Somalia: Future of a Failed State

[Suldaanka]

Somalia: Future of a Failed State

 

Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki urged exiled Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf on Nov. 22 to quickly form his Cabinet and return to Mogadishu to begin governing. Hours earlier, three people were killed in factional fighting in the Somali capital, highlighting the difficult situation facing Yusuf if and when he returns. Yusuf will return with what amounts to a mandate from the international community to reunify and reconstruct the fractured African nation, but he soon might find it far easier and more beneficial to succumb to secessionist forces.

 

Analysis

 

Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki publicly urged newly elected Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf on Nov. 22 to name a Cabinet and return to Somalia to govern. The day before, three people were killed in factional fighting in Mogadishu in what residents have said is an example of the increased violence as warlords vie for power before the return of a government.

 

Somalia has been a chaotic geopolitical backwater since the collapse of governance and the withdrawal of U.S. and U.N. peacekeepers in the wake of fighting in Mogadishu in 1993 in which 18 U.S. servicemen were killed. The exiled Parliament's election of Yusuf in October 2004 -- which received support from the international community -- is designed to be the first step toward reconciliation, reconstruction and peace in Somalia. Its success is far from assured, but given the very vital role Somalia can play on the world stage, there likely will be no shortage of foreign players interested in the outcome.

 

What is perhaps most interesting is that the most strategically and geopolitically vital areas of Somalia are the areas where autonomous and secessionist forces have made the most headway: Somaliland and its neighbor, Puntland.

 

Stratfor has discussed Somaliland's vital importance to neighboring Ethiopia and its long-term desire to diversify its port facilities for both economic and national security reasons. The Red Sea port of Berbera would be extremely beneficial to not only Ethiopia but also to whichever foreign party is able to secure access to it, as the port would provide control and watch over vital Red Sea shipping lanes. This is where the future of Somalia becomes interesting.

 

Ethiopia's interest in Berbera is obvious, as is its support of Somaliland's independence. However, Ethiopia is not the only foreign power with an interest in the breakaway republic's future. The European Union has funneled millions of dollars into the region for infrastructure improvements to allow Addis Ababa to use the port. This money has dried up, Ethiopian sources say, because of diplomatic concerns about what might be viewed as hypocrisy in supporting a breakaway region while the international community is calling for the reunification of the country. Chief among Somaliland's European benefactors has been, and still is, the United Kingdom.

 

The United Kingdom has colonial ties to the republic that run deep. These ties included hosting a Somaliland mission -- unofficially -- and sending members of Parliament to the country on official fact-finding missions. On a February 2004 mission, Labor Member of Parliament Tony Worthington proposed that London should rethink its policies toward Somaliland and encouraged the permanent separation of the region from Somalia proper, saying Somaliland would be "destroyed" by reunification with the south. As humanitarian as Britain's motivations might seem -- and genuinely be -- there is a much broader strategic benefit to involvement (and stability) in the area, including Puntland.

 

Like Somaliland, Puntland lies on the Red Sea, has colonial ties to Europe (Italy) and has pushed for autonomy. To add to the intrigue, Puntland's president and most influential warlord is none other than Yusuf. As recently as 2002, Yusuf was involved in a military coup to seize power in Puntland and also is alleged to lead the forces engaged in fighting with Somaliland over the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag. Given the U.S. military presence in Djibouti, coupled with British and Italian influence in Somaliland and Puntland, it would appear the West has a fairly solid hold on the southern side of the Gulf of Aden.

 

Yusuf was educated in Europe and trained in the Soviet military. He was a key player in the unsuccessful coup attempt on Somali President Siad Barre in 1978 and commanded a guerrilla movement while in exile in Ethiopia. Many of Yusuf's opposition believe he seized power in Puntland with the alleged help of Ethiopian forces -- suggesting that Ethiopia is being very savvy in its dealings with Somalia. Ethiopia has been openly supporting Somaliland while tacitly backing one of its chief antagonists in Yusuf. Italy's support of Somalia in general and Puntland in particular is not as substantial as the United Kingdom's, though Rome still provides millions of dollars in aid. Italy also has hosted members of Somalia's exiled government.

 

The interest and potential strategic importance of these northern regions is patently clear. How the situation unfolds and what the future holds for Somalia, however, remains rather obtuse.

 

Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi said Nov. 22 his government would return to Mogadishu no later than January 2005, setting the stage for the success or failure of this most recent attempt to rebuild and bring peace to Somalia. Whether Yusuf is successful in this regard is of little import to extra-regional players interested in the country. Yusuf already has a history of not being a team player when it comes to Somali politics -- most recently in his seizure of power in Puntland in 2002 and before that with his open resistance to Somalia's last transitional government as president of Puntland. Based on his personal political history and the already contentious situation in Somalia it remains unlikely -- or at least unproven -- that Yusuf can reunite Somalia.

