Memorial for the First SNM Shahiid in 1983

[me]

Saaxiib you should come up with credible sources. This is the second time that you used erronous sources to back up your claims. I truelly believe that you can do better.

[Jacaylbaro]

Me, May 1988 was when the war started in the main cities ,,, by August the SNM succeeded to fully capture the cities

[N.O.R.F]

Me, have you conceded that Barre's Barbarians committed crimes?

[Jacaylbaro]

Now, Let's hear from General Abdi-Aziz Ali Barre, the leader of the Siad Barre's military from late 1988 until 1991 ........ Here he says about his experience:

 

 

“Ama Itoobiya Ha Ka Dhex Dagaalanto Ama Maraykan Ha Ku Soo Duulo'e Somalia Wali Kama Dhicin Dagaal La Mida Kii Na Dhexmaray Anaga (Dawladii Hore Ee Siyaad Bare) Iyo Xoogagii SNM” Kornayl Cabdicasiis Cali Bare

 

 

Kornayl Cabdicasiis Cali Bare oo ka mid ahaa saraakiishii ugu saraysay milatariga taliskii kalidii taliyihii Siyaad Barre ee dawladii la isku odhan jiray Soomaaliya ayaa markii u horaysay ka hadlay xaalada xiligan ee koonfurta Soomaaliya isagoo ku tilmaamay arin aan macno badan samaynayn oo ah gorgortan kursi iyo mid shaqsiyo ah. Waxa kale oo uu ka hadlay Cabdicasiis Cali Barre in koonfurta Soomaaliya iyo waqooyigu (Somaliland) ay ku kala horeeyaan dagaalada milatariga dhinac walba waxanu tusaale u soo qaatay dagaaladii dhex maray SNM xiligii ay dalka haysteen isagoo arintaasi ka hadlayan wuxu yidhi "Ama Itoobiya ha ka dhex dagaalanto ama maraykan ha ku duulo'e Soomaaliya wali kama dhicin mid la mida kuwii na dhex maray jabhadii SNM waxanan damacsanahay inaan buug ku soo saaro laakiin hadaan in yar ka xuso waxay ahaayeen dagaalo aad iyo aad u qadhaadh dhinac walba oo leh maskax xeel dagaal, taatiko milatari, iyo dhiiranaantii halista ahayd ee dagaalyahanimada Soomaalidu ku caan baxday waxanay dagaaladaasi lahaayeen qaabab badan oo halisa sida weerar dhamaystiran, difaac, jidgooyo, dhabarjabin, miino-xidh, arbush, iyo sahan culus taas oo ay dheerayd dagaalka ku dhufoo ka dhaqaaqda ah oo leh sas iyo jaha habaabin khatar ku ah cutubyada ciidanka, ma aha waxa aayar la ilaawi karo dhacdooyinkii dagaaladaasi khusuusan xiliyadii u danbaysay ee aan anigu gulufka adag ee ciidankii 77 ee libaaxyada Soomaaliya aan ku kiciyay guud ahaan aagagii SNM gaar ahaana xeebta galbeed oo aan ku horeeyay.

 

Weerarkii cuslaa ee aan ku qaadnay guutadii 99naad ee SNM oo uu hogaaminayay kornayl (Jidhif) oo aan isku kuliyad ahayn kuwaas oo aan weerarkaa hore kaga guulayasanay hase yeeshee, aad noogu waxyeeleeyay weeraradii rogaal-celiska ee gaadmada iyo goosgooska ahaa waxaad moodaysay inaanu aad isku kaarto fahmaynay milatari ahaan sababtoo ah waxay jid gooyo ku dileen abaanduulahaygii ciidanka saraakiil badan oo kalena way sigteen, waxay noo adeegsadeen sirta culus ee ciidanka taas oo ah dhegaysiga isgaadhsiinta raadiyaha iyo fasiraada afgarashooyinka ciidanka ee (Taararka) la isku dirayo, meelihii ugu darnaana waxa ka mid ahaa jidgooyadii dooxa Bariisle maalintaas oo ahayd markay saraakiisha laayeen oo ciidanka uu watay kornayl (Jidhif) waxa markii gurmadkayagii ku soo dhawaaday qasab ku mareen ciidankii Djibouti ee xadka ilaalinayay taas oo macnaheedu ahayd inay taarkayaga dhagaysteen waana hab dagaal.

