OLOL Posted October 14, 2005 Direct State support for the opposition and the TransitionalFederal Government Yemen 20. The Monitoring Group has determined during the current mandate period that arms flows from Yemen to Somalia came not only from criminal groups (to BAM for purchase by the opposition) but also from the Government of Yemen directly to TFG. Using military aircraft (Antonov 26) to transport arms shipments from Aden,Yemen, to Bossaso, Puntland, in direct State support for TFG and President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the Yemeni Air Force delivered arms on eight occasions between 2 and 10 July 2005. Details of specific flights are included in annex III. The Yemeni authorities also provided the following response to Monitoring Group inquiries concerning their support for TFG. “The unstable conditions in Somalia are a direct threat to the security and stability of the Republic of Yemen, as they lead both to insecurity and to largescale migration of Somalis to Yemen, which has considerable adverse consequences. “Over the last decade the Yemeni Government has therefore followed a clear policy aimed at restoring stability in Somalia, ending the civil war there and supporting the central Government. “Since the election of the present Government, Yemen has been pursuing this approach with a view to supporting the legitimate Government of the country. In so doing, Yemen has received full backing from the international community, including the European Union, the African Union and the United States of America. “Accordingly, the Yemeni Government, in response to a direct personal request from the new Somali President, provided the requested aid with a view to strengthening the capacities of the legitimate Government. The aid, which was transported to Bossaso airport on a number of flights, comprised: “–15,000 uniforms for the Somali police; –Food supplies for 5,000 people; –5,000 personal weapons. “The framework within which this aid was provided can be stated as follows: “1. The aid was supplied to and at the request of the legitimate elected Government, which has received international endorsement; “2. Its aim was to enhance the capabilities of the police force and to strengthen security so that the President can move to Mogadishu, the capital, to perform his official duties. This cannot happen unless the armed bands are disarmed in favour of the legitimate Government; “3. The task of disarming those bands and consolidating the grip of the legitimate authority is a sine qua non for combating terrorist hotbeds in Somalia. It isvconsistent with the policies embraced by States all over the world in the fight against terrorism and will ensure that no new Taliban emerges in Somalia. “Reinforcing security and stability in Somalia and strengthening the legitimate Government represent a desideratum both for Yemen and for the international community. Yemen has accordingly taken on this task,notwithstanding the economic burden it entails, with a view to bringing an end to the deteriorated conditions in Somalia. It trusts that the international community will appreciate and duly compensate it for those efforts.†21. During a conversation with the Monitoring Group arms experts, a well-placed source with intimate knowledge of the affairs of TFG confirmed that PresidentYusuf and the Chief of Staff, General Naji, had negotiated a deal with the Government of Yemen for the delivery of large numbers of arms and a variety of ammunition, including the following: AK-47 and G3 assault rifles; RPG-7 and RPG-2 rocket launchers; 75mm and B-10 anti-tank weapons; 37mm, 14.5mm and 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns; mines and hand grenades; shoulder-fired Strella missiles; and 3 or 4 helicopters with missiles for the express purpose of fighting the Mogadishu dissidents. Also included in the deal were other items of military equipment, such as fatigues. Other Monitoring Group sources confirmed the relevant flights and the arms deliveries. 22. Some of the goods listed above were received and unloaded on 5 August by TFG forces located in Waajid, Bakool region, about halfway between Hudur and Baidoa. The weapons — small arms and ammunition — blankets and fatigues were delivered in three N3 lorries and came from Puntland via Ethiopia to Waajid. The Minister of Agriculture, Hassan Mohamed Nuur (Shatiguduud) and the Minister of Justice, Sheik Mohamed Noor (Madobe), among others, shared the arms shipment. About 400 TFG militia members were expected to arrive in Waajid from Mustahil,Ethiopia, receive the supplies and, at an unspecified date, attack opposition forces in Baidoa. Ethiopia 23. The Monitoring Group learned that arms shipments were sent from the Government of Ethiopia directly to TFG militia forces in Western Somalia. Upon enquiry by the Monitoring Group, however, the Government of Ethiopia denied providing arms shipments to TFG and sent a formal reply to that effect (see annex VI). The following are examples of information obtained by the Monitoring Group concerning military support in the form of arms and military training supplied to the TFG forces by the Ethiopian Government. 