 

The stage is being set for Yusuf's failure. Countries -- including Ethiopia -- have offered to provide troops in the event of a peacekeeping mission to Somalia. Yusuf has asked both the African Union (AU) and the United Nations to get involved, but no such mission has yet happened. As a result, Yusuf could be thrown into the lions' den of warlords and factional fighting with little if any international peacekeeping support -- something he will desperately need to keep rival warlords and factions at bay upon his return to Mogadishu.

 

The southern sections of Somalia are not only the most chaotic but also of the least interest to anyone but their neighbors. Theoretically, Yusuf could make a show of establishing a central government and, upon failure, place the blame squarely on the shoulders of Somalia's myriad warlords and return to Puntland and business as usual. This would put the international community in a situation of either supporting the separate stability of two-thirds of the country or trying to force unification and inevitable anarchy on the whole of Somalia. For European powers it likely will be an easy choice; beyond humanitarian interests there is little keeping international attention in southern Somalia. All of the strategic sites are in the north -- and if separation from the south could be formalized, relative stability would likely return to the regions, given their history of self-governance. The rest of Somalia could be left to its own chaotic devices with little geopolitical impact outside its neighbors.

 

Ethiopia and Kenya would obviously be concerned by such a development -- which is likely why both have offered to provide troops under a proposed AU peacekeeping mission -- but this concern would not stretch far beyond Addis Ababa and Nairobi. If the possibility exists for stability in the north even at the price of anarchy in the south, it will suit Ethiopia just fine, as access to Somaliland's deep water ports is far more important than bringing peace to Mogadishu.

 

Ultimately, the future of Somalia as a unified nation is not very important on the world stage. The development of its northern regions and former colonies is, however, and that importance likely will serve to drive international involvement in the area in the coming years. This will most likely take the form of aid packages, infrastructure development, sponsoring peacekeeping missions and even -- perhaps -- formal recognition of their independence.

[Suldaanka]

What is perhaps most interesting is that the most strategically and geopolitically vital areas of Somalia are the areas where autonomous and secessionist forces have made the most headway: Somaliland and its neighbor, Puntland.

I find that quote as a joke. What is so strategically important about Puntland, I wonder?

[Emperor]

^^^Whats so funny about that? Geographically and in terms of strategy Puntland has access to the red sea and the Indian Ocean, It has borders with Ethiopia and the South, and equally similar to Somaliland in anything else ( Ooh sorry Maybe except djibout border, seems too important and far more strategic to you I guess)..

 

As for the topic I think is obvious

 

The stage is being set for Yusuf's failure.

the future of Somalia as a unified nation is not very important on the world stage.

R u sure? Oh yeah we know the world has much bigger plan and far better important agenda in place than unifying Somalia, Seperating it and the recognition of the North.

The development of its northern regions and former colonies is, however, and that importance likely will serve to drive international involvement in the area in the coming years. This will most likely take the form of aid packages, infrastructure development, sponsoring peacekeeping missions and even -- perhaps -- formal recognition of their independence.

I hope this rings a bell..

[Suldaanka]

^^ Djibouti is a sneaky lil country which has become very important thesedays thanks to Somaliland's lack of recognition.

 

Anyways, you have just listed the geography of Puntland, but I asked what is so strategic about that? Even geographically speaking, Puntland is too remote a region from any important foreign centre, including Somaliland's .

 

I mean, we know once the south gets its acts together and Mogadishu returns back to normalcy, Puntland will just fade away into the background.

 

You see the South has bigger population, richer economic prospects, more important cities and deep sea ports. It also has long borders with both Ethiopia and Kenya.

 

During the Cold War that was very obvious I suppose. Nowonder the USSR choose Berbera and Kismaayo as bases for its navy and airforce, Berbera being the centre.

[Animal Farm]

I think the separatist camp needs a long break, if you think about it they just seem to be blowing hot air. Puntland supports the new government and when Xamar jumps on the bandwagon, of course Puntland will join. Regardless of procedurally advocated separation and finger point in the naming and shaming of actions in certain regions of Somalia, united Somalia will be achieved in the long run, even if it takes a hundred years. Sooner or later the indoctrinators of war, qabil cleansing, and separation will die knowing that their irrational propaganda did not materialized. A united Somalia means all regions.

[wind.talker]

Originally posted by Suldaaanka:

I mean, we know once the south gets its acts together and Mogadishu returns back to normalcy, Puntland will just fade away into the background.

You think?