 

Dhinaca kale ee isaguna aadka u adkaa wuxuu ahaa aagii cidhifka Bari ee guutadii 1aad ee SNM oo sidaan ka warqabo uu hogaaminayay Maxamed Kaahin, waxa xusid mudan maalintii aan damacsanaa inaan qabsado tuulada la yidhaahdo Dhoqoshay oo xiligaa ahayd meel istaraatiji ah magaalo camirana ah way noo suurto gali wayday oo waxa lanagu difaacay difaaca adag ee madaafiicda, difaaca (Madfaca Hoobiyaha) oo garbo siman ah, waxay ahayd mid aad u jabisay weerarkaygii maalintaas oo la mid ahayd kuwii aan ku qabsaday goobo muhiim ahaa sida xaruntii taliska guud ee SNM oo ahayd Baligubadle iyo Alaybaday iyo meelo kale oo badan. Maaha wax si kooban aan uga sheekayn karo labada dhinacba saraakiil ha jiraane waxay ahaayeen raga tayada badan lihi saraakiishii waqooyiga gaar ahaan dhinaca SNM ragga isugu tagay.

 

Gebagabadii dagaaladan xiligan ee koonfurta Soomaaliya waa kuwo magac dil ku ah sumcada soomaalidu dagaalada milatari ku lahayd, waxana inta badan ka muuqata rag iska hadlaya oo aan khibrad dagaal shaqo ku lahayn."

 

la soco qaybaha dambe ee dagaaladii SNM.

 

 

Xigasho: Haatuf

[me]

Somalia: conflicts within and against the military regime

 

Patrick Gilkes

 

Briefings

 

Somalia: Conflicts within and against the Military Regime

Patrick Gilkes

 

On 23 May 1986, President Mohammed Siad Barre sustained serious body and

head injuries in a car crash and had to be flown to Saudi Arabia for six weeks

hospitalisation. It was months before he recovered fully, though he formally

resumed the duties of the presidency again in August. The accident had major

political repercussions, setting off political manoeuvres within the government and

the President's own clan, the *******. For the first time in Siad's 17 years of rule,

attention was focused on the succession to the more than 79-year old president.

His illness revealed considerable weaknesses and divisions within the regime and

a lack of consensus among the various factions and clans on who should succeed

him.

 

In the immediate aftermath of the accident, General Mohamed Ali Samatar, First

Vice-President and Minister of Defence, took over as acting President and declared

a state of emergency. At the same time, the President's eldest son, Colonel (now

Brigadier General) Maslah Mohamed Siad, promptly took command of the

presidential guard units and the ******* militia guarding the official residence,

retaining control of these troops until the President's return. Subsequently, in April

1987, three months after presidential elections in which President Siad Barre, as

the sole candidate, took 99.2% of the votes cast, General Samatar was made Prime

Minister, but lost his position as Minister of Defence.

 

Samatar is a popular figure in the army. He is also seen by Somalia's western allies

as a moderate and reasonable politician, despite his close links with the USSR in

the past. In Somali political terms, however, he lacks clan backing, coming from a

insignificant group. Somali politics since independence have revolved around the

major clans; the Dolbah-unta, Gadabursi, ******, Issak, Maje-rteen, Mare-han,

Oga-den and Warsangeli. Of these, the Dolba-hunta, *****t-een, Mare-han and Og-aden

are the main components of the ***** clan family.

 

The ***** will often form a

united front against the ****** and Issak clans, but will as frequently fall out

among themselves.

 

In recent years the most important single clan has been the President's own

M-arehan group. While the Mare-han have continued to build up their position in

both the civilian and military spheres, they have apparently failed to agree on a

successor to Siad Barre. In the presidential stakes the position of Minister of

Defence has been of considerable importance, particularly since May 1988, whenthe opposition Somali National Movement (SNM) launched major surprise attacks

on several northern Somali towns, including Burao and the regional capital,

Hargeisa.