24. In preparation for the second battle for control of Baidoa, the TFG forces of Sheik Madobe (Minister of Justice), Shatiguduud (Minister of Agriculture) and others were supplied with a steady flow of arms from Ethiopia. The following chronology of events is indicative of Ethiopian arms support to TFG. 25. On 29 April 2005, a meeting took place in Ethiopia between Ethiopian military officials and TFG officials, including the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Planning, Mohamed Dheere, local administration leader in charge of Jowhar,Abdikarim Farah Laqanyo, local administration leader in charge of Beledweyne and the Chief of Staff, General Naji, and others. 26. Following that meeting and on 3 May 2005, N3 lorries entered Ethiopia from the Bakool region of Somalia to pick up shipments of arms. On 5 May 2005, the same lorries, transporting arms and foodstuffs, returned to Somalia via the border town of Yeed, Bakool region. On 7 May 2005 the lorries containing the arms arrived at Hudur, the capital city of the Bakool region, and temporarily stored the arms at the Hudur police station. 27. On Sunday, 8 May, Sheik Hassan Madobe and Shatiguduud took possession of the arms shipments. The arms consisted of AK-47 assault rifles, RPGs, a variety of ammunition and explosives. The intended recipients were the militias of Madobe,Shatiguduud and other TFG forces in Somalia. 28. On Monday, 9 May, the arms were distributed in Hudur among the TFG militias. On Monday evening the militias moved to positions near Waajid, about 90 kilometres north of Baidoa. 29. On Tuesday, 10 May, the same militias moved to positions about 45 kilometres north of Baidoa, near Goofgaduud. Also, between 7 and 10 May, the TFG Minister of Planning, Abdirizak Osman Hassan, received a shipment of arms supplied by Ethiopia at Luuq, located north of Baidoa in the Gedo region. 30. On 30 May 2005, TFG militia forces of Shatiguduud and Madobe attacked militia forces of the opposition at Baidoa, under the command of Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade. Habsade’s forces defeated the TFG forces and caused them to retreat from the immediate area of Baidoa. 31. Following the battle, the Monitoring Group obtained photographs of Ethiopian-supplied ammunition boxes made of wood and physical samples of thick plastic Ethiopian-supplied ammunition pouches; the boxes and the pouches were captured by Habsade’s forces. The following information is printed on the surface of one of the pouches: “200 cartridges 7.62x54, Lot. No.: 13/2000â€. Similar information is also printed on the other pouches. The ammunition boxes contained 14.5mm armour-piercing ammunition for heavy machine guns; in the Somali context, this is the type of heavy machine gun that is typically mounted on technicals. 32. Ethiopia also supplied arms to Mohamed Dheere, the warlord in charge of Jowhar (Middle Shabelle) and a TFG ally. Mohamed Dheere had welcomed the publicly expressed intention of TFG to locate the new Government at Jowhar. The Monitoring Group was informed that Mohamed Dheere was supplied with arms from Ethiopia to assist TFG in its possible relocation to Jowhar. For example,during the first two weeks of May 2005, five lorries containing an arms shipment from Ethiopia and destined for Mohamed Dheere travelled to Jowhar via Hudur and Tayeeglow; two technicals escorted the arms shipment. 33. The Monitoring Group learned that Hudur was set up by TFG as a militia staging area, supply centre and depot for arms supplied by Ethiopia. For example, in June Mohamed Dheere also received a shipment of arms from Ethiopia, via Hudur. On 17 June 2005, two N3 trailers left Jowhar and travelled to Hudur, arriving on 18 June. One of the N3s continued on to Ethiopia to pick up a shipment of arms. Ammunition from Sheik Madobe’s Ethiopian-supplied arms stocks was loaded onto the remaining N3, which departed Hudur on the night of 20 June 2005, escorted by two technicals belonging to Sheik Madobe. The convoy travelled to Eel Garas (Bakool region, east of Hudur), where technicals belonging to Mohamed Dheere took over security escort services for the N3. The convoy arrived in Jowhar on 21 June 2005. 34. It is important to note that the Monitoring Group has been repeatedly informed by numerous sources that as a matter of general practice, Ethiopia has typically and historically provided small arms — assault rifles, RPGs, etc. — and ammunition to warlords and allies in Somalia. It has also been reported to the Monitoring Group that the warlords have on occasion also sold or bartered the Ethiopian-supplied weapons at BAM in exchange for more powerful armaments, such as anti-aircraft guns. The flow of weapons from Ethiopia to warlords and then to BAM helps to explain another source of small arms and ammunition available at BAM. This activity has been noted in previous reports of the Monitoring Group. 