Zenawi's report to his 'parliament': Analysis and commentary

[Jacaylbaro]

Zenawi's report to his 'parliament': Analysis and commentary By Prof. Alemayehu G. Mariam

 

 

In the past, I have deferred to the commentary and scrutiny of independent local media sources and opposition political groups for enlightenment on Zenawi's shenanigans. I reluctantly agreed to comment on this "report" now for two reasons. First, since independent journalists and opposition leaders in Ethiopia — that is, the voice of the people — remain muzzled in jails and prisons, I thought it my moral duty to "stand in" and stand up for them, and let the world know that though they may be in the belly of Zenawi's dungeons, THEY ARE NEITHER ALONE NOR VOICELESS! WE ARE STANDING BY THEM!

 

 

Second, I believe there will be wide-ranging conversation on freedom, democracy and human rights within and without Ethiopia following the release of the prisoners of conscience. I am acutely aware of the gamesmanship surrounding their release, and even if they are not released, the GAME IS OVER for Zenawi. Beyond that, I believe it is necessary to challenge Zenawi not only for his actions and omissions, but also for his ideas and vision, if he indeed he has any, for Ethiopia. And so, here is my analysis and commentary...

 

Zenawi's Mantra: Peace, Development and Good Governance

 

The central themes in Zenawi's report to the "House" consist of the trilogy of clichés he has been tediously harping about for the last decade and half: peace, development and good governance. The "report" is a self-graded, self-serving statement intended to chronicle his achievements on these issues over the past year, and rationalize the "government's action plans" and "implementation of strategies for peace, development and good governance."

 

Let me say at the outset that this report-cum-speech is one of the most desultory and confusing statements I have ever read by anyone purporting to be a political leader. The "report" is full of platitudes about peace. It is unimaginative about development; and it lacks fresh ideas about good governance.

 

The "report" recycles the same old hackneyed and discredited arguments about why things are not possible in Ethiopia. It contains no creative ideas about healing the great divides — political, economic, social — in Ethiopian society, strikes no bold gestures about living harmoniously with neighboring countries, demonstrates no discernable commitments to the rule of law and preservation of human rights, presents no intelligible strategy to deal with the country's grinding poverty and widening inequality, and above all, it is devoid of any vision for Ethiopia's future.

 

Remarkably, the report does not demonstrate the depth of understanding necessary to deal with the current and long-term domestic and foreign policy issues and problems of the country. It reeks with insincerity and hypocrisy. Most importantly, it ignores the people of Ethiopia, and the burdens they face every day. It fails to answer the supreme existential and transcendental question for all Ethiopians today: How can one chicken cost 80 birr?

 

In general, my opinion on the substance of the report/speech is that it is boilerplate hokum designed to hide the stark fact that Zenawi has no solutions for Ethiopia's current problems or a realistic vision for its future.

 

In terms of style, the speech/report is dry and uninteresting. It lacks passion, conviction and eloquence. The Amharic audio recording of the speech is unbearably monotonous and robotic, reminiscent of the soporific (sleep inducing) drone of an old time radio announcer reading the news.

 

So much for general comments. Now, let us now carefully examine the substance of the report/speech.

 

A. PEACE: Peace In/With Somalia, Peace With Eritrea, or Pax Zenawi?

 

Zenawi referred to "peace" in one form or another some 22 times in his speech. But much of the use of the word is platitudinous (dull political oratory). Beyond that, his conceptions of peace and associated remarks are confusing, and send dangerous signals to both friend and foe.

 

Zenawi's idea of regional peace is anchored in a doctrine of militarization which he describes as "bolstering our defense capacity until peace is realized." He said he seeks a "durable peace" in Somalia, and a "sustainable peace" with Eritrea. But he wants to guarantee both "by bolstering our defense capacity".

 

During the reporting year, it is clear that Zenawi did not find peace in Somalia or Eritrea, and certainly, not in Ethiopia. He said he sent his troops to Somalia to give the Somalis peace at the "request made by the government of Somalia". But peace remains elusive because of "threats posed by extremists who have taken refuge in Somalia". He argued that he "was forced to revise plans for [troop withdrawal in] the third and final phase because terrorists were regrouping and coordinating their efforts with Eritrea."

 

He reported progress in disarming Somali militia members and "re-integrating them into the police and defence forces as part of the drive to build the forces" of the Transitional Federal Government" (TFG). He declared Mission Accomplished: "[T]he situation in Mogadishu is one in which the TFG is in control of the whole city making it impossible for terrorists or non-government militia to control any part of the city." He noted that he is working "whole-heartedly to convene a National Reconciliation Congress in Somalia." He commended the TFG for "setting-up an independent Commission that freely organizes and oversees the congress", allowing "dialogues with parties claiming inadequate participation."

 

Zenawi cautioned that withdrawal from Somalia under the current circumstances would "prevent deployment of AU (African Union) peacekeepers", and lead to a "reversal of the process of stabilization of Somalia". He affirmed that Somalia's salvation remains with the deployment of African peacekeepers. But that has not been possible because of the "failure on the part of states and parties to release funds they pledged to support the deployment of the peacekeeping force to Somalia."

 

He reassured the "House" that he will "completely pull out" his troops "upon the successful conduct of the reconciliation conference and the consolidation of the TFG with the capability of the police and defence forces bolstered and the full deployment of AMISOM realized."

 

Courting Disaster in Somalia

 

As events over the past six months have shown, keeping Ethiopian troops in Somalia is misguided, calamitous and plain wrong. No country has the right to invade its neighbors regardless of the domestic situation of that neighboring country. If Zenawi's recent comment to the Washington Post is any indication, it appears that he now understands that elementary principle of international law along with the catastrophic consequences of his strategic miscalculations.