 

The SNM, supported by the Issak clan in the north, is based in Ethiopia and

received considerable support from Addis Ababa. This was Ethiopia's chance to

offset Somalia's support for the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF),

 

BRIEFINGS 55

movement fighting for self-determination of the Somali people in southeast

Ethiopia, the region known as the ******. It was the WSLF which precipitated the

disastrous war of 1977-78 against Ethiopia, seriously affecting Somalia's fledgling

socialist revolution and leading to the break with the USSR. In January 1986, a few

months before his accident, President Mohamed Siad Barre met President

Mengistu of Ethiopia in Djibouti, and started a cautious dialogue. Both had internal

reasons for lowering tension in the region, and the Italian government in particular

was pressing both governments towards a deal. Discussions were held up by

Mohamed Siad Barre's car crash and by the difficulty of agreeing on an agenda for

talks. As a result little progress was made until 1988. In March, the Ethiopian army

suffered a major disaster at the hands of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front

(EPLF) at the battle of Afabet. With a paralled upsurge of military activity by the

Tigrai People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in the neighbouring region of Tigrai, the

Ethiopian regime had an immediate need for fresh troops in northern Ethiopia.

 

Within a matter of weeks, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on almost all the secondary

points of issue, leaving the border and nationality questions to be decided at some

future date. Most of the Ethiopian troops stationed in the south and southeast of

the country were promptly transferred to the north.

 

The effects of this for Somalia were not entirely foreseen. Predictably, the deal

upset the Ogad-en clan which remains committed to the self-determination struggle

inside Ethiopia. Most of the Somali population of Ethiopia, at least in the southeast,

are Oga-den. Oga-den relations with the Mare-han were close for most of Siad Barre's

period of rule (Siad's mother is from the Ogad-en), but the Ogad-en were angered

by the meetings of 1986 between the two heads of state, and strongly criticised the

1988 agreements which, they believe, effectively abandons their claims.

The surprising outcome of the agreement was the SNM's response. Threatened

by a complete loss of all Ethiopian support, it opted for an immediate guerilla

offensive on a large scale. Earlier it had tried to sabotage an Ethiopian/Somali

rapprochement by launching a campaign of urban guerilla attacks in the north in

late 1986 and seizing a number of border villages. Its operations against largely

conscript troops had some successes. In May 1988 it launched major attacks on

Burao and Hargeisa in the north. Burao was captured and held for some time and

most of Hargeisa was also seized, though the SNM failed to capture the airport and

the military headquarters where the army was entrenched. It took the army weeks

to recover the initiative and force the guerillas out, and they had to use heavy

artillery and air strikes, as well as infantry house to house assaults to clear

Hargeisa. It is widely claimed that mercenary pilots, former Rhodesians, flew

bombing missions for the government.

 

It was not until October, four months after

the fighting finished, that foreign diplomats and representatives of relief and donor

agencies were able to go to the north. They returned convinced that much of the

destruction had been caused by government operations, concerned by the army's

 

56 REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

control of food and water distribution and more prepared to accept Amnesty

International's very critical reports on human rights violations.

 

The SNM was decimated in the fighting (though it still has guerilla units operating,

mostly against clan militias), but the army did not come well out of it either. It was

heavily criticised for its slow response to the attacks, and then for excessive use

of force, particularly against civilians. Amnesty International accused the

government of allowing substantial abuses of human rights. The troops in the

northern 26th sector also suffered heavy casualties in the fighting. In part because

of this the government found it necessary to turn to clan militias to raise

reinforcements. Several clans, however, notably the Dolba-hunta, refused to join

in a fight they saw as being against the Issak rather than the SNM. It was largely

the traditional rivals of the Issak, the Oga-den (with a long history of disputes over

water and grazing rights inside Ethiopia) who were prepared to join in. Some 8,000

****** militia were sent to Hargeisa where they bore the brunt of clearing the

town of SNM guerillas. The majority of the present population of Hargeisa are not

the former Issak inhabitants but ****** from Ethiopia, previously living in refugee

camps. A number of Oromos who fled from Ethiopia in the last few years have

also moved into the town.

Of greatest concern to the army itself were the internal problems revealed by the

fighting, and the apparent growth of clan rivalries even within the military.

