taken place from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Somalia on July 25, 2006 and that therefore, the allegations raised against my country in the aforementioned letter are totally rejected” (Annex XI).

 

(b) At the time of the writing of this report, there were two (2) Iranians in Dhusamareeb engaged on matters linked to the exploration of Uranium in exchange for arms to the ICU.

 

© Further to the arrangements made by Hizbollah on behalf of the ICU in exchange for the participation of the military force of ICU in Lebanon, on 14 August 2006, an aircraft from Iran arrived at Baledogle Airport containing a small shipment of arms. It also transported about 40 wounded members of the ICU military force that had fought on the side of Hizbollah. (See Hizbollah Section this report).

 

(d) In the early morning hours of 17 August 2006, a large dhow containing food commodities and arms destined for the ICU arrived in El-Adde seaport, Mogadishu. Before arriving in Mogadishu, the dhow travelled from the coast of Iran to the UAE where the food commodities were taken onboard.

 

The arms portion of the shipment came from Iran and consisted of 80 man-portable, shoulder fired surface to air missiles and rocket launchers. In addition, there were 120 sealed boxes with unknown contents, but the wording on the surface of the boxes indicated that the contents contained medical goods.

 

The dhow’s captain and his assistant were reported to be from Singapore and Bangladesh, respectively. Also reported to be on board the vessel were two (2) engineers that were simply identified as Asian, and two (2) Somali businessmen from the UAE, who were responsible for coordinating the consignments of arms and foodstuffs.

 

On 18 September 2006, the Monitoring Group also sent a general letter to the Government of Iran notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply to this letter by the time of the submission of the present report.

 

Hizbollah (Lebanon)

The Monitoring Group received information that the Hizbollah movement (operating in Lebanon) has provided military training and has made arrangements with other states on behalf of the ICU for the ICU to receive arms, as follows:

 

During mid-July 2006, the ICU sent approximately a 720 person strong military force to Lebanon to fight along side of Hizbollah against the Israeli military. The Somali force was personally selected by the ICU, Hizbul Shabaab (Youth Movement), Aden Hashi Farah “Eyrow”. As part of the criteria of the selection process, individuals were chosen based on combat experience that might include Afghanistan.

 

Only about 80 members of the force initially returned to Mogadishu after the fighting. Some of the returning fighters were wounded and were sent to a private hospital in Abdul-Aziz, an area in northern Mogadishu. The hospital is operated and secured by the ICU. Some of the funds used to buy medicines for the wounded originated from a businessman using the name of Abdi Karim. Karim. The funds for the ICU, totalling about $390,000, had been donated from a number of supporting countries.

 

A number of the fighters also remained in Lebanon for advanced military training by Hizbollah. And, further, between 8 and 10 September 2006, about 25 Somalis returned to Somalia accompanied by five (5) members of Hizbollah.

 

During the recruitment and selection process for the Somali force the following financial incentives and arrangements were offered to the fighters and their families: 1) $2000 (USD) given for the families of individual fighters to use while the fighters were in Lebanon; 2) in the event that a fighter was killed, between $25,000 and $30,000 (USD) would be given to the fighters family; 3) upon return to Somalia from fighting in Lebanon, a fighter would receive hero money of $100 (USD) per month (for and unspecified amount duration of time).

 

In exchange for the contribution of the Somali military force, Hizbollah arranged for additional support to be given to the ICU from the Governments of Iran and Syria, which was subsequently provided (see Iran and Syria Sections this report).

 

The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 27 September 2006 to the Government of Lebanon notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

 

Libya

The Government of Libya has sent military aircraft to Somalia and has provided training, funds and at least one (1) separate consignment of arms in support of the ICU, as follows:

 

(a) The Monitoring Group received information that an IL-76 using call sign LAAF (Lybian Arab Air Force) 930 and operated by the Libyan government, landed on 20 April 2004 in Mogadishu, Somalia. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group also received information that on 6 September 2005 another IL-76 operated by the Libyan government landed at Baledogle airport (northwest of Mogadishu), Somalia.

 

The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 12 June 2006 to the Government of Libya notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. On 8 August 2006 the Government of Libya informed the Monitoring Group (Annex XII), as follows: “The two Libyan aircrafts are air-force planes usually used for air cargo. They made two trips to Somalia one on 20 April 2004, and the other on 14 September 2004. The purpose of both trips was to repatriate illegal aliens who have infiltrated into the country”.

 

The Monitoring Group wishes to note that it did not receive from the Government of Libya the requested documentation with regard to the flights such as air cargo manifests, airway bill, flight plans and names of the crew.

 

(b) On 24 July 2006, a delegation of Libyan military officers arrived at Baledogle Airport, located west of Mogadishu and on 26 July 2006, participated in a meeting in Mogadishu with officials from the (ICU) and visiting Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the house of ICU Finance Chief, Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. The meeting resulted in the following decisions: provide military training to about 3800 fighters at the Hilweyne military barracks located near Bal’ad town, north of Mogadishu; Egypt and Eritrea would provide instructors; facility upgrades, training costs and incentives were to be paid for by the Libyan Government; Libyan, Eritrean and Egyptian military officers with support from Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, Adan Hashi “Eyrow”, Abdullahi Ali Nuur and Mukhtar Roboow “Abu Mansuur” were to evaluate the condition and needs of the proposed training site the day following the meeting.

 

Subsequent to the meeting, Libya provided $1,000,000 (one million USD) to be used to organize the future training and for salaries – ranging between $75 and $450 (USD), depending on rank.

 

On 23 August 2006, the ICU opened the military training camp at Hilweyne and welcomed their first contingent of about 600 recruits who are expected to undergo a period of intensive military and ideological training.

 

© On 31 July 2006, a vessel from Lybia with arms and food for the ICU docked in the early morning hours at the seaport of El-Ma’an (Mogadishu area). The vessels’ cargo was given to the following officials from the Security Committee of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts: Abdulahi Moalin Gaab “Abu-Uteyba”, Aden Hashi Farah “Eyrow”, Sheikh Mukhtar Roboow “Abu-Mansuur” and Sheikh Hassan Mukhtar (Raskiambooni group). The inventory of the shipment is as follows: 12 DShK heavy machine guns; 24 RPG; 70 PKM; 350 grenade launchers for AK-47 assault rifles; an unknown quantity of ammunitions for AK-47, PKM and RPG2/7; 2000 spare tires of different types for the technicals; 80 generators; vegetable oil, sugar, wheat flour and dates.

 

The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 9 August 2006 to the Government of Libya notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

 

(d) On 27 July 2006, 100 fighters/militia from the ICU where transported by aircraft to Libya to undergo advanced military training in small unit tactics and use of special weapons.

 

The Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 19 September 2006, to the Government of Libya notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

 

Saudi Arabia

The Monitoring Group received information that the Government of Saudi Arabia provided logistical support in the form of foodstuffs and medicines that were specifically intended for use by the military forces of the ICU in Somalia, as follows:

 

(a) On 11 June 2006, a C-130 aircraft, using flight call sign SVA6708, departed Jazan, Saudi Arabia, with a destination of Baledogle Airport (northwest of Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle Region, Somalia. Baledogle is an important entry point for arms for the ICU. In order to obtain details concerning the cargo of this particular flight, the MG sent a letter, dated 25 August 2006 (Note: The correct date of the MG’s letter is 1 September 2006), to the Government of Saudi Arabia notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. In its reply (Annex XIII), dated 28 September 2006, the Government of Saudi Arabia explained that the flight that took place was for “medical” reasons.

 

The Monitoring Group wishes to note that it did not receive from the Government of Saudi Arabia the requested documentation with regard to the flights such as air cargo manifests, airway bill, flight plans and names of the crew.

 

(b) On 20 July 2006, a maritime vessel, originating from Saudi Arabia and containing cargo consisting of foodstuffs and medicines for the ICU, arrived at the seaport of El Ma’an, Somalia, located north of Mogadishu. The cargo was reported to have been provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia.

 

Following a dispute over payment of port landing fees between Abukar Omar Adani and Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, the vessel relocated to Mogadishu seaport, where it was unloaded and the cargo delivered to the ICU.

 

On 14 August 2006, seven (7) trucks containing logistical supplies, including food and ammunition, left Mogadishu for ICU located in the central regions of Somalia. Accompanying the convoy of trucks were also 320 fighters from the ICU. They were being sent to add to the numbers of fighters in the central regions. Sheikh Abdullahi Yare was in charge of the convoy and the fighters.

 

On 18 August 2006 and 1 September 2006, the Monitoring Group sent a total of three (3) letters to the Government of Saudi Arabia requesting details of the above-mentioned information. The Monitoring Group received a letter from the Saudi Mission to the United Nations confirming receipt of the letter, dated 18 August 2006, but had not received a substantive reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

 

Somalia

TFG

(a) On 11 July 2006, the Monitoring Group received a copy of an email prepared by the TFG, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Somali Republic to the United Nations, New York, referring to new developments in Somalia. Contained in the email are references by the Deputy Permanent Representative to very reliable reports received by the TFG concerning foreign forces, money and weapons having arrived in Mogadishu, as well as reports relating to the preparation of an attack by Islamic Courts. The Monitoring Group immediately responded to the email and sent a letter, dated 17 July 2006, to the Government of Somalia requesting details of the above referenced information. As of the time of the submission of present report - mid-October 2006 - the Monitoring Group had still not received a reply.

 

(b) Furthermore, at the request of the Monitoring Group, the Secretariat of the United Nations tried several times to organize a meeting between the Somali Mission to the United Nations and the Monitoring Group, while the Monitoring Group was in New York during early September 2006 to give its mid-term briefing. The Somali Mission did not respond to the repeated requests for meetings.

 

© Finally, the Monitoring Group, within the framework of due process, sent a detailed letter, dated 21 September 2006, to the Government of Somalia notifying it of information obtained by the Monitoring Group regarding their involvement in arms embargo violations. As of the time of the submission of present report - mid-October 2006 - the Monitoring Group had not received a reply.

 

Somali Islamic Courts Council

(d) The Chairman of the Monitoring Group had several discussions by telephone with Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Somali Islamic Courts Council (SICC) and discussed the Council’s involvement in arms embargo violations.