 

Zenawi's current strategy of "I-will-not leave-Somalia-until-African-Union-peacekeepers-arrive" is a recipe for disaster. He has now put himself in the unenviable position of "cutting and running" or staying in Somalia and sinking deeper into the Somalia quagmire, while needlessly expending the lives of young Ethiopians to sustain a doomed policy of aggression.

 

The fact of the matter is that the presence of Ethiopian combat troops in Somalia is not a solution to Somalia's political or social problems. For the past 16 years, Somalia has been a polarized and fragmented society. It is regarded as a "failed state" because it has no legitimate national government, among other things. It has become the battleground for warlords and militiamen. Zenawi naively believed that he could outmaneuver and outwit the Somali clan leaders into accepting his lackey, Ali Mohammed Gedi, as transitional federal government prime minister. In much the same way as he accused the Eritreans for trying to use "Trojan Horses" to create chaos in Ethiopia, he tried to use Gedi as a Trojan Horse to impose a Pax Zenawi (Zenawi's brand of peace) on the Somali people. He tried to sell them his brand of peace in the name of national reconciliation and power sharing. But neither the clan leaders nor the Somali people are buying it.

 

Zenawi finds himself in the cauldron of Somali clan politics. He has learned that it is impossible to trick or coerce all of the clan leaders into accepting Gedi. No Somali regards him as a genuine national leader. He is considered Zenawi's stooge. He has little credibility.

 

Now, Zenawi is facing the consequences of his intervention: Somali nationalist reaction to Ethiopia's occupation and rejection of a puppet government he set up. He can try and justify his intervention by trotting out jihadist bogeymen, but the fact remains that Somalis are rightfully resisting occupation of their country. In all fairness, if Somalia had invaded Ethiopia and made the same claims of terrorist infestation, all of us would be outraged and rise up to defend our country against such naked aggression.

 

So the twin outstanding problems in Somalia today are 1) the presence of Ethiopian occupation forces, and 2) Zenawi's support of Gedi's regime. Until these two issues are resolved, the principal political problem of Somalia — clan polarization and fragmentation — can not be effectively addressed. The fact is that since the downfall of Said Barre in 1991, Somalia has degenerated into clan politics, and clan leaders are more interested in carving out territory to control than establishing a national government. It is doubtful that they can be pressured into agreeing to form a national government led by an individual perceived to be an Ethiopian puppet.

 

By his own admission, Zenawi miscalculated the intentions and integrity of the clan leaders, and underestimated the complexity and severity of Somali clan politics. Whatever political problems the Somalis may have had in the past, it is now trumped by the unwelcome presence of troops from a country many Somalis regard as a historical foe. The inescapable fact is that sooner or later Ethiopian troops will have to leave Somalia, and if persuasive diplomacy is not underway soon to bring about genuine reconciliation and power sharing, we would have to fear about stateless not only in Somalia, but Ethiopia itself. But despite Zenawi's claims of political reconciliation and power-sharing, there is no evidence that he is genuinely interested in an all-inclusive political arrangement that would include those groups who have been marginalized by his support of Gedi.

 

In any case, Zenawi has put himself in a "catch 22" situation. He says he can not leave Somalia because African peacekeepers are not there. But the peacekeepers will not set foot in Somalia so long as Ethiopian troops are there. So, he digs deeper into the Somali quagmire.

 

Stuck in Somalia: No Peace and No Exit Strategy

 

The bottom line on Zenawi's peace report on Somalia is: There is no peace in Somalia today. There will not be peace there tomorrow. There will not be peace in Somalia anytime in the foreseeable future because the whole country is infested by "terrorists", "extremists", jihadists, Islamists and wild-eyed Al-Queidists. Several days after submission of the "report" to the "House", Zenawi admitted to the Washington Post that he "made a wrong political calculation" when he intervened in Somalia. Now facing an implacable and tenacious Somali insurgency, and lacking any domestic or international support for his reckless adventurism, the best Zenawi can do is offer half-hearted contrition and meaningless words of remorse.[2]

 

And if the "House of the People's Representatives" were to ask, "So, what is the exit strategy out of Somalia?", I suspect Zenawi's answer, with a stiff upper lip, would be: "There is no exit strategy out of the quagmire of Somalia until Mission is Accomplished!"

 

Somalia faces extraordinary challenges today, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Neither Zenawi nor the international donors have the ability to address these challenges. The solution is in the hands of the Somali people. It is their choice ultimately to have political and social harmony, or fall even deeper into a vortex of political chaos and anarchy. They can not be pressured or tricked by neighbors or international donors. Today Ethiopia's occupation of Somalia has become a lightening rod focusing Somali rage on their occupiers. And if Somalia should fall deeper into political chaos and violence, the responsibility will be placed on Zenawi's doorsteps.

 

The long term consequences of this reckless intervention for Ethiopia will be monumental. Future generations of Ethiopians will have to deal with and pay for this dark legacy of intervention. Suffice it to say that we live in a rough neighborhood in Northeastern Africa. Our friends are few, and our foes many!

 

Just for the record: There were a few "minor" omissions from the report: How many thousands of Somalis were killed in the violence occasioned by the intervention? What happened to the hundreds of thousands of Somalis who fled the country following Zenawi's invasion and occupation? Did any countries, international organizations, leaders call for the immediate withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia? There is nothing about these issues in the report.

 

 

 

Prof. Al. Mariam

 

 

HERE