According to reports, the commander in the north at the time of the SNM assaults,

Major General Mohamed Siyad 'Morgan', a son-in-law of the President and from

the *********, disagreed sharply with the Minister of Defence, Major General Adan

Abdullahi 'Gebiyu', an ******. In mid-1988 General Morgan lost his post amid

allegations that he had favoured ********* units during the fighting; early in 1989,

General Gebiyu was moved to the Ministry of Information and Tourism, with claims

being made that ****** units were refusing anyone else's orders. General Morgan

became Deputy Minister of Defence.

Clan politics have also continued to bedevil the opposition. The SNM's main

problem has been its failure to turn itself into the national organisation it claims

to be. Despite some contacts with southern clans, and even for a time the

appointment of a vice-chairman from the ******, the SNM has never managed to

get rid of its image as a northern and specifically, an Issak, grouping. In early 1989

****** critics of the government set up their own organisation in Rome, headed

by the former SNM Vice-Chairman, Ali Mohamed Osoble. The failure to reach

accommodation with the other Ethiopian based opposition, the Somali Salvation

Democratic Front (SSDF) also underlined the SNM's weakness. The SSDF's

support came largely from the *********, traditional rivals of the ******* within

the ***** clan family. The frequently proposed unity between the two fronts

would have gone far towards creating a national opposition. The various opposition

groups have planned a conference for 1989 to try and improve co-ordination, but

there is little expectation of any united front coming into being.

The SNM has also failed to solve internal divisions within the Issak itself. These

have operated on the level of sub-clan divisions as well as over political and

religious policies. The present chairman of the SNM, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo,

from the Habr Jello sub clan, has been consistently opposed by critics from the

Habr Yunis, another major branch of the Issak. Disagreements have also surfaced

over the degree of Islamic fundamentalism that the SNM should accept, and

 

BRIEFINGS 57

whether or not it should openly push for separatism from southern Somalia, an

issue that has not been publicised but which is becoming of growing importance.

The government unveiled plans for reconstruction in January at a central

committee meeting of the ruling party. These included a statement of the need for

a political solution and an extension of the existing amnesty. The government also

said it planned to take responsibility for resettling displaced people, help them

rebuild houses, rehabilitate hospitals, schools, water supplies and set up a high

powered government agency to achieve all this. A considerable number of political

prisoners have also been released, including many Issak professionals arrested

immediately after the first SNM attacks last year. In interviews, the Prime Minister

has emphasised that the releases will continue. He has also stressed the need to

talk to the elders and people in the north (though not the SNM); and there have

been hints that the government will allow more representation of the Issak in

central government positions. None of this will come cheap, and it will be difficult

to satisfy the north, unless some economic benefits are on offer as well. Given

Somalia's economic problems this may be difficult.

In September 1987, the Somali government unilaterally broke its agreement with

the IMF. This has still not been renewed and one effect has been that much needed

meetings of donors to reschedule debts have not been held. The results have been

predictable. Donors have become very cautious and major projects have been held

up. The government's most important developmental project, the controversial

Barhdere dam scheme, has been indefinitely postponed. Financial commitments

were made by a number of countries and organisations, including the IDA and the

EEC, but all have been held up by the failure to talk to the World Bank.

Bilateral relations have done better, though relations between Somalia and the

US continued to deteriorate in 1988. Somalia has never been satisfied with the aid,

military or economic, promised or given since 1977, nor with the terms for the US

use of the Berbera facilities which included the harbour where the US has

lengthened the quay, dredged out some areas to take larger ships and built a

helicopter pad; there is also an airfield which has one of the longest runways in

Africa. In 1987 military aid fell to $5 million and Congress blocked a $55 million aid

package, citing human rights violations and the refusal to talk to the opposition.

However, the government's use of policies of the type so often suggested by the

IMF — cutting back the state sector, dropping subsidies and limiting numbers of

civil servants — has meant that some economic aid from the US and Italy has

continued to arrive.

As so often, the imposition of such policies has produced its own problems. Price

control of foodstuffs early last year merely.led to the disappearance of food from

the market. By mid-year the government had quietly backed down, telling

merchants to ignore the controls. Food returned to the shops, but at a higher price.