 

(e) Within the framework of due process, the Monitoring Group also sent a letter, dated 20 September 2006, to the SICC, addressed to Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, reinforcing the substantive aspects of the earlier telephone conversations with the Chairman of the Monitoring Group and seeking a written reply. The Monitoring Group received a letter, dated 2 October 2006, from the SICC and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Annex XIV). In their letter, the SICC dismissed the Monitoring Group’s allegations as “baseless” and “categorically” denied violations of the arms embargo. However, on the other hand, they charged, “Ethiopia is the main country that has been breaking the UN arms embargo on Somalia on a regular basis…….Ethiopia has been openly supplying enormous quantities of sophisticated arms to the Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa…..”

 

Syria

The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Syria has provided arms, ammunition and training in support of the ICU, as follows:

 

(a) On 27 July 2006, 200 fighters from the ICU where transported by aircraft to Syria to undergo military training in guerrilla warfare.

 

(b) Further to the arrangements made by Hizbollah on behalf of the ICU and in exchange for the ICU’s military force’s participation in Lebanon (see under “Hizbollah” section), approximately between 27 August and 3 September 2006, an aircraft travelling from Syria via Eritrea arrived at Esaley Airport, Mogadishu, carrying a shipment of arms for the ICU. The shipment consisted of a large quantity of handguns, AK 47 assault rifles, RPG 2 and 7s, PKM machine guns, three (3) surface to air missiles and a variety of ammunition.

 

The Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 22 September 2006, to the Governments of Syria notifying them of the above information and seeking its response. In their reply (Annex XV) to the Monitoring Group, dated 9 October 2006, the Government of Syria effectively denied its involvement in the above described matter.

 

Uganda

The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Uganda has provided arms, ammunition and military personnel in support of the ICU, as follows:

 

On the morning of 26 August 2006, TFG President Yusuf, Prime Minister Gedi, the Chief of Staff, General Naaji, and others conducted a closed-door meeting to conclude preparations for the arrival of the Ugandans at Baidoa. Following the meeting, three (3) aircraft transporting a contingent of Ugandan military (UPDF) personnel and other officials of the Ugandan Government landed in Baidoa (Bay Region), Somalia. The military personnel were armed and brought with them a variety of other military materiel including a quantity of ammunition, tents, communications equipment, a forklift and fencing material. They also brought with them the barrels of 80 anti aircraft guns. The remaining parts of the weapons were to be airlifted from Uganda to Ethiopia and then transported by trucks to Baidoa.

 

The Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 31 August 2006, to the Government of Uganda notifying them of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

 

Yemen

The Monitoring Group received information that approximately during the time period 9 June through 6 September 2006, 20 arms shipments were sent from the territory of Yemen to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, as follows: 14 shipments from the Government of Yemen – 13 to the TFG and 1 (one) to the Puntland Administration; and 6 (six) shipments from the trading networks – 5 (five) to the ICU and 1 (one) to the Puntland Administration. The details of the arms shipments are as follows:

 

Government of Yemen support to the TFG

(a) Between 9 June and 24 July 2006, Mudan Airlines transported a total of 12 arms shipments from Bossaso (Puntland) to TFG President Yusuf in Baidoa. The arms shipments originated in Yemen and were flown to Bossaso by Government of Yemen military aircraft.

 

The 12 shipments were delivered to Baidoa, as follows: 9 and 16 June – one (1) shipment each day; and 10,11,12,14 and 24 June – two (2) shipments each day. The shipments variously consisted of large quantities of ammunition for the AK 47 assault rifle, RPG, PKM machine gun, M-79 grenade launchers, portable jeep gun; and large numbers of weapons including ZPU heavy machine guns, ZP-39 and ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns, M-40 recoilless rifles (anti-tank), M-79 grenade launchers, SG-43 heavy machine guns, RPG-2 and RPG-7, AK47 assault rifles, PKM machine guns and pistols.

 

(b) On 27 July 2006, four (4) dhows containing arms and military uniforms destined for TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed arrived in Bossaso, Puntland, Somalia. Transportation costs for the shipments were shared by President Abdullahi Yusuf and the Government of Yemen. President Yusuf thereafter sent an envoy to receive the goods on his behalf due to the deteriorating political and security situation in Baidoa. The shipment consisted of the following: PKM machine guns – 250 units per dhow for a total of 1000 units; RPG ammunition – 200 units per dhow for a total of 800 units; and military uniforms – 3500 units, total.

 

Government of Yemen support to the Puntland Administration

© On 4 August 2006, four (4) dhows containing arms for the Puntland authorities arrived in the Seaport of Bossaso, Puntland, Somalia. Transportation costs for the shipments were shared by TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf and the Government of Yemen. The arms consisted of the following: PKM machine guns, AK47 assault rifles, RPGs and a variety of ammunition.

 

(d) On 2 October 2006, President Muse told the Chairman of the MG during a telephone conversation that Puntland had not received military support (during the current mandate) from Yemen.

 

Yemeni Arms Trading Networks

Yemeni arms trading networks continue to be active and have been sending large shipments of arms on a regular basis to Somalia. Early in the mandate, when the ICU were fighting against the opposition alliance, also commonly known as the counterterrorism alliance, in Mogadishu, the trading networks were shipping arms to both sides in the conflict. In the case of the counterterrorism alliance, the traders sent the arms to the BAM from where the alliance made large and regular purchases. In the case of the ICU, the traders shipped the arms directly to them. Following defeat of the counterterrorism alliance, the networks began to ship arms almost exclusively and directly to the ICU, avoiding the BAM. Subsequently, the arms traders also sent arms to the Puntland Administration. The following are examples of direct arms shipments to the ICU and the Puntland Administration:

 

Shipments to the ICU

(e) On 10 and 13 June 2006, two shipments of arms, each transported by dhow, arrived in the seaports of El Ma’an and Harardheere, respectively. The 10 June shipment was received by Somali financier and businessman Abukar Omar Adani at El Ma’an; the 13 June shipment was received by Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys at Haradheere. Both shipments originated with the Yemeni arms trading networks. The combined arms shipments consisted of AK47 assault rifles – 314 units, PKM machine guns – 35 units, DShK anti-aircraft guns – seven (7) units, ZU 23 anti-aircraft guns – five (5) units, and ammunition for the foregoing weapons. Fuel and medicines were also included in the shipments. The arms and other items were for the ICU in Mogadishu and for distribution to other ICU strongholds in central and southern Somalia.

 

(f) On 12 July 2006, a dhow from Yemen, using the name of Al-Soufa XL2x60 and containing an arms shipment, arrived in the Seaport of El-Ma’an, Somalia. The arms shipment consisted of the following: LAW’s (M72-series lightweight anti-armour weapon) – 24 units; AK 47 assault rifles – 2500 units; RPGs – 40 units; and RPG ammunition – 1500 rounds. The consignment was received by representatives of both Abukar Omar Adani and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. The arms were to be provided to ICU military elements operating in the Kismaayo and Baidoa areas.

 

(g) On 2 August 2006, a dhow, belonging to a businessman from Bassaso (Puntland) and containing an arms shipment and fuel – 100 barrels - from Yemen, arrived in El-Adde temporary seaport in Mogadishu. The arms consignment consisted of the following: ZU-23-1 with a seat for the gunner – 18 units; DShK – 60 units; AK47 assault rifles – 500 units, and 24 boxes of ammunition. The cargo was given to ICU Finance Chief, Mohamud Omar Adani for forwarding to ICU military elements operating in the Hiraan and Galgaduud Regions.

 

(h) On 12 August 2006, a dhow from Yemen, using the registration XXLB and containing arms and logistical supplies and destined for the ICU, was seized by pirates near Harardheere, central coast of Somalia. In response to seizure, the ICU conducted a military attack on the pirates in Haradheere and retrieved the dhow and its contents. The dhow contained the following cargo: RPGs – 25 units; DShK – 10 units; PKM machine guns – 90 units; AK47 assault rifles – 400 units; fuel – 42 drums and a variety of ammunition.

 

Shipment to the Puntland Administration

(i) On 6 September 2006, an arms shipment arrived at Bossaso. The Puntland Administration bought weapons from local merchants in Yemen that were subsequently transported via dhow to the seaport at Bossaso. The shipment consisted of following: AK47 assault rifles – 600 units; DShK – 14 units; shoulder fired anti-tank weapons – 12 units; PKM machine guns – 60 units; RPD machine guns – 20 units; RPGs – 20 units; and fuel – 45 barrels.

 

The Monitoring Group sent three (3) letters, as follows: on 1 September 2006 to the Government of Yemen, on 18 September 2006 to Mudan Airlines, and on 18 September 2006 to the Government of the U.A.E. (where Mudan Airlines is based) notifying them of the above information and requesting a response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply from Mudan Airlines and the Government of the UAE by the time of the submission of the present report.

 

However, the MG did receive a substantive reply from the Government of Yemen (Annex XVI), dated 30 September 2006. Regarding Government of Yemen complicity in arms embargo violations, they denied providing “…weapons or military assistance to the Somali Government, to Puntland state or to any of the Somali parties during the period referred to...” in the Monitoring Group’s letter. They also indicated their readiness to send a list of aircraft flights specifically requested by the Monitoring Group, but did not send it. In the latter sense, they also noted “..that most of the flights from our country to Bossasso are transit flights.” Regarding arms smuggling networks operating out of the territory of Yemen and delivering arms to Somalia by dhow, the Government of Yemen affirmed that it is combating the admitted problem in a number of different ways including having recently referred the owners and men of several “boats” to the courts.

 

B. The Bakaraaha Arms Market

Historically, the Bakaaraha Arms super-Market has been a crucial and conspicuous element in the pattern of arms flows in central and southern Somalia. Past reports of the MG have detailed large quantities of many different types of arms routinely passing through the BAM, an activity that, among other things, contributed to the general condition of insecurity and instability in Somalia. The BAM was also a thriving commercial enterprise, with significant amounts of currency, especially USD, exchanging hands from buyer to arms dealer. And, regardless of the purchaser – member of the opposition alliance or warlord, member of the TFG, businessman, or ICU – funds for arms purchases from the BAM came from revenues generated in local administrations, the commercial activities of businessmen, and from contributions, or gifts, both from states and private sources.

