Insiders and Insurgents: The Business of Al-Shabaab

[Deeq A.]

 

Insiders and Insurgents: The Business of Al-Shabaab

 

At the heart of the Horn of Africa is a chilling story—one that combines corruption, terror, and insurgency into a deadly cycle. Somalia, forever plagued by political instability and extremism, is now in the hot seat for its suspected harboring of an unholy trinity: a low-key, transactional relationship between branches of its government and the Al-Qaeda-linked militant group Al-Shabaab. This is less a story of betrayal but more an expose on how terror had become a cross-ventured business.

In recent years, credible reports and investigations have revealed a disturbing picture: that certain Somali government officials may not only be tolerating Al-Shabaab activities but may in some cases even be benefiting from them.

Where Allegiance Ends and Opportunity Begins

In June 2023, Ali Abdi Wardhere, a former deputy of the Banadir Regional Administration, made headlines when he declared that government troops in Mogadishu were engaging in routine money transactions with Al-Shabaab groups. According to him, monthly payments were being exchanged in order to agree on mutual non-interference—a shocking assertion which lends credibility to the growing view that terror and politics have been transactional.

Mogadishu Mayor Yusuf Hussein Jimale added to the worry by publicly confessing in September 2023 that Al-Shabaab had penetrated government circles successfully. To him, insiders help facilitate the group’s deadly attacks, making government corridors sabotage channels.

These allegations are not singular. Interviews of bureaucrats, leaked documents, and court hearings have revealed a trend where there have been some officials who not only have admitted to Al-Shabaab’s presence but who purportedly profited from it.

In April 2025, the Prime Minister-led Somali delegation, Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi included, made a controversial trip to the rebel-held eastern Sool region in Somaliland. In the area, the delegation was received warmly by Abdi Hussein Ali Kamin-led—also referred to as Abdi Madobe—a notorious Al-Shabaab affiliate. Minister Fiqi appeared to condone one of Africa’s most stable and democratic countries being destabilized. The timing of the visit raised further questions when, just days later, Al-Shabaab seized Adan Yabal, a strategic town that is part of Fiqi’s own electoral constituency. Observers noted the irony: while the Minister was allegedly encouraging conflict and fostering militant elements in Somaliland, his own region fell into militant hands.

A Shadow Network of Officials

The intersection of government officials and Al-Shabaab is secret, dangerous, and habitually hidden behind a screen of nationalist and counterterror rhetoric. Nevertheless, the following names have cropped up with consistency in public debate and investigative journalism:

• Ahmed Madobe (President of Jubaland): In Dec 2024, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre publicly accused Madobe of colluding with Al-Shabaab. He claimed that the fighters of the group were allowed safe passage through Jubaland-held areas during recent clashes in Lower Juba. A committee of investigation was formed to probe these links. (Somali Guardian)
• Abdirahman Yusuf Omar ‘Al Adala’ (Deputy Minister of Information): In July 2024, it was reported that he was a relative of Yahye Ahmed Mohamud, deputy leader of Al-Shabaab’s suicide unit. Journalist Abdulkadir Isse, who investigated this connection, indicated Al Adala lived with his uncle but failed to inform intelligence authorities about this. (Horn Observer)
• Ali Gudlawe Hussein (President of Hirshabelle): In April 2023, his predecessor Mohamed Abdi Waare accused Al-Shabaab of financing efforts to remove Hiran Governor Ali Jeyte, suggesting that the government of Gudlawe was in league with the militants. (Halqabsi)
• Abdinur Fooley (Former Regional Director): Fooley was prosecuted in July 2024 for his alleged involvement in enabling Al-Shabaab financing. The prosecution claimed that he had opened a bank account to which funds were transferred to the group via family members. (Radio Dalsan)
• Hassan Ali Khaire (Former Prime Minister): A leaked UN Panel of Experts report for 2016 indicated that Khaire, while at Soma Oil & Gas, was under investigation for possible connections with terrorist financing. Though the investigation did not result in formal charges, the allegations remained. (Wikipedia)
• Mukhtar Robow Ali Abu-Mansur (Religious Affairs Minister): Robow is the most contentious of all. A former deputy leader and spokesman of Al-Shabaab, he defected in 2015 and was rewarded with a ministerial role in 2022. Critics argue that his cabinet appointment legitimizes extremist elements. (Wikipedia)
• Eleven Hodan District Officials: In November 2023, 11 officials from the Hodan district in Mogadishu were tried for collaborating with Al-Shabaab. They were accused of gathering intelligence for the group and operating as a clandestine cell within the local administration. (Halqabsi)

On 19th May 2019, a terrorist named Ali Dubad Nure Siyad with Al Shabaab suicide squad named Mohamud visited Guriel district of Galgadud region to kill Sheikh Shakir and Moalim Mohamud who were an Ehl Al Suna Wal Jama’a top ranking faction but fortunately things did not go as planned since the bomb wires did not function properly and within no time people arrested the terrorist, recently Somali National Television had conducted a public interview with Ali Dubad surprisingly Ali named some government officials who participated in that failed terrorist act, their names were Abdi Nour Siyad working for the ministry of national security, MP Abdishakur Ali Mire, immigration department director Mohamed Adam Kofi and Sakariye Ismail, Banadir Region’s NISA director. As Mr Ali Dubad revealed during the interview, MP Abdishakur Ali Mire coordinated him to get issued identity cards from the ministry of national security.