35. The Monitoring Group has also learned that the Ethiopian military conducted military training for TFG militias from the Puntland, Bakool and Hiraan regions. The training occurred in at least two locations, the Ethiopia-Somalia border town of Fer Fer Hiraan region, north of Beledweyne) and Waajid (Bakool region). -------------- 54. With the exception of the small TFG enclave of influence that has, at the time of writing, been established in Mohamed Dheere’s area of Jowhar, Middle Shabelle, both sides have developed military-style strategies and plans to extend their respective areas of influence, each desiring to push the line in the sand to a position more in their favour. Accordingly, the Monitoring Group has learned that TFG President Yusuf and General Ahmed Naji, Chief of Staff, have devised a military plan to attack the opposition. They have targeted various geographic locations for military operations, planning to wrest them from the opposition. These locations include Baidoa, Marka and Mogadishu. To carry out their plan, they intend to unite various militias under their control and equip and train them in Fer Fer (Ethiopia) and Waajid (Bakool region). They expect to have a total force of about 20,000. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
BN Posted October 14, 2005 Lets bring a bit of balance shall we...Annex 1 of UN Report. Here is a quote that sums up the situation: "The establishment of a viable Government in Somalia continues to be the greatest threat to and fear of those people (members of the different TFG institutions, warlords, businessmen, traders, religious fundamentalists and others)that have through years of operating in a lawless territory carved out their own kingdoms, replete with personal political power and ambitions, military-style muscle in the form of their own militias and, probably most importantly, the *ongoing* accumulation of PERSONAL WEALTH. A Somali Government would considerably alter this landscape of PERSONAL KINGDOMS. This threat to vested interests remains the impetus behind the increasing threat of serious violent confrontation between TFG and the opposition, which is in reality an alliance of convenience to PRESERVE vested interests." Arms purchases and sales at the Bakaraaha Arms Market[bAM] Individual conducting transactions Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction Role (supplier/purchaser/seller) Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, businessman and Minister for National Security in TFG -Ammunition for Zu-23 -mortar shells -10 PKM0 -2 DShK, and a variety of ammunition for belted machine guns and anti-aircraft guns such as the Zu-23-2 and Zu-23-4 -Ammunition for mortar and -100 shells for the B-10 -20 AK-47, ammunition for the Zu-23, ammunition for mortars and small arms and feeder belts for machine guns -50 AK-47, 10 PKM and a variety of ammunition -40 AK-47 and ammunition for Zu-23 and mortars -50 AK-47, 4 PKM, ammunition for small arms, mortar and Zu- 23, magazines for AK-47 and empty belt feeders for PKM -A variety of ammunition including 120mm shells -Purchased the arms through his representatives Abdi Jilaoow and Ali Yusuf -Purchased the arms -Purchased the arms -Purchased the arms through his representatives Abdi Jilaoow and Ali Yusuf -Purchased the arms -Purchased together with Atto and Muse Suudi for Habsade -36 S/2005/625 -A variety of ammunition -A variety of ammunition -3 PKM -70 AK-47, 10 RPG-2, 4 mortars, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition -A variety of ammunition -Ammunition for mortars, Zu-23, DShK, B-10 and ZP-39 -30 AK-47, 7 PKM and 100 RPG-7 grenades -1 B-10 and a variety of ammunition -Ammunition for small and big arms -Ammunition for small and big arms -Purchased the arms through his representatives Abdi Jilaoow and Ali Yusuf Continued...Annex 1 of UN Report. Muse Suudi Yalahow Minister for Commerce in TFG 1 DShK and a variety of ammunition, mostly for the Zu-23 100 120mm shells Ammunition 45 AK-47, a variety of ammunition, ammunition pouches and belts and feeder belts for machine guns Ammunition, battle clothing and load-bearing equipment 50 AK-47, 10 PKM and a variety of ammunition A variety of ammunition but mainly 120mm mortar shells 50 AK-47, magazines for AK- 47, ammunition boxes, empty belt feeders for the PKM, belts for militiamen and a variety of ammunition A variety of ammunition 2 80mm mortars and a variety of ammunition 1 ZP-39 A variety of ammunition including for Zu-23, DShK, ZP- 39, mortars, B-10 and RPG-7 Osman Hassan Ali “Attoâ€, Minister for Public Works