 

Previous patterns of overall activity at the BAM, as described above, have changed, however, with the final defeat of the opposition alliance - Alliance for Peace Restoration and Combat Against Terror (APRCT) - during the first week of June 2006 by the ICU. Subsequently, the ICU gained control over all of Mogadishu including the BAM.

 

The ICU has been engaged in talks with principal arms dealers of the BAM in an attempt to determine how best to regulate the activities of the market. While the future role of the BAM is uncertain, however, it remains in operation, but with the total volume of arms transiting the market having dropped measurably. Correspondingly, prices for weapons and ammunition have also fallen.

 

In a large part, the initial decline in activity at the BAM can be attributed to the fact that arms dealers at the market were apprehensive about the possible reaction of the ICU to previous sales to the APRCT (counterterrorism alliance). Another reason for change has been the direct delivery of arms by traders to the intended recipient without first going via the BAM.

 

However, during the last half of the current mandate, arms sales at the BAM are on the rise. The buyers making the most significant purchases at the time of the writing of this report are some former Mogadishu based warlords and Sharia Courts. Different Sharia Courts continue to buy arms at the market. The Courts that are purchasing the arms are reportedly in a friendly competition with one another to see which Court can accrue the most lethal and otherwise impressive inventory of arms.

 

The Somali warlords, members of the former Mogadishu based opposition alliance, are buying increasing numbers of arms and are working through relatives to arrange for clandestine purchases of large calibre weapons from arms traders of the BAM. The large calibre weapons are for mounting on technicals belonging to the warlords. These types of weapons are not normally supplied by Ethiopia to their Somali allies and, therefore, must be obtained elsewhere.

 

Typically, the warlords’ relatives negotiate with the arms dealers for prices and delivery of the weapons. Once purchased, the weapons are dismantled into separate pieces and hidden in trucks that transport food or clothing. The arms are then subsequently delivered to the warlords or their agents. The arms transactions are kept secret to avoid discovery by the ICU.

 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the arms experts of the Monitoring Group have gathered details concerning some deliveries of arms to the BAM and subsequent purchases (Annex XVII).

 

C. The case of Air Tomisko

The Monitoring Group received information that on 2 August 2006 an Ilyushin aircraft (IL-76) - registration number YU-AMJ, using call sign TOH607 - operated by Air Tomisko, landed at Mogadishu International Airport, Somalia. The aircraft departed from Salalah, Oman. Mogadishu International Airport is under the control of the ICU who is in the process of being re-supplied with arms and military materiel following their hostile takeover of Mogadishu and its environs.

 

The Monitoring Group sent a total of three (3) letters, dated 18 August 2006, to the airline company Air Tomisko and to the Government of Serbia, where Air Tomisko is based, and the Government of Oman, notifying them of the above information and seeking their responses.

 

The Monitoring Group received a reply from Air Tomisko, dated 30 August 2006, and the Government of Serbia, dated 15 September 2006. Documentation provided by Air Tomisko, including a Cargo Manifest (Annex XVIII), dated 1 August 2006, indicates that the aircraft was transporting “Bulk Cargo” primarily consisting garments and shoes. The Government of Serbia in its reply simply re-affirmed the Air Tomisko reply.

 

However, in contradiction to the above mentioned replies, the Government of Oman in its reply (Annex XIX), dated 25 September 2006, informed the Monitoring Group that the aircraft in question had “repatriated Somalis apprehended while illegally entering Oman.” The Monitoring Group continues its investigations.

 

D. The case of Global Aviation and Services Group

The Monitoring Group received information that on or about 27 September 2006 an Ilyushin aircraft (IL-76) - registration number 5A-DQA, using call sign GAK-114/115 - operated by Global Aviation, based in Tripoli, Libya, landed at Baidoa, Somalia. The aircraft had departed from Kufra, Libya. Transported on the aircraft were two (2) bullet-proof vehicles for President Yusuf and senior officers of the Ugandan military.

 

The Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 5 October 2006, to the Managing Director of Global Aviation notifying him of the above information and seeking his response. The Monitoring Group received a reply from Global Aviation, dated 12 October 2006, which included a copy of two different Air Waybills. However, the reply did include other important documentation and information requested by the Monitoring Group. As a result, the investigation continues.

 

 

III. Finances

A. Introduction

As the ICU expands politically, militarily and geographically, they are giving great attention to organizing and managing their economic and financial resources. Serious effort is being directed to traditional and other sources of revenues including: 1) local administrations (checkpoints, seaports, airports); 2) financial support from the business community - a strategic financial alliance between ICU and most of the Somali business community in an effort to boost key main sectors of the Somali economy, obtaining therefore more revenues; and 3) increasing contributions from inside Somalia and foreign countries.

 

By contrast, the TFG does not seem to have an applicable financial plan, has little available funds, and lacks a system to obtain revenues. It depends, for the most part, on financial support foreign countries.

 

The purpose of this section is to approach the above-referenced topics in more detail, since they comprise sources of revenues that both sides depend upon to finance their activities in violation of the arms embargo.

 

B. Local Administrations: changes in the revenue-generating infrastructure.

In southern and central Somalia, possession of key revenue generators has changed hands from the former warlords to the ICU. After gaining overall control of Mogadishu in June 2006, the ICU started to re-organize and create a self-sufficient revenue system to make their administration viable. At the moment, the most evident elements of this process include a partial removal of checkpoints in Mogadishu and the refurbishing of infrastructure of long-time unused key public assets, such as the Mogadishu seaport and airport, and they have instituted a program of taxation.

 

Revenues from checkpoints and small businesses

For example, the ICU removed three (3) checkpoints in the Mogadishu area where average monthly revenues collected represented cash flows to the former warlords in excess of one million US dollars annually. The checkpoints were at the Bakahaara, Madina and Sinai districts of the city. Numerous other checkpoints were also dismantled which represented revenues collected on behalf of warlords that exceeded several millions of US dollars annually. At this point in time, there has not been an immediate replacement for those revenues and efforts are on going towards finding alternate funds that in the past allowed regular maintenance of militias.

 

However, an apparent immediate consequence of this action was a reduction in some cases of up to 50% of the delivery costs for goods and commodities, which ultimately will benefit the business community and by extension the ICU.

 

In other cities now under control of the ICU the settlement and establishment of a revenue structure has faced difficulties. For instance in the city of Jowhar (previously analyzed in the MG report S/2005/625 of 4 October 2005) the ICU met resistance from small businesses when confronted required to pay additional fees different from the ones they were already paying to the ousted administration. There, unlike what happened with checkpoints in Mogadishu, the ICU decided to keep checkpoints at the city-limits, or outskirts, of Jowhar. In summary, revenues from small businesses account for $ 655,000 US dollars a year, while at entry points to the city of Jowhar revenues collected are in the order of $1.3 million US Dollars a year. (Annex XX)

 

In the local administration of Lower Shabelle, traditionally under control of Sheik Yusuf Mohamed “Indohaadde”, who on 30 September 2006 handed over control of the region to the ICU, checkpoints are also still in position. Such is the case at the place called “Laanta Buuro” where revenues were collected on average $ 3.9 million USD annually. In this local administration, checkpoints continue to be a source of immediate revenues for the maintenance of the ICU.

 

Thus, in every local administration now under the control of the ICU, conditions relating to the removal or maintenance of checkpoints are different. They have to discuss the topic with clan leaders and/or members of their own organization. It is clear that the ICU is in the process of implementing a plan to secure sustainable sources of revenues in each local administration, but taking into consideration the differences in the political and economic dynamics of every one of them.

 

Mogadishu seaport and airport

The ICU is rapidly taking control over the most important airports and seaports in southern and central Somalia including along the central coastal portion of the country (Hobyo, Harardheere), airstrips located in the greater Mogadishu area (K-50 and Dayniile) and most recently, on 24 September 2006, over the key seaport and airport of the city of Kismaayo . Mogadishu airport and seaport represent both actual and symbolic power of the Somali economy.

 

The ICU authorities consider Mogadishu seaport and airport as public assets and therefore have agreed to form an organization to take care of them, operating sort of a national seaport and airport authority. In the case of the Mogadishu seaport, they have initially trusted its operation to the consortium of the business cartels running El Ma’an seaport. (The consortium was object of analysis in the previous report of the MG - S/2006/229 of 4 May 2006). Since the opening of the Mogadishu seaport in August 2006, the neighboring seaport of El Ma’an, was closed.

 

The ICU has appointed experienced businessmen as managers of the Mogadishu seaport and airport. An example of this approach by the ICU is reflected in the strategic finance alliance between the ICU and Abdulkadir Abukar Omar, Head of Finance, ICU, who is also a successful private businessman and partner in one of the Mogadishu based cartels. (Annex XXI)

 

Seaport

The re-opening of the Mogadishu seaport was essential for the ICU/businessmen strategic finance alliance for the purpose of increasing the volume of import and export operations, while lowering operational costs, therefore generating more revenues. The Mogadishu seaport offers more opportunity for revenue generation than El Ma’an due to its ability to stay operational year round and its port infrastructure.

 

With regard to taxes that are collected, the MG has obtained information indicating that effective 29 July 2006 the ICU and Mogadishu based business cartels have agreed to certain taxation rates for the seaport that include fees on commodities, labour, and transportation. Taxes on goods and commodities are mostly levied on weight (kilograms and tons), volume and type of goods (energy generators, vehicles, timber, mattresses and others). (Annex XX)

 

Although it is still too early to establish yearly income amounts, Mogadishu seaport has the potential to produce significantly more revenues than did El Ma’an. To give an indication of the future potential revenues that may be generated at Mogadishu seaport, the following graphic shows that during the years 2003 and 2004, El Ma’an seaport earned from 22.5 to 30 millions USD, respectively, easily surpassing the revenues earned at the other main Somalia seaports.

 

 

Graphic No.1

 

 

Non-Official data

 

Once fully operational, the Mogadishu seaport may become one of the main revenue generators for the ICU/businessmen strategic financial alliance, as it used to be for the central government that collapsed in the year 1991.

 

Airport

After been closed for about 11 years, the ICU has reopened the Mogadishu airport, effective 15 July 2006. As general manager, the ICU has appointed a businessman who holds shares in two of the most important Somali airlines and is also member of the Somalia Union of Traders.