Ismail Osman the ex NISA deputy director said in an interview conducted by the British Somali journalist Jamal Osman that Alshabab is shipping the material directly that they utilize to manufacture bombs via the government-controlled port of Mogadishu. An FBI unit that deals with handling terrorist bombings conducted investigation in different places where explosion took place earlier had eliminated that Potassium Nitrate (KNO3) blended with Nitroglycerine or Ammonium Nitrate combined with charcoal and metals.

25 June 2019 commander Paul Johnson commander of HMAS (FFH 155) Ballarat of Australian Royal Navy intercepted a vessel to Somalia’s port city Mogadishu that carries weapons and 5 tons of Ammonium Nitrate which are needed for explosives production.

General Abdalla Abdalla the deputy director of NISA wrote an official letter numbered as HSNQ/XT/134/2017 on 16th of July 2017 to the president said in the paper that Fahad Yasin the director general of NISA recruited Alshabab members in the government institutions, within few days General Abdalla was attacked at his office.

a detailed map of Somalia’s area of control and it’s affiliate Al-shabab and the broke away Republic of Somaliland. source BBC.

Connecting the Dots: Previous Studies and Reports

Many solid studies over the last decade have provided the foundation for comprehending the extent of state-insurgency complicity:

• The UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group has gone on reporting instances where state actors, regional powers, and commercial actors have enabled Al-Shabaab’s survival through illegal protection and trade arrangements.
• In 2018, an International Crisis Group report substantiated Al-Shabaab control of business and taxation had become so widespread that government-aligned businesspeople found it more preferable to trade with militants than the state bureaucracy.
• A study conducted by a 2021 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime revealed that Al-Shabaab approximated at least $100 million annually, with at least $25 million being thought to originate from legitimate businesses in Mogadishu, the majority of which had political patronage.
• In 2023, the Heritage Institute in Mogadishu published a policy document which said that over 40% of government leaders believed militants or sympathizers had infiltrated their institutions

A Compromise and Fear Business Model

Al-Shabaab’s strategy model has evolved. No longer merely a radical group, it is now operating as a shadow state. It takes taxes from companies in areas it controls, provides judicial services, and applies its own laws of law and order. It extracts millions annually from extortion, contraband trade, and protection money.

Government officials who cooperate—either in conspiracy or omission—benefit as well. Al-Shabaab acquires control of trading routes in return for revenue-sharing agreements. Political officials use the militant presence of the group to suppress opponents or intimidate opponents. In other cases, such officials broker votes and political influence by aligning with the militants in rural constituencies.

In 2022, the Ministry of Finance realized that Al-Shabaab’s shadow taxation system was draining the state’s revenue streams. The militants had captured ports, markets, and transport hubs, making it nearly impossible for the state to operate in certain areas without the group being implicated.

In recent months, there have been a number of steps taken by the federal government to tackle the problem. Hundreds of bank accounts have been frozen, military campaigns have been escalated, and some of its public servants have been sacked. But critics are not impressed. Such measures tend to follow pressure from international donors and are not usually followed by lasting reform.

A 2024 report by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies noted that even though counterterrorism rhetoric is strong, institutional corruption and judicial impunity guarantee that the majority of suspects are never prosecuted seriously. Instead, they are reassigned or protected by powerful patrons.

Even more damning, a leaked internal March 2024 report by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) indicated ongoing coordination lapses in counterinsurgency operations, sometimes exacerbated by politically motivated leaks of operational plans.

Somalia has seen better times, but that the possibility that some of its own officials could be aiding the survival of one of the most deadly insurgencies in Africa’s history is a harsh irony in its ongoing drama. Such unofficial collusion, unless contained, imperils not merely national stability but also public faith in the very institutions tasked to secure it.

Al-Shabaab’s very survival is not ideological or religious but it exists because of systemic corruption within the political and administrative institutions of Somalia. To kill this network, the country will be required to go beyond cosmetic improvements and embrace far-reaching structural reforms.

This requires a brave judiciary, empowered investigative agencies, and political will to bring the powerful to book. Until then, Somalia will remain a war zone not just of bullets and bombs, but of treasons committed behind closed doors. A shadow partnership will still thrive one in which both sides gain, and the people suffer.

About the Author

My name is Mohamoud, and I am an international affairs analyst and a dedicated advocate for Somaliland’s diplomatic recognition. As both a lawyer and a banker by profession, I actively work to promote stability and development. I am committed to advancing efforts to eliminate terrorism and extremism across Africa, fostering peace and security on the continent.

https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/insiders-and-insurgents-the-business-of-al-shabaab/

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