Inflation has continued to rise, and the increases in civil servant salaries, in August,

the pay rises for the army (a 50% rise in gross pay and 100% increase in monthly

rations), and new rises budgeted for 1989, will increase the pressure. Continuing

rises in fuel prices are another problem. Abu Dhabi is the current supplier under

an agreement last year, replacing Saudi Arabia; but in either case Somalia still

depends upon the US or Italy or the IMF to cover its annual balance of payments

deficit. Oil supplies have often proved erratic, and have been partly responsible

for frequent electricity blackouts at the end of 1988. Water supplies too have been

causing concern. Shortages in both have caused considerable criticism. Much will be expected of the high level presidential committee set up late last year to recommend ways of easing the shortages.

 

Source: Somalia: conflicts within and against the military regime

Author: Patrick Gilkes

Published in: Review of African Political Economy, Volume 16, Issue 44 1989 , pages 53 - 58

[N.O.R.F]

“Ama Itoobiya Ha Ka Dhex Dagaalanto Ama Maraykan Ha Ku Soo Duulo'e Somalia Wali Kama Dhicin Dagaal La Mida Kii Na Dhexmaray Anaga (Dawladii Hore Ee Siyaad Bare) Iyo Xoogagii SNM” Kornayl Cabdicasiis Cali Bare

Waar hayaaaaay!

 

Xoogagii - nice

[me]

I Think you guys should stop dreaming and start reading: Somalia: conflicts within and against the military regime, I posted the full article for you guys.

 

1. The SNM was decimated.

2. it took weeks

 

You guys are claiming August 1988, but they entered teh town in May and within weeks they were decimated.

 

Defeat I was claiming the SNM was defeated but according to this article the SNM was decimated can someone tell me the difference? North give it a try.

 

It was not until October, four months after

the fighting finished, that foreign diplomats and representatives of relief and donor

agencies were able to go to the north.

Hmmmm 4 months before October is yes june, the 6th month of the year, and june follows ...yes MAY the 5th month of the year. So how can you claim that in August 1988 Hargeysa was under SNM command? when the major fighting finished way before that........ Been abuur guys?

 

edited.

[Jacaylbaro]

Thanks Oodweyne for clarifying this .... the young man was born in 1988

[N.O.R.F]

Me you used incorrect and biased information(sound familiar?)

 

Worst thing is the same piece mentiones the attrocities committed by the Barbarians you were contesting earlier.

[me]

Lol@ erroneous and biased......sxb the dates are easily verifiable so don't dig yourself any deeper. Ta labaad this is a piece that’s published in an academic journal so its references have been checked. We cannot say that for your sources.

 

Ta sadexaad, I have not denied that there were excesses, but it was the SNM that brought the civilians in harms way not the SNA.

 

You’re not having your day Norf.

[N.O.R.F]

We cannot say that for your sources.

Your report was by the US State Dept and so was my source. So what is the difference? Because its not to your taste you say its baised etc? That is what is called crying wolf dear lad

 

I have not denied that there were excesses, but it was the SNM that brought the civilians in harms way not the SNA.

You denied it. But what happened to the 'somalino' stuff? Are inncents 'collateral damage'?

 

Read this

 

The dominant SNM, whose fighters had evicted Siad Barre's forces from almost all of Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, and Sanaag regions as early as October 1990, had also captured the besieged garrisons at Berbera, Burao, and Hargeysa at the end of January

US State Depart Analysis of Somalia in 1993

 

Go ahead and tell me this is not worthy aswell saxib.

 

Time for my weekend,,,,

[me]

Have nice one sxb.

[Jacaylbaro]

If i would say Habashis didn't committ any crimes in Mogadishu Mr. me would hit the roof and blame me of being melez ...... isn't that the same he is saying about Somaliland ?? ,,

 

it is like i say yeah, ethiopians are helping the goverment and didn't bomb civilians and it is the cause of the ICU and the Muqaawamah

[me]

Your comparison is an insult sxb.

 

The Somali national Army defending its homeland against rebels that were armed, trained and collaborated with our enemy.

 

The Xabash on the other hand are invaders occupying our land and killing our brothers and sisters.

 

The SNA was in its full right to engage and defeat the rebels that attacked our cities and killed our countrymen.

[N.O.R.F]

Somalinimo when it suits iga dhe!