 

Fees are levied on entry and exiting passengers at a rate of $ 20 US dollars each, inbound-outbound cargo (especially seafood), handling, security provision and landing. It has been recently reported that the airport produces monthly revenues at an average of $ 550,500 US dollars and has the potential to generate $ 6.6 millions US dollars annually. (Annex XXII).

 

C. The ICU and the business community.

The ICU has made a strategic financial alliance with the great majority of large businesses in Somalia, an alliance that benefits both sides, as follows:

 

The benefits for the ICU:

- it is not a product of improvisation, it is a deliberate and well-planned alliance; and

 

- the ICU heavily relies on the “know how” of the businessmen, because they want the businesses to effectively create a highly profitable business environment with wide ranging and essential infrastructure in key economic sectors; they also want to promote an environment that supports a strong future relationship between the ICU and the business community.

 

The benefits for the businessmen:

- generally, restoration of law and order is good for business;

 

- reduction of operational costs, for example, of up to 50% by the removal of checkpoints;

 

- increase in overall volume of imports equals more profit; and

 

- an increased in the area of coverage where humanitarian relief goods are distributed, reflects and increase of private business profits.

 

Business structures

Considering the importance of the above-mentioned alliance, the MG now has a better understanding of an increasingly important aspect of financial support for the ICU. The MG further investigated the organization of the most prominent Somali business community.

 

The core of the leading Somali business community is composed of a approximately 20 experienced businessmen with highly profitable businesses. Their businesses are interrelated and have operations that cover virtually the whole country. The concept presented by the MG, referring to the Somali business community as “business cartels” remains more valid than ever. (See S/2006/229, 4 May 2006.)

 

The MG is now aware of 11 business cartels (versus three (3) that the MG reported in S/2006/229) that entail a total of 60 companies, all related to five economic sectors as shown in the following graphic. Each business cartel has a lead company in one of these sectors and many associated or satellite companies in the others, thus facilitating its entire operations.

 

Graphic No. 2

Business community and main Somali economic sectors

 

 

Some remarks of these economic sectors are:

1-Trade: Includes revenues from imports, exports and the operation of seaports and airports.

2-Remmittances: This sector only has been frequently mentioned in previous reports to have an estimate volume of operations of about 800 million to $1 billion USD a year.

3-Telecommunications: As an observation, it is worth mentioning that in Mogadishu there are approximate 25.000 land lines, served by only 3 companies that charge from 0.10 to 0.30 USD per minute.

4-Transport and Fuel: Obtains revenues from maritime, air and ground transportation, logistics, cargo handling, warehousing and supply of necessary fuel to carry out these operations.

5-Construction: Derives revenues from construction work mostly required from international organizations.

 

As a conclusion, at the moment the ICU seems to have a broad mosaic of economic sectors headed by businessmen ready to provide the necessary financial support.

 

 

Effects on trade and remittance economic sectors

The overall expansion of the ICU has also created a mutually beneficial relationship on the trade and remittance sectors - expansion in these sectors generates revenues that benefit ICU military expansion and military expansion benefits the trade and remittance sectors. Examples of this relationship can be seen, as follows:

 

Increased trade

When comparing imported items through El Ma’an Seaport from January to June 2005 with the same period in 2006, note that there is an increase in the imports of some important goods in Somalia:

 

Table 1

Item/Year 1st half 2005 1st half 2006 % Increment

Vehicles 487 units 1,025 units 110

Cement 16,067 M/tons 31,685 M/tons 97

Cooking oil 297,634 Litres 491,392 Litres 65

Sugar 60,717 M/tons 80,507 M/tons 32

Non-official data

 

Since the beginning of the year 2006, and especially since the take over by the ICU, there has been a steady increase in trade. Somali businessmen inside and outside the country are keener to make more business deals, taking advantage of reduced costs and improved security conditions in Mogadishu, that also contribute to minimizing risks and enhancing profits. Given time, more businesses and greater profits will generate more revenues for the ICU.

 

Remittance sector

During the present mandate, the remittance economic sector has seen an increase in the amount of funds transiting the system. In particular, there have been some remittance businesses that the MG believes have been actively funnelling money used to commit arms embargo violations by both the TFG and the ICU. The following three (3) cases are illustrative:

 

Case 1

On or about 4 July 2006, a prominent leader, Sheik Ali Warsame – former chairman of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiyya (AIAI) - of the ICU sent $ 250.000 US dollars to a businessman in Mogadishu through a remittance business. The money was later handed-over to the leadership of the ICU in that city. The origin of the funds was a businessman in Saudi Arabia. Initially, the money was sent to a remittance branch in Somaliland and from there re-sent to its final recipient in Mogadishu, all in an effort to conceal the source of the funds.

 

Case 2

On or about 10 July 2006, TFG leaders attempted to send cash in the amount of $100,000 US dollars and ammunition to a warlord that at the time was engaged in a fight against ICU’s militia for the control of an area in Mogadishu. The money was transported concealed in two trucks carrying vegetables, however it was intercepted by members of the ICU at a roadblock in Afgooye, a town near Mogadishu. The original transfer of the funds was made by another well-known Somali remittance business.

 

Case 3: Tremors in the remittance sector

During the month of May 2006 one of the leading Somali remittances companies, Dalsan, International, went bankrupt. Dalsan’s co-founder and chairman was Mohamed Sheikh Osman, former spokesman of AIAI. The brother of Adan Hashi Ayro, ICU leader of Al-Shabaab (“The Youth”) was also part of the management of Dalsan. No official explanation for the bankruptcy has been put forth, and at the time of the bankruptcy, about $10 million US dollars disappeared from Dalsan’s accounts.

 

Dalsan was among the top five (5) main companies that shared 75% of the market of the Somali remittance economic sector. Its business operations involved more than 100 agents in 30 countries, remitting operations for more than 150 million US dollars a year and an estimated capital of 8 million dollar with licensed branches in the United States, United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates, among other places. Some Dalsan staff members commented that the reason for the bankruptcy was that branches of the company were lending money without recording the transactions, making it almost impossible to recover the moneys lent.

 

However, according to MG sources, one of the reasons of the bankruptcy was that an ICU military leader managed to divert a large amount of money to help financially support the organization in their fight for the control of Mogadishu during the June 2006 confrontation with the former counter terrorism alliance.

 

Additional information obtained by the MG during the mandate indicates that another Somali money remittance business may have filled the void left by Dalsan. A number of business representatives of Dalsan have moved their business operations to the new company. Sources have indicated that the ICU also uses this business for their financial transactions.

 

D. Greater financial support from inside Somalia and abroad.

Since the ICU’s expansion, information indicates that increasing amounts of money are flowing to support ICU operations. The funds have their origins from both outside and inside of Somalia. Reports indicate that individual contributions from inside of the country in amounts of as much as $170,000, $250,000 and $600,000 US dollars have been sent from Puntland, Somaliland and Mogadishu, respectively.

 

Funds from abroad

According to information obtained by the MG, the ICU requested from wealthy Somali Diaspora members to add an extra amount of money in each remittance. The amount may vary from 5% to10% of the total amount being sent. The explanation given was that funds are needed in order to maintain the security and stability in the areas now under their control.

 

The potential for the ICU to add more funds to their expanding financial capability may be considerable, amounting to several million US dollars a year. For example, during recent months, fundraising by the Somali Diaspora has seen donations via the Hawala system from the UK of an estimated $ 1.1 million US dollars, and the Somali communities in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland of an estimated $ 300,000 US dollars.

 

However, a small number of Somali companies may have been forced to make contributions to the ICU. Information obtained by the MG suggests that, for example, three (3) large money remittance businesses made donations in the form of military hardware to the ICU. This notwithstanding, they represent only a small fraction of the overall business community – three business out of a total of about 60 large businesses – the remainder of which willingly supports the ICU.

 

Other examples of significant externally derived funds can be noted in connection with Sheikh Indohaaddhe, who, on or about 15 July 2006 collected about $5 million out of an available $11 million US dollars reportedly originating from Zakat in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The funds were also reported to have been transferred to the ICU in Mogadishu.

 

In addition, the MG has learned that money - $2 million US dollars - reported to have been sent from Iran to the ICU in Mogadishu during August 2006 along with a consignment of military cargo transported on board an Ilyushyn 76 aircraft.

 

E. Funds for the TFG.

The investigation of the MG shows that by contrast, the TFG has little funds available from inside the country, relying all most completely on foreign contributions. Most of their internally generated revenues originate from the operations of the Bossasso seaport, Puntland. For comparative purposes, and to give a monetary indicator of the US dollars involved, the seaport generated annual revenues of approximately 9 million and 12 million US dollars in the years 2003 and 2004, respectively. While current dollar figures are not readily available, it is safe to say that several millions of dollars – small in comparison to the funds available to the ICU - are likely available to the TFG to make purchases of arms and other military necessities.

 

A case of money printing

Since October 2005, the MG has been investigating a case where a large amount of counterfeited Somali Shillings was seized from the son-in-law of TFG President Yusuf by the customs authorities in Dubai, UAE. The intended recipient of the shipment was the TFG. In order to obtain additional information, letters were sent in December 2005 to Dubai Customs in this regard, but no reply has been obtained. Subsequently, in July 2006, the MG learned that after facing trial, the son-in-law, who had been arrested for attempting to the move150 billion Somali shilling (about $10,2 million US dollars) via Dubai, was exonerated of having the intention to circulate the currency in the UAE and the money was released.

 

TFG officials have indicated that the money was not counterfeited and its printing was requested by them from a company in Indonesia. It is likely that the money was finally delivered to the TFG.

 

 

IV. Transport

As has been noted in abundant detail elsewhere in this report - Section II Known arms embargo violations during the mandate period – both states and arms trading networks have been relying on all manor of transport - motorized road vehicles, maritime vessels, and aircraft - to deliver their cargo of arms, military materiel, combat troops, and other forms of support to both the TFG and ICU. Large aircraft and dhows have been arriving at seaports and airports virtually on a continuous basis and at an exceptionally high rate, a rate that has not been seen by the Monitoring Group during past mandates. During the current reporting period, approximately 26 maritime vessels including dhows have landed at Somali seaports. The vessels have used ports located along most of the coastline of Somalia including from Puntland in the north to Lower Jubba in the south. And similarly, a total of approximately 52 aircraft have arrived in different airfields and airports located throughout most of Somalia. The combined total of dhow and aircraft arrivals comes to 78 and covers a time period of about five (5) months. The Monitoring Group believes that this figure represents only a sub-set, or a portion, of the total that have actually come into Somalia – exact numbers being unknown.