and Housing in TFG Ammunition and load-bearing equipment 50 AK-47, 10 PKM and a variety of ammunition 4 120mm mortars and 120 shells for the 120mm mortar 40 AK-47, 10 RPG-2 and ammunition 6 120mm mortars and a variety of ammunition Aadan Saronsoor, ally of Habsade 2 DShK Sharia Courts Purchased the arms through Salaad Ilka Weyne 44 S/2005/625 60 AK-47, 2 PKM, 10 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition 20 AK-47, 6 PKM, 1 DShK and some ammunition 2 DShK Purchased the arms through the representative of Indohaadde, Mohamed Hassan Purchased the arms through the representative of Indohaadde, Mohamed Hassan Sharia courts 24 PKM and 10 120mm mortars 10 RPG-2, 5 RPG-7, 5 PKM 14 PKM, 6 RPG-7, 4 80mm mortars and ammunition for anti-aircraft gun 24 AK-47, 8 PKM, 2 DShK and ammunition for small arms 70 AK-47, 8 PKM and ammunition for small arms, RPG-7, DShK and Zu-23 14 AK-47, 4 PKM, 8 RPG-2 and ammunition for small arms, DShK and RPG-7 16 AK-47 and some ammunition 1 DShK 20 AK-47, 1 DShK and ammunition 12 RPG-2, 1 DShK and a variety of ammunition Purchased the arms from Yemen (arms-trading network) via traders at BAM Sharia court, south Mogadishu, purchased the arms Sharia court at Ifka Halane purchased the arms Sharia court at Ifka Halane and Shirkole (Circola) (Mogadishu area) purchased the arms Sharia court at Ifka Halane and Shirkole (Circola) (Mogadishu area) purchased the arms Sharia court at Ifka Halane purchased the arms. Sharia court at Shirkole (Circola) purchased the arms Sharia court at Warshadda (Mogadishu area) purchased the arms. Sharia court at Ifka Halane purchased the arms Sharia court at Ifka Halane purchased the arms 45 S/2005/625 24 AK-47, 4 PKM and a variety of ammunition Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Said Indohaadde, warlord/ businessman and governor in southern Somalia, associated with Al Itihaad Al-Islaami 2 Zu-23 and a variety of ammunition 1 DShK and ammunition 2 mortars and ammunition 1 Dhuunshilke, 12 RPG-2 and ammunition for Zu-23, B-10 and small arms 80 pistols and a variety of ammunition for Zu-23, DShK, PKM, RPG-7, RPG-2 and small arms, and load-bearing equipment 60 AK-47, 12 RPG-7, 4 120mm mortars, 1 DShK, 2 B- 10 and a variety of ammunition Purchased the arms through his representative Mohamed Hassan Purchased the arms through his representative Mohamed Hassan 43 S/2005/625 55 AK-47, 10 PKM, 16 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition 28 AK-47, 3 120mm mortars, 2 Dhuunshilke, 2 B-10, 11 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition Large quantity of ammunition 1 Zu-23 2 Dhuunshilke, 2 PKM, 1 RPG-2 and ammunition A variety of ammunition 4 PKM, 6 RPG-2 and a variety of ammunition 1 Zu-23 Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
BN Posted October 14, 2005 17. The foregoing notwithstanding, arms transactions remained numerous, as indicated in the statistical increase over transactions documented in the previous mandate period. The arms were crucially important for opposition plans to protect itself against TFG forces. The opposition used arms purchased at BAM to fight TFG in the battle for control of the strategically important town of Baidoa (Bay region). Both the leadership of the opposition in Mogadishu and Habsade, the member of the opposition in charge of Baidoa, purchased arms from BAM in apparent anticipation of the fight for Baidoa. It is significant to note that on 22 May 2005, approximately one week before the second battle of Baidoa, a very large arms shipment arrived from Yemen, via the arms-trading networks, at BAM. The shipment consisted of 500 AK-47 assault rifles, 100 PKM machine guns, 120 RPG-2 rocket launchers, 3 Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns, 15 DShK anti-aircraft guns, 12 Dhuunshilke one-barrel antiaircraft guns, 20 120mm mortars, 6 B-10s and a variety of ammunition. The buyers included the following: Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, who on 23 May 2005 bought 28 AK-47s, 3 120mm mortars, 2 Dhuunshilkes, 2 B-10s, 11 RPG-2s and a variety of ammunition; Muse Suudi, who on 25 May 2005 bought 50 AK-47s, magazines for AK-47s, ammunition boxes, empty belt feeders for PKMs, belts for militiamen and a variety of ammunition; Qanyare, who on 25 May 2005 bought 50 AK-47s, 4 PKMs, ammunition for small arms, mortars and Zu-23s, magazines for AK-47s and empty belt feeders for PKMs; Atto, who on 25 May 2005 bought 4 120mm mortars and 120 shells for them; and, Habsade who on 26 May 2005 bought 50 AK- 47s and a variety of ammunition, through Indohaadde’s representative at BAM (see annex I). 18. Similarly, learning of TFG plans for a possible move to Jowhar, the opposition also purchased arms from BAM and moved some militias to positions around Jowhar. The militias involved in encircling Jowhar included that of Muse Suudi, who moved his militia to a position about five kilometres south-west of the city. Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde moved militia members from Baledogle airfield to positions north-east of Jowhar. Bashir Rage and Abukar Omar Adaan sent 13 of their most militarily capable technicals to positions located 20 kilometres south-east of Jowhar. The Monitoring Group noted that during this time, the opposition had 12 S/2005/625 purchased a number of anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition from BAM. The buyers included the following: Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, who on 22 April 2005 bought 1 DShK anti-aircraft gun and ammunition for a Zu-23 anti-aircraft gun and on 25 April 2005 bought DShK Zu-23 ammunition; Mohamed Qanyare, who bought 2 DShKs on 16 April 2005; and Bashir Rage, who bought 1 Zu-23 and ammunition on 23 April 2005 and 2 DShKs on 15 May 2005 Another State[Eritrea] in the region 36. The Monitoring Group has been informed that another State in the region provided support to the opposition and the Oromo National Liberation Front (ONLF) in the form of arms. That State provided arms to opposition allies including Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde (Governor of Lower Shabelle), Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys (an Al Itihad leader) and others for the purpose of countering support provided to TFG by Ethiopia. 37. Credible sources alleged that from approximately the beginning of February to the end of the second week of May 2005, that State supplied arms on approximately eight different occasions to Hassan Dahir Aweys and elements of ONLF that at the time were located in the Dhusamareeb area of the Galgaduud region. The arms were 16 S/2005/625 transported on aircraft that flew from the State in question to an airfield located in the Dhusamareeb area. 38. Hassan Dahir Aweys had travelled to that central Somalia location to establish sharia courts and to provide military training to his militia (Al Itihad) or set up military training programmes. While there he also met with representatives of the ****** Liberation Front (OLF) and ONLF. Some were militia leaders who arrived in Dhusamareeb by aircraft from the State in question in April 2005. Also, during the last week of April and the end of the second week of May 2005, approximately three flights transporting 270 trained and equipped ONLF militia arrived in Dhusamareeb from that State. Most of the shipments of arms provided during the first part of the period mentioned above were given to Hassan Dahir Aweys, with the smaller portion going to ONLF. 39. The Monitoring Group also received credible information that the same State provided another member of the opposition, Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, with arms by transporting them to two locations in Middle Shabelle — by aircraft to Baledogle Airport, near Mogadishu, and by ship to the port of Marka. Both shipments arrived between 25 March and 10 April 2005. Included among the types of arms in the shipments were anti-aircraft guns and mines. 40. The Monitoring Group noted above that Sheik Indohaadde and other opposition leaders from Mogadishu had provided arms to Habsade, opposition leader in charge of Baidoa, for potential use against TFG forces in the fight for control of that city on 30 May 2005. Subsequent to the battle, the Monitoring Group obtained two metal ammunition containers and photographs of other ammunition containers that were alleged by Monitoring Group sources to have been provided by the State in question. 41. The Monitoring Group has further learned that an opposition leader and TFG dissident from Mogadishu travelled to that State during the middle of the mandate period to make arrangements with authorities there to obtain arms shipments. The State allegedly promised to give arms only to the opposition and in quantities that equalled what TFG President Yusuf received from other countries. 42. The Monitoring Group did not mention the State of the region by name because at the time of the writing of the present report it had not completed its investigation. However, the Monitoring Group remained convinced that the information was of sufficient quality and credibility to merit its inclusion in the report, but without naming the State. The Monitoring Group also believed that including the information describing the activities of the State in Somalia is important for a balanced understanding of the overall picture presented in the present report. As a final note, the Monitoring Group has been made aware of historical information previously given to the Security Council by the Panel of Experts relating to a very similar pattern of activity conducted by the same State in its involvement in the affairs of Somalia. 17 S/2005/625 III. Analysis of trends and patterns o Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