 

Moreover, it is worth mentioning in general that the process involving the transport of arms, military materiel, combat troops, and other forms of support from point of origin to Somalia has, as a rule, been deliberately made clandestine in an attempt by the numerous suppliers to avoid discovery by unwanted parties – including the Monitoring Group. Of particular interest are the air transport cases of ERIKO ENTERPRISE, Asmara, Eritrea, and the B-707 of Euro Oceanic Air Transport, Ltd, also reported in Section II Known arms embargo violations during the mandate period. In these cases, the Monitoring Group has observed that the parties involved in the transport process took additional clandestine measures including adding different commercial layers of participants between the source of the cargo and the eventual recipients. They also filed false and deceptive flights including declaring the wrong destinations. Finally, as an added ruse, while in flight the aircraft operators avoided making any contacts with Regional air traffic controllers.

 

 

V. Analysis of trends and patterns

A. The ICU as the pre-eminent military force in Somalia

The strongly sustained trend toward total military, economic and political dominance by the ICU (formerly referred to as the militant Islamic fundamentalists in the MG’s previous reports) in central and southern Somalia continues. They are currently the most powerful force in Somalia and the single most immediate threat to the existence of the TFG. And, while the TFG has received large quantities of arms and military materiel, the ICU has been the recipient of larger quantities, and more diverse and sophisticated types of arms. They have also received large amounts of military materiel and financial support.

 

On its rise to pre-eminence, the ICU neutralized or subdued other major powerful elements in central and southern Somalia including the former Mogadishu based, opposition alliance, the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA), based at Kismaayo, and maritime pirates.

 

The spreading control of the ICU over the southern and central parts of Somalia has had a severe dampening effect on the activities of maritime piracy in the waters off the Somali coast. After declaring piracy illegal, the ICU took over Harardheere (central coast), which has been the pivotal area for the main group of Somali pirates – the Somali “Marines”, also referred to as “Defenders of Somali Territorial Waters” – that had been the principal threat to maritime shipping in Somali coastal waters. Since eliminating that pirate group, there have been no acts of piracy along the central and southern coastal area.

 

Although not monolithic, the ICU, nevertheless, may be characterized, as follows: they are focused, and have the drive and will to pursue their aims; they are proactive; they have a master plan, and strategies for accomplishing their plan that is substantially supported by elements from outside of Somalia – strategic guidance; and they are also operationally and tactically guided and directed with the help of outsiders; they have organization, cohesion – notwithstanding internal disagreements – and discipline; and importantly, they have the means.

 

Means effectively consists of overall military capability including an increasingly organized military-style force - versus a patchwork of independently operating militias; military command and control; military advice, direction and guidance; diverse forms of military training; arms and the military materiel and logistics necessary to support military operations; financial and economic strength - both internally self generated, through large and affiliated business operations, and gifts and donations from outside of Somalia. They also rely to a very considerable extent on state support including from Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria to maintain their military capability. In sum, their objective successes are as much a clear manifestation of the combined effect of all of these characteristics, as it is a demonstration of their intent.

 

In an effort to consolidate and strengthen their hold on newly obtained areas of central and southern Somalia, the ICU has been refining their internal organizations and structures to meet the challenges of their rise to power. They have established command and control centres (inclusive of politics, economics and military operations) in different geographical areas under their control including Marka (Lower Shabelle Region) and Guriel (near Dhusamareeb, Galgaduud Region), in addition to Mogadihsu. They have also deployed units of their military force to those areas, along with distributing the necessary armaments to the units to allow them to maintain military superiority.

 

The ICU has established numerous military training facilities throughout central and southern Somalia and has been actively recruiting new Somali militia members. Foreign volunteers (fighters) have also been arriving in considerable numbers to give added military strength to the ICU. An unknown number of the volunteers, but believed by the MG to be significant, have combat experience gained from participation in wars and hostile conflicts and actions in the Middle East and Asia. Volunteers with this type of experience add the all-important aspect of reality to military training and combat, and greater insight to the leadership of the ICU.

 

ICU military training includes the instruction on conventional military tactics. But, importantly, foreign volunteers also provide training in guerrilla warfare and special topics or techniques consisting of bomb making and the use of bombs against different targets such as a variety of different types of transport and buildings. Other techniques include kidnapping and the conduct of assassination by ambush and sniping. It is the view of the MG that the ICU is fully capable of potentially turning Somalia into what is currently an Iraq-type scenario, replete with roadside and suicide bombers, assassinations and other forms of terrorist and insurgent-type activities.

 

In sum, it is the view of the MG that the very core of the ICU’s strength and ability to maintain their position of dominance comes from outside Somalia. The know-how, the arms, military materiel, and financial support chiefly come from outside Somalia and are essentially arms embargo violations. Without these forms of support, the ICU would have the will, but not the means. However, as of the writing of this report, means continue to flow to the ICU.

 

Further, it is the view of the MG that the ICU is well prepared, in all essential military aspects, as outlined above, to wage a violent, widespread and protracted conflict in defence of its gains in Somalia. As an example, on Sunday, 24 September 2006, the ICU took control of the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA) stronghold of Kismaayo and its environs. The JVA stronghold was under the long term leadership of warlord Colonel Bare Hiraale, who had also been named to the post of Minister of Defense of the TFG.

 

The takeover of Kismaayo by the ICU, under the command of Sheik Hassan Turki, came as little surprise to the arms experts of the MG who had previously learned that the ICU wanted to control Kismaayo in order to deny it as a possible forward base and logistical hub for any attempted deployment of a foreign peace keeping force to Somalia. ICU military forces that took control over Kismaayo consisted of a coalition of troops from the Sharia Courts, Eritrea, ONLF and the OLF.

 

B. State support and groups of combatants inside Somalia, and military build-up

The overall military strength and power of the TFG is diminutive when compared to that of the ICU. Nonetheless, the TFG is also supported with arms, military materiel and foreign military personnel in violation of the arms embargo. And, similar to the ICU, the very essence of TFG military support - the means - comes from outside of Somalia. Both sides are overwhelmingly reliant on states for support, but also, to a lesser degree, on powerful individuals and groups existing on the territories of those same states and elsewhere. And, because the TFG and the ICU are the principal contenders for ultimate control of political power in, and of, Somalia, each with their own dedicated state supporters, the result is an aggressive, and by Somali standards, large, and deliberate military build-up on both sides. The support received from outside of Somalia is, de facto, life-sustaining for the TFG and the ICU, and all in violation of the arms embargo.

 

Of particular concern, as a case in point, is the most crucial aspect of state support for the military build-up – armaments. It is indicated from an analysis of all information obtained by the MG during the present mandate that arms embargo violations involving arms, per se, have been rampant. In particular, for example, as detailed above in Section II regarding arms embargo violations, in addition to the sheer numbers of arms involved in the violations, the different and new types of arms brought into Somalia represent a dangerous escalation in the level of sophistication of weaponry, adding a new and more deadly dimension to the arms inventory in Somalia. The ICU has been the recipient of the new types of arms. And, as also mentioned in the same Section, most prominent among the new weapons are the man portable surface to air missiles such as the Strela-2 and 2M, also known as the SA-7a and 7b ‘Grail’, and the SA-6 ‘Gainful’ Low to Medium Altitude surface to air missile. Other new types of arms include multiple rocket launchers, and second generation, infrared-guided anti-tank weapons.

 

More broadly, the principal sources for the overall military build-up involving arms, military materiel and foreign military personnel can be variously attributed to ten (10) states, as follows: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uganda and Yemen. Of the foregoing states, seven (7) are aligned with the ICU, as follows: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria; the remaining three (3) states, Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen, are aligned with the TFG.

 

Not included in the foregoing is Lebanon, whose territory is being used by the Hizbollah who have created a reciprocal relationship of assistance with the ICU. Also not included is a complete list of the states from where volunteers originate in support of the ICU, or states from where individuals or groups send monetary contributions to either the TFG or the ICU.

 

At the same time, military build-up facilitated by aggressive state support not only perpetuates widespread instability and rising tensions, but, also helps to sustain a clearly discernible momentum toward the possibility of a major military conflict involving most of Somalia - Puntland in the north, and central and southern Somalia, Somaliland excepted for the moment. And, further aggravating and contributing to this momentum toward possible conflict is the direct involvement inside Somalia of the military personnel of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda - all members of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development). Consequently, there exists the not unlikely prospect of violent confrontations inside Somalia between the military personnel of these states, since Ethiopia and Uganda support the TFG and Eritrea supports the ICU.

 

Moreover, in addition to the presence inside Somalia of military personnel of those states, further seriously complicating the security situation is the existence of other groups of combatants, also inside of Somalia, that are aligned either with the TFG or the ICU, as follows: in support of TFG militias are some members of the former opposition alliance and Mogadishu based warlords, Puntland militias, Ethiopian combat units and members of the Ugandan military – five (5) groups; and in support of the ICU Sharia Courts are the Ethiopian insurgent groups ONLF and OLF, foreign volunteers, or fighters (many with combat experience and specialized military skills), and Eritrean combat units – five (5) groups. Thus, the two (2) coalitions effectively have a total number of ten (10) distinct groups of potential combatants inside of Somalia.

 

It is into this highly unstable, complicated and militarily diverse environment that the Regional and international community is actively considering inserting a peace keeping force consisting of military troops from the IGAD or the AU. It is the firmly held view of the MG that committing such a force to Somalia in the current context may in the worst case be the catalyst that sparks a serious military confrontation between the opposing sides, or at a minimum simply adds to the pressing momentum toward a confrontation. And, given the situation as described above, what control would such a foreign peace keeping force be able to exercise? In virtually any case, there is a very good likelihood that instead of curbing tensions, a peace keeping force would simply become a part of the problem - another potential combatant in the push toward a military solution in Somalia.

 

C. The re-emergence of the Somali warlords – former members of the opposition alliance

The Mogadishu based opposition alliance that has for so long ruled over the area under their control through a patchwork of individual fiefdoms, or local administrations, were decisively beaten in a series of military style engagements by the ICU and have vacated the areas formerly under their control. The ICU has moved in to fill the void left by the alliance. Accordingly, the ICU took control of the revenue generating resources of the local administrations, recruited militia formerly belonging to the warlords and confiscated large quantities of a wide variety of abandoned arms. The Monitoring Group believes that it had already documented during previous mandates a considerable portion of the confiscated arms as being involved in arms embargo violations.

 

The ICU seized heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns and large amounts of ammunition from individual warlords including Mohamed Qanyare – former TFG Minister of National Security, Mohamed Dheere – Governor of Middle Shabelle, and Abdi Qeybdiid, warlord, south Mogadishu. Many of the confiscated weapons were mounted on technicals, which were seized along with armored personnel carriers.

 

In addition to confiscation of arms and military materiel belonging to various members of the opposition alliance, many of the militias belonging to those same members have been converted to the ranks of the ICU. Of those that weren’t killed in combat, some fled, but hundreds of fighters representing a number of the defeated warlords, along with their weapons, joined the ICU. The Monitoring Group also learned that several hundred members of the TFG militias also joined the ICU.

 

Notwithstanding the defeat and subsequent dispersal of members of the opposition alliance, the Monitoring Group has learned that some members, including Mohamed Qanyare, Mohamed Dheere and Abdi Qeybdiid, are re-organizing and re-arming themselves for the fundamental reason of attempting to re-take those local administrations in and around Mogadishu that they lost to the ICU. All initial indications are that their intentions are to use military force against the ICU. Attempts to forcefully take back their former fiefdoms will only make worse an already tense and highly explosive situation in central and southern Somalia.

 

The TFG and the Ethiopian military have gained the support of the same warlords in order to form a coalition that will be used to defend the areas under the influence of the TFG and to protect certain border areas with Ethiopia. As of the writing of this report, the same coalition has also been joined by Puntland forces for the purpose of defending Galkayo against a possible attack by ICU military forces.

 

As the MG has detailed elsewhere in this report, the Ethiopian Government is supporting both the TFG and the former Somali warlords - a contradiction. It is the view of the MG that the principal reason behind the re-emerging Somali warlords is to regain their respective former vested interests comprising of individual fiefdoms complete with political and economic benefits. Their purpose is not too assist in the establishment of the TFG as a viable Government This contradictory activity clearly indicates the self-serving nature of Ethiopian support to Somalia.

 

 

VI. Capacity-building

In view of the totality of the information provided in this report describing the highly dangerous and volatile military and security situation inside of Somalia and, further, the deep involvement of certain Regional states, including members of IGAD, in support of either the TFG or the ICU, the Monitoring Group is of the belief that proposing capacity building measures in the current environment is impractical.

 

 

VII. Coordination with States and organizations

A. States

Due process

The Monitoring Group sent 54 letters to individual States and businesses identified in connection with information about alleged involvement in arms embargo violations, as noted in section II above. Replies received by the Monitoring Group by the time of the completion of the present report have been cited in the information on alleged arms embargo violations in section II and are reproduced in the annexes. Information concerning arms shipments reported to have taken place was sometimes not sent to the respective governments for a response, as the Monitoring Group received such information only after dispatch of its letters. After all of the letters were sent, United Nations-NY, Secretariat, followed up with telephone calls in an attempt to encourage replies from the numerous recipients.

 

Somalia

On 19 June 2006 the Chairman of the Monitoring Group met with the TFG Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, and exchanged views on the arms embargo.

 

Germany, Kazakhstan and the UAE

The Monitoring Group is very appreciative of the cooperation and specific investigative assistance extended to it by the Government of Germany, Kazakhstan and the UAE through their letters dated 27 July 2006, 19 September 2006 and 3 October 2006, respectively. The Monitoring Group looks forward to continued cooperation with the Governments of Germany, Kazakhstan and the UAE in the future.

 

B. Organizations

United Nations

Members of the Monitoring Group met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, François Lonseny Fall and his Deputy on several occasions during which they exchanged views and information.

 

On 9 October 2006, at Nairobi, Kenya, at the request of SRSG Fall, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group and the arms expert provided a substantive briefing on arms embargo violations in relation to the current military build up and security situation in Somalia to the “Inter-Mission Cooperation Meeting: UNMEE, UNMIS, UNPOS”.

 

African Union

On 25 August 2006, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group, together with the arms expert held a meeting with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare, to discuss the arms embargo, the associated military build up, and the overall threat of an outbreak of civil war in Somalia and its potential negative repercussions for the Region. (Annex XXIII).

 

Somali Donor Group and Finland (EU-Presidency)

On 14 June and 23 August 2006, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group, together with the arms expert, met with the Somali Donor Group and the Ambassador of Finland, respectively, and provided a briefing on the arms embargo and related matters.

 

 

VIII. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

In an environment of steadily rising tensions and deep anxieties, the ICU and the TFG are in a bitter contest for control of Somalia. However, the TFG is no match for the ICU - a powerful, expanding, organized, and focused organization in control of most of central and southern Somalia. The TFG, on the other hand, is considerably weaker and lacking in focus; it is highly internally divided and controls little of Somalia. The contest is overwhelmingly military in nature with rampant arms flows to both sides. The arms flows are a premier part of a deliberate, ongoing and broader military build-up, also taking place on both sides.

 

Aggressive state support from both inside and outside of Somalia provides the main means for the military build-up and is one of the key reasons driving the rising tensions. A multitude of other organized groups of combatants supporting either the TFG or the ICU from inside of Somalia are also key elements in an increasingly threatening security mosaic.

 

Somalia is a complicated and potentially volatile military mix, a hostile environment that seems to be moving irresistibly toward playing host to an unnecessary war, a war that may be widespread, and, quite likely, protracted and unconventional. A widespread and protracted war in Somalia involving not only the ICU and the TFG, per se, but the multitude of other combatants has clear Regional implications including the reasonable possibility of re-igniting a state-to-state war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and fomenting acts of terrorism in very vulnerable neighbouring states.

 

An alternative to this potentially highly destructive military solution in an intensely complex and aggravated scenario that defines present-day Somalia remains a possibility and is within the grasp of the international community. A combination of stronger enforcement of the arms embargo applied in conjunction with certain economic sanctions and high-level diplomatic and political efforts could offset the momentum toward a catastrophic conflict in Somalia, a conflict with clearly dangerous implications for the Horn of Africa and East Africa.

 

B. Recommendations

In view of the unprecedented and highly exacerbated security situation in Somalia, the MG proposes a new and inter-related set of recommendations that are intended to reduce the level of tension and offset the continuous momentum toward a military catastrophe in Somalia. In brief, the new recommendations call for (1) increasing the strength of the arms embargo through an all-border surveillance and interdiction effort for Somalia, (2) the application of financial sanctions on significant Somali owned and operated business entities, and (3) a high level, international diplomatic and political effort intended to encourage the will in states in the Region to avert war, and further, to give cause for states to disengage from contributing to the military buildup in Somalia

 

Past recommendations put forward by the MG were predicated both on an analysis of the information available and a sense, or perception, of what measures may best serve to curb arms embargo violations, thereby providing sufficient room for the implementation of alternatively constructive political and social measures. However, no past recommendations have been implemented. Consequently - arguably - the security situation in Somalia has continued to dramatically deteriorate, resulting in an explosion of arms flows, wider militarization of society and, eventually, the ongoing and broad military buildup of the two (2) major contenders for control of Somalia, all in violation of the arms embargo. As a result, the MG sees the need to propose a new and equally dramatic set of inter-related recommendations that are intended to effectively neutralize the more threatening security scenario that is now in evidence in Somalia.

 

In view of the information that the MG has put forward to the Security Council for its consideration in the form of numerous reports and briefings, and its cumulative knowledge and experience investigating various aspects of the situation in Somalia in connection with specific arms embargo violations, and the broader security environment in general, the MG is of the firmly held view that the current relentless momentum toward a violent confrontation between the TFG and the ICU, and their respective coalitions, may create a protracted and widespread civil war, accompanied by major losses of life and a large displacement of Somalis into neighboring countries, and Regional acts of terrorism.

 

Therefore, to offset this increasingly apparent possibility, and to simultaneously curb arms flows and retard the ongoing military buildup, the MG proposes that the Security Council consider implementing a number of inter-related recommendations for Somalia. The conceptual framework for this approach involves three (3) aspects, as outlined below:

 

1) Strengthen the arms embargo with the intention of severely curtailing or cutting-off arms flows into Somalia by implementing a total border surveillance and interdiction effort involving a combination of sea, air and land military forces supported by other organizations, as follows: sea - employ the naval forces of Regional maritime states and international naval forces present in the Region, assisted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Maritime Bureau (IMB); air – employ the air forces of Regional states and international air forces present in the Region, assisted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); and land – employ a UN observer mission, assisted by customs authorities of Regional and other states. Design a practical and working mix of the foregoing to help in the enforcement of the arms embargo on Somalia through the activities of surveillance and interdiction of arms, military materiel and other forms of military support, as necessary, that violate the arms embargo;

 

2) A financial assets freeze on all Somali owned and operated businesses located both inside and outside of Somalia that have a relationship to either the TFG or the ICU and whose assets have been, or may be, used to support the purchase of arms, military materiel and/or to provide military training, or otherwise support activities prohibited under the arms embargo; and

 

3) A concerted and immediate international political and diplomatic initiative - fully incorporating Regional actors - to accomplish, among other things, the following: a) to draw to the attention of all states in the Region, and elsewhere, that are involved in supporting either the TFG or the ICU to the big-picture momentum toward the very real possibility of an extended war and military conflict in the Horn of Africa; b) to encourage among those states the will to avert a possible military catastrophe in the Horn of Africa; c) work toward disengaging those states that are actively and unilaterally supporting either the TFG or the ICU with arms or other military materiel in violation of the arms embargo; and d) provide guidance, direction and coordination, and encourage the involvement of all essential Somali actors in meaningful political dialogue leading toward a political solution of the Somali situation.

 

In summary, there are two fundamental underlying reasons for the proposed recommendations, as follows: 1) in the near term – calm or quiet the tensions and volatility of the current situation in Somalia, and, thereby slow and, perhaps, divert the existing momentum toward military confrontation, and 2) in the longer term – gain the time necessary for diplomacy to seek a political solution for Somalia.

 

Annex I

 

Djibouti Airlines response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

 

Annex II

 

Djibouti Red Crescent response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

 

 

 

Annex III

 

Government of Egypt response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

 

Annex IV

 

Daallo Airlines response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

 

 

 

Annex V

 

Government of Eritrea response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

Annex VI

 

Government of Eritrea response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

Annex VII

 

Government of Kazakhstan response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

 

 

Annex VIII

 

Aerolift response (e-mail) to the Monitoring Group

 

TO : Secretary Security Council Committee UN

Mr. Gregory Boventer

REF : IL-76 operation to Mogadishu

FROM : Evgueny Zakharov /AEROLIFT company

DATE : 29-09-2006

Dear Mr. Gregory Boventer ,

 

 

Refer to your letters dated 19/09/2006 and 27/09/2006 I would like to confirm the following

information on behalf of AEROLIFT company :

 

1. AEROLIFT company purchased IL-76 aircraft REG: UN-76496 from “Overseas Cargo FZE” (

UAE) for purpose to resale it to Eritrean company “ERIKO ENTERPRISE” .

 

2. “ERICO ENTERPRISE” and AEROLIFT company agreed that during lease-purchase period

“ERIKO ENTERPRISE “ will operate under Eritrean AOC (Aircraft Operators License ) and may

use AEROLIFT call sign “LFT” until they will get their own ICAO call sign .

 

3. The conditions “ERICO ENTERPRISE” using AEROLIFT call sign aircraft will not transport

drugs, arms and will operate under ICAO regulations .

 

4. AEROLIFT suspended agreement with “ERICO ENTERPRISE “ at the moment.

 

5. AEROLIFT sent copy’s of Your letters to “ERICO ENTERPRISE “ and requested them to provide

information you need a.s.a.p.

 

Please do not hesitate contact directly to “ERIKO ENTERPRISE “ :

ERIKO ENTERPRISE

P.O. Box 9302 Asmara, Eretria

Tel. 002911122144&122806

Fax. 002911123137

e-mail: horneriko@yahoo.com

Mr. T. Tango cell: 002917116579.

P.S. I will be traveling next 2 weeks and for quick communication please use email

evguenyz@aerolift.org or contact my mobile number +27724616361 .

With regards , Evgueny Zakharov .

Annex IX

 

Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd document to the Monitoring Group

 

 

Annex X

 

Government of Ethiopia response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

 

 

 

Annex XI

 

Government of Iran response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

Annex XII

 

Government of Libya response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

Annex XIII

 

Government of Saudi Arabia response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

Annex XIV

 

Islamic Courts Union response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

Annex XV:

Government of Syria response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

Annex XVI:

Government of Yemen response to the Monitoring Group

 

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

 

Office of the President of the Republic 30 September 2006

 

 

Our country’s reply to the questions of the Chairman of

the Monitoring Group on Somalia

 

I. Allegations that our country sent arms shipments to Somalia

 

1. The Government of the Republic of Yemen affirms that it provided no weapons or military assistance to the Somali Government, to Puntland state or to any of the Somali parties during the period referred to in the letter of the Chairman of the Monitoring Group and that the information in that connection contained in the said letter is incorrect.

 

2. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ready to send a list of aircraft flights for the period referred to in the letter of the Monitoring Group, bearing in mind that most of the flights from our country to Bossaso are transit flights.

 

3. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ready to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Group on Somalia in the same spirit and with the same transparency that it has always sought to display in the past.

 

4. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ever determined to implement the embargo resolution on the basis of its responsibility towards the international community, the essentials for stability and security in Somalia and the Somalis’ need for dialogue and reconciliation above all.

 

5. The Government of the Republic of Yemen stresses the importance of striving to ensure the accuracy, clarity and transparency of the information used and the sources dealt with by the Monitoring Group, as well as the importance of primarily establishing the authenticity of both so that no expediency is lost.

 

6. The Monitoring Group should take into account the developments in the current politics of Somalia following the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union, in addition to the consequences for the embargo resolution, the mechanisms for its implementation and the worth of its contribution to normalizing the situation and ensuring the success of the reconciliation and dialogue, in view of the multitude of arms sources and the intensification of conflict that is open to all possibilities.

 

II. Allegations of arms smuggling from our country to Somalia via arms traders

 

1. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is making enormous efforts to combat arms-smuggling operations to Somalia and is working hard to finish equipping the coastguard forces recently established to secure its long coastal strip, a project for which additional support is required from the international community.

2. The Government of the Republic of Yemen welcomes any information from the Group on any arms smuggling from its territory to Somalia and affirms that it cracks down strongly on boats confirmed to be engaged in arms smuggling by referring their owners and men to the courts, as was recently done in the case of several such boats. In this regard, it points out the possibility that non-Yemeni entities are using Yemeni boats to transport arms from other countries to Somalia.

 

3. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ready to follow up and investigate cases relating to arms smuggling to Somalia, in which connection it has taken a number of measures aimed at the following:

 

- Closing arms markets in the context of official efforts for the return and purchase of arms;

 

- Strengthening control, inspection and monitoring procedures for Yemeni ports, airports and coastal areas in order to enforce the embargo resolution;

 

- Numbering and listing boats in all ports, particularly fishing boats;

 

- Strengthening the role of the new coastguard administration, establishing a radio network and monitoring centres on the coasts and readying a specialist force and armed patrol boats in accordance with available resources.

 

 

Annex XVII

 

Arms purchases and sales at the BAM investigated during the

mandate period

 

Identity of individual conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction Role (Supplier/purchaser/ seller)

Qanyare Afrah Mohamed

Businessman and former Minister for National Security in the TFG 80 AK-47, 20 PKM, 20 RPG-7, 4 DShK and a variety of ammunition

05.2006

 

45 AK-47, 24 PKM, 16 RPG-2 and RPG-7, 2 DShK

10-20.08.2006 Purchased the arms

 

 

Bought through business people who are not suspected by the Sharia Courts in Mogadishu

 

Rage Shiraar Bashir

Businessman 150 AK-47, 22 PKM, 2 ZU-23 and a variety of ammunition

05.2006 Purchased the arms

Muse Sudi Yalahow

Former Minister of Commerce in the TFG 145 AK-47, 33 PKM, 12 mortars, 3 DShK, 2 B-10 and a variety of ammunition

05.2006 Purchased the arms

Habsade Mohamed Ibrahim

MP

Minister of the TFG A variety of ammunition

11.07.2006

 

110 AK-47, 28 PKM, 3 B-10, 20 RPG-2/7, a variety of ammunition

20.08 to 20.09.2006 Purchased the arms and brought them to Baidoa

 

Purchased the arms

Barre Aden Shire "Hirale"

Minister of Defense in the TFG

Formerly charge of Kismaayo 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition

11.07.2006

 

150 AK-47, 40 PKM, 50 RPG-2/7, mines

20.08 to 20.09.2006 Purchased the arms and brought them to Kismaayo

 

Purchased the arms

Abukar Omar Adaan

Businessman

Financier AIAI A variety of ammunition worth 500.000 USD

05.2006 Purchased the arms

BAM traders 1 ZP-39, 12 mortars, 6 DShK and a variety of ammunition

29.04.2006

 

360 AK-47, ammunition for ZU-23, B-10, RPG-2, RPG-7, DShK and ZP-39

07.05.2006

 

Many AK-47, 63 PKM, 12 DShK, 4 ZU-23, 8 Dhuunshilke and ammunition

15.05.2006

 

480 AK-47, 24 PKM, 26 RPG-7, 24 mortars and a variety of ammunition

27.05.2006

 

300 AK-47, 120 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition

12.06.2006

 

250 pistols and ammunition

20.06.2006

 

An unknown quantity of AK-47, RPG-2 and ammunition

23.06.2006

 

Small arms, some anti aircraft guns and a variety of ammunition

19.07.2006

 

680 AK-47, 132 PKM, 12 B-10, 15 DShK, 25 82mm and 120mm mortars, landmines, anti tank mines, large quantity of ammunition for AK-47, ZP-39, DShK, PKM and RPG

20.08 to 20.09.2006 From Somaliland via Puntland by road to the BAM

 

 

From Puntland via Galkayo and Beletweyne to the BAM

 

 

Brought by traders to the BAM

 

 

Shipped from Yemen by trading networks to the BAM

 

 

Brought by traders to the BAM on behalf of the Sharia Courts

 

 

Brought by traders to the BAM

 

 

Brought by traders to the BAM

 

 

Brought by traders to the BAM via the port of El Adde

 

 

Brought by traders to the BAM

 

Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Siyad “Indohaadde” Warlord/businessman, governor of Lower Shabelle and associated with Al Ittihaad Al-Islaami 100 AK-47, 9 DShK and a variety of ammunition

05.2006

 

 

97 AK-47

03.08.2006 Purchased the arms and gave them to Yusuf Mire Seerar, deputy of Barre Aden Shire "Hirale"

 

Purchased the arms and brought them to Marka

 

Sharia Courts 235 AK-47, 45 PKM, 37 RPG-7, 4 DShK and a variety of ammunition

05.2006

 

185 AK-47, 70 RPG-2 and RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition

16.06.2006

 

2 DShK and a variety of ammunition

22.06.2006

 

50 AK-47, 6 PKM, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition

20.06.2006

 

25 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition

05.07.2006

 

38 AK-47, 1 DShK and a variety of ammunition

08.07.2006

 

2 DShK and a variety of ammunition

11.07.2006

 

40 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition

22.07.2006

 

1 ZU-23-1 and ammunition

24.07.2006

 

An unknown quantity of mines

28.07.2006

 

1 ZU-23

09.08.2006 Purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms

 

 

Sharia Court at Guriel purchased the arms

 

 

Sharia Court Saruur purchased the arms

 

 

Sharia Court Jiiramiskiin (Hawaale Clan) purchased the arms

 

Sharia Court at Balad purchased the arms

 

 

Sharia Court Daynille purchased the arms

 

 

Sharia Court Buuloburto purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms

 

Botan Ise Alin "Haaraan Kunaar"

Former Minister for Rehabilitation and Training of Militias in the TFG 120 AK-47, 5 PKM and a variety of ammunition

05.2006 Purchased the arms

Col. Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybdiid

Former police Chief Banadir region. He controlled checkpoints between Afgooye and Mogadishu. Was arrested/released in Sweden. Re-arming his militia near Galkayo 200 AK-47, 15 PKM, 9 mortars and a variety of ammunition

05.2006

 

16 PKM, 14 RPG-7, 1 B10 and a variety of ammunition

22.06.2006

 

7 RPG-7, 6 mortars and a variety of ammunition

25.06.2006

 

A variety of ammunition

23.06.2006

 

A variety of ammunition

03.07.2006

 

2 DShK and a variety of ammunition

23.07.2006

 

2 DShK

31.07.2006

 

 

50 AK-47, 16 PKM, 10

RPG-7

03.08.2006

 

 

75 AK-47

10-20.08.2006

 

 

170 AK-47, 25 PKM, 9 82mm or 120mm mortars, 28 RPG-2/7, mines and ammunition

20.08 to 20.09.2006 Purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms through his clan representative. Will mount them on 4x4 vehicles he received from Ethiopia

 

Purchased the arms and wants to bring them to his base at the Somali/Ethiopian border

 

Bought through business people who are not suspected by the Sharia Courts in Mogadishu

 

Purchased the arms

 

Abdirashid Ilqeyte

Businessman, owner of the Sahafi Hotel now under the control of the ICU 95 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition

05.2006 Purchased the arms

Abdi Nuur Siyad “Waal”

Freelance militia leader 45 AK-47, 9 PKM, 3 mortars and a variety of ammunition

05.2006

 

5 PKM, 3 DShK and a variety of ammunition

10-20.08.2006 Purchased the arms

 

 

Bought through business people who are not suspected by the Sharia Courts in Mogadishu

 

Galjeel clan 30 AK-47, 6 PKM and a variety of ammunition

03.07.2006 Purchased the arms

Yusuf Mire Seeraar

Militia Commander in Kismaayo 100 AK-47, 9 DShK and a variety of ammunition

05.2006 Received from Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Siyad “Indohaadde” who bought the arms at the BAM

Yusuf Dabageed

Former governor of Hiraan region 5 PKM and 1 DShK

09.08.2006 Purchased the arms

 

Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Dheere”

Former Governor Middle Shabelle 4 DShK and ammunition

23.07.2006

 

10 PKM

31.07.2006

 

 

65 AK-47, 2 B-10

10-20.08.2006

 

 

90 AK-47, 27 PKM, 4 B-10, 6 DShK, 40 RPG-2/7, mines and a variety of ammunition

20.08 to 20.09.2006 Purchased the arms

 

 

Purchased the arms and brought them to his base in Quria Joome???

 

Bought through business people who are not suspected by the ICU in Mogadishu

 

Purchased the arms

Abdishukri 130 AK-47, 6 PKM, 3 120mm mortars, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition

05.2006 Purchased the arms

Hussein Mohamed Aideed

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior TFG 48 AK-47 and ammunition

19.06.2006 Purchased the arms

Goobaanle

Militia Commander in Kismaayo 175 AK-47, 26 PKM, 7 120mm mortars, 3 DShK and a variety of ammunition

20.08 to 20.09.2006

Purchased the arms

 

Comment:

Dhuunshilke = 1 barrel Zu-23 mounted on a tri-pod

Sekawe (also know as S.K.U) = 1 barrel Zu-23 with seat for the gunner

 

 

Annex XVIII

 

Air Tomisko response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

Annex XIX

 

Government of Oman response to the Monitoring Group

 

 

 

Annex XX:

Finance: Revenues from small businesses and checkpoints

 

 

Jowhar: Revenues from small businesses

 

Description Quantity Unit Fee Daily Monthly Yearly

United States Dollars

Shops 4000 0.3 1200 36000 432000

Stores and ware houses 110 1.3 143 4290 51480

Remittance branches 23 0.83 19 570 6840

Kiosks 1300 0.2 260 7800 93600

Restaurants 38 1 38 1140 13680

Street vendors 1150 0.1 115 3450 41400

Telecommunication branches 45 0.33 14.85 445.5 5346

Milk and grass vendors 240 0.13 31.2 936 11232

Total 1821.05 54631.5 655578

Non-official data

 

Jowhar: Revenues from checkpoints

 

Description Quantity Unit Fee Daily Monthly Yearly

United States Dollars

Mini bus (Mogadishu -Jowhar) 16 4 64 1920 23040

Mini bus to other regions) 35 6 210 6300 75600

Trucks 20 60 1200 36000 432000

Smaller trucks 30 35 1050 31500 378000

Vehicles transiting to Jowhar, Mogadishu and Balad 16 6 96 2880 34560

Vegetable vendors 31 15 465 13950 167400

Charcoal 8 60 480 14400 172800

Grass 6 20 120 3600 43200

 

Total 3685 110550 1326600

Non-official data

 

 

Annex XXI

Finance: Letter with regard to Mogadishu Seaport fees

 

Fees at Mogadishu Seaport

 

Somali Islamic Courts Council

 

Date 29/07/06

Ref______________

 

Thank for Allah today, the date is 29/July/2006 which (corresponding to) 7/Rajan/1427 of (SMC), Islamic courts Council and Banadir region businessmen had managed to met and agreed taxation for Mogadishu main port which will be as follows;

 

S/No Commodity Type Taxation

($) Laborers

($) Transportation

($)

01

A bag of ration (50kg) 0.90 0.14 0.24

02

A bag fertilizer (50Kg) 0.50 0.1832 0.24

03

A bag of Cement (50 Kg) 0.60 0.1559 0.24

04

A bag L/D (50 KG) 0.60 0.14 0.24

05

A ton of fuel 12.00 Nil

06

Big Bundle 6 1.299

07

Big Bundle 4.55 0.9746

08

Big Carton 0.80 0.1213

09

Small Cartons 0.50 0.10

10

Small tiers/wheels 0.60 0.10

11

Big tiers/wheels 1.00 0.1444

12

Mattresses

0.75 0.1188

13

Timber (Cubic Meter) 15

14

Iron/steel 18

15

Full drum 4 1.1545

16

Trailer 12,00 43.326

17

Truck trailer-N-3 Etc 900 43.326

18

Ten ton truck Etc 800 43.326

19

Vehicle (Landcruser)

Etc 360 21.663

20

Luxury cars Etc 270 21.663

21

Big Generator 200 1.299

22

Small Generator 100 1.299

 

With regard to the vehicle taxations it has only been mentioned above those are known in terms of their weight and capacity. However, those are not unknown the taxation will be based on their volume and weight.

 

On the side of Somalia Islamic Courts Council signed by

 

1. Abdulkadir Abukar Omar - Head of Finance –SICC

2. Mohamed Kahiye Siyad – Head of general transportation

 

On the side of Banadir region Business-men signed by

 

1. Mohamud Abdikarim Ali – Chairman of Banadir Businessman

2. Ismail Cabdilahi Siyad (Gooni)

3. Omar Mohamud Hubane ( Carabey)

 

 

 

Annex XXII:

Finance: Fees at Mogadishu International Airport

 

PREVIOUS TARIFF

 

# PARTICULARS QUANTITY PRICE

1 Departing passengers Per person $20

2 Arriving passengers Per person -

3 Departing cargo Per Kg $0.010

4 Departing cargo-SEA FOOD Per Kg $0.015

5 Arriving cargo Per Kg -

6 Loaders charge for arriving cargo Per Kg $0.071

7 Security charge Per flight $1100

8 Landing fees Per flight $350

 

 

CURRENT TARIFF

 

# PARTICULAR QUANTITY PRICE

1 Departing passengers Per person $20

2 Arriving passengers Per person $20

3 Departing cargo Per Kg $0.015

4 Departing cargo-SEA FOOD Per person $0.020

5 Arriving cargo Per Kg $0.135

6 Loaders charge for arriving cargo Per Kg $0.007

7 Security charges Per flight $1100

8 Landing fees Per flight $500-700

 

 

Estimated revenues at Mogadishu International Airport

Description Quantity Unit fee Daily Monthly Yearly

United States Dollars

Flight charges (Security and landing fees) 4 1700 6800 204000 2448000

Passengers departing and arriving) 120 20 2400 72000 864000

Cargo (Imp. & Expo.) 60 tons 152.5 9150 274500 3294000

Total 18350 550500 6606000

Non-official data

Annex XXIII

 

Letter from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission

 

 

Annex XXIV

 

Countries visited and representatives of Governments, organizations and private entities interviewed

 

 

Kenya

Government officials

Kenya Ministry of Defence (Navy)

Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Defence (Navy)

Kenya Civil Aviation Authority

H. E. Muhammed A. Affey, Kenya Ambassador to Somalia

Kenya Maritime Authority

Kenya Ports Authority

Kenya National Focal Point on illicit Small Arms and light Weapons

 

State representatives

Ambassador of Finland

Liaison Office of the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic

 

International organizations

European Union, delegation of the European Commission

Somali Donor Group

Food Security Assessment Unit

ICAO

IMO

Special Representative of the Secretary-General François Lounseny Fall (United Nations Political Office for Somalia)

UNDP Somalia

United Nations Department of Safety and Security

WFP Somalia

 

 

Madagascar

East Africa and West Indian Ocean Maritime Security Conference

 

 

United States of America

 

State representatives

Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations

Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations

Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations

Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations

 

International organizations

 

 

Yemen

 

Government officials

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[Abu-Salman]

D. Greater financial support from inside Somalia and abroad.

Since the ICU’s expansion, information indicates that increasing amounts of money are flowing to support ICU operations. The funds have their origins from both outside and inside of Somalia. Reports indicate that individual contributions from inside of the country in amounts of as much as $170,000, $250,000 and $600,000 US dollars have been sent from Puntland, Somaliland and Mogadishu, respectively.

 

 

Are Somalis accross artificial clan/regional lines therefore united in support of "Terror" as claimed by the TFG?

 

the Ethiopian Government is supporting both the TFG and the former Somali warlords - a contradiction. It is the view of the MG that the principal reason behind the re-emerging Somali warlords is to regain their respective former vested interests comprising of individual fiefdoms complete with political and economic benefits. Their purpose is not too assist in the establishment of the TFG as a viable Government This contradictory activity clearly indicates the self-serving nature of Ethiopian support to Somalia.

 

Self-explanatory indeed...